Afghanistan’s Political Settlement Puzzle: The Impact of the Breakdown of Afghan Political Parties to an Elite Polity System (2001–2021)

Abstract:

The rapid collapse of the Afghan Republic in August 2021 was in part the result of two decades of disintegrating political parties at the hands of former Presidents Karzai and Ghani. After the 2001 US intervention, political parties did not play a significant role in the politics of Afghanistan. The country’s nascent democracy experienced major shifts in the aftermath of the US intervention, largely concerning the behaviour and structure of its parties, which impacted the government’s prospects of reaching a political settlement. In this period, politics began to shift toward a more elite-centric model. By applying a political settlement conceptual framework and case studies, especially with reference to the presidential elections, this article argues that the transformation to an elite-centric model intensified political rivalries in Afghanistan. The resulting polarisation consequently had decreased Afghanistan’s chances of reaching a political settlement, an essential component of state-building in this fragile, linguistically fragmented country with multiple politico-military factions.

Key Words:

• Afghanistan
• Elite politics
• Ashraf Ghani
• Hamid Karzai
• Party politics
• Political Settlement
• Single Non-Transferable Voting system (SNTV)

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive, insightful and thought-provoking feedback on the first draft of this article.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

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6 Anna Larson (2015) Political Parties in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace).

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14 Asian Legal Information Institute (2003) Afghan Law, AsiaLII Organization, Australia.

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21 Lucy M. Edwards (2010) State-Building in Afghanistan: A Case Showing the Limits?, International Review of the Red Cross, 92(880), pp. 967–991.

22 Ibid.

23 Faridullah Bezhan (2013) The Emergence of Political Parties and Political Dynamics in Afghanistan, 1964–73, Iranian Studies, 46, no. 6, pp. 921–941.

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29 Ahmed Rashid (2001) Afghanistan: Ending the Policy Quagmire, Journal of International Affairs, pp. 395–410.

30 Ibid.

31 Burhanuddin Rabbani was the leader of Jamiat-e Islami party and served as the President of Afghanistan, 1992–2001; a member of the Taliban killed him in a 2011 suicide attack.

32 Composed of various Afghan politico-military factions, mainly the Jamiat-e Islami.

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38 Astri Suhrke, Kristian B. Harpviken & Arne Strand (2002) After Bonn: Conflictual Peace Building, Third World Quarterly, 23(5), p. 877.

39 Anna Larson (2015) Political Parties in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace).

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41 Tahir Amin (1984) Afghanistan Resistance: Past, Present and Future, Asian Survey, 24(4), p. 376.

42 Ibid.

43 David Loyn (2019) Politics Without Parties: Afghanistan's Long Road to Democracy, Asian Affairs, 50(1), pp. 40–59.

44 Barnett R. Rubin (2005) Afghanistan: The wrong voting system, The New York Time (March 15). Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/16/opinion/afghanistan-the-wrong-voting-system.html, accesed Jan. 20, 2020.

45 Alper T. Bulut & Ahmad Z. Wasiq (2018) Understanding the Role of Political Parties in Afghanistan, Akademik Ortadoğu, 12(2), pp. 141–152.

46 Srinjoy Bose & Niamatullah Ibrahimi (2017) Afghanistan’s Political Parties: A Tale of Incomplete Reform and Transformation, in: Srinjoy Bose, Nishank Motwani & William Maley (eds) Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects, pp. 122–140 (London: Routledge).

47 Zahir Shah (1914–2007), the Last King of Afghanistan, Ruled the Country between 1933 and 1973.

48 Lucy M. Edwards (2010) State-Building in Afghanistan: A Case Showing the Limits?, International Review of the Red Cross, 92(880), pp. 967–991.

49 Ahmad Rashid (2001) Afghanistan: Ending the Policy Quagmire, Journal of International Affairs, pp. 395–410.

50 Mark Fields & Ramsha Ahmed (2011) A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press).

51 Amin Saikal (2005) Afghanistan's Weak State and Strong Society, in: Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff & Ramesh Thakur (eds) Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press), pp. 193–209.

52 Grand Council of Tribal and Religious Leaders in Afghanistan, which is considered to be one of the strongest sub-state bodies to ratify many national and foreign policy decisions.

53 See, for example, UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) [on the situation in Afghanistan], 20 December 2001, S/RES/1386 (2001). Available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3c4e94571c.html, accessed January 11, 2020.

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55 Mark Fields & Ramsha Ahmed (2011) A review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Institue for National Strategic Studies).

