Kenosis and Nature: Critical Notes on Vattimo’s and Bubbio’s Notion of Kenotic Sacrifice

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I focus on Gianni Vattimo’s and Paolo Diego Bubbio’s notion of kenosis showing that (1) they both understand kenotic sacrifice in a strongly hermeneutical sense, and connect it with a perspectival account of truth and knowledge; (2) they both emphasize that kenotic sacrifice has a fundamentally ethical aspect; and (3) they both maintain that kenotic sacrifice is an “un-natural” act that is implied in the withdrawal of one’s self. However, I intend to show that nature can be understood positively through the notion of kenosis, and that it is possible to envisage an ethical theory that concretely tackles the self-proclaimed centrality of human agency within nature, therefore, implementing an effective and non-anthropocentric form of kenotic sacrifice. In this sense, I conclude by arguing that kenotic sacrifice can primarily be seen as an act of making room for other ways of being.

KEYWORDS:

• Kenosis
• nature
• sacrifice
• freedom
• hermeneutics

In recent years, there has been increasing interest around the question of sacrifice in various areas of philosophy. Such scholarly interest is directly related to the work of some of the greatest figures of twentieth-century Western philosophy: for instance, Georges Bataille understood sacrifice as the restoration of the value of one’s self through its withdrawal and relinquishment (Bataille 1989, 49); Jacques Derrida defined sacrifice as that responsibility which one takes towards a specific other at the expense of both oneself and the other “others” (Derrida 1995, 68); René Girard claimed that sacrifice plays a crucial symbolic and normative role, and “serves to protect the entire community from its own violence” in order to secure peace and social cohesion (Girard 1977, 8); Emmanuel Levinas highlighted the fundamental importance of sacrificing oneself for others in order to give a meaning to one’s death and to the world (Levinas 1998, 228); and Jean-Luc Nancy argued that the true nature of existence implies that it cannot be sacrificed, preventing the possibility of “true sacrifice” (Nancy 1991, 38).

In this paper, I want to focus on a specific conception of sacrifice: that of kenotic sacrifice. Derived from the Greek κένωσις (which literally means “the act of emptying”), the term kenosis has a strong religious origin, since it refers to the renunciation of some divine attributes conferred by God in the act of God’s incarnation in human forms. In contemporary theological and philosophical thought, such a conception has been the focus of the work of several scholars, such as Jürgen Moltmann, Sarah Coakley, Ruth Groenhout, and Alex Dubilet. According to Moltmann, kenosis is the act through which God made creation possible: that is, God weakened and emptied God’s self of the divine nature in order to make the physical world possible (Moltmann 1985, 88). Similarly, both Coakley and Groenhout provide a taxonomy of sacrifice, namely a detailed scale of the various nuances of meaning of kenotic sacrifice in relation to God’s nature; the former specifies six different “levels” of kenosis – risk, self-limitation, sacrifice, self-giving, self-emptying, and annihilation (Coakley 2001, 203) – while the latter maintains only the ones explicitly related to God’s selfhood – such as self-limitation, self-giving, and self-emptying (Groenhout 2006, 297). Moreover, Dubilet has recently argued for an ethics of kenosis according to which sacrifice is a fundamental part of existence, which in turn is defined as groundless and purposeless. He claims that such an ethics of self-emptying “gives voice to dispossession, anonymity, and a life without a why, which are found as the foreclosed, obverse side of the subjected life” (Dubilet 2018, 20), without entailing any transcendent conception of divine grace or even of God.

Kenotic sacrifice is also the kernel of the works of two contemporary thinkers: Gianni Vattimo and Paolo Diego Bubbio. Vattimo interprets kenosis as the essential and fundamental element of Christianity, namely as the abasement of God and “the removal of all the transcendent, incomprehensible, mysterious and even bizarre features that seem to move so many theorists of the leap of faith” (1999, 55). Drawing on Vattimo’s account, Bubbio identifies in the kenotic sacrifice – that is, the withdrawal of one’s self and the act of making room for other points of view – the driving force of a hermeneutic theoretical framework which results in a perspectival account of knowledge (Bubbio 2014, 3). In this sense, Bubbio’s reading has the merit of both underpinning Vattimo’s hermeneutical account, and of strongly emphasizing the ethical and normative nature of sacrifice. I will come back to this in the third section of this article. For now, I just want to point out that the readings of Vattimo and Bubbio differ from all of the abovementioned scholars for three main reasons: (1) they both understand kenotic sacrifice in a strongly hermeneutical sense, and connect it with a perspectival account of truth and knowledge; (2) they both emphasize that kenotic sacrifice has a fundamentally ethical aspect; and (3) they both maintain that kenotic sacrifice is an “un-natural” act that is implied in the withdrawal of one’s self. On the latter point, both Vattimo and Bubbio agree in maintaining that nature is a lawless and non-ethical background, characterized by violence and/or by the absence of empathy and solidarity.

