Failing at Violence: The Longer-lasting Impact of Pro-government Militias in Northern Mali since 2012

ABSTRACT

This article examines the impact of violence on the state and on civil-military relations of pro-government militias that failed to use violence to influence the outcome of the conflict. It uses the case of the Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy and the Ganda Iso. It argues that, since 2012, militias have succeeded in increasing political influence and in framing a national narrative; it further reflects on how state sovereignty can be reappropriated by the agency of civilians once a state institution, the military, fails to defend it.

KEYWORDS:

• Ganda Koy
• Ganda Iso
• Mali
• militia
• civil-military relations
• sovereignty
• West Africa

Notes

1. Daniel Blocq, “The Grassroots Nature of Counterinsurgent Tribal Militia Formation: The Case of the Fertit in Southern Sudan, 1985–1989,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, no. 4 (2014): 710–24; Corinna Jentzsch, Sthatis N. Kalyvas, and Livia Isabella Shubiger, “Militias in Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 755–769.

2. Ariel I. Ahram. Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-sponsored Militias (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 9.

3. Jentzsch et al., “Militias in Civil Wars,” 757.

4. Andrew J. Dowdle, “Civil Wars, International Conflicts and Other Determinants of Paramilitary Strength in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no. 2 (2007): 161–174.

5. Frederic Wehrey and Ariel I. Ahram, “Taming the Militias: Building National Guards in Fractured Arab States” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 1.

6. Ibid.

7. Jentzch et al., “Militias in Civil Wars,” 758.

8. Sabine C. Carey, Michael P. Colaresi, and Neil J. Mitchell. “Governments, Informal

9. Links to Militias, and Accountability,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 850–876.

10. See, among others, Ahram, Proxy Warriors; Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014); Jentzch et al., “Militias in Civil Wars.”

11. Ahram, Proxy Warriors, 129; Ariel I. Ahram, “Origins and Persistence of State-Sponsored Militias: Path Dependent Processes in Third World Military Development,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 4 (2011): 532.

12. Blocq, ‘‘The Grassroots Nature of Counterinsurgent Tribal Militia Formation,” 760.

13. Ibid.

14. Stathis M. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 9.

15. Elizabeth Jean Wood, “The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 539–561.

16. Ahram, “Origins and Persistence of State-Sponsored Militias,” 532.

17. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 80.

18. Mitchell, Neil, Sabine Carey, and Christopher Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations,” International Interactions 40, no. 5 (2014): 812–36.

19. Alice Hills, “Warlords, Militia and Conflict in Contemporary Africa: A Re-Examination of Terms,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 8, no. 1 (1997), 49.

20. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957): 80–84.

21. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 169.

22. Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).

23. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 83.

24. Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), 242.

25. A. R. Luckham, “A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations,” Government and Opposition 6, no. 1 (1971), 21.

26. Ibid.

27. Adam Baczko, “Contre-Insurrection en Sierra Leone: une analyse stratégique de la désintégration des forces armées,” Stratégique 19 (2012): 21–23.

28. Claudine Vidal, “La brutalisation du champ politique ivoirien, 1990–2003,” Revue africaine de sociologie 7, no. 2 (2003): 45–57.

29. The word “militias” in the text will further refer to both Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso movements.

30. The Imghad are part of the hierarchical Tuareg society in which they would be located under nobles, such as the Ifoghas, without being part of the lower class. They gained during the colonial era an awareness “of the possibility of a political existence independent from the noble clan” and joined the colonial and the postcolonial army; see Baz Lecocq, Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali (Amsterdam, The Netherlansds: Brill, 2010), 263. This left a legacy of tension among the hierarchy.

31. Arthur Boutellis, “Can the UN Stabilize Mali? Towards a UN Stabilization Doctrine?” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 4, no. 1 (2015), 15.

32. The pro-Azawad MAA is led by Sidi Brahim Ould Sidat.

33. Lawrence E. Cline, “Nomads, Islamists, and Soldiers: The Struggles for Northern Mali,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36, no. 8 (2013): 618.

34. Baz Lecocq, That Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (FMG, The Netherlansds: Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, 2002), 272.

35. Africa Research Bulletin 45, no. 9 (2008), pp. 17687–17688.

36. Andrew McGregor, “The Sons of the Land: Tribal Challenges to the Tuareg Conquest of Northern Mali.” Terrorism Monitor 10, no. 8 (2012): 8.

