Defending seabed lines of communication

ABSTRACT

Australia is yet to adequately grapple with the unique challenges that critical seabed infrastructure protection poses to its defence and national security. While the paramount importance of Australia's sea lines of communication are widely understood, Australia's seabed lines of communication are understudied and underappreciated. This article lays the foundation for an Australian strategy to protect critical seabed infrastructure that constitutes seabed lines of communications. The article first overviews critical seabed infrastructure in Australia's immediate region. Second, it examines various suspected cases of seabed warfare in Europe and the Indo-Pacific which targeted critical seabed infrastructure. Third, the article analyses Australia's response to date, before, fourth and finally, outlining how Australia, and in particular the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), ought to respond to the growing threat to seabed lines of communication. By systematically analysing seabed warfare trends since 2021 using reputable journalism, think tank reports and fresh regional responses, this article demonstrates Australia's seabed vulnerabilities, and novel resiliency strategies.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Besides the Suez Canal, where data is generally transmitted terrestrially across Egypt.

2 Australia's planned Maritime Strategic Fleet will consist of up to 12 privately owned and commercially operated Australian flagged and crewed vessels. Once established, these vessels could be requisitioned by the Commonwealth when required in a crisis or emergency to underpin Australia's national resilience and maritime capability.

3 Australia Submarine Cable Map (TeleGeography, June 12, 2024), https://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/.

Additional information

Funding

This article was written and received funding as part of the author’s Non-Residential Fellowship with the Royal Australian Navy’s Sea Power Centre – Australia. All views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the Royal Australian Navy or any other organisation.

Notes on contributors

Samuel Bashfield

Samuel Bashfield is research fellow with the Australia India Institute's Defence Program at the University of Melbourne. He is also PhD candidate at the Australian National University's National Security College and Non-Residential Fellow at the Royal Australian Navy's Sea Power Centre – Australia. Sam's research interests include (modern and Cold War-era) Indo-Pacific security, defence and foreign policy, Indo-Pacific security architecture, maritime security, nuclear issues, the rules-based order and technology governance. His thesis examines the British Indian Ocean Territory's Cold War history, focussing on Britain's withdrawal ‘East of Suez’ and the Anglo-US special relationship in the Indian Ocean.