Conformance Quality of the Dual-Channel Tourism Supply Chain under Tourists’ Quality Preference

ABSTRACT

The arising of unprofessional service in package tour makes conformance quality control increasingly important. This paper constructs a game model of dual-channel tourism supply chain composed of a traditional tour retail channel and an online channel under tourists’ quality preference. Focus on the condition that tour retailer provides extra service as differentiation strategy, the impacts of conformance quality on the decision-making of centralized and decentralized systems are analyzed with mathematical analysis, as well as the equilibrium conformance quality and the coordination strategy. This paper further compares the conformance quality and profits in centralized, decentralized, and coordinated systems and provides a sensitivity analysis of tourists’ quality preferences with numerical analysis. The results indicate that the conformance quality produces different impacts on the two channels. Decentralized structure is the dominant strategy, while centralized structure is more conductive to conformance quality control. The two-part tariff strategy is proposed and demonstrated to be effective in improving conformance quality. Tourists’ quality preferences are conductive to increasing the equilibrium conformance quality under certain conditions. This study provides guidance to the sustainable development of dual-channel tourism supply chain.

摘要

随着跟团游服务质量问题的出现, 旅游供应链的质量控制日益重要。基于游客质量偏好, 本文构建了由组团社渠道和网络渠道组成的双渠道旅游供应链模型。在组团社提供附加服务作为差异化策略的条件下, 理论探讨了集中式和分散式决策模型中, 质量控制对定价和附加服务的影响, 均衡质量水平和协调优化策略。在此基础上, 通过算例分析进一步对比了集中式, 分散式和协调策略模型中的均衡质量, 并提供了关于游客质量偏好的敏感性分析。结果显示, 质量控制对组团社渠道和网络渠道的影响存在差异。分散式结构是双渠道旅游供应链的占优策略, 但集中式结构更有利于质量控制。本文提出的两步定价法能有效的优化分散式决策模型, 提高均衡质量。在一定的条件下, 游客质量偏好的增加也有利于提升均衡质量。本研究对双渠道旅游供应链的可持续发展提供指导意义。

KEYWORDS:

• Dual-channel tourism supply chain
• extra service
• conformance quality
• coordination strategy
• tourists’ quality preference

关键词:

• 双渠道旅游供应链
• 附加服务
• 质量
• 协调策略
• 游客的质量偏好

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Where v_w = β_w(1-e_o)+ p_w—δq_w, v_I = [β_I(1-e_o)+ p_I]/α

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by National Social Science Foundation of China [19XJL006].

Notes on contributors

Lingyun Huang

Lingyun Huang is Professor of Economics in School of Economics and Business Administration at Chongqing University, Chongqing, China. (E-mail: [email protected]).

Man Zhang

Man Zhang is studying her Ph.D. degree in School of Economics and Business Administration at Chongqing University, Chongqing, China. (E-mail: [email protected]).