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Articles

Safeguarding the South African public broadcaster: governance, civil society and the SABC

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Pages 244-272 | Received 28 Nov 2018, Accepted 28 Feb 2019, Published online: 19 Mar 2019
 

ABSTRACT

The South African public broadcaster, the SABC has faced serious threats to its independence. The ruling African National Congress has been the dominant political party since South Africa’s first democratic elections and factional battles have played out in the SABC from time to time. President Zuma and the Minister of Communications visibly took control of the SABC through Hlaudi Motsoeneng, the Chief Operations Officer between 2011 and 2017. This article examines the mechanisms and processes that allowed institutional safeguards intended to guard the autonomy and independence of the SABC to be subverted. The incorporation of the SABC as a company accounts for some of its vulnerability. Although good institutional and governance structures are important for any public broadcaster, they cannot protect the institution on their own. Vocal political support for independent public broadcasting crossed frontiers of race, class and politics. This support accounts for the resilience of the SABC.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Victoria Bronstein is an associate professor at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. She is also an Advocate at Thulamela Chambers in Johannesburg. She was previously a Commissioner on the Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa. She teaches media law and constitutional law.

Judith Katzew is a lecturer at the School of Law at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Before joining the Law School she was an attorney in a commercial and insurance law practice. Judith has a particular interest in Company Law. She teaches company law to undergraduate and postgraduate students.

Notes

1 Evangelia Psychogiopoulou and others, ‘The Freedom and Independence of Public Service Media in Europe: International Standards and their Domestic Implementation’ (2017) 11 IJoC 1932, 1939. On the features of public broadcasting systems see EM Barendt, Broadcasting Law (Clarendon Press 1993) 52.

2 Act 4 of 1999.

3 Act 153 of 1993.

4 Ruth Teer-Tomaselli, ‘Legislation, Regulation and Management in the South African Broadcasting Landscape: A Case Study of the South African Broadcasting Corporation’ in Robin Mansell and Marc Raboy (eds), The Handbook of Global Media and Communication Policy (Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2011) 414, 416.

5 ibid 417.

6 Broadcasting Act, s 8(d).

7 ibid s 6(3).

8 Section 6(3) states: ‘In terms of this Charter, the Corporation, in pursuit of its objectives and in the exercise of its powers, enjoys freedom of expression and journalistic, creative and programming independence as enshrined in the Constitution’. Section 6(4) continues:

The Corporation must encourage the development of South African expression by providing, in South African official languages, a wide range of programming that: (a) reflects South African attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity; (b) displays South African talent in education and entertainment programmes; (c) offers a plurality of views and a variety of news, information and analysis from a South African point of view; (d) advances the national and public interest.Section 6(8) states:The Corporation must develop a Code of Practice that ensures that the services and the personnel comply with- (a) the constitutional principle of equality; (b) the equitable treatment of all segments of the South African population; (c) the constitutional requirement of equitable treatment of all official languages; (d) the rights of all South Africans to receive and impart information and ideas; (e) the mandate to provide for a wide range of audience interests, beliefs and perspectives; and (f) a high standard of accuracy, fairness and impartiality in news and programmes that deal with matters of public interest.

9 The SABC was established by the Broadcasting Act 22 of 1936.See Daniel Malan Pretorius, ‘Ten Years after the Transition: The Emergence of a Broadcasting Jurisprudence in South Africa’ (2003) 19(4) SAJHR 593, 594.

10 Act 73 of 1976.

11 Pretorius (n 9) 595.

12 ibid.

13 Teer-Tomaselli, Handbook (n 4) 416. See also Jane Duncan and Ian Glenn, ‘Turning Points in South African Television Policy and Practice since 1990’ in Dumisani Moyo and Wallace Chuma (eds), Media Policy in a Changing South Africa: Critical Reflections on Media Reforms in the Global Age (Unisa Press 2010) 39–72.