37. Baz Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 297.

38. Morten Bøås and Liv Elin Torheim, “The Trouble in Mali—Corruption, Collusion, Resistance,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 7 (2013): 1279–1292; International Crisis Group (ICG), “Mali: Sécuriser, Dialoguer et reformer en profondeur,” Report no. 201 (2013); Martin Van Vliet, “Weak Legislatures, Failing MPs, and the Collapse of Democracy in Mali,” African Affairs 113, no 450 (2014): 45–66.

39. ICG, “Mali: Sécuriser, Dialoguer et reformer en profondeur.”

40. Idrissa, Kimba. Armée et Politique au Niger (Paris, France: Karthala, 2008), 88.

41. Interview with Ibrahim Diallo, commander of the Ganda Iso, Sévaré, December 2012.

42. Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 297.

43. The Ganda Koy official newsletter, La Voix du Nord, published calls for violence, such as, “Citizens of the north, let’s sweep all nomadic presence from our towns and villages, from our land.” The Ganda Koy official spokesperson in Paris, Mahmood Alpha Maiga, said, “Tuareg and Arab populations are with the rebellion. We have the right to judge and sanction them.” Lecocq, That Desert is Our Country, 275.

44. Army deserters that joined the Ganda Koy include several military accused of the worst exactions during the 1990–1991 exactions, notably the massacre of civilians. Abdoulaye “Blo” Cissé is one of them (Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 337); McGregor “The Sons of the Land, 8.

45. Ibrahim ag Youssouf and Robin Edward Poulton, A Peace of Timbuktu Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (New York, NY: United Nations, 1998), 78.

46. Susanna Wing, Constructing Democracy in Africa: Mali in Transition (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 82.

47. Moussa Konaté, Ils ont assassiné l’espoir (Paris, France: L’Harmattan, 2000); Lê, Châu, “Politiques économiques et crises durant les 30 années d’indépendance,” Politique Africaine, no. 47 (1992): 31–47.

48. Wing, Constructing Democracy in Africa, 82.

49. Virginie Baudais and Gregaury Chauzal, “Les partis politiques et l’idépendance partisane d’Amadou Toumani Touré,” Politique Africaine, no. 104 (2006): 61–80; Alioune Sow, “Nervous Confessions: Military Memoirs and National Reconciliation in Mali,” Cahier d’Études Africaines 50, no. 197 (2010): 69–93.

50. McGregor, “The Sons of the Land,” 8.

51. Amadou Diallo was arrested in Niger after a fight in his hometown Fafa. He was released few days later (Info-Matin, June 15, 2009). The move was perceived as a way to appease intercommunity tensions ahead of elections. Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables provide the full account: see https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09BAMAKO246.html and https://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08BAMAKO778.html.

52. Interview with Abdoulaye Najim Maiga, Sévaré, December 2012.

53. On August 2, 2010, a post-negotiation “peace flame” was celebrated, with hundreds of weapons being burned. Demobilization packages were promised to ex-combatants but were distributed later. In any case, the militias did not trust the government and only gave old malfunctioning weapons to the flame. Lecocq, Disputed Desert, p. 336.

54. Boukary Sangaré. Conflit au nord du Mali et dynamiques sociales chez les Peuls du Hayré. (Dakar, Senegal: Master II Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences sociales, Département de Sociologie, UCAD, 2013).

55. There is no agreed number on how many militia members were integrated, but it is a commonly held belief that they were the loser. Similarly, several Tuareg reached the highest command of the army, while no former Ganda Koy or Ganda Iso have climbed up, Sergeant Amadou Diallo being the known highest-ranked military among the military (five interviews with Ganda Iso and Ganda Koy leaders and four interviews with Malian Armed Forces officers, August 2012, December 2012, and September 2013). See also http://www.afribone.com/spip.php?article27901 and http://www.maliweb.net/category.php?NID=63576; Pierre Boilley, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh, Dépendances et révoltes: du Soudan Français au Mali Contemporain (Paris, France: Karthala, 1999), 533.

56. Sangaré, “Conflit au nord du Mali et dynamiques sociales chez les Peuls du Hayré.”

57. Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 349.

58. Mali Demain, December 22, 2011.

59. Reuters, “Mali Militia Chief, Fighters Die in Clash with Rebels,” http://afriquefederale.centerblog.net/89-le-ganda-Iso-clin-oeil-a-amadou-diallo, accessed March 25, 2012.

