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ABSTRACT
This article discusses the relationship between John Ruggie's ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’ and the UN ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, tort law and transnational business human rights self-regulation. In a first step, it highlights the parallels between the recent attempts to introduce human rights obligations to transnational corporations, as laid down in the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles, with tort law principles, doctrine and interpretation. It thereby considers recent developments related to the specific responsibilities of parent companies for their subsidiaries' activities and of core companies for their supply chains. In a second step, it conceptualises the potential for progressive mutual impact and mutual learning, not only between tort law and public international soft law, but especially with regard to the legal effects of transnational self-regulatory regimes like codes of conduct and best practices. The article elaborates that these transnational self-regulatory regimes and best practices have the capacity to constitute legal minimum standards of care and, in particular, standards concerning corporation-wide or supply chain-wide tortious responsibility. As a consequence, the interplay between the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles, transnational business self-regulation and tort law could lead to an upward helix development of the consideration of human rights in corporate practice and in raising legal requirements for parent and core companies.
Notes
1 See UN Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct, Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, UN Doc E/1990/94 (12 June 1990); Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (draft Norms) UN Doc E/CN4/Sub2/2003/12/Rev2 (26 August 2003).
2 See e.g. the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations as first adopted in 1976 <http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text>; the revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of 2011 have at least been equipped with certain enforcement and sanction mechanisms, see <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf> . Another example would be the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy of the ILO <http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm> all urls last accessed 9 February 2017.
3 See e.g. the UN Global Compact: <www.unglobalcompact.org> accessed 9 February 2017.
4 Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, 24 June 2014, A/HRC/26/L22/Rev1; Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 23 June 2014, A/HRC/26/L1.
5 J Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights', UN doc A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
6 J Ruggie, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (Guiding Principles), UN doc A/HRC/17/31 (31 March 2011) <http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17.31.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
7 J Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights, The Evolving International Agenda’ (2007) 101 The American Journal of International Law 818, 824.
8 The most prominent private regime is the Forest Stewardship Council, on which see e.g. E Meidinger, ‘Multi-Interest Self-Governance through Global Product Certification Programmes’ in O Dilling, M Herberg and G Winter (eds), Responsible Business: Self-Governance and the Law in Transnational Economic Transactions (Hart Publishing 2007) 259ff.
9 For the transnational German chemicals industry, see M Herberg, ‘Codes of Conduct und kommunikative Vernunft’ (2001) Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 25ff.
10 In this article, the term ‘core company’ refers to the company that is central to a buyer-driven chain of independent suppliers that do not form part of the core company's corporation (e.g. Nike, Apple or KiK).
11 On the fierce resistance of industry against any binding character of that framework, see only D Kinley and R Chambers, ‘The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 447, 448–9.
12 The Framework was preceded by a comprehensive compilation of all types of existing frameworks; see Ruggie (n 7), 827–8. Materials are available at <https://business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-special-representative-on-business-human-rights> accessed 9 February 2017.
13 Guiding Principles (n 6), Introduction, para 14.
14 See also R Mares, ‘A Gap in the Responsibility to Respect Human Rights’ (2010) 36 Monash University Law Review 33 <http://rwi.lu.se/app/uploads/2012/08/A-Gap-in-the-Corporate-Responsibility.pdf> 8–11.
15 Guiding Principles (n 6), Commentary on Principle 19.
16 Ruggie Framework (n 5), para 56.
17 ibid, paras 60–64.
18 J Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, UN Doc A/HRC/11/13 (22 April 2009) para 71.
19 See Ruggie Framework (n 5) para 7. See also A Sanders, ‘The Impact of the “Ruggie Framework” and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights on Transnational Human Rights Litigation’ (2014) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 18/2014, 1, with further references.
20 Ruggie Framework (n 5), para 24.
21 See Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580.
22 ibid.
23 See also Mares (n 14) 58–60.
24 See G Brüggemeier, Common Principles of Tort Law (BIICL 2004) 65–70.
25 On parallels between the Guiding Principles and the tort of negligence, see also Mares (n 14) 37–46; Sanders (n 19) 14–20.
26 On a recent attempt to revive the company law discussion, see P Muchlinski, ‘Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for Corporate Law, Governance and Regulation’ (2012) 22 Business Ethics Quarterly 145, 151–153.
27 See e.g. HP Westermann, ‘Umwelthaftung im Konzern’ (1991) 155 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht 223, 239–40. Regarding the relevant standard of a ‘reasonable enterprise’ see below 3. III.
28 Mares (n 14) 48.
29 See e.g. BGH, 17/1/1989 (1989) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift – Rechtsprechungsreport 394. For an application to corporations, see P Hommelhoff, ‘Produkthaftung im Konzern’ (1990) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 761, 764, on tort law rules for product liability.
30 See JE Antunes, ‘Neue Wege im Konzernhaftungsrecht–Nochmals: Der “Amoco Cadiz”-Fall’ in UH Schneider and others (eds), Festschrift für Marcus Lutter zum 70. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt Verlag 2000) 1007.
