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ABSTRACT
This study moves beyond theories emphasising “state failure” as the cause for terrorist “spill-over”. The aim is to offer new theoretical and empirical considerations concerning the determinants of terrorist groups’ geographical strategies. The main argument this article presents is that transnationality for nationalistic terrorist organisations can be costly. This is the case due to the mobility, social and strategic costs of operating beyond controlled territories. Hence, the article proposes an interpretation of these decisions as being mainly generated by states’ counterterrorism strategies. Using data gathered from the GTD Dataset and secondary sources such as specialised reports and strategic documents, the article explores the argument by presenting observations and empirical findings on two groups, AQIM and Boko Haram.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Andre Python, Timothy Poirson, Edoardo Baldaro, Martin Lestra, Alice Martini and the three anonymous reviewers for the insightful feedback and comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. In terms of the “Islamist” categorisation of these groups, although a Sufi interpretation of Islam was historically dominant in the Sahel-Sahara region, the claims of the two groups seem to be grounded on a more conservative Wahhabi strain of Islam (Cline Citation2007). However, by drawing on Gunning and Jackson (Citation2011), there is no interest in underlying this type of classification as a universal and distinct category of behaviour, in a nomological-deductive approach. In fact, contrary to the way the religious identifications of the two groups is presented in Western discourse and traditional literature, here it is acknowledged as a tool for political and military mobilisation. In this regard, it might be worthwhile to distinguish between “Islamic” and “Islamist”. While the former refers to the historical religion and to related cultural habits, the latter specifically incorporates the political dimension of the fight for the restoration of an Islamic political and social rule (Mozaffari Citation2001; Bartolucci Citation2010).
2. In the video, AQIM was represented by Abul Hammam, the head of the Sahara Emirate, 9th military region of the group. With him, Iyad Ag Ghali, chief of Ansar Dine, Al Hassan Al Ansari, second in command of Mourabitounes and, finally, AQIM’s judge of the Sahara region Abd al-Rahman al-Sanhaji. See Fall Oumère (Citation2017).
3. I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this important point.
4. The first recognised significant attack was against a police station on 31 December 2003 (Tran Ngoc Citation2012).
5. See http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/.
6. It is worth noticing that the Fragile States Index does not consider regional-based heterogeneity in terms of weakness. In fact, it only presents countries’ aggregated values as single units. I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
7. In the Fragile States Index, 10 represents the highest negative value of risk. See http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015.
8. For more disaggregated data, see, for Algeria and Nigeria http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/country-data/. .
12. Mokhtar Belmokhtar was one of the core figures in AQIM before seceding and forging the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), and becoming known as “Mr. Marlboro”. Made contraband since the 1980s, cigarettes guarantee a high level of revenue. According to the estimate of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, it was worth around $775 million in 2009. AQIM’s engagement in this trafficking, for many years overtaken by the traffic of cocaine, was both direct and indirect; either they tax smugglers for safe passage or they take responsibility for the transport through different means, such as “trucks, motorcycles and even bicycles” (Doward Citation2013). However, according to the inquiry by Salem (Citation2014), more than illicit substances, Belmokhtar has been mostly active in smuggling of general products towards Algeria, such as food products, medications or fuel.
13. With respect to the relationship of Boko Haram with non-local populations, Pérouse De Montclos (Citation2016a) also reports on the failure of the group to convert Hausa fish traders who decided not to pay the requested religious tax to the insurgents.
14. See also https://oldsite.issafrica.org/uploads/war19-fr.pdf.
17. Since the early 1990s, the DRS has been the core body dealing with terrorism.
18. For data on police and security forces brutality, see also http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/NGA-Watch-Report14.pdf and Human Rights Watch (Citation2009).