60. Interview with three Chief-of-Staff, December 2012, Abdijan.

61. In the last ECOWAS meeting of regional army chiefs of staff, the Malian army needed to present a plan for an operation to be supported by the regional organization. Two West African chiefs of staff described plans as “amateur” and said they need serious reworking (interviews, December 2012, Abidjan).

62. ICG, “Mali: Sécuriser, Dialoguer et reformer en profondeur.”

63. In Bamako, there was a political office responsible for coordinating with other movements and a coordination to liaise with organizations on the field, notably in Sévaré. It was impossible to assess how much local coordination was truly implanted in Mali’s regions, as most of their leaders were in Bamako during the crisis (interviews with Ganda Iso representatives, Bamako and Sévaré, November–December 2012). For a journalistic account, see: http://www.maliweb.net/la-situation-politique-et-securitaire-au-nord/en-attendant-la-guerre-le-president-de-ganda-izo-galvanise-ses-troupes-96071.html.

64. The most prominent name circulating is Ali Bady Maiga, an influential Gao businessman; interview with the political office of the Ganda Iso, Bamako, December 2012 and February 2013.

65. This became clear during the creation of the FPR as, in spite of not opposing the deal, Ganda Koy representatives seem to have difficulty stating their exact position, in comparison to Ganda Iso leaders. Interviews with Ganda Koy leaders, military leaders and politicians, Bamako, December 2012 and February 2013.

66. Interviews with Ganda Iso and Ganda Koy leaders, Bamako, December 2012 and January 2013.

67. The other movements are the Forces de Libération des Régions Nord du Mali (FLRN), the Alliance des Communautés de la Région de Tombouctou (ACRT), Forces Armées Contre l’Occupation (FACO), and the Cercle de Réflexion et d’Action (CRA). These four movements gathered less than a hundred members. “Our objective is to liberate northern Mali. And we can. We have thousands of men, the will and a heart. We have weapons … . We will not wait for anyone’s permission and support to take action. Our main aim is to end the permanent cycle of Tuareg rebellions and instability,” stated Harouna Toureh, the spokesperson of the newly created movement (press conference, Bamako, July 20, 2012).

68. The choice of Harouna Toureh as spokesperson was controversial. Toureh became coup leader Amadou Sanogo’s lawyer during his prosecution. He was a closely allied to the short-lived military junta, reflecting the government’s shift of policy toward militias from isolation to ambiguous support. He was dismissed to become the spokesperson of the Platform, the alliance between the GATIA, the CM-FPR, and the MAA during peace negotiations but was often criticized and contested, being a southerner with few ties with the local dynamics of the conflict in the north. Several episodes showed how the militias would refuse to see him as a leader, including on June 24, 2015, when he was trying to negotiate with the CM-FPR-II, which angered Ganda Iso and Ganda Koy members.

69. “There is no fundamental differences anymore between the Ganda Koy and the Ganda Iso. We are all together to get back the north, and ensure that it remains for Malians,” explained Ibrahim Garango, national secretary of the Ganda Iso (interview, November 2012). Ganda Koy leaders provide a similar answer. Interview with Ibrahim Cissé, Bamako, August 2012.

70. While journalistic coverage in the north was limited, Sévaré became the frontier with the Islamist-controlled area, bringing several journalists and inflating militias’ coverage out of proportion to their importance as the military secured the front line.

71. There is no definitive account of the events, and they remains subject to interpretation. Both Ganda Iso and Ganda Koy claimed to hold Douentza. Baba Ahmed, correspondent for Jeune Afrique and Associated Press, stated they were Ganda Iso. The author’s sources, at the moment, said they were Ganda Koy. But follow-up interviews in Bamako seem to actually state that both movements were in Douentza. There was no fighting to recapture the city, as Islamists did not maintain a presence. Militias were later expelled by Islamists. Thus, this episode does not demonstrate any capability of fighting from the militias. Sources: http://news.yahoo.com/islamist-rebels-seize-control-douentza-124435160.html and http://maliactu.net/apres-plus-de-3-mois-doccupation-ganda-koy-a-repris-le-controle-de-douentza/.

72. UNHCR, “2013 Mali Situation Report,” no. 21, http://www.unhcr.org/5269310d9.pdf, accessed August and September 2013.

73. Media coverage on the militias exploded during the time as several journalists, including the author, went to the front, but could not find any story as they were stopped from going further by the military. It became a necessary story from the “frontline.”

74. Interviews, Sévaré, December 2012.

75. Interview and inspection of presence lists (Sévaré, December 2012). At the same moment, the UN estimated recruits at 1,842 for the Ganda Koy and 1,337 for the Ganda Iso; UN, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A-HRC-22-33_fr.pdf.