56 Lucy M. Edwards (2010) State-Building in Afghanistan: A Case Showing the Limits?, International Review of the Red Cross, 92(880), pp. 967–991.

57 Barnett R. Rubin (2004) Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, Journal of Democracy 15(3), pp. 5–19.

58 Asian Legal Information Institute (2003) Afghan Law (Australia: AsiaLII Organization).

59 Sven G. Simonsen (2004) Ethnicising Afghanistan?: Inclusion and Exclusion in Post‐Bonn Institution Building, Third World Quarterly, 25(4), pp. 707–729.

60 Traditionally, Afghan leaders, especially King Zahir, strongly feared that political parties would threaten the establishment of the state rather than strengthen it. See more on this argument in Faridullah Bezhan (2013) The Emergence of Political Parties and Political Dynamics in Afghanistan, 1964–73, Iranian Studies, 46(6) pp. 921–941. Arguably, Karzai manifested similar fears.

61 Larry P. Goodson (2004) Afghanistan in 2003: The Taliban Resurface and a New Constitution is Born, Asian Survey, 44(1), pp. 14–22; and Roger B. Myerson (2009) A Short Overview of the Fundamentals of State-Building, University of Chicago. Available at http://home.uchicago.edu/rmyerson/research/stablizn.pdf, accessed October 10, 2020.

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63 David Loyn (2019) Politics Without Parties: Afghanistan's Long Road to Democracy, Asian Affairs, 50(1), p. 45.

64 Willam Maley (2009) The Afghanistan Wars (London: Pelgrave).

65 Shah M. Tarzi (1991) Politics of the Afghan Resistance Movement: Cleavages, Disunity, and Fragmentation, Asian Survey, 31(6), pp. 479–495.

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68 Arif Sahar (2014) Ethnicizing Masses in Post-Bonn Afghanistan: The Case of the 2004 and 2009 Presidential Elections, Asian Journal of Political Science, 22(3), pp. 289–314.

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71 Ahmad Shah Masoud (1953–2011) was the Afghan Minister of Defence under President Rabbani between 1992 and 2001; he was assassinated on September 9, 2011.

72 Abdul-Ali Mazari, leader of Hezb-e Wahdat, was killed by the Taliban in 1995. After his death, the party (which was composed of 8 factions of Hazaras) divided into two branches: Mazari, under Khalili; and the Akbari branch.

73 Srinjoy Bose & Niamatullah Ibrahimi (2017) Afghanistan’s Political Parties: A Tale of Incomplete Reform and Transformation, in: Srinjoy Bose, Nishank Motwani & William Maley (eds) Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects, pp. 122–140 (London: Routledge); David Loyn (2019), Politics Without Parties: Afghanistan's Long Road to Democracy, Asian Affairs, 50(1), pp. 40–59.

74 Marika Theros & Mary Kaldor (2018) The Logics of Public Authority: Understanding Power, Politics and Security in Afghanistan, 2002–2014, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 7(1), pp.

75 Ashraf Ghani & Clare Lockhart (2009) Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (New York: Oxford University Press).

76 Ahmad Shah Katawazai (2018) Afghanistan: Technocrats vs. Warlords, The Diplomat, July 7. Available at https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/afghanistan-technocrats-vs-warlords/, accessed, Mar. 10, 2020.

77 For example, Ashraf Ghani persuaded Ahmad Zia Masoud to abandon Abdullah after the first round of the 2014 elections. After the formation of the AUG, Ghani appointed Ahmad Zia as Special Representative of the President of Afghanistan in Reform and Good Governance. He later was fired in 2017 due to major disagreements with the president.

78 Thomas H. Johnson (2018) The Myth of Afghan Electoral Democracy: The Irregularities of the 2014 Presidential Election, Small Wars & Insurgencies 29(5–6), pp. 1006–1039.

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88 Ibid.

89 William Maley (2020) Afghanistan: Elite Tensions, Peace Negotiations, and the COVID Crisis, Acta Via Serica, 5(2), p. 13.

90 According to President Ghani, between 2014 and 2019, more than 45,000 Afghan soldiers were killed; see his Jan. 25, 2019 interview with BBC. Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47005558, accessed July 20, 2021.

91 Daud Malaiz (2014) The Political Landscape of Afghanistan and the Presidential Election of 2014, A CIDOB Policy Research Project Barcelona Centre for International Affairs.

92 Arif Sahar (2014) Ethnicizing Masses in Post-Bonn Afghanistan: The Case of the 2004 and 2009 Presidential Elections, Asian Journal of Political Science, 22(3), pp. 289–314.