Accordingly, a large part of this article will be dedicated to a detailed analysis of Vattimo’s and Bubbio’s respective understandings of kenosis, in order to highlight both their innovative hermeneutic approach and their consequent characterization of kenotic sacrifice as an “un-natural” act. Subsequently, I show that nature can be understood positively through the notion of kenosis, namely that kenotic sacrifice does not necessarily oppose nature conceived of as a lawless and non-ethical background. In doing so, I do not intend to provide a thorough-going criticism of Vattimo and Bubbio, nor to develop an alternative theory to theirs (since that would require a much more extensive treatment), but rather to suggest a complementary approach aimed at expanding on their reflections on kenosis to consider the concept of nature itself. The main goal of this paper, then, is to point out that reading nature through kenosis ultimately produces an understanding of nature according to which nature itself embodies the historical mutability of Being and effectively de-centers the human in ethics and normativity. That is to say, I argue that by understanding nature through kenosis, and by maintaining a positive understanding of nature itself, it is possible to envision an ethical theory that concretely tackles the self-proclaimed centrality of human agency within nature, therefore, implementing an effective form of kenotic sacrifice as the withdrawal of one’s self. In this sense, I conclude by arguing that kenotic sacrifice can primarily be seen as an act of making room for other ways of being.

Vattimo: Kenosis as the Ground of “Weakened Ethics”

The notion of kenosis plays an important role in Vattimo’s late philosophy, and it is strictly related to his conception of “weakened thought,” which Matthew Edward Harris describes as

loosely follow[ing] Heidegger’s presupposition that metaphysics has (i) been the normative mode of thinking from the time of Socrates, and (ii) that it is violent because it reduces discussion back to fixed first principles. However, we have reached the end of metaphysics due to it collapsing under the weight of its own logic. (2017, 637)

That is to say, metaphysics has fallen prey to its own “strong” and dogmatic conception of truth and ethics, which also contradicts the very essence of Christianity. Accordingly, Vattimo proclaims the necessity of a “weakened” ethics, grounded on charity (caritas) and kenosis, in order to “rediscover” the authentic vocation of Christianity (1997, 43). On these grounds, for Vattimo, the interpretation of kenosis results in a regulative principle that can guide action – one that has to be regulative, lest it become an absolute or dogmatic guide outside the bounds of interpretation. As clearly explained by Nancy K. Frankenberry, for Vattimo

the story of philosophy’s weakening is at the same time a story of Christianity’s coming to fulfillment in the very process of secularization. Vattimo’s narrative is distinctive for asserting a causal relationship between the Christian message of kenosis, on the one hand, and philosophical antifoundationalism, antiessentialism, and the collapse of capital-T Truth, on the other hand. (2007, 274)

Vattimo’s first use of the notion of kenosis dates back to his 1994 Oltre l’interpretazione (translated into English as Beyond Interpretation in 1997), where he writes that

modern hermeneutic philosophy is born in Europe not only because here there is a religion of the book that focuses attention on the phenomenon of interpretation, but also because this religion has at its base the idea of the incarnation of God, which it conceives as kenosis, as abasement and, in our translation, as weakening. (1997, 48)

Such a statement shows that kenosis relies on the idea that a truth that is absolute, metaphysical, and objective is impossible and can be legitimated only by power structures – and never solely by intellectual speculation (see Vattimo 2014, 55). Rather, for Vattimo truth is always a matter of interpretation in its historical situatedness, from which follows that truth itself is characterized as the opening of new horizons and points of view, and not as a transcendent and immutable occurrence.

Similarly, in Credere di credere (first published in Italian in 1996, and then translated into English as Belief in 1999), he argues that “both belief in objective truth and faith in the progress of Reason towards full transparency appear to have been defeated” (Vattimo 1999, 29); for this reason, the concept of truth has lost its traditional metaphysical and dogmatic value, having been reduced to sheer interpretation inextricably bound to its historicity. However, Vattimo sees such a defeat in a positive way, since it implies the disappearance of the intrinsic violence of the notion of objective truth that is typical of traditional metaphysics. As explained by Harris, “metaphysics is ‘violent’ for Vattimo because it silences further questioning as objectivity permits there to be only one right answer for any given question” (2012, 2). In other words, Vattimo identifies “traditional metaphysics” with a dogmatic and absolutist conception of truth, which in turn is imposed in an authoritarian manner and leaves no room for alternative interpretations.