31 For details, see H Ward, ‘Towards a New Convention on Corporate Accountability? Some Lessons from the Thor Chemicals and Cape PLC Cases’ (2001) Yearbook of International Environmental Law 105, 113ff; P Muchlinski, ‘Corporations in International Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction and the United Kingdom Asbestos Cases’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 1, 3ff.
32 [2012] EWCA Civ 525. For detailed analysis, see M Petrin, ‘Assumption of Responsibility in Corporate Groups: Chandler v Cape plc’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 603ff; S Demeyere, ‘Liability of a Mother Company for its Subsidiary in French, Belgian, and English Law’ (2015) European Review of Private Law 385, 402–6.
33 Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525, [80].
34 On this, see below 3. II. iii.
35 See also Petrin (n 32) 614.
36 [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC).
37 See, amongst others, Appeal Court of the Hague, 18/12/2015, Dooh et al v Royal Dutch Shell et al ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3586, [3.2] <http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3586> accessed 9 February 2017.
38 District Court of the Hague, 30/1/2013, Fidelis Ayoro Oguru et al v Royal Dutch Shell plc et al [4.30] and [4.34]–[4.39] <https://milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/bezwaren-uitspraken/final-judgment-oguru-vs-shell-oil-spill-goi> accessed 9 February 2017. See also L Enneking, ‘The Future of Foreign Direct Liability? Exploring the International Relevance of the Dutch Shell Nigeria Case’ (2014) 10 Utrecht Law Review 44. The Appeal Court of the Hague has not decided on that issue yet.
39 See P Wesche and M Saage-Maaß, ‘Holding Companies Liable for Human Rights Abuses Related to Foreign Subsidiaries and Suppliers before German Civil Courts: Lessons from Jabir and Others v KiK’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 370, 372–3.
40 Choc v Hubday Minerals Inc [2013] ONSC 1414.
41 See Demeyere (n 32) 393.
42 See also Mares (n 14) 47.
43 On which see Brüggemeier, Common Principles (n 24) 117–27 and 132–7 concerning enterprise liability in German and US-American tort law.
44 See A Matusche-Beckmann, Das Organisationsverschulden (Mohr Siebeck 2001) 37ff.; G Brüggemeier, Prinzipien des Haftungsrechts (Nomos 1999) 116ff; Common Principles (n 24) 132ff concerning enterprise liability in US-American tort law.
45 See G Spindler, Unternehmensorganisationspflichten (Heymann 2001); Brüggemeier, Common Principles (n 24) 126–8.
46 See P Rott and V Ulfbeck, ‘Supply Chain Liability of Multilateral Corporations?’ (2015) European Review of Private Law 415, 426 f with further references.
47 See Hommelhoff (n 29) 763ff. See also Spindler (n 45) 945ff.
48 See G Brüggemeier, ‘Enterprise Liability for Environmental Damage: German and European Law’ in G Teubner, L Farmer and D Murphy (eds), Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility (Wiley 1992) 90ff for the organisation of enterprises. See also C Glinski, Die rechtliche Bedeutung der privaten Regulierung globaler Produktionsstandards (Nomos 2010) 346–50, with further references.
49 See Ward (n 31) 120, concerning Thor Chemicals.
50 [2014] EWCA Civ 635. See also Demeyere (n 32) 405 f.
51 Critical comments by Petrin (n 32) 618.
52 See also A Sanger, ‘Crossing the Corporate Veil: The Duty of Care Owed by a Parent Company to the Employees of its Subsidiary’ (2012) 7 Cambridge Law Journal 478, 480.
53 See Glinski (n 48) 349 f.
54 C McIvor, Third Party Liability in Tort (Hart Publishing 2006) 12. See also Mares (n 14) 49–50; Sanders (n 19) 18–20.
55 Guiding Principles (n 6), Commentary on Principle 19.
56 Rott and Ulfbeck (n 46). See also Sanger (n 52) 480; C van Dam, ‘Tort Law and Human Rights: Brothers in Arms’ (2011) 2 Journal of European Tort Law 221, 251; Demeyere (n 32) 390.
57 See above, at 3. II. ii. See also Wesche and Saage-Maaß (n 39).
58 Abdur Rahaman et al v JCPenney Corp Inc et al, case number 1:15-cv-00619, in the US District Court for the District of Columbia.
59 Das v George Weston Limited, No CV-15-526628 (Ont Superior Ct filed Apr 22, 2015).
60 See generally (but with special focus to German and US American tort law) Brüggemeier, Common Principles (n 24) 5ff, 65ff, 76ff. For objective standards in the different European legal orders see e.g. W Wurmnest, Grundzüge eines europäischen Haftungsrechts (Mohr Siebeck 2003) 113ff.