14 Sekibakiba Peter Lekgoathi ‘“You are Listening to Radio Lebowa of the South African Broadcasting Corporation”: Vernacular Radio, Bantustan Identity and Listenership, 1960–1994’ (2009) 35(3) JSAS 575, 577.

15 ibid.

16 ibid 586.

17 ibid 577.

18 On the history of the press in South Africa see Harvey Tyson, Editors Under Fire (Random House South Africa 1993) generally but especially 389–406. Rex Gibson, Final Deadline: The Last Days of the Rand Daily Mail (David Philip Publishers 2007) and Irwin Manoim, You have Been Warned: The First Ten Years of the Mail and Guardian (Viking, Penguin Group 1996).

19 Also see Helen Suzman Reflections: South Africa: The Past and Nelson Mandela Reflections: South Africa: The Future in Tyson (n 18) at 408–412.

20 <www.ukhozifm.co.za/sabc/home/ukhozifm/aboutus> accessed 29 October 2018. <www.sabc.co.za/sabc/radio/> accessed 29 October 2019.

21 South African Government, ‘South Africa’s People’ <https://www.gov.za/about-sa/south-africas-people> accessed 20 February 2019.

22 Section 6(8)(c) of the Broadcasting Act quoted above n 8.

23 Teer-Tomaselli, Handbook (n 4) 428.

24 Act 153 of 1993.

25 Pretorius (n 9) 596.

26 ibid.

27 Teer-Tomaselli, Handbook (n 4) 428.

28 Guy Berger, ‘Towards an Analysis of the South African Media and Transformation, 1994–99’ (1999) 38 Transformation 82, 95.

29 Ruth Teer-Tomaselli, ‘Militancy and Pragmatism: The Genesis of the ANC’s Media Policy’ (1994) 8(2) Africa Media Review 73, 86. See also Nkosi Ndlela, ‘Broadcasting Reforms in Southern Africa: Continuity and Change in the Era of Globalization’ (2007) 4(3) Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 67, 76.

30 ibid 85.

31 Jane Duncan, ‘Executive Overstretch: South African Broadcasting Independence and Accountability Under Thabo Mbeki’ (2008) 34(1) Communicatio: South African Journal for Communication Theory and Research 21, 25. See also Ndlela (n 29) 83.

32 Teer-Tomaselli, ‘Militancy and Pragmatism’ (n 29) 85.

33 ibid 75–8.

34 ibid 87.

35 Teer-Tomaselli, Handbook (n 4) 417.

36 ibid 422.

37 These sales were contentious and the radio stations were not sold to the highest bidders. See Clive Barnett, ‘The Contradictions of Broadcasting Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ (1998) 25(78) Review of African Political Economy 551, 559–60 and 577–9.

38 Ruth Teer-Tomaselli, ‘Transforming State Owned Enterprises in the Global Age: Lessons from Broadcasting and Telecommunications in South Africa’ (2004) 18(1) Critical Arts: A Journal of South-North Cultural and Media Studies 7, 32.

39 Duncan, ‘Executive Overstretch’ (n 31) 34, J Duncan and I Glenn (n 13). See also on commercialisation and language, Clive Barnett, ‘Governing Cultural Diversity in South African Media Policy’ (2000) 14(1) Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 51; and Clive Barnett ‘Language Equity and the Politics of Representation in South African Media Reform’ (2000) 6(1) Social Identities 63, 81. See also Barnett, ‘Contradictions’ (n 37) 551.

40 Duncan, ‘Executive Overstretch’ (n 31) 34.

41 ibid.

42 Teer-Tomaselli, ‘Transforming SOEs’ (n 38) 23–24.

43 ibid 14.

44 ibid 14.

45 ibid 15.

46 Teer-Tomaselli Handbook (n 4) 422; Teer-Tomaselli, ‘Transforming SOEs’ (n 38) 33–5.

47 Barendt (n 1) 55.

48 Section 8A(1).

49 Berger (n 28) 100.

50 Duncan ‘Executive Overstretch’ (n 31) 37.

51 Section 6(3).

52 Section 10(d).

53 SABC Charter (n 8).

54 Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act 13 of 2000 (the ICASA Act). See also Pretorius (n 9) 597.