The absolute and objective conception of truth shows that violence belongs not only to metaphysics, but also to the notion of sacred (Vattimo and Girard 2010, 83). Vattimo also endorses “the idea of the incarnation as the dissolution of the sacred as violence” (1999, 38), which he paradoxically interprets both as the very meaning of secularization and as the fundamental essence of Christianity. However, such a paradox can be easily dispelled through a proper understanding of kenosis. That is, kenosis is the abasement of God to the level of humanity, meaning that God renounces God’s divine attributes in order to become human. Moreover, if secularization means a withdrawal of the violence of the sacred from the world, then it is not in contrast with Christianity, but it perfectly fits into the essence of Christianity itself. To put it differently, by renouncing God’s divine attributes, God automatically dismisses the possibility of an absolute and metaphysical truth, the rigid and transcendent structure of which is intrinsically violent. This weakening of truth and of God Godself, for Vattimo, is what makes revelation possible and dismisses violent, authoritarian, and dogmatic truth.

Being the abasement of God, kenosis reveals the weak nature of God, as well as of truth, hence denying all legitimacy to the human pretense of possessing an absolute and objective knowledge. In doing this, kenotic sacrifice becomes essential to withdraw the violence of sacred and absolute truth, showing that the essence of Christianity is not grounded in abstract theological dogmas, but in acknowledging that truth is always a matter of interpretation. Hence, kenosis cannot but be inscribed within a hermeneutical account. However, such an account does not entail a form of radical subjectivity: as Vattimo himself points out, “hermeneutics also involves a sort of weakening of subjectivity” (Rorty and Vattimo 2004, 59), meaning that the process of secularization and weakening of traditional Western metaphysics implies a different conception of subjectivity, according to which the subject is no longer conceived of as that idealized and absolute self-consciousness which is the foundation of “strong” metaphysics. In this sense,

the subject has necessarily to articulate itself in terms of a system of mediations that make subjectivity less peremptory. … Indeed, this represents a powerful factor in secularization insofar as it removes the illusion regarding the sacred ultimacy of consciousness. (Vattimo 1999, 42)

Similarly, Vattimo maintains that the concept of nature has often been used for the purpose of legitimizing and strengthening the traditional “strong” and dogmatic structure of Western metaphysics, fostering a transcendent, violent, and authoritarian definition of truth. This, however, is nothing but a prejudice that entails a sort of “fear of the unknown” that impels us to act under the threat of divine punishment. In this sense, Vattimo states that

the idea that there is an objective truth of Being which once recognized (by reason, enlightened by faith), becomes the stable basis of dogmatic theology and above all of moral teaching, which claims to be grounded upon the eternal nature of things. (Vattimo 1999, 49)

Accordingly, such a metaphysical prejudice effectively results in the

Christian preaching claiming to dictate the “truth” about how matters “really stand” with nature, mankind, society, and the family: God is the foundation, and he speaks through the Church, which has been authorized by him to decide in the last instance. (Vattimo 2011, 51)

In other words, Vattimo points out that traditional Western metaphysics – and particularly its Judeo-Christian version – has developed a negative concept of nature as static and immutable in order to provide a ground to their “violent” and dogmatic account of truth. Indeed, according to this tradition of thought, nature is an objective form of reality established by God, and its structure is eternally fixed in an unalterable way; for this reason, nature itself serves in this tradition as the undisputable ground for its moral commandments and truth claims. However, Vattimo also warns us that such an understanding of nature is nothing but a vague and arbitrary criterion used to enact specific forms of oppressive power together with a dogmatic and absolutist notion of truth. Indeed, once it is freed from the misuse and arbitrariness of metaphysics, all that remains is that “nature is the world where the big fish eat the little fish, not in the least a place where natural laws and rights obtain” (Vattimo 2011, 75).

In this respect, Vattimo’s criticism is directed against a very precise conception of nature, that is, nature conceived of as a closed system and as an immutable pre-established order that serves to promulgate and perpetrate transcendent truths and eternal moral laws. However, Vattimo’s account is somehow wanting on this point, meaning that it seems to assume that ethics and nature are antipodal concepts. Instead, I argue that it is possible to define nature positively through kenosis, by understanding it as that material principle which effectively requires the de-centralization of the human from ethics and normativity, precisely through performing kenotic sacrifice. In this sense, nature has an ethical meaning, but not a moral one: that is to say, the concept of nature entails a precise way to see the world and be in the world (that is, to understand the world in a certain way and act accordingly), without slipping into the account that Vattimo rightfully criticizes – that is, without becoming an immutable metaphysical principle from which moral commandments derive. Put simply, it is not possible to impose moral constraints by resorting to the idea of nature, but it is possible to develop ethical norms and theories implementing the overcoming of anthropocentrism that nature itself suggests. I shall return to this point later in the article; for now, suffice it to say that, while I recognize the validity of Vattimo’s point on the misuse of the concept of nature to legitimize the “violent” and dogmatic structure of traditional Christian metaphysics, I argue that such a concept can be maintained within a kenotic perspective without being negatively understood as the lawless background in which the big fish eats the little fish.

