Family Feuds: Digital Battles Over the Place of Women in Contemporary Iran

Abstract

Late marriages, rising divorce rates, and women outnumbering their male counterparts on university campuses are among the most striking indicators of major shifts in the position of women and the family in contemporary Iran. In the post-revolutionary state, where officially sanctioned discourses largely have addressed women's roles and rights in terms relating to family, marriage and motherhood, these changes constitute a crisis. To address this crisis and to reframe discourses on women, the Iranian state has provided substantial support for the production of material that emphasizes the essential links between women and family. Recognizing the influence of New Media in general and the online successes of dissenting voices in particular, state actors and supporters have supplemented the explosion in offline material about women and the family with digital sites for promoting similar content. With a focus on New Media, this article interrogates such attempts to define and circumscribe discourses on women within frameworks pertaining to the family. Drawing from online venues dedicated to women's issues (such as Mehrkhaneh, a ‘news and analysis site on women and the family,’ and Charghad, which describes itself as a site for the ‘Muslim Iranian Girl’), the article also highlights the internal inconsistencies of conservative discourses on women and examines the reasons why these sites have been unable to garner popular participation. In addition, the article argues that the push to redirect the conversations about women must be understood not only in relation to the changing status of women and marriage but also must be placed in a broader context where the state's views and policies on women constantly are being challenged by foreign media, reformist and independent activists, and even dissenters within the factionalized power establishment.

Keywords::

• Digital divide
• divorce
• conservatives
• family
• Islamic feminists
• marriage
• motherhood
• state funded media
• new media
• opposition
• reform movement
• women

In post-revolutionary Iran, state sanctioned discourses largely have addressed the roles and rights of women in terms relating to family, marriage, and motherhood. The rise of the reform movement in the late 1990s and the appearance of independent feminist campaigners in the new millennium posed a challenge to such frameworks, and official responses to competing narratives and activities relating to women in Iran have been multifold: Alongside various steps toward suppressing opposing voices such as harassing and arresting activists, undermining or shutting down women's studies departments, and supporting legislation aimed at undermining women's social and legal progress, the production of material emphasizing the essential links between women and family has been highly encouraged. The rising number of books, television show forums, and public declarations (including by Supreme Leader Khamenehi) about women and the family are evidence of this. Given that most offline publications and public spaces are regulated to varying degrees by state institutions, many oppositional activists use the Internet as a primary site for writing or organizing around women's rights issues. Recognizing the influence of New Media in general and the online successes of dissenting voices in particular, the explosion in offline material about women and the family has been accompanied by an intensification of digital sites for promoting similar content. Focusing on two digital magazines, Mehrkhaneh1 and Charghad,2 this article examines the digital manifestation of the push to define and circumscribe discourses on women within frameworks pertaining to the family. An examination of these digital attempts reveals that they are not without complication or surprising elements. Some of these complexities arise from the internal inconsistencies in the conservative approaches to the issue, but also they can be attributed to the specificities of the digital spaces where these discussions are taking place, where feedback, even when moderated, is visible to larger audiences.

Crisis of Women and the Family

State sanctioned discourses on women and the family and their expansion across various platforms have been shaped in relation to several factors: The rise of reformist and independent women's rights activism in the late 1990s; developments in media technologies and official strategies for increasing participation in digital spaces; and perhaps most importantly, the socio-economic realities for women in Iran in the face of high unemployment, the increasing age of marriage, and steep divorce rates, among other issues. Various analysts and writers often have credited the advent of the reform movement and its electoral successes in the late 1990s with catalyzing the creation of official and independent arenas for political and social action. Although these spaces eventually would be sacrificed in the power struggles between reformist and conservative factions, the explosion in news and literary publications as well as the formation of various civil society organizations created a lively forum for cultural production and political participation.3 This era also stimulated developments in the work of secular and Islamic feminists alike.4 Because such a large number of feminists—whether or not they considered themselves Islamic feminists—either explicitly identified with or were sympathetic to the reformist cause, women's rights became yet another site of factional conflict and muscle-flexing.5

For conservatives aligned with the most powerful elements in the political structure, factional disputes in relation to women often has manifested itself in the following forms: Suppression of women's rights activists and organizations;6 legislation and policy battles; and both engaging and restricting media as it pertains to women. In 1998, for example, when conservatives held a majority in the Majles [parliament], two bills on women became law: One extended gender segregation codes to medicine while the second objected to what it deemed un-Islamic formulations of women's rights and depictions of women in Iranian media. As Ziba Mir-Hosseini has pointed out, both laws were unrealistic and proved impossible to implement. Nonetheless, they were clear legislative attempts at challenging reformist promises to improve the position of women.7 Although the subsequent Majles (2000–2004) held a reformist majority that tried to address legal inequalities facing women, the conservative Council of Guardians vetoed most of their efforts. Relevant bills that were allowed to become law were weakened significantly by amendments demanded by the Council of Guardians.8

