Do elections lead to reform? Assessing the institutional limits of representative bodies in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia

Abstract

Over the past decade, the states of the Arabian peninsula have taken strides to liberalize their political systems. They have convened elections for different types of representative bodies and have liberalized their economies more than ever before. Some countries have even systematized these elections over time. While the political science literature views elections as a significant step towards political liberalization, it remains unclear whether or not elections in authoritarian settings actually lead to more meaningful reforms. This paper considers the institutional set‐up and limits that are placed on representative bodies in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and how these inhibit manifestation of additional reforms.

Keywords:

• elections
• institutional limits
• reform
• Bahrain
• Kuwait
• Saudi Arabia

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Shareefa Al‐Adwani for offering constructive comments on a previous draft.

Notes

1. This is not to suggest that Shura and municipal councils are irrelevant bodies. But what is being argued here is that these structures do not retain legislative authorities, nor are they able to check the executive branch of government. Consequently, they should not be viewed as substitutes for parliaments.

2. This distinction is the author's own, but numerous scholars discuss the fear of dissolution at great length. For a critical evaluation of parliament and the effect of open‐ended dissolutions on Kuwaiti politics, see al‐Nefisi (1978).

3. Heydemann (2007) finds that autocrats in the Arab World create new or upgraded strategies to maintain their superiority.

4. Voter turnout in 2008 and 2009 were the lowest in Kuwaiti history (al‐Qabas 2009).

5. The ‘secular petition’ was presented in March 1991 and the Islamic response known as the ‘Memorandum of Advice’ was sent to the King in May of the same year (Al‐Rasheed 2002, pp. 168–169).

6. It is customary for the Saudi King to delegate oversight of the Cabinet to a Deputy Prime Minister when he is not in the country.

7. Founding elections are defined as ‘elections after a period of more or less protracted authoritarian rule’ (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p. 61).

8. The second municipal election was scheduled for the latter part of 2009, but was postponed by the Saudi council of ministers until 2011. For more information, see BBC Arabic (2009).

9. For a discussion of the structural challenges to Saudi democratization please, see Al‐Rasheed (2005).

10. The literature depicting this line of thinking is quite vast, but for a select overview, see Hamzawy (n.d.), Nusseibeh (1995), and al‐Rubai'i (2004).

11. The history and current hegemony of democratic principles in the modern age is examined at great length by Guilhot (2005).

12. See the updated conclusion of Al‐Rasheed (2007).

13. For more on this theory, see Desai et al. (2009).

14. For more on differences in regime strategies during the ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ periods, see Chaudhry (1997).

15. Eric Bjornlund finds that an understanding of elections must take into account events prior to and following the vote (Bjornlund 2004, p. 13).

16. In fact, the Kuwaiti regime used the constitution to specify al‐Sabah as the sole hereditary rulers of Kuwait. For more, see Herb (1999, p. 251).