Unpacking “glocal” jihad: from the birth to the “sahelisation’ of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ABSTRACT

Jihadist groups are often analysed either by looking at their global rhetoric, or by focusing on local grievances. Despite the distinctions made between the global and the local issues, these groups often belong to a complex “glocal jihad,” meaning that the borders between local, national, regional, transnational, and global layers, are partially blurred due in large part to the symbolic dimensions and imaginaries shared within the broader jihadist landscape. Rethinking and clarifying the notion of “glocal jihad” and applying it to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) reveals the complex interconnections that exist between the different layers and the ambiguous spatial reality of the group. The glocal jihad is understood as a dialectical process and as a sequence of events and actions occurring in intertwined layers. By analysing the “glocal realities,” this article will attempt to craft a critical understanding of the group.

KEYWORDS:

• Jihad
• glocal
• Al-Qaeda
• AQIM
• North Africa
• Sahel

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their comments. The reflections in this paper are also the fruits of the rich discussions and debates with members of the Sahel Research Group at the University of Florida, more specifically with Leonardo Villalón, Benjamin Soares, Tatiana Smirnova, Musa Ibrahim and Olivier Walther. The author would like to thank Salma Moustafa Khalil and Mónica Villalón for copy-editing the different versions of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. No official confirmation of Belmokhtar’s death has been given by JNIM or any other al-Qaeda-linked affiliate.

2. Since 2016–2017, some sources were indicating that he was hiding himself in the mountains of Tebessa at the Tunisian border (Mémier 2017, 52).

3. Nevertheless, some analysts like Andrew Lebovich remind after Droukdal’s death persistent rumours signalling AQIM’s leader meeting or travelling in northern Mali during the last years (Lebovich 2020). His plausible short stays in northern Mali were also mentioned to me by security experts in informal discussions in 2013.

4. JNIM was officially created on 2 March 2017. It is a jihadist coalition led by Iyad Ag Ghali merging Ansar Dine, the Katiba Macina, Al-Mourabitoune and the Saharan branch of AQIM.

5. Some analysts noticed that ISGS pledged allegiance to the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The name of ISGS is still the most used by analysts and in media. For consideration of clarity, I will use the name of ISGS in the present article.

6. This section is of course an oversimplification to introduce the readers to the jihadist landscape. For a very good introduction on radical Islamism and the genealogy of thinkers, see the chapter 7 in Mandaville’s book (2014).

7. Thank you to the reviewer 1 for reminding me in this formula the common understanding of “glocal”, especially in the context of jihad

8. In 2013, this was confirmed to me by a European security expert who tracked and arrested GICM members during this period. The journalist Tazagart (2011, 170) affirmed nevertheless that the GICM followed an order of al-Zawahiri and pledged allegiance to AQIM in 2008.

9. MUJWA is an important split from AQIM but is not discussed directly in this paper. Some well-informed studies have already focused on MUJWA and the role of political Islam, radicalisation and inter-relations between ethnic communities, partially developing on its “glocal” frame. See the studies of Luca Raineri (Raineri and Strazzari 2015; Raineri 2019) and Jourde (2017). Important insights are also developed in Lebovich (2013), Bøås (2014), Bencherif (2020) and Thurston (2020).

10. Thurston (2020, 75–85) named the relations between Droukdal, Abu Zaïd and Belmokhtar, a “broken triangle”.

11. Al-Mourabitoune will pledge allegiance to AQIM in 2015. However, part of the MUWA led by Al-Sahrawi left the group, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in May 2015, and created the ISGS. In 2016, ISIS leadership accepted officially Al-Sahrawi allegiance.

12. Yahia Djouadi was the emir of the Sahara between 2007 and 2011, Nabil Makhloufi between 2011 and 2012, and Yahya Abou El Hammam between 2012 and 2019.

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Notes on contributors

Adib Bencherif

Dr Adib Bencherif is Assistant Professor at the School of Applied Politics at the University of Sherbrooke, Research Fellow with the Sahel Research Group at the University of Florida and Fellow at the UNESCO Chair in Prevention of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism.