The ICCPR in Armed Conflict: An Appraisal of the Human Rights Committee’s Engagement with International Humanitarian Law

ABSTRACT

The present article examines the Human Rights Committee’s pronouncements on the relationship between the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and international humanitarian law (IHL), taking into account the developments in the jurisprudence of other human rights bodies. The analysis aims to clarify the theoretical underpinnings of the relationship between the ICCPR and IHL, paying special attention to the complementarity perspective and the interpretive principle of systemic integration. The article critically examines the Human Rights Committee’s understanding of how the Covenant applies in armed conflict, specifically in relation to the protection of the rights to life and liberty and the regulation of the use of force and security detention; it considers both the shortcomings and the innovative aspects of the Committee’s interpretations. The analysis concludes by exploring the normative and practical implications deriving from the concurrent application of IHL and the Covenant, particularly with regard to the Committee’s ability to review state action in armed conflict, the duty to investigate violations, and the right to a remedy and reparation for victims.

KEYWORDS:

• Human Rights Committee
• ICCPR
• Armed Conflict
• International Humanitarian Law
• Human Rights Law
• Use of Force
• Security Detention
• Principle of Systemic Integration

Notes

1 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Reports 179 (2004) 106: ‘[T]he Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict … ’

2 René Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (CUP 2002); Roberta Arnold and Noelle Quenivet (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law (Brill/Nijhoff 2008); Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar 2013); Erika De Wet and Jann Kleffner (eds), Converge and Conflicts of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in Military Operations (Pretoria University Law Press 2014); Gerhard Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Law, Practice, Policy (CUP 2015); Daragh Murray (ed), Practitioners’ Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict (OUP 2016).

3 A notable exception in this sense is David Weissbrodt, ‘The Role of the Human Rights Committee in Interpreting and Developing Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 1185 31 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, who offers a comprehensive analysis of the Committee's jurisprudence touching upon IHL-related issues.

4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171.

5 A related theme is the extraterritorial applicability of the ICCPR. An analysis of this complicated and well-rehearsed topic falls outside the scope of this article. For present purposes, the Committee's established position that the Covenant applies extraterritorially will be accepted without further discussion. See Human Rights Committee (HRC), ‘General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 11; ‘Concluding Observations: Israel’ (21 November 2014) CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, 5(a). Note that all General Comments cited in this article are produced by the CCPR (unless otherwise specified).

6 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision) ICTY-94-1 [2 October 1995] 70.

7 e.g. Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 287 [GC IV].

8 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 3 [AP I].

9 The existence of a NIAC also requires that the armed group be sufficiently organised and that hostilities reach a certain level of intensity. See Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) ICTY-94-1 [7 May 1997] 562.

10 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 610 [AP II].

11 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol 1 (CUP 2005).

12 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Judgment) ICJ Rep 114 [1986] 219.

13 Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) IT-94-1-A [15 July 1999] 137, 145. For an overview of the complexity of conflict classification, see Sylvain Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations’ (2009) 69–91 International Review of the Red Cross.

14 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (AComHPR), ‘General Comment 3: The Right to Life (Article 4)’ AComHPR 57th Ordinary Session [4–18 November 2015] 33.

15 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) ICTY-96-23 and ICTY-96-23/1 [12 June 2002] 57–59.

16 Noam Lubell and Nathan Derejko, ‘A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict’ (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 65, 75–76.

17 Michelle Lesh, ‘Interplay As Regards Conduct of Hostilities’ in De Wet and Kleffner (n 2) 99–120, 105. For an analysis of this question, see Ryan Goodman, ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’ (2013) 24 European Journal of International Law 819.

18 Lesh (n 17) 100–2.

19 Françoise Hampson, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law’ in Scott Sheeran and Nigel Rodley (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Routledge 2013) 185–213, 191–2; Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Theories on the Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ in Kolb and Gaggioli (n 2) 53–64; Oberleitner (n 2) 80–127.

20 See section 4 below.

21 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Rep 226 [1996] 25.

22 Jean d’Aspremont and Elodie Tranchez, ‘The Quest for a Non-Conflictual Coexistence of International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law: Which Role for the Lex Specialis Principle?’ in Kolb and Gaggioli (n 2) 223–250, 239; Lesh (n 17) 112.

23 International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) 56–57, 88, 102.

24 Inter alia: Nancie Prud’homme, ‘Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?’ (2007) 40 Israel Law Review 356; Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties. Law, Principles, and Policy (OUP 2011) 229–61; Oberleitner (n 2) 95ff; Cedric De Koker and Tom Ruys, ‘Foregoing Lex Specialis? Exclusivist v Symbiotic Approaches to the Concurrent Application of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ (2016) 240 1 Revue Belge de Droit International.

25 Françoise Hampson, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 549, 558.

26 d’Aspremont and Tranchez (n 22) 239. Although in different terms, other commentators made similar points. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Relevance of Paragraph 25 of the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons’ (2004) 98 American Society of International Law Proceedings 353, 361; Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law (CUP 2003) 410.

27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331.

28 For an analysis of this provision, see Panos Merkouris, Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration (Brill/Nijhoff 2015).

29 In general terms, art 31(3)(c) VCLT conveys the need to interpret international norms against ‘the whole background of international law’; Mark Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Brill/Nijhoff 2009) 432.

30 ILC (n 23) 419.

31 d’Aspremont and Tranchez (n 22) 236.

32 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 21) 25.

33 Walter Kälin, ‘The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Relationship with International Humanitarian Law’ Expert Meeting on the Supervision of the Lawfulness of Detention during Armed Conflict (Geneva 24–25 July 2004) 25–34, 30–31.

34 Molina (Ecuador v Colombia) (Admissibility) IAComHR Report 112/10 (21 October 2010) 121; Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Series C no 134 (15 September 2005) 115; Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda AComHPR Communication 227/1999 (May 2003) 70, 78; Hassan v United Kingdom ECtHR App 29750/09 (16 September 2014) 102.

35 See section 4.1 below.

36 Coard v United States (Merits) IAComHR Report 109/99 (29 September 1999) 42; Molina (n 34) 122.

37 ICJ Wall (n 1) 106; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (Merits) ICJ Rep 168 [2005] 216–19.

38 Prud’homme (n 24) 382, 384, 386; Milanovic (n 24) 251, 260.

39 ICCPR art 4(2).

40 ‘General Comment 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person)’ CCPR/C/GC/35 (16 December 2014) 65–67.

41 ‘General Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4)’ CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (31 August 2001) 3.

42 Kälin (n 33) 27–28.

43 ‘General Comment 29’ (n 41) 3.

44 The rules on internment will be discussed in section 4.2.

45 e.g. GC IV art 146.

46 ‘General Comment 29’ (n 41) 16.

47 ‘General Comment 31’ (n 5) 11.

48 See sections 4.2–4.3 below.

49 Walter Kälin, ‘Universal Human Rights Bodies and International Humanitarian Law’ in Kolb and Gaggioli (n 2) 441–465, 443.

50 See also ‘Concluding Observations: Israel’ CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (18 August 1998) 10; ‘Concluding Observations: Germany’ CCPR/CO/80/DEU (4 May 2004) 11.

51 ‘Second Periodic Report: Israel’ CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (4 December 2001) 8; ‘Fourth Periodic Report: USA’ CCPR/C/USA/4 (22 May 2012) 507; ‘Fourth Periodic Report: Israel’ CCPR/C/ISR/4 (12 December 2013) 47.

52 ‘Concluding Observations: USA’ CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (18 December 2006) 5. In a similar vein, see Weissbrodt (n 3) 1224–5. See also Kälin, ‘Universal Human Rights Bodies’ (n 49) 444: ‘[IHL] with its specific rules for a specific situation – i.e. that of armed conflict – complements the more general and generally applicable human rights guarantees.’

53 ‘General Comment 31’ (n 5) 11.

54 Robert Goldman, ‘Extraterritorial Application of the Human Rights to Life and Personal Liberty, including Habeas Corpus, during Situations of Armed Conflict’ in Kolb and Gaggioli (n 2) 104–124, 112.

55 This categorisation is borrowed from Robert Cryer, ‘The Interplay of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Approach of the ICTY’ (2009) 14 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 1, 4.

56 IAComHR Molina (n 34) 121; Massacres of El Mozote v El Salvador (Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACtHR Series C 252 (25 October 2012) 141; ECtHR Hassan (n 34) 102.

57 Article 9(2–5) regulates the rights of detained persons.

58 ‘General Comment 35’ (n 40) 15.

59 ibid 64 (footnotes omitted).

60 Being adversary combatants, prisoners of war (POWs) can be interned for the whole duration of the conflict. Since in this respect no issue arises concerning the grounds for and review of detention, the internment of POWs will not be considered further.

61 To be precise, GC IV regulates the detention of so-called protected persons, i.e. non-nationals of the detaining State who find themselves in the adversary's hands or in occupied territory. See GC IV art 4.

62 GC IV art 42(1). This ground also covers civilians detained during the invasion phase, before a territory is effectively occupied.

63 ibid art 78(1).

64 ibid arts 43(1), 78(2).

65 ibid arts 46(1), 132(1)–133(1). For a comprehensive analysis of internment in IACs, see Jelen Pejic, ‘Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and other Situations of Violence’ (2005) 87 International Review of the Red Cross 375.

66 Goldman (n 54) 119–20; Pejic (n 65) 385–87; Prosecutor v Delalic (Judgment) IT-96-21-A [20 February 2001] 320–22.

67 ‘General Comment 35’ (n 40) 66. See also ‘General Comment 29’ (n 41) 3. The IAComHR took a similar view: see Coard (n 36) 54–55.

68 Kälin, ‘The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (n 33) 31–32.

69 IAComHR Coard (n 36) 42. The case refers to the security detention of six individuals during the US invasion of Grenada in 1983. See also ‘Report on Terrorism and Human Rights’ IAComHR OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116 (22 October 2002) 141.

70 IAComHR Coard (n 36) 42, 54–55. See also Goldman (n 54) 118. This commentator refers to the power to detain POWs. Yet, since what matters is that IHL actually authorises and regulates detention, the same reasoning may be applied to the internment of civilians.

71 ECtHR Hassan (n 34) 104.

72 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 222 [ECHR].

73 ECtHR Hassan (n 34) 97.

74 To reach this conclusion, the ECtHR relied on two arguments: (a) a purported States Parties’ practice not to lodge formal derogations in relation to the internment of civilians in IACs; (b) the need to interpret the ECHR in harmony with IHL: see Hassan (n 34) 100–02. The ECtHR's reasoning has been criticised by a minority of judges: see Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Spano Joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku and Kalaydjieva 11–15; also Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, ‘The Grand Chamber Judgment in Hassan v UK’ (EJIL Talk! 16 September 2014) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-grand-chamber-judgment-in-hassan-v-uk/> accessed 19 May 2017.

75 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges (Opinion Paper, November 2014) 6.

76 For an analysis of this topic, see Els Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed Conflict (Hart 2013); Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts (OUP 2016).

77 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB) 228–68; Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843 251.

78 ICRC (n 75) 7.

79 ibid 8.

80 With reference to the ECHR, see Serdar Mohammed [2014] (n 77) 293.

81 Goldman (n 54) 121. In passing, it is worth pointing out that certain domestic courts held that a Security Council's resolution adopted under Chapter VII may provide a State with the authority to detain on security grounds in NIACs. See Serdar Mohammed [2015] (n 77) 162–63; Al-Waheed v Ministry of Defence and Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2 134 (Lord Wilson).

82 Shaheed Fatima, ‘UN HRC's General Comment on the Right to Liberty and Security: A Missed Opportunity? (Part Two)’ (Just Security 20 November 2014) <https://www.justsecurity.org/17596/human-rights-committees-general-comment-no-35-security-detention/> accessed 10 May 2017.

83 ‘General Comment 35’ (n 40) 66.

84 Fatima (n 82).

85 See section 4.1 above.

86 ‘General Comment 35’ (n 40) 64.

87 Coard (n 36) 52–61.

88 Hassan (n 34) 105.

89 ibid 106. One commentator already reads such requirements into GC IV. See Pejic (n 65) 385–87.

90 Guerrero v Colombia Communication R.11/45 CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979 (31 March 1982) 13.1–13.3; Nigel Rodley, ‘Integrity of the Person’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights Law (OUP 2014) 174–194, 186.

91 ‘Draft General Comment 36: Article 6 (Right to Life)’ CCPR/C/GC/R.36/Rev.2 (2 September 2015) 18.

92 ibid 13, 63.

93 ‘Concluding Observations: USA’ CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (23 April 2014) 9.

94 Avilan v Colombia IAComHR Report no 26/97 (30 September 1997) 167–74; Santo Domingo Massacre v Colombia IACtHR Series C 259 (30 November 2012) 211–37; AComHPR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 14) 32.

95 AP I arts 48, 51–52. The principle of distinction dictates that only combatants and persons taking direct part in hostilities may be lawfully targeted; civilians cannot be the object of attacks.

96 AP I art 51(5)(b). The principle of proportionality regulates the lawfulness of so-called collateral damage, which is prohibited only when it is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage an attack anticipates to achieve. The assessment of whether or not collateral damage is excessive is always context-dependent. See Emily Crawford and Alison Pert, International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2015) 175.

97 AP I art 57. The principle of precaution prescribes that in the choice of means and methods of warfare, as well as in the planning and conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare civilians and to prevent or minimise collateral damage.

98 In NIACs, AP II art 13 prohibits attacks on civilians. It also acknowledges that civilians lose their protection when, and only for such time that, they take direct part in hostilities.

99 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (n 11) Rules 1, 6, 14–15. For a comprehensive analysis of the IHL rules governing the conduct of hostilities in NIACs, see Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (OUP 2012) 336–429.

100 One major issue, which falls outside the scope of the present article, is the way a State determines that a civilian is taking direct part in hostilities. This assessment has the effect of changing the legal paradigm on the use of force – from law enforcement to conduct of hostilities, and vice versa – and consequently determining whether it is IHL or human rights law that governs the targeting of an individual. See Lesh (n 17) 109–12.

101 See section 2.

102 AComHPR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 14) 33.

103 ‘Concluding Observations: USA’ (2014) (n 93) 9: ‘[T]he Committee remains concerned about the State party's very broad approach to the definition and geographical scope of “armed conflict”, including … the unclear position on the nexus that should exist between any particular use of lethal force and any specific theatre of hostilities … ’

104 ‘Draft General Comment 36’ (n 91) 11.

105 McCann v United Kingdom ECtHR App 18984/91 (27 September 1995).

106 ibid 150, 194. In the case at hand, the ECtHR concluded that the individual soldiers shot the suspected terrorist in the honest belief that the latter posed an imminent threat. On the other hand, it found that the UK violated article 2 ECHR because it did not control and organise the operation in a way that would have prevented the death of the three suspects – e.g. through prior arrest: ibid 195–214.

107 Ergi v Turkey ECtHR Apps no 66/1997/850/1057 (28 July 1998) 79; Isayeva v Russia ECtHR App no 57950/00 (24 February 2005) 176. Although these cases regarded incidents that had occurred during NIACs, the ECtHR judged the facts against the law enforcement rather than the conduct of hostilities paradigm. For an analysis of this jurisprudence, see Noëlle Quénivet, ‘The Right to Life in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ in Arnold and Quenivet (n 2) 331–354.

108 AP I art 57.

109 ‘Draft General Comment 36’ (n 91) 63.

110 AComHPR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 14) 32.

111 ‘Draft General Comment 36’ (n 91) 63.

112 American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969) 1144 UNTS 144.

113 IACtHR Santo Domingo Massacre (n 94) 237.

114 ibid 211–37.

115 ‘Concluding Observations’ (2014) (n 93) 9(a), (d).

116 ‘Draft General Comment 36’ (n 91) 29–30. Alleged violations of the right to liberty are to be investigated only when amounting to enforced disappearance. In cases of arbitrary detention, a State is only obliged to release the person and compensate her/him.

117 Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010, ‘Second Report: Israel's Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to International Law’ (February 2013) 73–77.

118 ‘Concluding Observations: USA’ (2014) (n 93) 9(e).

119 ‘Concluding Observations: Colombia’ CCPR/C/COL/CO/6 (4 August 2010) 9; Concluding Observations: United Kingdom’ CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7 (17 August 2015) 9.

120 ‘Concluding Observations: USA’ (2014) (n 93) 9(e).

121 See Frits Kalshoven, ‘State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed Forces’ (1991) 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 827.

122 35 citizens of the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v Germany (Varvarin Bridge Case) Bundesgerichtshof III ZR 190/05 (2 November 2006); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (n 11) 544–45.

123 ICCPR Article 2(3); ‘General Comment 31’ (n 5) 15–16.

124 ‘Concluding Observations: USA’ (2014) (n 93) 9(f).

125 ‘Concluding Observations: Colombia’ (n 119) 10.