Additionally, it must be said that Vattimo develops a very pragmatic and concrete understanding of kenosis and of charity, which he sees as that ethical principle from which kenosis arises. In this sense, “the Christian inheritance that ‘returns’ in weak thought is primarily the Christian precept of charity and its rejection of violence” (Vattimo 1999, 44). Accordingly, Vattimo relies on the Pauline principle of “making truth in lovingness,” which is not only the most authentic meaning of charity, but also a concrete guide for actions in human life. In other words, given the “weakened” and interpretive nature of truth, we cannot but acknowledge that it is not possible to rely on an objectively rational and immutable principle of truth itself. Therefore, the existing contrast between the various interpretations – which is the kernel of reality – can only be resolved through the retrieval of a genuine ethical principle grounded on charity (see Vattimo 2011, 10–11).

On such grounds, Vattimo argues that “Christianity is marching in a direction that can only be that of lightening and weakening its burden of dogma in favor of its practical and moral teaching. In that sense too, charity takes the place of truth” (2011, 78). Kenosis, then, assumes an ethical and normative value, since “we don’t reach agreement when we have discovered the truth, we say we have discovered the truth when we reach agreement” (Vattimo 2011, 77). That is to say, since no one can access absolute truth, human beings can only acknowledge that what they call “truth” or “norms” is nothing but a shared interpretation and the product of mutual recognition. For this reason, “in the act of knowing, I always select a perspective” (Vattimo 2011, 63), meaning that I can know something only and exclusively through my limited point of view, and never fully and objectively.

Therefore, ethics does not spring from a metaphysical or a “natural” source, but exclusively depends on charity and mutual recognition; similarly, normativity is not based on an eternal and objective truth, but on a shared interpretation. It follows that the ethical and normative dimension of kenosis becomes the fundamental one, taking over the conceptual and speculative one. Here, Vattimo draws a clear parallel between ethics and charity, as opposed to metaphysics and truth; that is, ethics takes the place of metaphysics just as charity takes the place of truth. By so doing, Vattimo radicalizes the meaning of kenosis by strongly emphasizing its hermeneutic and normative nature.

Indeed, the normative value of kenotic sacrifice does not have a metaphysical character – that is, it is not grounded on a conceptual speculation aimed at giving truth a metaphysical and immutable meaning – but rather relies on that mutual recognition, which in turn depends on an act of generosity and of renunciation of absolute truth.

Even our ethical choices are influenced by the normative aspect of kenotic sacrifice, since the only norm that governs this kind of choice is established not by truth, but by charity. According to Vattimo, “no one ever tells the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Every statement entails a choice of that which we take to be relevant, and this choice is never disinterested” (2011, 9). Hence, the governing principle of our choices coincides with “the norm of secularization, or more generally, in the language of ethics, … the reduction of violence in all its forms” (Vattimo 1999, 88). To put it simply, given the impossibility of reaching an absolute and objective form of truth, the only viable solution is an ethics based on charity to replace traditional metaphysics. Such a weakening of the old metaphysical structures through kenosis, for Vattimo, leads to the dismissal of violence and dogmatism, and hence to a more solid ethical ground for human actions.

Since the notion of kenosis deeply affects God, truth, and Being, we are required to rethink those concepts in hermeneutical terms. Such is, according to Vattimo, the goal of philosophy after the dismissal of absolute and metaphysical truth: under these circumstances, philosophy can only be an ontology of actuality, namely “an interpretation of the epoch that gives form to pervasive sentiments about the meaning of actual existence” (Vattimo 2011, 43). However, in Vattimo’s thought, philosophy is interpretation, namely a finite perspective on its epoch. Hence, Vattimo’s ontology of actuality coincides with hermeneutics and has nothing to do with the allegedly rational or metaphysical essence of reality.

In conclusion, Vattimo’s conception of kenosis can be understood as the inevitable ethical consequence of his theoretical approach, namely the hermeneutics of “weak thought.” Being an ontological reflection on actuality, philosophy for Vattimo overcomes traditional Western metaphysics and becomes hermeneutics, since it can only grasp existence within a particular, given spatio-temporal situation; that is, it can only provide an interpretation of – and a perspective on – a specific frame of reality, without pretending to reach the knowledge of any intrinsic and transcendent rationality. In this sense, kenotic sacrifice has the double significance of both revealing the essence of Christianity (and of God) and being the ethical and normative ground of our choices, since it opens to a finite perspective on reality. Finally, I have shown that Vattimo maintains that the concept of nature has been misused to justify the “violent” and dogmatic structures of traditional metaphysics; however, for Vattimo nature cannot serve as a valid ethical principle because, once it has been liberated from the dogmatic manipulations of metaphysics, it is reduced to an environment where only “the law of the strongest” prevails.