55 The IBA was initially intended to ensure that there was independence and fair play in the broadcasting sector although its role has been downgraded to ‘consumer watchdog and spectrum manager (Teer-Tomaselli, Handbook (n 4) 419 and 427); Duncan, ‘Executive Overstretch’ (n 31) 27–33 describes attempts to strip ICASA of its independence. See also Clive Barnett, ‘Broadcasting the Rainbow Nation: Media, Democracy, and Nation-Building in South Africa’ (1999) 31(3) Antipode 274.

56 Section 181 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.

57 Duncan, ‘Executive Overstretch’ (n 31) 33.

58 ibid 37.

59 Broadcasting Act, s 6(7).

60 Antonio Ciaglia ‘Explaining Public Service Broadcasting Entrenched Politicization: The Case of South Africa’s SABC’ (2017) 18(7) Journalism 817, 819.

61 Duncan, ‘Executive Overstretch’ (n 31) 22.

62 Kristin S Orgeret ‘From his Master’s Voice and Back Again? Presidential Inaugurations and South African Television–the Post-Apartheid Experience’ (2008) 107 African Affairs 611, 625–627.

63 Duncan, ‘Executive Overstretch’ (n 31) 40.

64 ibid 34.

65 ibid 39.

66 James Myburgh, ‘How the ANC Captured the SABC’ (Politicsweb, 12 May 2015) <http://politicsweb.co.za/documents/how-the-anc-captured-the-sabc> accessed 27 October 2018.

67 ibid.

68 ibid.

69 Barendt (n 1) 53.

70 Berger (n 28) 107.

71 ibid 106.

72 Khahliso Mochaba and others, SADC Media Law: A Handbook for Media Practitioners–a Comparative Overview of the Laws and Practice in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa (Konrad-Adenauer Foundation 2003) 63.

73 ibid 63.

74 ibid.

75 John Perlman presenter of the SABC’s premium news service AMLive contradicted an SABC spokesperson who claimed that no blacklisting had occurred on air. Matthew Burbidge, ‘The SABC Handled Blacklist Saga Poorly’ <https://mg.co.za/article/2006-10-16-sabc-handled-blacklist-saga-poorly> accessed 27 October 2018.

76 Gilbert Marcus and Zwelakhe Sisulu, South African Broadcasting Corporation Commission of Enquiry into Blacklisting and Related Matters Report. Transcript of leaked report published on the Mail & Guardian website <www.mg.co.za> accessed 14 October 2006.

77 ibid para 2.1.

78 ibid para 2.2.

79 ibid para 5.38.

80 ibid para 8.6. 2005 complaint by senior journalist Jacques Pauw. Broadcast was about airport security.

82 The Broadcasting Act (n 2) s 5 and s 6. Blacklisting Report (n 76) para 4.12.

83 Blacklisting Report (n 76) para 8.4.

84 ibid.

85 ibid para 5.7.

86 Blacklisting Report (n 76) para 5.7.

87 Ad Hoc Committee, Final Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Inquiry into the Fitness of the SABC Board, 24 February 2017 para 10.2. <https://pmg.org.za/page/https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/2898?via=homepage-feature-card> accessed 27 October 2018.

88 Phumzile Van Damme, ‘Muthambi Misleading the Public about Secret SABC Policy’ Democratic Alliance (DA) Statement, 10 May 2016. <www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/muthambi-misleading-the-public-about-secret-sabc-policy> accessed 27 October 2018.

89 Ad Hoc Committee (n 87) para 10.2.2.

90 ibid para 10.2.2.

91 The Ad Hoc Committee was initiated by the shadow Minister of Communications (telephonic discussion with van Damme on 24 October 2018). There was obviously sufficient support for the move within rival factions of the ruling party.

