The cultural construction of sympathiser social identities in the Islamic state’s virtual ecosystem: an analysis of the politics of naming

ABSTRACT

This study explores the politics of naming in the Islamic state (IS) media networks, looking into how sympathisers’ (munāsir-s) virtual identities are socially constructed online. Naming is a discursive practice which is purely ideological in that when sympathisers name themselves online, they re-imagine their roles and the boundaries of their national belonging alongside cultural representations of the organisation. By naming, they reify IS cultural heritage which is recontextualised from the historical legacy of the Prophet and Islamic Conquest. By naming, they also amplify IS hegemonic cultural frames and master narratives. In this sense, naming oneself in the IS virtual ecosystem is a significant rhetorical strategy that may fulfil at least one of the three main cultural functions. Names may (1) imitate historical role models, (2) reconstruct the sense of belonging to homophilic communities (brothers of the same faith) beyond ethno-racial geographies, and/or (3) convey a politically religionist bias in constructing the self vs. the other. The politics of naming is an online social learning process in which collective intelligence instructs sympathisers on how to create accounts with innovative iconic/connotative identifying aliases. In IS social ecology, naming may stand for a ritual call to adventure, the destination of which is already recognised. Sympathisers are interpellated as jihadi subjects to cross the threshold of their ordinary world and embark on a virtual journey to media jihad – hence, their recognition of their new subject positions in support groups and the potential manufacturing of their loyalty and disavowal (al-walā’ wa l-barā’).

KEYWORDS:

• Naming
• media jihad
• radicalization
• ISIS
• propaganda
• jihadi culture

Acknowledgments

I thank Gabriel Weimann, Thomas Hegghammer, Paul Willis, and Philip Hermans for their valuable comments on the original manuscript of this article. I also thank CST anonymous reviewers for their valuable constructive comments. The work is funded by CNRST, Morocco as part of a research program –IBN KHALDOUN (Grant#IBK-2018-40). The arguments raised here are those of the author.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. IS media discourse identifies sympathisers (munāsir-s) as media jihadists (sing. mujahid I‘lāmi) within the framework of IS participatory activism that is viewed as institutional active work of prosumers beyond the stereotypical academic model of jihadi inspiration suggesting passive consumption of propaganda.

2. The term is used in IS media discourse to refer to participatory activism. Sympathisers are interpellated as “munāsir-s”, or media jihadists, i.e. active supporters who defend the caliphate political project. They are entrusted with virtual duties viewed as battlefronts (thughūr) they have to fulfill with commitment and perseverance (for a full treatment of the meaning of media jihad, see Krona 2019; Winter 2017).

3. These are veteran/elite sympathisers who are trustworthy in the group. They are information authorities who may own groups or channels, occupy positions of leadership in media institutions and/or direct “online raids” [ghazawāt iliktrūniya] – attacking active opponent groups with ammunition/weapon tweets, images, or video excerpts with the intention to propagandise, shut opponent accounts down, or chase their admins away. Elite sympathisers wield powerful social capital in IS social networks.

4. Pledge of allegiance 1441 AH: We pledge allegiance to Ameer Al Mumineen and the Caliph of Muslims Abi Ibrahim al-Hachimi al-Qurashi to listen to him and obey his orders both in times of ease and hardship, prosperity and woe, that we would not contest the orders of whoever is in command unless we see overt disbelief on which we have a clear proof from Allah, who is the Almighty Witness to what we say (Translated by author).

5. The word “kumah” is a metonymy derived from the Arab cultural legacy of war – also mentioned in Abou Tammam and ‘Antarah Ibn Shaddād’s poetry. It refers to the traditional military equipment, shield and helmet knights may wear to protect themselves during battle. It is a reference to IS soldiers by their symbolic equipment.