76. Among the ten Ganda Iso interviewed and followed, nine were coming from such small communities in northern Mali and, even if most traveled through the south, were recruited through local northerners networks. For Ganda Koy, six out of ten interviewees were also from several villages in the north. If it is unclear how much they were familiar with militias, recruitment was possible through existing networks.

77. Interview, Sévaré, December 2012.

78. Interview, Sévaré, December 2012.

79. Among the ten Ganda Iso interviewed and followed, six came from such small communities in northern Mali and, even if most traveled through the south, were recruited through local northerners’ networks. For Ganda Koy, nine out of ten interviewees were also from villages in the north. While the extent of their prior familiarity with the militias is unclear, recruitment happened through the existing networks.

80. “There is no fair skin here,” said Ganda Iso’s secretary, Ibrahim Garango; Interview, Bamako, December 2012.

81. Interview, Sévaré, December 2012.

82. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Collapse, Conflict and Atrocity in Mali. Human Rights Watch Reporting on the 2012–13 Armed Conflict and Its Aftermath (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2014), 62.

83. Interview, Sévaré, December 2012.

84. Interviews, Sévaré, December 2012; A.D., “Les milices d’auto-défense du FLN, du Ganda-izo et du Ganda-koï recrutent large, entraînent des volontaires mais se révèlent particulièrement démunies,” L’Essor http://maliactu.net/camps-de-volontaires-de-mopti-ce-sont-les-armes-qui-manquent-le-plus-1/, accessed July 25, 2012.

85. Interview, Sévaré, December 2012.

86. Interviews, Sévaré, December 2012.

87. Two members introduced themselves as Rambo and Commando. A third one, wearing rags, constantly posed in front of the others with big guns and ammunition in his mouth.

88. Interviews, Sévaré, December 2012.

89. Observation and interviews, Sévaré, December 2012.

90. Interviews, Sévaré, December 2012.

91. I have shown footage and pictures of training to a EUTM adviser, two Malian soldiers, and an Ivorian soldier. They all came to the conclusion that the trainees were amateur, with a few obviously having used weapons before. Small Arms Survey, 2015 Report (Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey), 157.

92. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Collapse, Conflict and Atrocity in Mali. Human Rights Watch Reporting on the 2012–13 Armed Conflict and Its Aftermath (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2014), 62.

93. Interviews with military trainers in Sévaré and with military officials (Sévaré and Bamako, December 2012 and February 2013); Human Rights Watch, Collapse, Conflict and Atrocity in Mali, 62.

94. Ibid., 64.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibrahim Dicko, the Ganda Iso chief of staff, would reflect this subtle politics. “The occupation of our land by foreigners cannot be tolerated by us, Malians. We need to get back our land.” Later, in an interview, he will add: “Our problem is the MNLA who wants to create a state that we do not recognize. Islamists are Muslims, like us.” Interview, Sévaré, December 2012; Jeune Afrique, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2690p039-041.xml1. In the Ganda Koy camp, the commander Djibril Moussa Diallo had similar words: “All Tuareg are members of the MNLA, from our point of view. It is the MNLA that brought the foreigners in.” Interview with Djibril Moussa Diallo, Sévaré, December 2012.

97. The reference to slavery refers to the shared belief that Tuareg enslaved black populations, notably the Bellas. Interview with Mamadou, a Ganda Iso recruit, Sévaré, December 2012.

98. Interviews with militia members, Sévaré, December 2012.

99. Interview with Ioussouf, Sévaré, December 2012.

100. Marc-André Boisvert. “Une ville en otage,” http://www.lapresse.ca/international/afrique/201212/29/01-4607394-crise-au-mali-mopti-une-ville-en-otage.php, accessed December 29, 2012.

101. Interview, Sévaré, December 2012.

102. Interviews, Sévaré, December 2012.

103. See earlier comments for the full account.

104. Interviews with military representatives, Bamako and Sévaré, December 2012 and January 2013.

105. Gregory Mann, From Empires to NGOs in the West African Sahel: The Road to Nongovernmentality (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

106. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, “Mali-Mètre, Numéro spécial pour Gao, Kidal, Ménaka” (Bamako, Mali: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015).

107. Only one Ganda Iso member, Moussa, said that he has participated. “We have provided some information. I went back to Goundam. I would tell the military where the infiltrated terrorists are.” Interviews, Bamako, August 2013; McGregor, “The Sons of the Land.”