92 Ad Hoc committee (n 87) para 10.2.2.

93 ibid.

94 C Hanretty, ‘Explaining the De Facto Independence of Public Broadcasters’ (2010) 40(1) British Journal of Political Science 75, 76.

95 Solidarity v SABC [2016] ZALCJHB 273; 2016 (6) SA 73 (LC) [8]. On previous editorial interference by Motsoeneng see SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 [83–86].

96 ibid [11] and [12].

97 ibid [13].

98 ibid [14]. The other journalists were Jacques Steenkamp, Busisiwe Ntuli and Lukhanyo Calata. The eighth journalist Vuyo Mvoko was an independent contractor. He had documented previous managerial political interference. Mvoko v SABC [2017] ZASCA 139; 2018 (2) SA 291 (SCA) [ 7]. Mvoko was also dressed down for mentioning in the run up to local government elections in 2016 that the DA believed that the ANC was ‘at its most vulnerable in certain metropolitan municipalities’. Mr Mvoko was informed that ‘Mr Motsoeneng was watching and scrutinising each and every word that he was uttering and that he should be careful on air’ ibid [7].

99 Solidarity (n 95) [19].

100 The Trustees for the Time Being of the Media Monitoring Project Benefit Trust, S.O.S Support Public Broadcasting Coalition, Freedom of Expression Institute v SABC Case Number: 195/2016 Complaints And Compliance Committee at ICASA (24 June 2016) <www.icasa.org.za/uploads/files/Media-Monitoring-Project-v-SABC-JULY-2016-JUDGMENT.pdf> accessed 28 February 2019.

101 ibid [20].

102 BEMAWU v SABC, Solidarity v SABC [2017] ZALCJHB 341; [2017] 12 BLLR 1237 (LC) [25].

103 Ad Hoc Committee (n 87) para 25.3.2.

104 His salary increased from R367 584 in 2008 to R1.4 million in 2011 (Democratic Alliance (DA) v SABC; DA v Motsoeneng [2016] ZAWCHC 188 (WCC), para 5). The Public Protector found ‘that his salary progression from 1.5 million to 2.4 million’ in 2011–2012 was irregular (SABC v DA [2015] ZASCA 156; 2016 (2) SA 522 (SCA), para 6).

105 Public Protector of South Africa, ‘“When Governance and Ethics Fail” A Report on an Investigation Into Allegations Of Maladministration, Systemic Corporate Governance Deficiencies, Abuse of Power and the Irregular Appointment of Mr. Hlaudi Motsoeneng by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)’ (Report No 23 of 2013/2014), para 6.1.3.7.

106 ibid para 2.1. In March 2013 the internal auditor Lorraine Francois stated that corporate governance structures were dysfunctional and recommended review by an external company. SizweNtsaluba-Gobodo prepared a report but Motsoeneng would not allow the report to be shown to the Board or released. Motsoeneng tried to ‘get rid’ of Francois who was reinstated by the CCMA (Public Protector’s Report, (n 105) paras 6.5.11–6.5.14.).

107 Public Protector’s Report, (n 105) para 2.1.6. For example Hosea Jiyane who survived discipline in 2012 on charges that appear to have been trumped up (see SABC v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration [2014] ZALCJHB 520).

108 Gugu Duda, a Chartered accountant was appointed as the GCFO in March 2012. The Public Protector found that her appointment was ‘unlawful’. She had not been shortlisted for the position and was interviewed at the ‘last minute’ (Public Protector’s Report, (n 105) paras 6.3.1.1–6.3.1.28). Her CV had been sent to the SABC by the Director General in the Department of Communications (Public Protector’s Report, (n 105) para 6.5.3). Duda was suspended five months after her appointment after fighting with Motsoeneng (Public Protector’s Report, (n 105) para 6.5.17). She said that Motsoeneng was ‘running the show’ instead of Makhobo, the GCEO (‘Gugu Duda: “I’m a Scapegoat”’ City Press (Johannesburg, 23 March 2014)).

