The African Union’s Mediation Mandate and the Libyan Conflict (2011)

ABSTRACT

The African Union’s mediation mandate for the Libya crisis of 2011 derived from the organization’s Constitutive Act and the United Nations Charter. The African Union activated this constitutional mandate by designing a roadmap to end the crisis peacefully. However, the roadmap’s incompatibility with the UN Security Council mandate on the use of force and its lack of clarity on the future of Muamar Gaddafi discredited it in the eyes of the rebels and the United Nations. The African Union obtained a mandate to mediate from Gaddafi but not from the rebels, and its mediation proved ill-designed to deal with the crisis. These factors contributed to the failure of the mediation effort.

KEYWORDS:

• African Union
• Libya
• mediation mandate
• United Nations

Notes

1. For definitions of the political, constitutional, and other types of mediation mandate, see Laurie Nathan, “Marching Orders: Exploring the Mediation Mandate,” African Security, 2017, 155-175.

2. I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, “International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics,” Journal of Social Sciences 41, no. 2 (1985): 27–45, 27.

3. Patrick Regan, Richard Frank, and Aysegul Aydin, “Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 1 (2009): 135–156, 138.

4. “Mandate,”Oxford English Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mandate.

5. Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000, Article 3(f).

6. Ibid., Article 4(e).

7. AU, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Durban: African Union, 2002), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf.

8. See Article 52 of the UN Charter, dealing with regional arrangements for peacemaking.

9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping, UN Doc. A/47/277–S/24111, June 17, 1992, especially paras. 60–65.

10. Kruschen Govender and Yvette Ngandu, Towards Enhancing the Capacity of the African Union in Mediation (Durban: ACCORD, 2009), 10.

11. Ibid.

12. AU, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): 2010 Assessment Study (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, 2010), 16.

13. For background analysis of the crisis see, for example, George Joffe, “The End of Autocracy?” The RUSI Journal 156, no. 3 (2011): 12–19.

14. Gilbert Khadiagala, “Roadmaps and Resolving African Conflicts: Pathways to Peace or Cul de Sacs?” African Security 7, no. 3 (2014): 163–180, 168.

15. Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012): 1–7, 3.

16. AU, Communiqué of the 261st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, February 23, 2011.

17. Ibid.

18. “AU to Deploy Fact-Finding Mission to Libya,” PANA Press, February 24, 2011, www.panapress.con/AU-to-deploy-fact-finding-mission-to-libya–12-760741-20-lang2-index.html.

19. Ben Kioko, AU Legal Counsel, personal communication, April 22, 2012.

20. See AU, Communiqué of the 265th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, March 10, 2011.

21. Ibid., para. 8.

22. Khadiagala, “Roadmaps and Resolving African Conflicts,” 168.

23. AU, Communiqué of the 265th Meeting, para. 7.

24. Anyway Sithole, “The African Union Peace and Security Mechanisms Crawl from Design to Reality: Was the Libyan Crisis a Depiction of Severe Limitations?” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 12, no. 2 (2012): 111–133, 117.

25. Laurie Nathan, personal communication, December 2, 2016 (on file with the author).

26. Ibid.

27. Khadiagala, “Roadmaps and Resolving African Conflicts,” 166.

28. UN Security Council Resolution 1973, March 17, 2011, para. 4.

29. AU, “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Activities of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on the Situation in Libya,” 275th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, April 26, 2011, para. 16.

30. Siba Grovogui, “Looking beyond Spring for the Season: An African Perspective on the World Order after the Arab Revolt,” Globalizations 8, no. 5 (2011): 567–572, 569.

31. AU, Communiqué of the Meeting of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya, Nouakchott, March 19, 2011.

32. Ibid.

33. John Odyek, “Be Strong, Museveni Tells African Gov’ts,” New Vision, March 18, 2014, http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1338821/strong-museveni-tells-african-govts.

34. Ibid.

35. Yoweri Museveni, “Key Note Address at the High Level Thematic Debate on ‘Strengthening Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations,’” May 4, 2015, New York, http://www.statehouse.go.ug/media/speeches/2015/05/04/high-level-thematic-debate-strengthening-cooperation-between-united-nation.

36. AU, “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission,” para. 32.

37. Comfort Ero, “The Political Changes in North Africa and the Middle East and the Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa,” paper presented at the Africa Coordinating Group bi-annual meeting, Open Society Initiative Africa regional office, Dakar, May 18, 2011, 7.

38. Ibid.

39. See “Libya Letter by Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy: Full Text,” BBC News Africa, April 15, 2011, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13090646.