By the end of Khatami's second term, conservatives enjoyed a revival, with gains that would become apparent in local councils, the Majles, and ultimately in 2005, with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president. Although the reformists were greatly weakened, their policy and legislative differences with the conservatives over issues pertaining to women continued. In fact, increased infighting during Ahmadinejad's two terms as president further complicated factional power struggles, which in turn had consequences for how questions pertaining to women and the family were handled. Specifically, several proposed policies and bills not only catalyzed opposition by reformist and secular activists, but also caused tensions among conservatives.

In 2012, for example, the Minister of Education, Kamran Daneshjoo, and other officials sought to enact new segregation regulations restricting enrollment in certain degree programs by gender. Outnumbered by their female classmates on many college campuses throughout the country, male students would be the primary beneficiaries of these new policies. Not surprisingly, the proposed policies received considerable negative attention in diaspora and opposition circles. Yet conservatives were also divided on the issue, including Ahmadinejad, who disagreed with his own minister. In so doing, Ahmadinejad earned the wrath of one of his most ardent conservative critics, the Majles representative Ali Motahhari. The latter politician defended these policies in terms of their implications for sexuality, and therefore morality, on Iranian campuses and in Iranian society generally.9 In short, the potential of women's upward mobility in education implicitly was linked to the breakdown of the society's moral fabric.

Similar concerns, this time literally involving women's mobility, were apparent in the introduction of and debates around a passport law that aimed to place restrictions on women's travel. In its original iteration proposed in April 2012, the Passport and Exit Law would require that single women under the age of 40 obtain the permission of a male guardian to leave the country. For married women, the bill required not only the permission of a woman's husband to leave the country, but also required the husband's permission to obtain a passport.10 Like the proposed changes to universities, the reactions to this bill similarly defied ideological and factional categorization. Indeed, the internal opposition from conservatives was so strong that a member of the national security committee in the Majles, Mohammad-Hassan Asefari, directly credited ‘basiji sisters and (female) seminary students’ for the repeal of the passport bill.11 The justification provided by the bill's supporters is as important as their acknowledgment that conservative women had played a role in killing it. Namely, supporters claimed that the aim of the law was to protect women ‘who had been taken advantage of… primarily in the countries around the Persian Gulf.’12 Whether the proposed bill had been motivated mainly by the case of such women, the paternalism underlying the bill and its justification is unmistakable. This urge to underline the authority of the male guardian must be read in relation to the broader context where ruling forces in the power structure implicitly or directly blame women's upward mobility in the public sphere for the rising age of marriage and divorce rates.

Ironically, the state itself has played a central role in promoting women's education. According to Bahramitash and Kazemipour, the post-revolutionary Iranian government's investments in schools and literacy programs for both children and adult populations resulted in notable improvements in female literacy and education, which they identify as a major factor explaining the increase in the mean minimum age of marriage. They also note a decline in the number of married women, whether they are women who never marry or who remain single after a divorce.13 Similarly, divorce rates have risen significantly in post-revolutionary Iran. Tracking the number of divorces for every 1,000 marriages, Aghajanian and Thompson have illustrated a steady increase in the rate of divorce starting in 1997, such that by the new millenium Iran qualifies as a “high divorce country.” Specifically, they point out that:

By 1997, the rate of divorce started to increase slowly from a rate of 78 per 1,000 marriages to a higher level of 82 per 1,000 and then, by 2001, it jumped to 94 per 1,000. Since then the rate has accelerated, reaching a level as high as 153 divorces per 1,000 marriages in 2011. This high rate demonstrates an increase of almost 45% over the rate in 2006.14

They also note that the rates for divorce have been consistently higher in urban areas, and posit two important factors that must be taken into consideration to explain the steep increases: Economic hardships in Iran (inflation, unemployment, high competition for few positions, etc.) and access to media that is outside the purview of the Iranian state. Namely, content available on the Internet and via satellite channels raise expectations for material goods and lifestyles that are not easily attainable.15

Thus, the context for the rise of material online that variously is sanctioned or approved by state institutions is one where the sanctity of marriage appears to be unraveling, women show striking improvements in their education levels but continue to face challenges in meeting their employment potential,16 and both independent and foreign state-sponsored media are seen as a dual threat to the Iranian state and society. The entry of the Iranian state and its supporters into the digital media sphere, of course, is not new and dates to the earliest days of the Internet in Iran. While state participation as an active promoter of online content has increased steadily, its involvement in both repressing and producing material on the Internet intensifies during times of crisis.17 In the case of the sites considered below, the crisis is the situation of women and the family in Iran. These digital manifestations of attempts to shape the discourses and circumstances of Iranian women reveal the paradoxes and complexities of conservative positions on new media and women's issues alike.