109 Public Protector’s Report, (n 105) para 9.6.2.

110 ibid 10.4.4.

111 ibid 10.7.1.

112 ibid 10.7.2.

113 ibid.

114 ibid 11.3.2.1.

115 DA v SABC [2015] ZAWCHC 182; 2016 (3) SA 468 (WCC) [8].

116 ibid [4]. See also DA v Motsoeneng [2017] ZAWCHC 5; DA v SABC; DA v Motsoeneng [2016] ZAWCHC 188; SABC v DA [2015] ZASCA 156; DA v SABC [2014] ZAWCHC 161; 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC); DA v SABC [2015] ZAWCHC 46.

117 Ad Hoc committee (n 87) para 6.1.1. The Committee noted poor financial management (para 33.1). It was concerned at a change to the delegation of authority framework which allowed Executive Directors to approve transactions of up to 10 million rand. In their view this was possibly a precursor to a ’substantial number of transactions with irregularities’ (para 7.2.1). See also Lornavision (Pty) Ltd v SABC [2017] ZAGPJHC 208 where there were allegations of corruption against GCEO James Aguna.

118 Act 71 of 2008 (Companies Act).

119 Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA). In terms of s 49(2) (a) of the PFMA the Board is the Accounting Authority of the SABC.

120 Section 66(1) of the Companies Act and s13 (11) of the Broadcasting Act provide that the Board ‘controls the affairs of the corporation’.

121 Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Limited v MultiChoice (Pty) Limited [2016] ZACAC 3 [68].

123 Ad Hoc Committee (n 87) para 8.2.4.

124 David Segal, ‘How Bell Pottinger, P.R. Firm for Despots and Rogues, Met Its End in South Africa’ <www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/bell-pottinger-guptas-zuma-south-africa.html> accessed 25 November 2018.

125 A Cadbury, Committee Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee 1992) para 2.5. See also Thabane Tebello and Elizabeth Snyman van Deventer, ‘Pathological Corporate Governance Deficiencies in South Africa’s State-Owned Companies: A Critical Reflection’ (2018) 21 PELJ 3.

126 Broadcasting Act (n 2) s 6.

127 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, The King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, 2016 <www.iodsa.co.za/?page=AboutKingIV> accessed 25 November 2018. The Protocols on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector 2002 developed by the Department of Public Enterprises also have an impact here.

128 Ibid.

129 Preamble to Chapter II of the Broadcasting Act (n 2).

130 OECD, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (OECD Publishing 2015).

131 King (n 127) Principle 16.

132 Glenda Daniels, ‘SABC Censorship Saga’ (Seminar to the Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa, Mount Grace, Magaliesberg, 23 July 2016).

133 Broadcasting Act (n 2) s 13(1).

134 ibid s 13(5).

135 African Commission, ‘Resolution to Revise the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa’ ACHPR/Res. 338 (EXT.OS/XX) (2016) 20th Extra-Ordinary Session, held in Banjul, Islamic Republic of The Gambia, from 09 to 18 June 2016.

136 Broadcasting Act (n 2) s 13(2). Africa Governance Monitoring Advocacy Project, Open Society Foundation for South Africa and Open Society Media Program Public Broadcasting in Africa Series: South Africa (Open Society Institute Network Publication 2010) 139.

137 ibid.

138 Broadcasting Act (n 2) s13(4).

139 ibid s13 (1).

140 ibid s13(3).

141 Africa Governance Monitoring Advocacy Project, (n 136) 139.

142 Angela Quintal, ‘Mbeki’s SABC Board: The War Goes On’. (IOL, 23 December 2007) <www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mbekis-sabc-board-the-war-goes-on-383731> accessed 28 October 2018.

143 Angela Quintal and Siyabonga Mkhwanazi, ‘Mbeki will Still Appoint SABC Board’ (IOL, 22 December 2007) <www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mbeki-will-still-appoint-sabc-board-383657> accessed 28 October 2018.