108. They mostly consist of a close-knit group around General El Hajj ag Gamou. It brings together some of the best trained and experienced Malian soldiers. Several members of the army, including its leader Gamou, have been trained by the European Union Training Mission.

109. “There was no mission to substitute ourselves for the army or [government] assistance, we just have the same enemy. In reality, when we took up arms, the Malian Army no longer existed [in northern Mali]” (Fahad ag Almahmoud, Secretary-General of GATIA quoted in Le Monde, 9 February 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/02/09/pour-le-groupe-d-autodefense-touareg-la-minusma-doit-rester-dans-le-cadre-de-sa-mission-initiale_4572630_3212.html; RFI, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140816-mali-le-gatia-dit-prendre-armes-participer-negociations-gamou-mnla-gao-kidal-azawad-alger/,accessed August 16, 2014.

110. Boilley, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh, Dépendances et révoltes: du Soudan Français au Mali Contemporain, 517.

111. Tuareg society is hierarchical, and the intricacies of the relationship would not fit a footnote. Iyad ag Ghali, Ansar Dine leader and a member of the noble Ifoghas, and Colonel El Hajj ag Gamou, from the lesser Tuareg class of the Imghads, have clashed several times. Local tensions as well as personal enmities have created its own logic where “rebels became internally divided on the content of their demands and on political issues internal to Tamasheq society” (Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 293).

112. The Ganda Iso movement and GATIA’s Imghad leader El Hajj ag Gamou had several clashes in the past. Personal conflicts have played a role in the creation of the breakaway CMFPR-II, as one of the leader could not stand being on the same side of the negotiations then ag Gamou (McGregor, “The Sons of the Land”). See MaliActu for more details: http://maliactu.net/mali-positionnement-pour-le-partage-du-gateau-la-cmfpr-iii-rallie-en-catimini-a-la-cmfpr-ii/.

113. The CMFPR-III includes Forces de Libérations Nationales (FLN), Bouctou-Protection, la Plateforme de résistance et Dignité (PFRD), la Plateforme des jeunes Ganda Iso, and members from the Ganda Koy and the Ganda Iso.

114. I have conducted several follow-up interviews over the phone or by Facebook. Those discussions were often ad-hoc, with some members eagerly contacting me and some more passive to maintain the link. From October 2014, I have lost connection with eight out of the ten Ganda Iso and eight out of the ten Ganda Koy. Among the Ganda Iso, Mohamed is now fighting in the Ansongo region, as of February 2015. He said that he has been trained by the EUTM, but I could not verify this claim. Moussa, a second Ganda Iso, is unemployed and inactive in Gao but has participated in “some fighting” in 2013.

115. The gap can be explained by the fact that Ganda Koy have mostly recruited among existing networks, while Ganda Iso have been more active in recruiting new members in regions where they had no security role prior to the events. Interview with Ibrahim Aba Kantao, Bamako, March 2014.

116. Jeune Afrique, 2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2781p100.xml0/#ixzz3Zvjckvax.

117. Sangaré, “Conflit au nord du Mali et dynamiques sociales chez les Peuls du Hayré.”

118. Interview with Ibrahim Aba Kantao, Bamako, March 2014.

119. Fighting occurred on May 18th, 2015. Ibrahim Diallo, the Ganda Koy leader said that, in this case, the Ganda Koy positions were attacked and that his men simply defend themselves. As the CMA was absent of those localities, the scenario seems truthful. Phone interview with Ganda Koy leaders, May 19, 2015.

120. Members of Ganda Iso were arrested following an exchange of fire in Sévaré on April 27, 2013 (UN Council Report, October 1, 2013). Ibrahim Aba Kantao, the president of the Ganda Iso, said that a breakaway movement was responsible for the violence (Press conference, May 6, 2013).

121. See UNSEC, UN Security Council. Rapport du Secrétaire général sur la situation au Mali, 1 Octobre 2013. (New York, NY: UN Security Council, 2013), for more details.

122. Interview over the phone and several email exchange (2012–2015).

123. Exchange of SMS, November 2014.

124. UN Security Council, Rapport du Secrétaire général sur la situation au Mali, 22 Septembre 2014 (New York, NY: UN Security Council, 2014).

125. Human Rights Watch, “Mali: Lawlessness, Abuses Imperil Population Government Needs to Restore Security, Justice System” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/mali-lawlessness-abuses-imperil-population.