Designing Virtual Homes for Women and Family

Both Charghad and Mehrkhaneh cover women's issues from angles compatible with officially-sanctioned frameworks, but their tone, and to some extent, their target audiences, are distinct. This is evident in their aesthetics and self-description. Mehrkhaneh is well designed and easy to navigate, with a familiar news site layout that includes photos but is dominated by written text. The site carries original material as well as republished news, analysis, and photography. It also includes a number of high quality infographics on a range of issues including women and family law during various Majles sessions,18 women's organizations from the Constitutional era to the present,19 and fertility rates over the last 120 years,20 among others. In an apparent effort to experiment with multimedia, the site includes an underdeveloped audio section with several short ‘workshop’ programs on themes of sexual and family health.21 This material leaves little doubt about the site's major focus on interlinked issues of women and the family.

Mehrkhaneh's archives show that it seems to have had a slow start, with much early content focusing on international news about women as individuals or groups such as the parliamentary campaign of Aung San Suu Kyi or marriage in India as a tactic to avoid sexual harassment. Much of the early material is not original, as most pieces previously appeared in other publications. However, the main concerns of the site have remained largely unchanged. Mehrkhaneh situates itself as an advocate for women in Iran, often including material about the challenges for women in the face of cultural and technological changes. The site also shows a marked interest in developments in the Majles that impact women. Articles about Majles debates and policies on women and family have been a core component from the outset. The site also inserts itself in controversial issues, such as the earlier noted passport bill.

Although there are parallels in positions between Mehrkhaneh and other women's organizations and activists from across the political spectrum, Merhkhaneh's stances are distinguishable by their emphasis on family and marriage as the dominant lens for locating and assessing women's issues in contemporary Iran. This emphasis is clear in its content, its self-description, and its affiliation with the Tarranom-e Andisheh Organization, which was founded in February 2013. On its website, Tarranom-e Andisheh claims to be a non-partisan, non-governmental organization, founded to ‘advertise and promote the discourses of the Islamic Revolution in relation to women and the family.’22 The organization notes that it will focus on media and educational workshops as a means for spreading the message of the Islamic Revolution and women as articulated by Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenehi.23 Describing itself as a base for developing and spreading the discourses of the Islamic revolution, Mehrkhaneh also acknowledges the existence of other groups working on women in Iran but considers itself unique in having a holistic approach to the issue:

Currently there are various groups with different approaches that are concerned with reforming the situation of women and families in Iran and work toward this end. But none have been able to address all aspects of the issue with one comprehensive look and to design a plan and execute a plan based on it… The Mehrkhaneh news-analysis site has been established with the hope that, alongside analyzing and investigating problems from various angles, it can provide a space for dialogue and the exchange of opinions that is free from pre-judgment or labeling so that it can provide a way for people with ideas to solve problems.24

In contrast to Mehrkhaneh's serious tone and conventional design, Charghad's image-heavy pages, bright colors, and unique layout indicate a youthful and fresh outlook. Taking on a more personal tone than the former, Charghad, which described itself as a site specifically for the ‘Muslim girl,’25 also considers that it is fulfilling a unique role despite the multiplicity of existing organizations and institutions that cover the issue. Addressing its audience in a familiar manner, it answers the question of ‘Why Charghad?’ as follows:

Yes, you are right, there are many sites and digital and non-digital magazines that work on women's issues. There are also news services and sites that may not specialize in women's issues but often have a service or section that is devoted to them. And this means that if there is to be a new digital magazine that announces its arrival or if there is an existing magazine that wants to refresh itself and grow, it must have something new to say. What does Charghad have to say that is new?… Charghad is a home for the Iranian Muslim girl, with all of her characteristics. [She is] a girl who has remained a stranger, even though her name always is repeated, and she always is a topic of discussion. And no one officially wants to recognize who she really is. Television series have not been successful in showing her in all her dimensions, nor has the cinema depicted her as she really is. Women's rights activists do not know her (or want to know her!), nor do the religious and traditional segments take her updated identity into consideration.26

