Abstract
This article addresses Axel Honneth’s recent attempts to incorporate two central phenomena of power – reification and ideology – within the terms of his recognition theory. Honneth’s arguments in relation to each of these phenomena are importantly distinct. Drawing on Collingwood in relation to reification and on Foucault with respect to ideology, it is argued that both sets of arguments are problematic but that, despite the differences between them, the problems pervading Honneth’s position on both topics can be resolved if his recognition theory adopts an expressivist account of agency. The article concludes by noting two more general implications of this proposed expressivist turn for Honneth’s recognition‐theoretic research programme.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Maeve Cooke for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article and Mark Haugaard for prompt editorial advice. I owe intellectual debts to Amy Allen, Bert Van den Brink and Peter Niesen for discussion of many elements of the arguments. A draft of Section I was presented at the Philosophy and Social Sciences conference in May 2009 and I benefited particularly from comments by Martin Saar and Rainer Forst. I also owe a debt to Axel Honneth whose generous discussion of the arguments concerning reification over a very pleasant lunch gave me the impetus to explore the idea of an expressivist turn in recognition theory further.
Notes
1. This section draws on and extends the discussion of Honneth’s view in Owen (Citation2008).
2. See on this issue Fitzgerald (Citation2000) for enlightening discussion.
3. For a broader philosophical treatment of these arguments, see Garnsey (Citation1996).
4. Sennet (Citation2003) captures this point nicely in relation to respect and it is not surprising that in doing so he is ineluctably drawn to analogies with artistic forms, in this case music and music‐making.