American Policy and Proliferation of Media as Causes of a New Type of Coup after the Cold War? Evidence from Turkey

Abstract

Several cases of coups d’état in the post-Cold War period suggest that, in some coup-prone countries, the classical way of taking over governments by armies may have given way to new coup mechanisms. However, students of military politics have yet to study in sufficient depth the nature and reasons for new type(s) of coups. Taking its cue from these cases, this article studies the deviant single case of the February 28th coup process in Turkey in 1997, which entirely diverged from the old textbook coup method the Turkish military had excelled at executing during the Cold War. In seeking to explore the conditions under which the Turkish army chose to follow a new coup playbook, this article focuses on two factors: the distinct American position that vetoed a hard coup and the end of the state’s monopoly on TV broadcasting.

Keywords:

• Democracy promotion
• Civil-military relations
• Clinton administration
• February 28th coup
• media pluralization
• secular democracy
• Turkish military

Notes

¹ I. Perkins (2013) Vanishing Coup: The Pattern of World History since 1310 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), p. 4.

² Ö. Aslan (2016) ‘Unarmed’ We Intervene, Unnoticed We Remain: The Deviant Case of ‘February 28th Coup in Turkey, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 43(3), pp. 360–377; H. Bou Nassif (2017) Coups and Nascent Democracies: The Military and Egypt’s Failed Consolidation, Democratization, 27(1), pp. 157–174, pp. 168–169; For the case of Pakistan, see A. R. (2014) Pakistan in Turmoil: Unleashing the Mob, The Economist (September 1). Available at: www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/09/pakistan-turmoil, accessed March 4, 2016; On Thailand, see U. Pathmanand (2008) A Different Coup d’état?, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(1), p. 125, 130; also see O. G. Encarnación (2002) Venezuela’s ‘Civil Society Coup,’ World Policy Journal, 19(2), pp. 38–42.

³ A. S. Klieman (1980) Confined to Barracks Emergencies and the Military in Developing Societies, Comparative Politics, 12(2), p. 143.

⁴ V. Piplani & C. Talmadge (2015) When War Helps Civil-Military Relations: Prolonged Interstate Conflict and the Reduced Risk of Coups, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(8), p. 1373.

⁵ Retired General Bölügiray (1999) 28 Şubat Süreci [The February 28th Process] (Istanbul: Tekin), p. 23.

⁶ A. Shah (2014) The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press), p. 28.

⁷ S. A. Cook (2007) Ruling but not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 14–64.

⁸ B. Nogaylaroğlu (2015) Milli Görüş’ten Silivri’ye Bir General [A Military General From National Outlook Movement to the Silivri Prison] (Istanbul: İrfan Yayıncılık), p. 165; T. Akbaş (2014) Benim Oğlum Paşa Olacak: Bir Generalin Anıları [My Son will be Pasha: Memoirs of a General] (Istanbul: Potkal), pp.196–217, 227; Ç. Bir (1999) Somali’ye Bir Umut [A Light of Hope for Somalia] (Istanbul: Sabah), p. 261.

⁹ E. Gilboa (2005) The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations, Political Communication 22(1), pp. 27–44.

¹⁰ The non-cooperation of private television channels with coup plotters marked the first time in modern Turkish history. This proved more crucial for the failure of the coup attempt than social media because, as a post-coup survey revealed, 62 percent reported that they received the initial news about the coup attempt through newspapers as opposed to a meagre 9 percent who heard through social media. ‘Democracy Watch Research’ (2016) Konda (July 26). Available at: http://konda.com.tr/democracywatch/, accessed August 2, 2016. For the impact of media on the failure of coup attempt see D. Hearst (2016) How an Iphone Defeated the Tanks, Middle East Eye (July 16). Available at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/how-iphone-defeated-tanks-turkey-1556177810, accessed August 26, 2016.

¹¹ A. L. George & A. Bennett (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), p. 81.