Both Mehrkhaneh and Charghad not only recognize but also emphasize the polyphony of voices that speak on the issue of women. They present themselves more as antidotes to the overabundance of existing representations and activism on women rather than as sites that fulfill gaps. Their proposed correctives to current discourses expose what is at the heart of contemporary debates about Iranian women. Charghad's emphasis on ‘girl’ rather than woman and its hip design indicate a target audience of young, unmarried women. The site is user-friendly, full of photos and illustrations, and provides options that allow readers to remove pictures easily before printing. It also is integrated visibly into various social media platforms. All of these features are appropriate for attracting the younger audience it seeks. Despite the emphasis on Muslim ‘girls’ and younger audiences, however, Charghad promotes content that is in line with the shift to family in conservative discourses on women. Notably, despite the emphasis on content by and about girls, the managing director of the publication is a cleric, Ahmad Najmi. The presence of a male overseer for a site promoting the voices of women and girls is not the only paradoxical feature of Charghad. Indeed, a closer look at both publications reflects a range of contradictions and the challenges they face in their attempts to impact discourses on women in Iran by framing women's issues in terms of the family.

Conventional Content: The Push Toward Home and Family

For all its focus on girls (i.e., single women), Charghad carries many pieces about marriage and family, often stressing the unhappiness or yearning of those who have yet to get married or to have children. In an article reflecting on marriage, for example, the author, Sara Erfani, a frequent contributor to the site and a well-known novelist, regrets not having had children sooner, and she attributes the decision of postponing having children to a kind of selfishness. Speaking on behalf of herself and her husband, she notes: ‘If we had experienced the good taste of having children earlier, we may have put aside our intellectual posturing and we would not have deprived ourselves from having a celestial angel for the sake of a few trips for two and a few months of love and pleasure.’27

In another article, ‘I am sad for you Women,’ the author Sarah Minayee laments that childbearing has become a choice. Identifying modernity as the root cause of why women have turned against their nature, she asserts that the question of whether to have children is predicated on a worldview that should be incongruent for Muslim women:

This question is a humanist question, it is a question that only comes up in societies where humans determine their own fate, a society where God does not give children to humans, humans decide whether to have children or not, a society where humans are not created, they are creators. Where they are not servants but masters, a society where humans have risen up against their nature and in which they act against their nature, based on their desire and their selves … Becoming a mother is not a choice. It is a capacity. It is an opportunity. It is you passing the matriculation exams. Becoming a mother is becoming beautiful. Becoming a mother is really difficult, but it is really good. And I am sad, for all the children who could have been born but were not, for all the mothers who could have grown wings but did not. I am sad for myself, because I don't have wings yet, I haven't flown yet, and I still am sitting in a world where women who can fly construct the question of whether or not to become a mother.28

Unlike Erfani's piece, which makes an attempt to prompt women to choose motherhood, Minayee dismisses the choice all together. Other pieces offer a more complicated picture of competing desires for contemporary conservative women. For example, Fatemeh Alamadar, a sociology doctoral student at Tehran University, addresses her child in expressing the guilt she feels for pursuing a higher degree. The article's title, ‘A homemaking mother is always more holy, but… is a mother who is a student, a sinner?,’29 takes for granted the moral superiority of being a stay-at-home mother, but the article presents a justification for a mother's pursuit of a higher degree:

To tell you the truth, I think that my studying and being social and working are necessary for me to be a good mother, so that I can understand you better and your concerns in today's world, so that tomorrow you will feel that you can talk to me, consult with me, and feel that I understand, and so that I myself have the self-confidence to speak with you when you are an adolescent and young person, and so that I can feel satisfied with myself … I know these things and believe them, but creating a balance between a mother's sense and feeling responsible to social duties is not easy.30

While Alamadar's justifications for pursuing activities beyond motherhood still are linked largely to her identity as a mother, she does allow herself to admit that she needs these pursuits for her own self-confidence. She also highlights the difficulties of negotiating the competing demands of motherhood and life outside the home. Overall, however, the emphasis remains on the centrality of motherhood to the author's identity and decision-making process.31

Articles posted under the category ‘Dokhtaran-e’ [which roughly translates as Girlish or For Girls] address an audience of unmarried women and, as such, are not dominated by material pertaining to the experiences of motherhood. Nonetheless, the connections between women, home, and family are emphasized. The short piece, ‘I am a Woman,’ written in the format of a stream of consciousness conversation between the author and herself, is a good example of this. Describing the household chores in which she is engaged, the author, Mahdieh Amanzadi, interjects with assertions of what she envisions for herself and what she will demand of a future husband: ‘Where was I? Yes, that I had a firm belief in being a man and not a woman. Of course, I don't mean that I am a man, but I am not a traditional woman. I will wear sporty clothes and enjoy the activities of boys. And if I get married, I will make the person first understand that this is how I prefer things. If you like it, take it, if not go get yourself a housewife.’32