Bubbio: Kenosis as Making Room for Other Points of View

In his definition of kenosis, Bubbio acknowledges the ethical relevance of Vattimo’s hermeneutics, according to which “I should put my point of view in perspective to take into consideration the perspectives of others. If nobody has access to the truth, then I have to ‘listen to others’” (Bubbio 2014, 159). Accordingly, Bubbio defines kenotic sacrifice both as self-withdrawal and as the act of making room for other points of view; however, he also aims at reinforcing the regulative meaning of kenosis, that is its being a practical guide for human actions. As Bubbio writes, “continental thought has often overemphasized [kenosis’s] symbolic aspect, while neglecting at the same time its regulative meaning” (2014, 60). Therefore, Bubbio claims, such regulative meaning has to be provided by recovering the connection between the symbol and the symbolized concept, namely by reinforcing the bond between ethics and epistemology.

Accordingly, Bubbio grounds his understanding of kenosis on a perspectival account of knowledge, tracing the origin of such an understanding back to Kant, for whom “the perspectivity of knowledge is a constitutive condition” of human beings (Bubbio 2014, 23). In other words, Bubbio argues that Kant’s epistemology is essentially kenotic, since Kant states that we can have knowledge of the world only within our finite perspective, namely we can know things only as they appear to us and never as they are in themselves. Thus, Kant negates the possibility for us to attain the so-called God’s-eye point of view, that is, that (hypothetically) divine form of knowledge which is free from any spatio-temporal limitations. This leaves us only with our human and finite point of view, constrained within the spatio-temporal boundaries of the finite world.

As Bubbio puts it, “this move [in Kant’s philosophy] mimics the process of withdrawal that is at the core of the kenotic thinking: God withdrawing from his absoluteness to make room for the universe” (2014, 23). Thus, just as God sacrificed God’s infinity and absoluteness to allow finite and particular beings to exist, we have to renounce our claim to an absolute and “noumenal” knowledge and “make room” for other “phenomenal” points of view. Consequently, for Bubbio, such a theoretical account implies that knowledge is always perspectival, since it always arises from a specific and finite point of view, and that one can (and should) try to see things also from other points of view.

Moreover, Bubbio highlights that the normative value of kenosis lies in the connection between sacrifice and recognition. In doing so, Bubbio refers to the section on forgiveness and reconciliation in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. In that episode, the “hard-hearted judge,” called to judge the “beautiful soul,” cannot but renounce the formulation of an absolute ethical judgement, in turn acknowledging the impossibility of possessing and identifying with the absoluteness of God’s law. This, according to Bubbio, is a clear example of kenotic sacrifice performed through the concept of recognition, since the hard-hearted judge recognizes kinship and continuity in the beautiful soul, sacrificing their own subjectivity for the sake of forgiveness and renouncing any dogmatic and absolutist perspective on truth and normativity (see Bubbio 2014, 74).

Accordingly, for Bubbio, normativity and symbolic value have to be understood as unified through kenosis: that is, kenotic sacrifice is understood as an ethical Darstellung, namely as a symbol which has both a representative value and a regulative and normative one. In this sense, the figure of Christ is the clearest example of kenosis, since he incarnates the highest form of sacrifice; indeed, Christ sacrifices something constitutive and essential to himself – that is, “in becoming human, [Christ] sacrifices his divine absoluteness” (Bubbio 2014, 74). Moreover, in this making room for others, the concept of recognition (which Bubbio finds in Hegel) is of vital importance: indeed, if kenosis is to be understood as self-withdrawal and as making room for the others, it inevitably follows that there needs to be a preliminary recognition of the others, since otherwise, it would be impossible to conceive those others for whom to make room in the first place. Drawing again on Hegel, Bubbio writes that “sacrifice, conceived as a Darstellung, is an account of a process that can be referred to, in the form of concept (Begriff), as recognition” (2014, 75). Nevertheless, “the concept is not an abstract and static logical notion. It is the most adequate conception of the world as a whole and the process of conceptual change” (93). In fact, for Bubbio “sacrifice is the Darstellung of the process of recognition” (74).

Accordingly, “sacrifice can be considered as a specific form of determinate negation phenomenologically conceived, in which recognition plays a central role” (Bubbio 2014, 62). That is, Bubbio reinforces the conceptual component of sacrifice by arguing that not only it requires mutual recognition, but also a conscious negation of (and unselfish renunciation of) one’s alleged absoluteness. Such an account stresses the active role of the subject, since the act of kenotic sacrifice is not a passive withdrawal but an active renunciation and a making room for other points of view. Hence, the fundamental target of kenotic sacrifice is precisely the self’s alleged absoluteness and unfounded pretense to a metaphysical truth. However, this must lead to an ethical and normative account based on sacrifice, in which one makes room for other points of view and rethinks one’s freedom in light of such ethical norms.