6. Most shibboleths are borrowed from the Koran. Phrase No.1 is cited in Surah al-Qasās, aya 83. Phrase No.2 is cited in Surah A-Nnaml, aya 69. Phrases No. 6&7 are cited in surah al-Baqarah, aya 191. They are also used as campaign hashtags and slogans to fight on the ground. Phrase No.1, for instance, was used by many statelets (Iraq, Sham, Bengal, Yemen, Central Africa, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, Libya, Azerbaijan, Khurasan, Caucasia, East Asia, Sinai, West Africa and Iraq-Fallujah) as a title of their video productions documenting their unified battles. Most battle campaigns are launched with such catchphrases like “The Revenge Battle for the Two Masters” (ghazwat aththa’r li shaikhain) that have lasted for months after the death of al-Baghdadi. A second unified battle was launched under the same slogan after the death of Abou Ibrahim al-Qurashi.

7. The catchphrases read from right to left: “Charge at them, You monotheist”, “the Happy End for the Pious (twice)”, “Men that are Faithful”, “Martyrs Caravans”, “Be Alert May Allah Bless You”, “Answer the Call”, “Knights of Martyrdom,” “the Promise of Allah”, “Committed to the Pledge”, “Guardians of Faith”, “To the Children of Yehuda”.

8. IS sympathisers use the word irhāb (terror) in the koranic sense of the term, creating a pun on the western civic meaning in the political use of the word “terrorism”. Sympathisers may often joke with one another calling themselves “jamā’at al-irhāb”. Indeed, they refer here to their power to terrorise the enemy, evoking the sacred meaning of the word. It is mentioned in the Holy book that Allah said: “prepare against them whatever arms and cavalry you muster, that you may strike terror (in the hearts of) the enemies of God and your own, and others besides them not known to you, but known to God. Whatever you spend in the way of God will be paid back to you in full and you will never be in a loss.” (Surah al -Anfal- verse 60; Trans. Ahmed Ali, 2001).

9. The Arabic version goes as follows: (a-ssalātu wa ssalāmu ‘alā a-nnabi a-ddaḥūki al qattāl al mansūr bi rru‘b masāfata shahr).

10. In IS cultural propaganda, social grievances are narativized in different generic victimisation discourses to frame Jihad as an act of vendetta.

11. Head Cracking (flaqu ru’ūs) is the title of a video release in two volumes by Wilyat al Iraq- Dajla. The first volume is released in Safar and the second in Shawal, 1440 H.

12. IS media institutions collaborated in November 2019 to compile the largest media archive of the caliphate and store it on Nextcloud using the following digital address: https://obedientsupporters.com/owncloud/index.php/s/52DjJoYWMgJbZpD?path=%2F.Now, the archive is partitioned into rubrics and uploaded on Telegram using bots. When one archival account and its working bots are deleted, others come to the surface, creating a Whack-a-Mole effect. Jihadists have mastered the trade of creating fake accounts and bots leaving them dormant for future use.

13. Virtual seminaries on ideological incubation are given in private groups under the title of “A Session on Sharia” (dawra shar‘iyya) using invite links-only. They are occasionally released for sympathisers to renew their understanding of sharia. An approximately 30-day workshop, with the tempo of a one-hour session a day, invites attendees to follow the sheikh’s tweets on basic religious issues, koranic rules, and linguistic meanings, often followed by short discussions at the end.

14. Translation: 1. Crashing Sons of Dogs 2. Animal carrion … it is named fatīs if it is not slaughtered in Islamic ritual style … when we hate someone and he dies or is killed, we say he becomes carrion (fātis).

15. Unconscious disclosure of social identity may also occur through linguistic indicators. Not all sympathisers master classical Arabic. They speak regional dialects, and using them when chatting may reveal regions where they come from. Sometimes self-discourse may happen by the user’s reference to an event, name or text that locates the user. On other occasions, this is not disclosure but tactics of deception. Sympathisers may deceive those they think are spies under cover by using alien dialects, posting fake news on themselves or on possible attacks to blur routes of follow up by intelligence work.

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Mohammed Maarouf

Mohammed Maarouf is an Ethnographer, Cultural Studies practitioner, and author of ethnographic research on online jihadi culture and popular and political Islam in Morocco.