¹² Deputy Chief of General Staff admitted the authenticity of official documents such as ‘Western Action Plan’ and others related to ‘Western Working Group’, which had been leaked to the media after the coup, during the court trial of the coup. S. Öztürk (2013) Belgelerle 28 Şubat Dünden Bugüne [A Timeline of Near History in Light of February 28 Documents] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap), p. 99.

¹³ P. D. Feaver (1996) The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control, Armed Forces & Society 23(2), pp. 151–153.

¹⁴ See economic, regime, social, strategic, and military hypotheses under ‘theories of coup attempts’ in N. Singh (2014) Seizing Power: Strategic Logic of Coups (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 42–50; J. S. Fitch (2005) Post-Transition Coups: Ecuador 2000, An Essay In Honor of Martin Needler, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 33(1), p. 41; Z. Sarigil (2011) Civil-Military Relations beyond Dichotomy: With Special Reference to Turkey, Turkish Studies, 12(2), p. 273.

¹⁵ Singh, Seizing Power, pp. 60–71.

¹⁶ S. Barracca (2007) Military Coups in the post-Cold War Era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela, Third World Quarterly, 28(1), p. 138.

¹⁷ Author Interview (a) with a four-star Turkish general, Ankara, July 23, 2015.

¹⁸ U. Sundhaussen (1998) The Military: A Threat to Democracy?, Australian Journal of Politics & History, 44(3), p. 331.

¹⁹ Finer quoted in Sundhaussen, The Military: A Threat, p. 330.

²⁰ H. Cevizoğlu (2001) Generalinden 28 Şubat İtirafı: Post-Modern Darbe [A General’s Confessions on the February 28th: A Postmodern Coup] (Istanbul: Ceviz Kabuğu), pp. 56–57. (italics and brackets are added). Other generals also agreed that the method of February 28th coup was different from previous coups. Bölügiray, 28 Şubat Süreci, p. 237; A. Yalman (2014) Zorlu Yılların Sessiz Tanığı-I [The Silent Witness of Difficult Years – I] (Istanbul: Kastaş), p. 140.

²¹ D. Clarridge (with D. Diehl) (1997) A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York: Scribner), p. 117.

²² S. Küçük (2008) Rumeli’den 27 Mayıs’a: İhtilalin Kaderini Belirleyen Köşk Harekatı [From Rumelia to the May 27th Coup: Mansion Operation as the Decisive Factor for the Fate of the Revolution] (Istanbul: Mikado Yayınları), p. 231; Bölügiray, 28 Şubat, p. 146; N. Esin (2005) Devrim ve Demokrasi Bir 27 Mayısçının Anıları [Revolution and Democracy: Memories of a 27th Coup Plotter] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap), pp. 359, 363, 369.

²³ This expression was first used by The Economist magazine to describe the overthrow of President Abdalá Bucaram in Ecuador, see Ecuador’s post-modern coup (1997) The Economist (US ed.) (February 15), p. 37.

²⁴ P. Robins (1997) Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan, Survival, 39(2), pp. 83–94; Ü. Cizre & M. Çınar (2003) Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism and Politics in the Light of February 28 Process, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 102(2/3), pp. 315–326.

²⁵ S. Huntington (1996) Reforming Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 3–11; J. Nye (1996) Epilogue: the Liberal Tradition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press). pp. 151–156.

²⁶ S. Talbott (1995), Why NATO Should Grow. New York Review of Books. Available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/08/10/why-nato-should-grow/, accessed March 10, 2016; also see M. Albright (with B. Woodward) (2003) Madame Secretary: A Memoir (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan), p. 167.

²⁷ D. Reiter (2001) Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy, International Security, 25(4), p. 46, with specific reference to Turkey, p. 61.

²⁸ H. Waterman et al. (2001) Correspondence: NATO and Democracy, International Security, 26(3), p. 225.

²⁹ T. Demirel (2003) The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980, Armed Forces & Society, 29(2), p. 257.

³⁰ N. S. Ludington & J. W. Spain (1983) Dateline Turkey: The Case for Patience, Foreign Policy, 50, p. 168.