Here, it clearly emerges that Bubbio is trying to strengthen Vattimo’s conception of kenosis by reinforcing the conceptual features of recognition: that is, while for Vattimo mutual recognition is a matter of charity derived from the impossibility of reaching an immutable truth, for Bubbio it is an essential and constitutive part of sacrifice, meaning that kenotic sacrifice could not exist without mutual recognition. In this sense, Vattimo correctly highlights that the two main elements of Bubbio’s theory are “the perspectivist epistemology, and the ‘subtractive’ ethics – or … kenotic ethics” (Vattimo 2015, 434). However, Bubbio also points out that

kenotic sacrifice … is significant not only because of its capacity to express a philosophical concept (mutual recognition) in an emotionally affecting and motivating representation, it also necessitates a historically located will to realize and improve a (potentially universal) recognitively based structure of norms and values. (Bubbio 2014, 85)

Thus, Bubbio highlights that in order to properly combine perspectivist epistemology and kenotic ethics, that is, normativity and symbolism, it is fundamental to maintain that symbols can produce ethical norms only if they are grasped in conceptual terms.

For this reason, Bubbio clarifies that the symbolic value of kenosis should not be overemphasized, to avoid the risk of emptying the notion of kenosis itself of all its normative and ethical significance. That is, “the main risk of this approach is that once symbols have been deprived of their regulative status, they maintain a merely descriptive value” (Bubbio 2014, 148). Even Vattimo partly falls into the same mistake, since he does not sufficiently develop his reflections on the conceptual nature of recognition – and, hence, of sacrifice.

Bubbio’s intention is not to criticize Vattimo, but rather to integrate Vattimo’s understanding of kenosis with a stronger conceptual structure. Indeed, a merely descriptive notion of sacrifice would result in groundless arbitrariness, if not blind necessitation; thus, it would jeopardize the very meaning of kenotic sacrifice, namely one’s ability to recognize and make room for otherness. Consequently, Bubbio stresses that kenotic sacrifice can never lead to self-annihilation, since self-annihilation cannot have any normative value and makes recognition impossible; namely, if there is no recognition, then there is no “room made for others,” that is to say that the fundamental condition of kenotic sacrifice disappears. Accordingly, “an authentic kenotic sacrifice does not imply the ‘dissolution’ of the self, but rather a ‘renegotiation’ of one’s own identity as a result of one’s withdrawal” (Bubbio 2014, 164).

Similar to Vattimo, the concept of nature does not play a prominent role in Bubbio’s reflection. However, while for Vattimo nature is presented as a lawless setting based on the domination of the powerful over the weak, for Bubbio nature seems to be a negative occurrence in the Hegelian sense; that is, it has the characteristics of the negative moment of a “dialectics” of sacrifice, or that moment which defines what kenotic sacrifice is not. That is to say, for Bubbio kenotic sacrifice is not a “natural occurrence,” meaning that the ethical and normative value of kenosis is not something that can be found in nature; in this sense, Bubbio still identifies in nature a form of absurd violence which is ultimately devoid of empathy and solidarity towards human beings, and therefore, cannot be considered as inherently ethical (see Bubbio 2018, 195). Rather, kenotic sacrifice requires a deliberate “effort” of intersubjective recognition by the self, according to which the self-renounces its absoluteness and recognizes the legitimacy and equal dignity of other perspectives on truth. Kenotic sacrifice, in Bubbio’s account, coincides the withdrawal of one’s self, so that

I can put my point of view in perspective to take into consideration the perspectives of others. Kenotic sacrifice is not suppressive. It does not suppress or destroy anything; rather, it requires a withdrawal of my identity for the benefit of others. (2014, 4)

In conclusion, Bubbio’s understanding of kenosis can be summarized as follows:

First, … a kenotic attitude is the condition for the establishment of a perspectival account of knowledge, insofar as it implies the renunciation of the God’s-eye view and the willingness to make room for other points of view. The idea here is simply that knowledge is perspectival – if it is not perspectival, it is not real knowledge at all. … Second, kenotic sacrifice has an ethical value. I withdraw and I put my point of view in perspective to take into consideration the perspectives of others. (2014, 164)

However, by so doing, Bubbio leaves the centrality of the human in ethics unchanged; hence, one might wonder whether this approach does not fully acknowledge nature’s ethical significance. In this sense, I intend to show that it is possible to understand nature through kenosis while maintaining nature’s ethical significance, which in turn coincides with the de-centralization of the human in ethics and normativity. Indeed, Bubbio’s definition of kenotic sacrifice maintains the self, although depriving it of its absolute and metaphysical structure and redefining it in perspectival terms; that is, the kind of sacrifice implied by kenosis requires us to step aside in order to recognize others and their finite points of view, which in turn co-exist with myself and my finite point of view, rather than overwhelming and annihilating them. Therefore, ethics and epistemology merge into kenotic sacrifice, strengthening its normative effects.

Moreover, Bubbio maintains that “the ultimate goal of philosophy is to question the meaning of human existence” (2014, 165), and kenosis is the key for grasping such meaning. Indeed, Bubbio’s account, as I understand it, can be related to the claim that hermeneutics is the only viable approach to a horizon of meaning of human existence, and to the recommendation to embrace kenosis as the norm that governs it both ethically and epistemologically.