40. AU, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, Article 16(1).

41. See UN Security Council, 6498th meeting, S/PV.6498, New York, March 17, 2011.

42. Ibid.

43. Cosmas Ekpunobi and Adekunle Adesuji, “Nigeria: Qaddafi Is a Mad Man—Mark,” Daily Champion (Nigeria), March 18, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201003180039.html; “Qaddafi Says Nigeria Should Be Split Into Several States,” BBC News, March 29, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8593355.stm; “Qaddafi: ‘Split Nigeria into Two Nations,’” afrol News, March 16, 2010, http://www.afrol.com/articles/35667.

44. Ekpunobi and Adesuji, “Nigeria: Qaddafi Is a Mad Man.”

45. Ero, “The Political Changes in North Africa”; see also Adekeye Adebajo, “Africa Grows Suspicious of Qaddafi’s Bizarre Ambitions,” Business Day (South Africa), April 1, 2010, www.ccr.org.za/index.php/media-release/in-the-media/newspaper-articles/item/259-pr-132?tmpl=component&print=1.

46. Institute for Security Studies, Peace and Security Council Report no. 21, Addis Ababa, April 2011, 6.

47. James Bamberg, British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950–1975: The Challenge of Nationalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 474.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Saskia van Genugten, “Libya after Gadhafi,” Survival 53, no. 3 (2011): 61–74, 71.

52. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Libya: Direct Military Hits, Unclear Political Targets,” Strategic Comments 17, no. 3 (2011): 1–3, 1.

53. Ibid.

54. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “War in Libya: Europe’s Confused Response,” Strategic Comments 17, no. 4 (2011): 1–3, 2.

55. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Libya: Direct Military Hits,” 1.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Laurie Nathan, “Remarks at UP Seminar on Libya by Dr. Laurie Nathan, Center for Mediation, University of Pretoria, 15 September 2011,” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 33, no. 2 (2011): 135.

59. Andrew England, Roula Khalif, and Peggy Hollinger, “African Union Mediators Arrive in Benghazi,” Financial Times, April 11, 2011, https://www.ft.com/content/b853de36-63b7-11e0-bd7f-00144feab49a.

60. Dan Murphy, “Why the African Union Road Map for Libya Is Unlikely to Go Anywhere,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 11, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0411/Why-the-African-Union-road-map-for-Libya-is-unlikely-to-go-anywhere.

61. Sithole, “The African Union Peace and Security Mechanisms,” 118.

62. Glyniss Underhill and Ilham Rahoot, “SA Government’s 6bn Libya Arms Push,” Mail & Guardian, April 1, 2011, http://mg.co.za/article/2011-04-01-sa-govts-r6bn-libya-arms-push.

63. Yoweri Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda, 2nd ed. (Nairobi, Kenya: Moran Publishers, 2016), 182.

64. Nathan, “Remarks at UP Seminar on Libya,” 135.

65. See Anna Mahjar-Barducci, “Qaddafi’s Mercenaries in Libya,” Gatestone Institute, March 30, 2011, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2000/gaddafi-mercenaries-in-libya.

66. Nathan, “Remarks at UP Seminar on Libya,” 135.

67. Murphy, “Why the African Union Road Map for Libya Is Unlikely to Go Anywhere.”

68. Peter Fabricius, “What Ended Zuma’s Mediation in Libya?” ISS Today, May 28, 2015, http://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-ended-zumas-mediation-in-libya.

69. Khadiagala, “Roadmaps and Resolving African Conflicts,” 169.

70. See “Libya Letter by Obama.”

71. Khadiagala, “Roadmaps and Resolving African Conflicts,” 169.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Sithole, “The African Union Peace and Security Mechanisms,” 127.

75. Fabricius, “What Ended Zuma’s Mediation.”

76. Ibid.

77. Laurie Nathan, personal communication, December 2, 2016 (on file with the author).

78. Sithole, “The African Union Peace and Security Mechanisms,” 126.

79. I. William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman, eds., International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000): 225–250, 225.

80. Ibid., 228.

81. Sithole, “The African Union Peace and Security Mechanisms,” 126.

82. James Reinl, “UN Mediator Pessimistic on Libyan Peace Deal,” The National, April 5, 2011, www.m.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/un-mediator-pessmistic-on-libyan-peace-deal.

83. Quoted in Sithole, “The African Union Peace and Security Mechanisms,”127.

84. Ibid.

85. Constitutive Act of the African Union, arts 3(d) and (f).