Palestinian public opinion and terrorism: A two-way street?

Abstract

The study addressed the relationship between terror attacks and public opinion among potentially supportive communities. We investigated whether terror attacks by Palestinian groups predict and are predicted by Palestinian public opinion. We examined the relationship of public opinion to total terror attacks, suicide attacks, and attacks by different groups. Increases in attacks predicted subsequent increases in public support for violence. Suicide attacks did not have a unique effect on support for violence, but suicide attacks by Hamas predicted increased support. Furthermore, increased public support for violence predicted subsequent increases in attacks by Fatah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), as well as suicide attacks by Fatah and Hamas, but not PIJ. The findings suggest that effects of terrorism extend beyond targeted opponents to potentially supportive communities and that terrorism-using groups relying on public support may regulate their militant activities according to public opinion.

Keywords:

• public opinion
• terrorism
• Palestinians
• Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Acknowledgements

This material is based upon work supported by the Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland Security under Grant Number 2008-ST-108-000003. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the US Department of Homeland Security. The work of Anna Sheveland does not reflect the views of the Fors Marsh group. The authors are indebted to Clark McCauley and to Christopher M. Federico for comments on an earlier draft.

Notes

1. The present focus on terror attacks by Palestinians against Israelis does not deny the existence of terror attacks by Israelis against Palestinians.

2. Note that this definition excludes attacks against strictly military targets from the ICT database.

3. The JMCC database can be accessed at http://www.jmcc.org/polls.aspx.

4. Although the item referring to support for the Intifada does not directly refer to support for violence, it is noteworthy that the Al-Aqsa Intifada, ongoing at the time of these surveys, involved mainly violent attacks rather than non-violent protests (unlike the first Intifada). The high correlation of this item with the item referring to support for suicide attacks also leads us to believe that most of the respondents understood ‘support for the Intifada’ as ‘support for the violent Intifada’.

5. For a statement by Khaled Mash'al, head of the Hamas political bureau (originally from an interview given to Al-Manar Television based in Lebanon) see http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/910.htm. For a Statement by Mahmoud 'Abbas of Fatah, Palestinian Authority President (originally part of a speech that appeared in Al-Ayyam newspaper) see http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3550.htm.

6. See also the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/index.html and the Center for Development Studies at Birzeit University. http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/.