144 SACP Statement on the appointment of the new SABC Board (23 December 2007) <www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2821> accessed 28 October 2018.

145 William Gumede, ‘Modernising the African National Congress: The Legacy of President Thabo Mbeki’ in State of the Nation: South Africa (HSRC 2008) 35, 41.

146 Department of Communications, White Paper on Broadcasting Policy (White Paper, 1998) 19.

147 Broadcasting Act (n 2) s 12.

148 Companies Act (n 118) s 66.

149 ibid s 13(1)(a).

150 Broadcasting Act (n 2) s 7(3).

151 MOI (20 September 2014) clause 13.5.3.

152 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v SABC; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 [87–117].

153 Broadcasting Act (n 2) s 14(1).

154 Ad Hoc Committee (n 87) para 9.3.4.

156 Ad Hoc Committee (n 84) para 23.1.6. Although the MOI is a public document available from the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPRO), our requests for the document were unsuccessful. Copies of various versions of the document were available in the Parliamentary hearings into the SABC in 2017 but even then parliamentarians had difficulty establishing which version applied.

157 According to the Minister’s evidence, she had briefed the Board and the Portfolio committee on the MOI and neither the Board or the committee had raised any difficulties. Ad Hoc Committee (n 87) para 9.1.2.

158 Broadcasting Act (n 2) s 15.

159 ibid s 15A.

160 ibid s15A.

161 ibid s 15A (1)(b)

162 On dissolution of the SABC Board in 2009 see Franz Kruger, ‘SABC Board is Victim of a Political Purge’ (Journalism.co.za, 22 June 2009) <http://journalism.co.za/sabc-board-is-victim-of-a-political-purge/> accessed 28 October 2018.

163 Amended MOI (n 151) Clause 14.

164 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) [117] and [142].

165 The problem of being inquorate had plagued the Board since 2015. Hope Zinde, Rachel Kalidass and Ronnie Lubisi were unlawfully removed after interference by the Minister. DA statement by Gavin Davis <www.polity.org.za/article/da-gavin-davis-says-muthambis-meddling-leaves-sabc-board-without-a-quorum-2015-06-24> accessed 28 October 2018.

166 Broadcasting Amendment Bill [B 39—2015] clause 3.

167 ibid clause 5 and 6.

168 ibid clause 2.

169 ibid clause 4.

170 There were also similar suggestions by Allister Sparks. Africa Governance Monitoring Advocacy Project (n 136) 141.

171 Thomas Gibbons, ‘Restraining the BBC: the 2016 Charter Settlement’ (2017) 9(1) Journal of Media Law, 28–44 at 34.

172 Charles Manga Fombad, ‘The Protection of Freedom of Expression in the Public Service Media in Southern Africa: A Botswana Perspective’ (2002) 65(5) Modern Law Review 649, 658. Also see Lyombe Eko, ‘Public Broadcasting in a Changing Political & Regulatory Environment: The Case of Africa’ (2000) 21(1) Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 85. A related argument is made in the context of Eastern Europe by Karol Jakubowicz, ‘Finding the Right Place on the Map: Prospects for Public Service Broadcasting in Post-Communist Countries’ in Karol Jakubowicz and Miklós Sükösd (eds), Finding the Right Place on the Map. Central and Eastern European media change in a Global Perspective (IntellectBooks 2008) 101–124. He states that Eastern European Public Broadcasters have fundamental problems resulting from ‘lack of social embeddedness of the idea of public service broadcasting and lack of a social constituency willing and able to support public service broadcasters and buttress its autonomy and independence’. He states that Public Service Broadcasters were ‘transplanted into post-communist countries in the process of “transformation by imitation”’ and consequently ‘they have not, generally speaking, been able to win support and a constituency in civil society’. (at 117)

173 Ndlela (n 29) 69.

174 See references cited in (n 18).

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