61 See Brüggemeier, Common Principles (n 24) 66ff.
62 See e.g. Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691.
63 See e.g. BGH, 10/2/1987 (1987) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1479; G Wagner, ‘§ 823 BGB’ in M Habersack (ed), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol 5 (6th edn, CH Beck 2013) margin note 37.
64 See Wagner (n 63) margin note 37.
65 See e.g. Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield 408 Mich. 579, 614 f 292 NW2d 880, 892 (1980).
66 See Glinski (n 48) 265–6.
67 For German law, see e.g. OLG Dusseldorf, 15/1/1999, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift – Rechtsprechungsreport 2000, 168; for English law, see e.g. Ward v The Ritz Hotel (London) [1992] PIQR 315; for US American law, see Meidinger (n 8) 282.
68 See e.g. LG Berlin, 18/10/1996, (1997) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift – Entscheidungsdienst Versicherungs- und Haftungsrecht 94; Glinski (n 48) 266–9.
69 Notably, this determination of the minimum standard does not preclude producers from taking different measures as long as the same safety level is achieved. See J Falke, Rechtliche Aspekte der Normung in den EG-Mitgliedstaaten und der EFTA, Bd. 3: Deutschland (European Commission 2000) 453ff.
70 See also M Herberg, Globalisierung und private Selbstregulierung (Campus 2007), 108ff.
71 The fact that different categories of producers in the same line of business face different requirements under tort law is likely not to be a violation of international law, in particular of the principle of national treatment that is usually enshrined in investment agreements, provided that the producer's nationality and its link with a foreign investor as such are not considered to be relevant criteria.
72 Guiding Principles (n 6) Commentary on Principle 17
73 See Brüggemeier, Common Principles (n 24) 66–7. For US tort law see e.g. Texas and Pacific Ry Co v Beymer 189 US 468 (1903), 470 (Holmes J); ‘The TJ Hooper’ 60 F 2d 737 (2d Cir 1932, Learned Hand CJ). For the position of English law see e.g. Edward Wong Finance Co Ltd v Johnson Stokes and Master [1984] AC 296.
74 For detailed analysis, see Glinski (n 48) 270–8.
75 Falke (n 69) 452.
76 K Sach, Genehmigung als Schutzschild? (Duncker & Humblot 1994), 239; Falke (n 69) 451ff.
77 J Falke and H Schepel, Legal Aspects of Standardisation in the Member States of the EC and EFTA, vol. 1, Comparative Report (European Communities 2000) 235.
78 ibid 233, with further references.
79 See e.g. BGH, 27/9/1994 (1994) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3349 (outdated standard); BGH, 13/3/2001, (2001) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2019 (incomplete standard); OLG Zweibrücken, 20/9/1976, (1977) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 111 (unusual circumstances).
80 BGH, 29/11/1983 (1984) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 801.
81 See Guiding Principles (n 6) Commentary on Principle 17.
82 See also Brüggemeier (n 48) 91–2; KA Hofstetter, ‘The Ecological Liability of Corporate Groups: Comparing US and European Trends’ in G Teubner, L Farmer and D Murphy (eds), Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility (Wiley 1994) 99, 109.
83 See Herberg (n 9) 39.
84 See in particular Sanders (n 19) 23–6.
85 In particular Mares (n 14) 37–9.
86 Mares (n 14) 24, concerning the OECD Guidelines before the recent revision.
87 Mares (n 14) 27–8. In fact, the Ruggie Framework does not contradict the legal separation of parent companies and their subsidiaries. Ruggie himself argues that there should be no automatic liability of parent companies for the acts of their subsidiaries. Rather, parent companies can avoid liability by establishing an appropriate corporation-wide human rights management system. See also the Guiding Principles (n 6), Commentary on Principle 17.
88 Mares (n 14) 48.
89 See also Mares (n 14) 37–41; D Davitti, ‘Refining the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework for Business and Human Rights and its Guiding Principles’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 55, 72–4.
90 See also Sanders (n 19) 23–6. Davitti (n 89) 72 even argues that this (progressive) interpretation of tort law could also be derived from the duty to regulate for home states in the first pillar of the Ruggie Framework.
91 See also Sanders (n 19) 25–6. Sanders, however, has observed that until now there have only been two short references to the Ruggie Framework in litigation, namely Doe v Nestle 748 F Supp 2d 1057 (CD Cal 2010) 1141 and n 67; Doe VIII v Exxon Mobil 654 F 3d 11 (DC Cir 2011) [4] (and n 9). In Choc v Hubday Minerals Inc, 2013 ONSC 1414, Amnesty International Canada has, as intervenor for the purpose of making submissions with respect to issues of law, and particularly international law and standards and norms concerning the existence or scope of the duty of care, referred, amongst others, to the Guiding Principles.
92 On that, see above, at 3. III. ii. In favour of the latter, Sanders (n 19) 25.
93 On the interaction between normative requirements and transnational best practice, see Brüggemeier (n 48) 91–2; Hofstetter (n 82) 109.