³¹ Author interview (b) with long-time diplomat and former Minister of Foreign Affairs after the September 12th coup İlter Türkmen, İstanbul, 16 November 2015.

³² T. Carothers (January/February 1997) Democracy Without Illusion, Foreign Affairs, 107, p. 86; A. Lake (1993) From Containment to Enlargement. Available at: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html, accessed April 2, 2016.

³³ J. Dumbrell (2002) Was There a Clinton Doctrine? President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Reconsidered, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 13(2), pp. 43–45; R. Haas (2000) The Squandered Presidency: Demanding More from the Commander-in-Chief, Foreign Affairs, 79(3), pp.139–140; S. Walt (2000) Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, 79(2).

³⁴ W. Hunter (1998) Negotiating Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Argentina and Chile, International Studies Quarterly, 42, pp. 298.

³⁵ S. Levitsky & L. A. Way (2006) Linkage versus Leverage. Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change, Comparative Politics, 38(4), p.382.

³⁶ Walt (2000) Two Cheers, pp. 75–75.

³⁷ Author Interview (c) with Prof. Zafar Jaspal in Islamabad, October 2, 2015.

³⁸ Author Interview (d) with Air Vice Marshall Shahzad Chaudhry in Islamabad, 29 September 2015.

³⁹ Author Interview (e) with retired Diplomat in Islamabad, 5 October 2015.

⁴⁰ ADST Interview with Thomas R. Pickering, 2003, p. 582.

⁴¹ Fitch (2005) Post-Transition Coups, pp. 50–51; Barracca (2007) Military Coups, pp. 149–150.

⁴² B. Lombardi (1997) Turkey—Return of the Reluctant Generals?, Political Science Quarterly, 112(2), p. 211.

⁴³ A. J. Pierre & W. B. Quandt (1996) The Algerian Crisis: Policy Options for the West (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution), p. 52.

⁴⁴ Author interview (f) with Hikmet Bayar, former Commander of Land Forces, İstanbul, August 8, 2015; G. S. Harris (2000) US-Turkish Relations, p. 197.

⁴⁵ A. Makovsky (2001) US Policy Toward Turkey Progress and Problems, p. 223.

⁴⁶ G. Erkaya & T. Baytok (2001) Bir Asker Bir Diplomat [A Soldier A Diplomat] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap), p. 79.

⁴⁷ C. Kırca (2009), Ekselans [Your Excellency] (Istanbul: Galatasaray Eğitim Vakfı Yayını), p. 97.

⁴⁸ Erkaya and Baytok, Bir Asker, pp. 20, 21.

⁴⁹ See Bir’s biography in the first pages of his memoir Somali’ye Bir Umut and also Ö. Şarlak (2004) Kışladan Kampüse: Gülhane Askeri Tıp Akademisi Komutanı ve İnönü Üniversitesi Rektörü’nün Anıları [From the Barracks to the Campus: The Commander of the Gülhane Military Medical Academy and the Memoirs of the Rector of İnönü University] (Istanbul: Alfa Basım), p. 164.

⁵⁰ Bir, pp. 29, 37.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 256.

⁵² Ibid, p. 229.

⁵³ N. Kemal Zeybek (2014) İnançlar, Ülküler, İlkeler, Görüşler ile Gerçekler Dünyasında Siyaset Yolu [The Road of Politics in a World of Facts, Beliefs, Ideals, Principles, and Opinions] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap), p. 361.

⁵⁴ Quoted in Bölügiray, 28 Şubat Süreci, p. 86.

⁵⁵ F. Gerges (1999) America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 202, 215.

⁵⁶ ADST Interview with Patterson, 2003, pp. 64–65.

⁵⁷ ADST Interview by Richard McKee, pp. 64–66.

⁵⁸ Gerges, America and Political Islam, 102; E. P. Djerejian (1993) One Man, One Vote, One Time, New Perspective Quarterly, 10(3), p. 49.

⁵⁹ Refah’s Gul Analyzes the Turkish Elections (1996). Wikileaks Cable. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/96ANKARA813_a.html, accessed April 4, 2015.

