Stability and Sovereignty at the Expense of Democracy? The SADC Mediation Mandate for Zimbabwe, 2007–2013

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the Southern African Development Community’s mediation mandate for Zimbabwe. The mandate was to facilitate a dialogue to promote peace, stability, sovereignty, and democracy. These aims were hard to reconcile. Short-term stability and protecting Zimbabwe’s sovereignty took precedence over democratization. The article examines tensions between the mandate’s components and traces the interaction between the mandators and the mediators. It shows how the mandate evolved as the conflict resolution process went through different stages.

KEYWORDS:

• mediation mandate
• Southern African Development Community (SADC)
• sovereignty
• Zimbabwe

Notes

^1. See Brian Raftopoulos, “The Crisis in Zimbabwe,” in Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, eds. Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo (Harare, Zimbabwe: Weaver Press, 2009), 227.

^2. SADC, Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, Dar es Salaam, March 29, 2007.

^3. Michael Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition: Interim Power-Sharing and Conflict Management in Southern Africa,” PhD thesis, University of Basel, 2015, 407–412; Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Politics behind Politics: African Union, SADC and the GPA in Zimbabwe,” in The Hard Road to Reform, ed. Brian Raftopoulos (Harare, Zimbabwe: Weaver Press, 2013), 142.

^4. For definitions of these different types of mandate, see Laurie Nathan, “Marching Orders: Exploring the Mediation Mandate,” African Security, 2017, 155-175.

^5. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 209, 259.

^6. Raftopoulos, “The Crisis in Zimbabwe,” 201.

^7. Ibid., 227.

^8. SADC, Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit, Dar es Salaam, 29 March 2007.

^9. Frank Chikane, The Things that Could Not be Said: From A(ids) to Z(imbabwe) (Johannesburg, South Africa: Picador Africa, 2013), 77.

^10. SADC, Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit, Sandton, August 17, 2008.

^11. Sydney Mufamadi, “Lessons from African Diplomatic Initiatives in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Zimbabwe,” The Round Table 99, no. 411 (2010): 629.

^12. Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga, MDC-N co-negotiator, interview, Harare, October 24, 2013; Brian Raftopoulos, “An Overview of the GPA: National Conflict, Regional Agony and International Dilemma,” in The Hard Road to Reform, ed. Brian Raftopoulos (Harare, Zimbabwe: Weaver Press, 2013), 7–10.

^13. Raftopoulos, “An Overview of the GPA,” 11; SADC, Communiqué of the Summit of the SADC Organ, Addis Ababa, February 4, 2008; SADC, Communiqué of the 27th Summit of Heads of State and Government, Lusaka, August 17, 2007, para. 13.

^14. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Politics behind Politics,” 2.

^15. Sydney Mufamadi, head of facilitation team, interview, Soweto, March 14, 2014.

^16. Laurie Nathan, Community of Insecurity: SADC’s Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012), 72.

^17. SADC, Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, Lusaka, April 13, 2008, para. 12–16.

^18. Amy Musgrave and Hopewell Radebe, “ANC Speaks Up on Mugabe Mischief,” Business Day, April 16, 2008.

^19. Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC-T president, interview, Harare, November 6, 2013.

^20. Hopewell Radebe, “Tsvangirai Wants Mbeki to Quit Talks,” Business Day, April 18, 2008.

^21. Human Rights Watch, Perpetual Fear: Impunity and Cycles of Violence in Zimbabwe (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2011), 4.

^22. Dumisani Muleya, “Mugabe Rejects Mbeki Plan,” Zimbabwe Independent, June 20, 2008; Constantine Chimakure, “Zanu PF, MDC in Secret GNU Talks,” Zimbabwe Independent, May 22, 2008.

^23. Nathan, Community of Insecurity, 73.

^24. SADC Election Observer Mission, “Preliminary Statement on the Zimbabwe Presidential Runoff,” June 29, 2008, para. 4.

^25. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 220.

^26. AU Assembly, Assembly/AU/Res.1 (XI), July 1, 2008, para. 1–4.

^27. Hopewell Radebe and Dumisani Muleya,“Mbeki Accepts Mediation Help,” Business Day, July 19, 2008.

^28. Frank Chikane, facilitation team member, interview, Soweto, March 6, 2014; Misihairabwi-Mushonga, interview.

^29. Mufamadi, interview.

^30. Tsvangirai, interview.

^31. Dumisani Muleya, “New Dawn in Zimbabwe as Mugabe Accepts Deal,” Business Day, July 22, 2008.

^32. Ibid.

^33. Memorandum of Understanding, Harare, July 21, 2008, Preamble, para.10, 11.

^34. Misihairabwi-Mushonga, interview; Tsvangirai, interview.

^35. Dumisani Muleya, “Mbeki Pushes Harare Talks Bid,” Business Day, September 9, 2008; Chikane, interview; Nathan, Community of Insecurity, 75.

^36. Chikane, interview; Global Political Agreement, September 15, 2008, Harare, para. 20.1.3(p); Tsvangirai, interview.

^37. Dumisani Muleya, “Zimbabwe Poised for Power Sharing,” Business Day, September 16, 2008.