Yet these musings do not last long, as the author appears to come to an epiphany in the course of her house work that she is a ‘a woman with authentic feminine beauty’ despite all that is said about women in her family, the media, and other tribunes, and concludes her piece with a quote from Imam Ali that ‘woman is a spring flower, not a hero.’33

While advocating for marriage, motherhood, and ties to the household, Charghad also reflects concerns about the rising age of marriage and the barriers to getting and staying married.34 In other words, although the site contains much content that seems to cajole, convey guilt, and/or persuade its readers to choose marriage and family, there is also recognition of the various obstacles that have led Iranian women to delay or avoid marriage and childbearing altogether. Whereas Charghad largely focuses on individual stories with only occasional forays into exploring the broader social and economic reasons behind changing childbearing and marriage statistics in Iran, the reverse is the case for Merhkhaneh, which often reports the findings of studies attempting to explain these questions.35 In addition to considering the socioeconomic factors dictating marriage decisions, Mehrkhaneh is also distinct from Charghad in looking into the policy side of the issue, with many articles evaluating failed ventures by various ministries or other government initiatives.36

In addition to considering the broader social factors as well as the institutional and policy issues of marriage, Merkhaneh discusses intimacy issues between couples and introduces the concept of ‘emotional divorces,’ where couples remain legally married but lead lives that are alienated from one another.37 Other articles explain factors leading to troubled married life, and one such piece quotes research that attributes blame to in-laws.38 Individual stories of failed marriages also personalize the issue:

Fatemeh is a 40 year-old woman who married a man ten years her junior seven years ago. She said that she met her ex-husband immediately after what she calls a heart-break, and that she married him out of revenge. She says: “I was a teacher and many men had asked for my hand in marriage, but I never could make the right decision when it came to getting married. My father had passed away a while back and then my mom passed away, and [thus] I was alone. That is when I met Behrooz. We were supposed to get married but we didn't, so, to get revenge, I married one of his friends, Navid, who was ten years younger than I. Navid's family was against the marriage, so they ostracized him, and my brothers and sisters did the same to me. I got pregnant during the first year of our marriage and that is the same time I found out that Navid was an addict. He stopped going to work and everything was running on my salary. My son was born but my husband's bad behavior kept getting worse. That is when my brother couldn't stand it anymore and interfered. With my family's help and waiving my right to my dowry, I was able to finish that tumultuous life and get a divorce and custody of my child.39

Whether through the personal or societal lens, both Charghad and Mehrkhaneh's materials on marriage and family indicate underlying problems. Although these sites ostensibly are geared toward promoting marriage and family, they cannot avoid addressing the widespread problems with them.

Tough Sell: Challenges for Promoting the Family Online

Clearly, it is no easy task to elevate family and married life in the midst of a crisis so severe that even the staunchest proponents of the institutions must acknowledge their problems. In a crowded media field online and off, where a range of foreign state-funded outlets offer diverse content, officially sponsored or approved media cannot compete for the attention of oppositional or apolitical audiences.40 Perhaps surprisingly, state efforts to expand media production beyond over the air televised and radio broadcasts have not had great success, not even with ideologically like-minded audiences. Like other state-sanctioned online venues that lean toward the hardline elements of the Iranian power structure, these sites do not appear to have widespread popularity among their target readers inside the country.41

At the same time, the engagement of those who are drawn to the sites and actively participate in the comments section shows that there is no consensus on the core issues. For example, the comments section of the earlier discussed Charghad article, ‘I am sad for you Women,’ included passionate objections to the article's assertions about motherhood. In a blunt, unsentimental riposte to the author's musing that ‘And I am sad for all the children who could have been born but were not, for all the mothers who could have grown wings but did not,’ one commenter simply noted: ‘And I am happy, for the children who could have been born but were not.’ Others who also disagreed with the author were less terse and tried to engage her claims more constructively. One commenter pointed out that perhaps in some cases having children may be a selfish rather than selfless act, such as when someone bears a child simply to gain some kind of social status. This commenter also noted that in some circumstances having children can do more harm than good to a woman, and therefore one should not insist that all women strive for motherhood.42 Like the range of views on motherhood evident among the authors who post material on the site (examined above), the comments indicate that the readership also holds no consensus on central issues.