⁶⁰ Gerges, America and Political Islam, p. 202.

⁶¹ U. Akıncı (1997) Albright: ‘It’s Vital that Turkey Remains Secular. Hurriyet Daily News (February 14). Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/albright-ampquotits-vital-that-turkey-remains-secularampquot.aspx?pageID=438&n=albright-quotits-vital-that-turkey-remains-secularquot-1997-02-14, accessed December 12, 2015.

⁶² W. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774–2000 (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass), p. 226.

⁶³ S. Yirmibeşoğlu (1999) Askeri ve Siyasi Anılarım [A Military and Political Memoir] (Istanbul: Kastaş), p. 366; Clinton Administration appreciated Refah-Yol’s extension of the mandate of Operation Provide Comfort. Turkey: New Government, Continuing Uncertainty (1996). CSIS Report Turkey Update (August 1). Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-update-turkey-new-government-continuing-uncertainty, accessed April 2, 2016.

⁶⁴ US Department of State – Daily Press Briefing (1996a). Electronic Research Collections (September 20). Available at: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9609/960920db.html, accessed March 8, 2016.

⁶⁵ US Department of State – Daily Press Briefing (1996b). Electronic Research Collections (August 30). Available at: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9608/960830db.html, accessed March 8, 2016.

⁶⁶ E. Aksoy, 28 Şubat’tan Balgat’a Mücahit [A Fighter from February 28th to Balgat] (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık), p. 220.

⁶⁷ İ. Çevik (1996) Erbakan’s Iran Visit Has Mixed Blessings. Hurriyet Daily News (August 8). Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erbakans-iran-visit-has-mixed-blessings.aspx?pageID=438&n=erbakans-iran-visit-has-mixed-blessings-1996-08-16, accessed December 12, 2015.

⁶⁸ US Department of State – Daily Press Briefing #157, 96–09-30 (1996c). Available at: http://www.hri.org/news/usa/std/1996/96-09-30.std.html, accessed April 4, 2016.

⁶⁹ E. Saygun (2012) Türk Ordusuna Balyoz [Sledgehammer to the Turkish Military] (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları), p. 190.

⁷⁰ Quoted in E. Athanassopoulou (2014) Strategic Relations Between The US and Turkey: Sleeping with a Tiger (London: Routledge), p. 159.

⁷¹ Quoted in Gerges, America and Political Islam, p. 196.

⁷² Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan, p. 82.

⁷³ Erkaya and Baytok, Bir Asker Bir Diplomat, pp. 254–255.

⁷⁴ Gerges, America and Political Islam, pp. 216–217; Makovsky (1997) The Making of US Foreign Policy on Turkey.

⁷⁵ US Dept of State – Daily Press Briefing (1997). Available at: https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/briefings/9706/970616db.html, accessed March 8, 2016.

⁷⁶ Gerges, America and Political Islam, p. 203.

⁷⁷ ADST Interview by Political Counselor, Richard McKee 2003; Pierre and Quandt, The Algerian Crisis, p. ix; Bölügiray, 28 Şubat Süreci, p. 132.

⁷⁸ TBMM Darbe ve Muhtıraları Araştırma Komisyonu [Turkish Grand National Assembly, Parliamentary Investigation Commission for the Coups and Memorandums] Interview with Tansu Çiller (2012a), pp. 3, 31;. Bölügiray, p. 135.

⁷⁹ R. Satloff (2000), US Policy Toward Islamism: A Theoretical and Operational Overview. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Satloff.pdf, accessed September 1, 2015, p. 30.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 30.

⁸¹ TBMM Darbe ve Muhtıraları Araştırma Komisyonu [Turkish Grand National Assembly, Parliamentary Investigation Commission for the Coups and Memorandums] Interview with Alper Görmüş (2012b). Available at https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/arastirma_komisyonlari/darbe_muhtira/docs/tutanak_son/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/04.10.2012/Alper%20Görmüş-04.10.2012.pdf, accessed December 4, 2015.