^38. Chikane, interview; South African Presidency, “Statement by President Motlanthe on the Support for Former President Mbeki,” October 2, 2008.

^39. Chikane interview; Thabo Mbeki, “Letter to MDC-T President Morgan Tsvangirai,” November 22, 2008; South African Presidency, “President Kgalema Motlanthe to Lead South African Delegation to the SADC Organ Troika Meeting in Zimbabwe,” Pretoria, October 26, 2008.

^40. Chikane, interview; Mufamadi, interview.

^41. Eddie Cross, director of policy, MDC-T, interview, Harare, September 22, 2013; Tsvangirai, interview.

^42. Misihairabwi, interview; Mufamadi, interview; Dumisani Muleya, “Mugabe, Rivals Deadlock on Cabinet,” Business Day, September 19, 2008; Constantine Chimakure, “Tsvangirai Suspends Talks,” Zimbabwe Independent, October 9, 2008.

^43. Mbeki, “Letter to MDC-T”; Constantine Chimakure, “SADC Resolution Leaves MDC Bitter,” Zimbabwe Independent, November 13, 2008.

^44. Constantine Chimakure, “Tsvangirai, Mbeki in War of Words,” Zimbabwe Independent, November 27, 2008.

^45. South African Presidency, “Statement on Zimbabwe Interparty Dialogue,” January 15, 2009.

^46. Misihairabwi-Mushonga, interview; Thys Hoekman, “The Politics of Negotiation: Opposition and Power-Sharing in Zimbabwe,” master’s thesis, Oxford University, 2012, 82.

^47. Tsvangirai, interview.

^48. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 259.

^49. Tsvangirai, interview.

^50. SADC, Communiqué of the Summit of the SADC Organ Troika, Maputo, November 5, 2009, para. 10–12; Tsvangirai, interview.

^51. Misihairabwi-Mushonga, interview; Brian Raftopoulos, “Beyond Livingstone,” SPT Update 3, Solidarity Peace Trust, June 24, 2011, www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1079/spt-zimbabwe-update-no-3/.

^52. Dumisani Muleya and Faith Zaba, “Zuma Turns Up the Volume,” Zimbabwe Independent, August 27, 2009; Laurie Nathan, University of Pretoria, interview, Cape Town, December 10, 2013.

^53. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 291–6.

^54. Moses Mzila-Ndlovu, MDC-N co-negotiator, interview, Bulawayo, October 27, 2013.

^55. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 259, 266, 289.

^56. SADC, “Report by President Jacob Zuma to the Troika Summit of the SADC Organ,” Windhoek, August 15, 2010.

^57. SADC, Communiqué of the Summit of the SADC Organ Troika, Livingstone, April 1, 2011, para. 13–18.

^58. International Crisis Group, “Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform or Another Dead End?” Africa Report 173 (2011): 10, 23; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Politics behind Politics,” 144.

^59. Raftopoulos, “Beyond Livingstone,” 1.

^60. “SADC Can’t Dictate Us—President,” The Herald, April 1, 2011.

^61. Rugare Gumbo, ZANU-PF spokesman, interview, Harare, September 10, 2013; “Mugabe Distances Himself from Attacks on Zuma,” Mail and Guardian, April 6, 2011.

^62. SADC, Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, Sandton, June 13, 2011, para. 6, 24–31.

^63. “SADC Can’t Dictate Us.”

^64. Dumisani Muleya, “Mugabe Rejects Dual Role for Zuma at SADC,” Business Day, August 18, 2011; SADC, Communiqué of the Summit of Heads of State and Government, Luanda, September 2, 2011, para. 13.

^65. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 274–275.

^66. SADC, Communiqué of 32nd Summit of Heads of State and Government, Maputo, August 18, 2012, para. 13.

^67. Paul Munyaradzi Mangwana, ZANU-PF co-chair of constitutional commission, interview, Harare, July 8, 2013; Douglas Mwonzora, MDC-T co-chair of constitutional commission, interview, Harare, August 22, 2013; “Zuma Waiting for Invite to Assess Coalition Performance,” Sunday Times, April 15, 2012.

^68. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 275–278.

^69. Ibid., 299.

^70. SADC, Communiqué of Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, May 26, 2013, para. 8; Peter Fabricius, “Zim Ready for Elections, Say African Leaders,” The Star, May 27, 2013.

^71. Brian Raftopoulos, “The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era,” Journal of Southern African Studies 39, no. 4 (2013), 8; SADC, “Report of the SADC Facilitator,” Maputo, June 15, 2013.

^72. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 299.

^73. SADC Election Observer Mission, “Preliminary Statement,” Harare, August 2, 2013, 17.

^74. SADC, Communiqué of the 33rd Summit of Heads of State and Government, Lilongwe, July 18, 2013, para. 21, 22, 36; Zimbabwe Election Support Network, “Report on the 31 July 2013 Harmonised Election,” Harare, 2013, 6–9.

^75. Sam Jones, “Robert Mugabe Assumes African Union Helm with Familiar Rallying Cry,” The Guardian, January 30, 2015.