Similar complexities are evident in the pages of Mehrkhaneh. As noted above, a core group of conservative women in the Majles staunchly opposed the passport law introduced by fellow conservatives. In publicizing a petition against the proposed passport law and reporting on opposition to it, the site echoed some of the sentiments of the conservative opposition.43 But the pushback Mekrkhaneh received also showed parallels to what oppositional and/or secular feminists have faced. In the comments section of an article against the passport law, for example, the site was harangued for being anti-men and for failing to understand the requirements of religious law.44 In this and other instances, broad ideological alignment with religious or state powers did not protect Mehrkhaneh from accusations that are routinely directed at independent or oppositional women who object to the situation of women in Iran.

Conclusion

Whatever their popularity, or lack thereof, sites like Charghad and Mehrkhaneh are important to any consideration of discourses on women in contemporary Iran. Continuous with offline efforts, these sites are digital manifestations of widespread efforts to redirect conversations about women toward marriage and the family. Yet these efforts to promote married life and childbearing are occurring at a time when both institutions are facing severe problems. Indeed, the expansion in the discussions on marriage and the family and the increase in the venues where these conversations are promoted must be read as a response to the crisis of these institutions. The rise in the age at first marriage, steep divorce rates, and more divorcees who are not re-marrying also mean an overall increase in single women. In addition, while women outnumber men on university campuses, they fare worse than men in the weak economy and continue to be socially and legally disadvantaged compared with their male counterparts. All of this occurs in a context where activist and entertainment content on foreign-funded media provide Iranian audiences a window into lifestyles that are free from the restrictions faced by Iranian women. Whether these depictions of life outside Iran are accurate or not, authorities see them as posing a threat to the already fragile status of marriage and family in Iran. Finally, the state's responses must be understood in a broader context where their overall policies, and in fact, their basic legitimacy as a ruling structure, constantly are being challenged by foreign media, reformist and independent activists, as well as by dissenters within the factionalized power establishment. Given the external and internal challenges, the complexities and contradictions of both Charghad and Mehrkhaneh are not surprising. While these websites may not be as popular as oppositional media, they are unique in showing that tackling the crisis of the family is a difficult and contested task, even within conservative circles sympathetic to the state. This is due to the specificity of online arenas, where audience members can either respond on the site (if commenting is allowed) or they can easily copy-and-paste and comment on content elsewhere. These sites of interaction make visible contestations that may remain hidden in other media formats.

Notes

¹http://mehrkhane.com/; accessed February 17, 2014.

²http://charghad.ir/about; accessed February 17, 2014.

³ Much has been written about the factional infighting following the reformist victories in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the consequences of these power struggles for political and cultural work in Iran. While a majority of these discussions targeted popular audiences, scholars in diverse disciplines also have taken on the issue. For background and analysis, see G. Khiabany and A. Sreberny (2001) The Iranian press and the continuing struggle over civil society 1998–2000, International Communication Gazette, 63(2–3), pp. 203–223; and V. A. Zoeram and L. Y. Fee (2010) Criticism in Public Sphere: The Press Development in Iran's Civil Society, 1997–2000, Journal of Politics and Law, 3(2), pp. 222–238.

⁴ The history and definitions of what constitutes ‘Islamic feminism’ is much contested and beyond the scope of this paper. For background on the topic and the debates it has engendered, see Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2006) Muslim women's quest for equality: Between Islamic law and feminism, Critical Inquiry, 32(4), pp. 629–645; Z. Mir-Hosseini (1999) Islam and gender: The religious debate in contemporary Iran (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); and V. Moghadam (2002) Islamic feminism and its discontents: Toward a resolution of the debate, Signs, 27(4), pp. 1135–1171.

⁵ For further details on the conservative-reformist battles over women's rights from 1997–2002, please see Z. Mir-Hosseini (2002) The Conservative–Reformist Conflict Over Women's Rights in Iran, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 16(1), pp. 37–53.

⁶ This aspect of official reactions to women's activism has received the most attention, particularly outside Iran, and is well documented in the reports of human rights organizations and foreign state-funded media. The arrest and harassment of the members of the One Million Signature Campaign for Equality—a campaign launched in 2006 to demand changes to discriminatory laws against women—is an often-cited example of how the state has attempted to suppress women's rights work. The official website of the Campaign is available at http://www.we-change.org/; accessed February 17, 2014.

⁷ Mir-Hosseini, The Conservative–Reformist Conflict, p. 40.

⁸ Z. Mir-Hosseini and V. Hamzić (2010) Control and Sexuality: The Revival of Zina Laws in Muslim Contexts (London: Women Living Under Muslim Laws), p. 106. More specifically, Mir-Hosseini and Hamzić point out that a bill aiming to raise the minimum age of marriage to 18 was changed to allow girls to marry at 13 and boys at 15. Another bill aimed at making divorce equally accessible to men and women was weakened to allow only expansion of grounds for divorce and increased custody rights for women.