Understanding Nature Through Kenosis

In light of Vattimo’s and Bubbio’s respective understandings of kenosis, it clearly emerges that nature is that lawless background which kenosis opposes, and that the ethical significance of kenosis is not to be found in nature itself. Consequently, both Vattimo and Bubbio maintain that kenotic sacrifice is not a “natural act,” but the result of deliberate acts of charity (Vattimo) and of recognition (Bubbio), from which the ethical and normative elements of kenosis derive. Put simply, according to Vattimo and Bubbio, an ethics of kenotic sacrifice can be developed only in relation to a human-centered perspective, in which the concept of nature does not play a key role. However, in this section, I suggest that a positive conception of nature – that is, one that sees nature itself neither as an absolute and immutable expression of Being or of God’s will, nor as a chaotic and “violent” background – necessarily entails an ethics of kenotic sacrifice, since it implies a real and effective de-centering of the human in ethics and normativity, namely a concrete act of withdrawal of one’s self from the self-proclaimed centrality of human agency within nature.

As I have already shown, both Vattimo and Bubbio understand kenotic sacrifice as an act that opposes nature conceived of as a lawless and non-ethical setting, namely an act of deliberate self-withdrawal that is not to be found in nature as such. Nevertheless, I argue that a positive concept of nature is perfectly compatible with a theory of kenotic sacrifice, since such a concept in fact strengthens the ethical significance of kenotic sacrifice by de-centering the human in ethics itself. However, as I mentioned earlier, my goal is not strictly to argue against Vattimo and Bubbio and to develop an alternative theory of kenotic sacrifice; rather, I intend to suggest a complementary approach aimed at expanding their reflections on kenosis to a concept of nature beyond their ethical anthropocentrism.

In other words, if we understand kenosis within a positive conception of nature, it emerges that the sacrifice of one’s self is primarily a practical redefinition of one’s freedom, and as such cannot be conceived without otherness and nature itself. Indeed, it is only by developing a positive concept of nature through kenosis that such a practical redefinition of human freedom can be actualized in a non-anthropocentric manner – in fact making nature the ethical center around which human freedom revolves.

Accordingly, it can be argued that kenotic sacrifice primarily implies the renunciation of the human’s self-proclaimed mastery over nature. In practical terms, this is nothing but a de-centralization of the human in ethics, meaning that kenotic sacrifice essentially requires the development of an ethics which is no longer human-centered but is based on that human’s being “alongside” nature – that is, just one agent among others, and not the main and dominant one. To put it simply, such an ethics of kenotic sacrifice fundamentally implies the dismissal of the human’s self-conferred status of being the dominant agent in nature, which is perfectly consistent with Vattimo’s and Bubbio’s theory. In this sense, the positive ethical features of nature manifest themselves precisely through the extent of our freedom – since we cannot dispose of the world as we please – and of our knowledge – since we cannot aim at grasping an absolute and eternally valid form of knowledge.

By so doing, it is also possible to reinforce the connection between epistemology and ethics – and consequently the pragmatic aspect of kenotic sacrifice – which is a key point for both Vattimo and Bubbio. Indeed, in the first instance, it is possible to maintain that knowledge is not passive reception by the knower, since it carries an ethical demand according to which the knower is required to act in a charitable manner and to recognize the impossibility of grasping an eternally valid truth and the legitimacy of other perspectives. In addition to that, once we include a positive conception of nature within a theory of kenotic sacrifice, a further ethical demand emerges, according to which we first need to step aside from our self-proclaimed centrality in ethics and no longer act as if we can dispose of nature itself as we please. That is to say, not only do we need to step back and reject the dogmatic and violent truth of traditional Western metaphysics, but we also need to redefine the extent of our freedom in a kenotic sense, namely to withdraw ourselves from the alleged centrality within and mastery over nature.

Therefore, giving nature a positive ethical meaning does not equate with reinstating a form of dogmatic moralism which outlaws all that is considered to be “against nature,” in fact legitimizing both a “violent” conception of truth and authoritarian forms of power. Similarly, a positive understanding of nature does not necessarily echo a romantic sentiment of nostalgia for a mythical past in which humankind and nature were more strictly connected. Rather, as pointed out by Mathias Schöner (who in turn borrows this argument from the philosophy of Deleuze), nature embodies the historical and concrete mutability of things, namely it is “a nature undergoing the process of becoming at the same time as it changes perpetually and irreversibly with history” (Schöner 2019, 92). Consequently, nature “stands for the renunciation of the eternal, of an everlasting and unalterable Being” (92). Such an understanding, I believe, not only is perfectly compatible with Vattimo’s and Bubbio’s respective theories of kenotic sacrifice, but also gives us a further element in support of a kenotic ethics.