⁸² Satloff, US Policy Toward Islamism, p. 30; Gerges, America and Political Islam, p. 204.

⁸³ The King’s Speech (2010).

⁸⁴ Singh, Seizing Power, pp. 30–31.

⁸⁵ When four generals started a coup plot against French President Charles de Gaulle in 1961 over his decision to withdraw from Algeria, he appealed to mass support to resist it. Conscripts, who were also unwilling to continue the war in Algeria, heard de Gaulle’s appeal on their transistor radios, see Singh, Seizing Power, p. 21.

⁸⁶ Perkins, Vanishing Coup, pp. 76–77.

⁸⁷ For the advantages provided by a centralized media source such as radio, see F. M. Wuthrich (June 2010) Commercial Media, the Military, and Society in Turkey During Failed and Successful Interventions, Turkish Studies, 11(2), p. 224.

⁸⁸ C. Koçak (Mayıs 2010) 27 Mayıs Bakanlar Kurulu Tutanakları, II. Cilt, 6 Ocak 1961–16 Kasım 1961 (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları), p. 897.

⁸⁹ O. Erkanlı (1987) Askeri Demokrasi: Orhan Erkanlı’nın Anıları [Military Democracy.

Memories of Orhan Erkanlı] (Istanbul: Güneş Yayınları), pp. 239, 245.

⁹⁰ M. Heper & T. Demirel (1996) The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey, Middle Eastern Studies, 32(2), p. 112.

⁹¹ S. Oral, Az Sonra Son Darbe: Reklamlardan Hemen Sonra [The Last Coup in a Moment: Right After the Commercials Break] (Istanbul: Aksoy Yayıncılık), p. 11.

⁹² TBMM Darbe ve Muhtıraları Araştırma Komisyonu [Turkish Grand National Assembly, Parliamentary Investigation Commission for the Coups and Memorandums]. Interview with Oral Çalışlar (2012c). Available at: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/arastirma_komisyonlari/darbe_muhtira/docs/tutanak_son/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/06.11.2012/Oral%20Çalışlar-06.11.2012.pdf, accessed December 17, 2015.

⁹³ Television came to Turkey in early 1970s. It was set up first in Ankara. Turkish Military Academy, for instance, had a TV but only Ankara could watch. See A. Parmaksız (2010) Türk Ordusu’nda General Olmak (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları), p.88; TV came to Turkey’s southeast in 1976 but again came first to Officers’ Club; it started to enter private houses only later and very gradually, Akbaş, Türk Ordusunda General Olmak, p. 96.

⁹⁴ S. Talbott (1996), Democracy and the National Interest: Idealpolitik as Realpolitik, Foreign Affairs, 75(6), p. 50; W. Varney & B. Martin (2000) Lessons from the 1991 Soviet Coup, Peace Research 32(1), pp. 55, 61.

⁹⁵ Y. Devran (2011) Siyasal İktidar-TRT İlişkisinin Dünü [The History of Political Power and TRT Relations] (Istanbul: Başlık Yayınları), pp. 55–58, 133,134.

⁹⁶ A. Öncü (1994) Packaging Islam: Cultural Politics on the Landscape of Turkish Commercial Television, New Perspectives on Turkey, 10, p. 13.

⁹⁷ Ibid. 18–19.

⁹⁸ Oral, Az Sonra Son Darbe, p. 81.

⁹⁹ Öncü, Packaging Islam, p. 20, footnote 10.

¹⁰⁰ Oral, Az Sonra Son Darbe, p. 7.

¹⁰¹ Bölügiray, 28 Şubat Süreci, pp. 98, 132.

¹⁰² H. Çiçek (1997) İrticaya Karşı Genelkurmay Belgeleri [General Staff Command’s Official Documents against Religious Reactionism] (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları), p. 69.

¹⁰³ Bölügiray, 28 Şubat Süreci, pp. 100–101.

¹⁰⁴ The Western Action Plan details these psychological operation plans. Öztürk, Belgelerle 28 Şubat, pp. 103–105.