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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses three questions: (1) what would have been the growth and income trajectory of Syria in the absence of war; (2) given the war, what explains the reduction in economic growth; and (3) what potential growth scenarios for Syria there could be in the aftermath of war. Conflict impact estimates point to negative GDP growth of −12% on average over 2011–2018, with output contracting to about one-third of the 2010 level. In post-conflict simulation scenarios, the growth drivers are affected by the assumed levels of reconstruction assistance, repatriation of refugees, and productivity improvements associated with three political settlement outcomes: a baseline (Sochi-plus) moderate scenario, an optimistic (robust political settlement) scenario, and a pessimistic (de facto balance of power) scenario. Respectively for these scenarios, GDP per capita average growth in the next two decades is projected to be 6.1%, 8.2%, or 3.1%, assuming a final and stable resolution of the conflict.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to staff of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia including Ahmad Shikh Ebid for sharing information and data, as well as to Shanta Devarajan, Young Eun Kim, Aart Kraay, Aljaz Kuncic, Rabie Nasser, Khalid Abu-Ismail, and the reviewers and editor of MEDJ for helpful comments. Nurlina Shaharuddin and Izzati Ab Razak provided excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. The paper represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 World Development Indicators (WDI) data for Syria is available up to 2007. For 2008–2010, we use data on GDP growth from the World Bank’s internal macroeconomic and fiscal model (MFMod), November 2017 vintage. See Burns et al. (Citation2019) for more information on the model.
2 ILO-modeled estimates are based on projections for GDP-related variables and population structure. The 2013 estimates draw on the IMF WEO April 2013 and United Nations (Citation2013). However, the IMF stopped publishing projections for Syria effective 2012, and ILO uses the regional median growth to extrapolate GDP growth for Syria.
3 See the documentation, ‘Human Capital in PWT 9.0’. (https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/human_capital_in_pwt_90.pdf).
4 TFP is measured by growth accounting. Syria data for output, physical capital, human capital, and employed persons are from PWT 9. Labor share is proxied by the average for four relatively conflict-free middle-income MENA economies (Djibouti, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia).
5 Source: http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=108723.
6 The nomenclature follows Barro and Lee (Citation2013, Citation2015).
7 We base the enrollment adjustment factor formula on Barro and Lee (Citation2013) (their Table A.2).
8 Source: http://uis.unesco.org/country/SY
9 We use a simple average calculation to obtain the 2015 primary enrollment rate based on a net enrollment rate for school-age children of 60% (UNICEF, Citation2016) and secondary enrollment rate of 45%. Net enrollment rate for school-age age children appears to have been relatively stable after 2015, amounting to 61% in 2018 (World Bank, Citation2019).
10 Milton (Citation2019) discusses how Syria’s higher education system survived quantity wise, despite general expectations that higher education suffers relatively more during conflict, but that quality had been eroded and political control over campuses increased.
11 The UN principle of non-refoulement, codified in Article 33 of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, requires that ‘no contracting state shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened.’
12 The limitations that the UN non-refoulement principle places on repatriation is frequently resented by states. Host countries are often impatient to see uninvited refugees leave. Countries of origin are sometimes impatient to see them return and signal the end of conflict. Moreover, donor states are eager to bring an end to the long-term refugee assistance programs that they fund.
13 This is based on the 2017 estimate of the trade balance share of GDP by ESCWA (Citation2018).
14 20-year average, 1991–2010 (WEO data).
15 From our calculations using details in the UN population statistics, this is in addition to about 112,000 returnees from mid-2019 to mid-2020, giving a total of 4.3 million returnees, or 76% of registered refugees residing in neighboring countries over 2019–2035.
16 UIS: the net primary enrollment rate rose from 81.9% in 1973 to 94.8% in 1987 while the net secondary enrollment rate increased from 39.3% in 2000 to 66.9% in 2010.