An ethics of kenotic sacrifice that includes nature as a positive concept also strengthens the case for a non-anthropocentric environmental ethics, as already argued by Eppinger (2011). Indeed, in contemporary scholarship it is largely accepted that anthropocentrism, defined as “an ideology that considers human beings to be the most significant entity of the universe … cannot lead us to a sustainable future” (Kopnina 2018, 123). Accordingly, a kenotic approach that regards nature – and not the human – as the kernel of ethics and normativity leads us to acknowledge “that we are part of nature, and have a responsibility to respect the web of life and heal the damage caused by the ideological dominance of anthropocentrism” (123). Thus, here I am suggesting that understanding nature through kenosis – that is, maintaining a positive understanding of nature within theories of kenotic sacrifice – can be both a good integration into Vattimo’s and Bubbio’s respective works, and a valid contribution to contemporary scholarship on the philosophy of nature and environmental philosophy.

In other words, I am suggesting that understanding nature through kenosis implies a redefinition of the scope and limits of human freedom, in fact resulting in the dismissal of the human’s self-proclaimed centrality within nature and the implementation of an ethics centered on the human no longer being the dominant agent within nature. This, I believe, complements Vattimo’s and Bubbio’s understanding of kenosis by strengthening its practical meaning: indeed, such an approach allows us to overcome anthropocentrism and develop an ethics based on the human being alongside nature and other beings. Simply put, the withdrawal of one’s self is not exclusively dependent on charity and recognition but can be related to nature – conceived of in a positive way – and on the fact that we are not the principal agents within nature itself, nor its undisputed masters.

Conclusion: Kenosis as Making Room for Other Ways of Being

As I already mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this article is not to provide an alternative theory to Vattimo’s and Bubbio’s philosophy, nor to engage in a radical criticism of their hermeneutic approach. Rather, I aim at suggesting that it would be beneficial to expand beyond Vattimo’s and Bubbio’s anthropocentrism and to take a complementary approach, in order to understand nature through kenosis and in a positive way. Therefore, the conclusions that I draw in this final section are not to be understood as final and definitive statements, but rather as the starting point for a potentially broader research project, and as an invitation to further investigate an increasingly relevant topic such as kenotic sacrifice.

There is no doubt that Vattimo and Bubbio provide significant contributions to the development of an ethics of kenotic sacrifice, but one might wonder whether the positive ethical significance of nature which kenosis highlights is in need of a deeper acknowledgment. Indeed, if on the one hand, it is true that nature is that place where “the big fish eats the little fish,” it is equally true that nature is not at odds with an ethics of kenotic sacrifice but can be used to develop an effective de-centralization of the human in ethics. In fact, nature, thus defined as such, has a very precise ethical meaning, since it embodies an effective form of kenotic sacrifice and of renunciation of the human’s self-proclaimed centrality within nature itself.

The core of the kenotic discourse, then, is not exclusively focused on the nature of truth or on the meaning of (human) life, but rather on the concrete, material redefinition of the extent of human freedom in relation to nature. That is to say, the form of withdrawal of one’s self that kenotic sacrifice implements involve in the first place the extent of our freedom. In other words, human freedom can no longer be understood as the unlimited capacity to dispose of nature, of the environment, or of others. Rather, it has to be understood in a kenotic sense – that is, as abdicating the self-assigned role of central agents within nature in order to act in accordance with the natural demands of ethical knowledge and agency. In this sense, kenotic sacrifice is not primarily a making room for other points of view, but first and foremost for other ways of being. That is, once we allow the compatibility of a positive conception of nature with the notion of kenotic sacrifice, it follows that kenosis itself unquestionably implies, in the first place, the withdrawal of that way of being according to which one acts as if one is the undisputed master of nature. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that kenotic sacrifice also implies the implementation of a different way of being, according to which one has to act in accordance with the status of being one agent among others, and not the main and dominant one.

In other terms, a positive understanding of nature within a kenotic account seems to be able to reach beyond a merely anthropocentric ethics, namely to effectively de-center the human in ethical and normative theories and allow a proper environment- and nature-centered ethics, whose fundamental core is precisely kenotic sacrifice. Once again, kenotic sacrifice, conceived of as the withdrawal of one’s self, that is, as the sacrifice of something essential to the individual, coincides with the sacrifice of the centrality of human agency within nature and the renunciation of our self-proclaimed mastery over nature itself. Consequently, kenosis first means to be and to act in a different way; as such, it is a fully-fledged act of making room for ontological otherness – that is, an actual stepping aside from the abovementioned centrality within nature, and an abdication of our mastery over it.

Finally, I want to reiterate that understanding nature through kenosis seems not only to give a stronger ethical ground to kenosis itself, but also to implement the most radical and effective meaning of kenotic sacrifice, namely as the withdrawal of one’s self that de-centers the human and makes room for other ways of being human. Once again, more than being an ending point, these conclusions should be considered as a starting point to further expand an important research topic – such as the one on kenotic sacrifice and nature – beyond the outcomes of the current scholarship.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).