⁹ N. Shahrokhi and P. Dokouhaki (2012) A Separation at Iranian Universities, Middle East Research and Information Project, October 18, available online at www.merip.org/mero/mero101812; accessed February 17, 2014. According to Shahrokhi and Dokouhaki, Motahhari claimed that Ahmadinejad's opposition to the policies were in line with his too liberal leanings in the cultural sphere in general and that these tendencies would lead to moral and sexual problems.

¹⁰ International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (2013) Lawyer and Women's Rights Activist Hopes Discriminatory Passport Law Does Not Pass, January Available online at: http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2013/01/passport_women/; accessed February 17, 2014.

¹¹Bultan News (27 Feb. 2013) Vakonesh-e Khaharan-e Talabe va Basiji bar Laghv-e Ghanoon-e Gozarname Taseer Gozar Bood [The reactions of Basiji sisters and seminary students was influential in the repeal of the passport law]. Available online at: http://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/128003; accessed February 17, 2014.

¹² Ibid (author's translation).

¹³ R. Bahramitash and S. Kazemipour (2006) Myths and Realities of the Impact of Islam on Women: Changing Marital Status in Iran, Critique, 15(2), pp. 111–128.

¹⁴ A. Aghajanian and V. Thompson (2013) Recent Divorce Trends in Iran, Journal of Divorce & Remarriage, 54(2), p. 116.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 120.

¹⁶ N. Mehdizadeh (2012) ‘Beyond Cultural Stereotypes: Educated Mothers’ Experiences of Work and Welfare in Iran, Critical Social Policy, 33(2), pp. 243–265.

¹⁷ For a periodization and description of the state's relationship to new media, see N. Akhavan (2013) Electronic Iran: the Cultural Politics of an Online Evolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press).

¹⁸Mehrkhaneh (2012) Ghavaneen-e masoob-e hozey-e zanan, az doreh-e aval ta hashtom-e Majles, Infography [Laws on women passed by the First through Eighth Parliaments, an Infographic], October 13, available online at: http://tinyurl.com/lpyhgl5; accessed February 17, 2014; and ibid, ‘Ghavaneen-e khanvedeh dar Iran az ebteda'i-e enghelab ta konoon, infography [Family law in Iran from the beginning of the Revolution to the present, an infographic, November 7], available online at: http://tinyurl.com/jw9vbt7; accessed February 17, 2014.

¹⁹ Ibid, ‘Tashakol-e zanan az mashrooteh ta enqelab-e Islami’ (August 5) [Women's organizations from the Constitutional era to the Islamic Revolution], available online at: http://tinyurl.com/qy3aws6; accessed February 17, 2014.

²⁰ Ibid, ‘Tahavol-e mizan-e barvari az 1270 ta konoon (September 3) [Fertility rates from 1890 to the present], available online at: http://tinyurl.com/lk35rka; accessed February 17, 2014.

²¹ Ibid, passim, see website, http://mehrkhane.com/fa/ava; accessed February 17, 2014.

²²Tarranom-e andisheh website, which is available in English and Persian at: http://tarannomandisheh.ir/About/. Ayatollah Khomeini's photo is atop both the English and Persian pages with an accompanying quote: ‘The nation whose women have been always at the front to promote the Islamic aspirations and objectives won't be damaged.’ The Persian and English sites are available at http://tarannomandisheh.ir/ and http://tarannomandisheh.ir/en/default.aspx, respectively, accessed February 17, 2014.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴Mehrkhaneh (ND) Darbarey-e Ma [about us], available online at: http://mehrkhane.com/fa/about; accessed February 17, 2014.

²⁵Charghad, online at: http://charghad.ir/about, accessed February 17, 2014.

²⁶Charghad ‘Charghad chera?’ [WhyCharghad?], available online at: charghad.ir/why-charghad; accessed February 17, 2014 (author's translation).

²⁷ S. Erfani (2012) Oboor az roozha-ye do nafareh [Moving beyond the days of couples], Charghad, 15 August. Online at: http://charghad.ir/4203/%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%87; accessed February 17, 2014 (author's translation).

²⁸ S. Minayee (2012) Baraye shoma zanha ghamgeenam [I am sad for you, women], Charghad, 1 July; available online at: http://charghad.ir/4202/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B2%D9%86%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%BA%D9%85%DA%AF%DB%8C%D9%86%D9%85, accessed February 17, 2014.

²⁹ F. Alamdar (2012) Hamishe madar-e khane-dar moghadasstar ast, vali aya madar-e daneshjoo gonahkar ast [A homemaking mother is always more holy, but is a student mother a sinner?], April 22, Charghad, available online at: http://charghad.ir/3969/%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%AC%D9%88-%DA%AF%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%87%E2%80%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%9F; accessed February 17, 2014 (author's translation).