^76. SADC, Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 2001, Art. 4.

^77. SADC, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, 2001, Art. 11.3(a).

^78. Ibid. Art. 11.4(d).

^79. SADC, Treaty, Chap. 3, Art. 4–5; SADC, Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, 2004, Art. 2; SADC, Protocol on Politics, Art. 2.

^80. Nathan, Community of Insecurity, 23, 25, 36, 50.

^81. AU, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2007, Art. 2–3; AU, Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2002, Art. 3–4; Rowland Cole, “Power-Sharing, Post-Electoral Contestations and the Dismemberment of the Right to Democracy in Africa,” International Journal of Human Rights 17, no. 2 (2013): 259–261.

^82. Mufamadi, interview.

^83. Gumbo, interview; Simba Makoni, former ZANU-PF Politburo member, interview, Harare, March 15, 2013; Misihairabwi-Mushonga, interview; Miriam Mushayi, MDC-N backup negotiator, interview Harare, March 14, 2013; Edwin Mushoriwa, MDC-N backup negotiator, interview, March 11, 2013.

^84. SADC, “Report by President Jacob Zuma”; SADC, Communiqué of the Summit of the SADC Organ Troika, Livingstone, April 1, 2011, para. 13–16; SADC, Communiqué of the 32rd Summit, para. 4; SADC, Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, Sandton, June 13, 2011, para. 6, 24–31; SADC, Communiqué of the Summit of the SADC Organ Troika, Pretoria, March 9, 2013, para. 4–10; SADC, “Report of the SADC Facilitator, South African President Zuma, at the SADC Extraordinary Summit,” Maputo, June 15, 2013; SADC, Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, Maputo, June 15, 2013, para. 8; Rowan Philp, “Zuma Unveils New Tough ‘Roadmap,’” Sunday Times, August 22, 2010.

^85. Misihairabwi-Mushonga, interview; Mzila-Ndlovu, interview.

^86. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 209, 215, 220.

^87. Ibid., 219.

^88. Tsvangirai, interview; Mbeki, “Letter to MDC-T”; South African Presidency, “Statement on Zimbabwe Interparty Dialogue,” January 15, 2009.

^89. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 260–262.

^90. Muleya, “Mugabe Rejects Dual Role”; SADC, Communiqué of the 32nd Summit, para. 4.

^91. Memorandum of Understanding, para. 10.

^92. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 212, 218, 222, 235, 237.

^93. Ibid., 255, 290.

^94. Ibid., 176, 213, 215, 222, 301.

^95. Cole, “Power-sharing,” 263, 270.

^96. Mufamadi, interview.

^97. Ibbo Mandaza, SAPES Trust, interview, Harare, November 6, 2013; Misihairabwi-Mushonga, interview; Nathan, interview; Tsvangirai, interview.

^98. Misihairabwi-Mushonga, interview; Tsvangirai, interview.

^99. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 289.

^100. Nathan, interview.

^101. Chikane, The Things that Could Not Be Said, 108; Mufamadi, interview.

^102. Nathan, Community of Insecurity, 68.

^103. Khabele Matlosa, “Elections and Conflict Management,” in Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems and Prospects, eds. Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi Dzinesa and Dawn Nagar (London, UK: Zed Books, 2012), 79–80.

^104. Nathan, interview; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Politics behind Politics,” 150.

^105. Amy Musgrave,“Zambia Breaks African Ranks on Zimbabwe,” Business Day, March 22, 2007; Nathan, Community of Insecurity, 72–75.

^106. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 220, 254.

^107. Ibid., 128, 132, 236, 261, 272, 279.

^108. Ibid., 298.

^109. Raftopoulos, “Beyond Livingstone.”

^110. “SADC Can’t Dictate Us.”

^111. Karl Gernetzky, “SADC a Problem for Zimbabwe—Moyo,” Business Day, August 1, 2012; Hasu Patel, University of Zimbabwe, interview, Harare, March 19, 2013.

^112. Takunda Modza, “President Raps Lindiwe Zulu,” The Herald, July 6, 2013.

^113. Peroshni Govender, “Zimbabwe Election ‘Not Looking Good,’ South Africa Says,” Reuters, July 17, 2013.

^114. South African Presidency, “South Africa Regrets Unauthorised Statements on Zimbabwe,” July 21, 2013.

^115. Mandaza, interview; Nathan, interview.

^116. Chikane, interview; Chikane, The Things that Could Not Be Said, 108.

^117. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 169–70.

^118. UNSC, S/PV.5933, 2008, 4–17; UNSC, S/2008/447, 2008, Art 2–7.

^119. Aeby, “Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition,” 222.

^120. Dumisani Muleya, “Tsvangirai Pulls Out of Signing Talks Agreement,” Business Day, July 17, 2008.

^121. Naison Ngoma, “Roles and Rules of Engagement between State, Regional and Non-State Actors,” in Africa’s Peacemaker? ed. Kurt Schillinger (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2009), 207.

^122. Misihairabwi-Mushonga, interview; Mzila-Ndlovu, interview.