³⁰ Ibid (author's translation).

³¹ Alamdar's piece also was published in Madar Banoo, a website dedicated entirely to issues about motherhood in Iran; online at: http://madarbanoo.com. Sarah Erfani, author of the article cited above, is the Editor-in-Chief of Madar Banoo as well as an active writer for Charghad.

³² M. Amanzadi (2012) Man yek zanam [I am a woman], Charghad, 27 May, available online at: http://charghad.ir/4052/%D9%85%D9%86-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B2%D9%86%D9%85, accessed February 17, 2014.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ See, for example, S. Daneshvar (2012) Mojarad-e ejbari, mojarad-e ekhtiyari: Chera amare dokhtaran-e mojarad roo be afzayesh ast? [Single by force, single by choice: Why are the rates of single women on the rise?], Charghad, available online at: http://charghad.ir/4031/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A, accessed June 13, 2014.

³⁵ See for example, Mehrkhaneh (2012) Ezdevaj-e javanan bozorgtareen daghdaghy-e khanevadeha-ye Tehrani ast [Marriage of youth is the biggest concern for Tehran families], November 7, available online at: http://mehrkhane.com/fa/print/4602, accessed February 17, 2014.

³⁶ See, for example, Mehrkhaneh (2013) Vaghti tamame tarhaye-e vezaratkhane baraye ezdevaj-e javanan shekast mikhorad [When all the ministry's plans for marriage of the young fail], October 7, available online at: http://tinyurl.com/oq9hnfo, accessed February 17, 2014. See also Mehrkhaneh (2013) Dard-e bi zeghbati javan be ezdevaj ba eghdamat-e namadeen darman nemishavad [Disinclination of youth toward marriage will not be solved with symbolic acts), October 7, available at http://tinyurl.com/px7hsaj, accessed June 13, 2014.

³⁷ M. Moslemifar (2012) Interview: Emrooz shahed-e amr-e jensi dar jame hasteem [Today we are witnessing an inflation in sexual affairs] Mehrkhaneh, December 25, available at: http://mehrkhane.com/fa/news/4938/امروزه-شاهد-تورم-امر-جنسی-در-جامعه-هستیم

³⁸Mehrkhaneh (2013) Zendegi ashofte madar-e shohar va ashefotegiy-e zanashooyee pesar/ashoftegiy-e madar-e zan dar rabetey-e jensi az avamel-e ashoftogeiy-e zanashooyee dokhtar ast [Troubled marriages due to mothers-in-law and troubled sexual life of mothers as a factor in the troubled marriages of daughters], December 22, available online at: http://tinyurl.com/o8rne28; accessed February 17, 2014.

³⁹Mehrkhaneh (2012) Esghha-ye godakhtey-e ke zood khamoosh mishavand [Fiery loves that extinguish quickly], October 20, available at: http://tinyurl.com/p98o6gz; accessed February 17, 2014.

⁴⁰ In terms of domestic penetration, television remains a top media form. With the hardline factions in control of the state Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, the state long has had an upper hand in reaching audiences inside the country. The rise of satellite broadcasts in the 1990s, followed by spread of the Internet, has posed a challenge to this dominance over content, prompting the state both to restrict satellite and Internet content and to produce favorable content via these media.

⁴¹ I would like to thank Roksana Bahramitash for sharing some of her research findings with me via email correspondence. In her extensive research on conservative-leaning women from working class neighborhoods in Iran, Bahramitash questioned many of her research subjects about their Internet habits and found that they had little knowledge or interest in such sites and instead were more engaged with satellite content, specifically serials.

⁴² S. Minayee (2012) Baraye shoma zanha ghamgeenam [I am sad for you women], Charghad, July 1, available at: http://charghad.ir/4202/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B2%D9%86%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%BA%D9%85%DA%AF%DB%8C%D9%86%D9%85; accessed February 17, 2014 (author's translation).

⁴³Merkhaneh (2013) Tabsarey-e mamnooiat-e dokhtaran-e mojarad ra hafz koneed [Remove the section on forbidding single girls], February 19, available at: http://tinyurl.com/o9w9gfy; accessed February 17, 2014.

⁴⁴Mehrkhaneh (2012) Entezar Miraft bad az 40 Sal, Mahdoodiathaye Atay-e Gozarname be Zanan Bardashte Shavad (One would expect that after 40 years, the limits on granting women passports would be lifted),” December 25, at: http://tinyurl.com/olqzxgy; accessed February 17, 2014.