Leaders and the Breakdown of Democracy in Turkey, 1973-1980

Abstract

This article focuses on Turkey’s crisis-ridden years, from 1973 to 1980. As an under-explored era in English language scholarship, it makes a distinct contribution to the literature on pre-1980 coup Turkish politics. In doing so, it illustrates the implications for the democratic order arising from the two central political leaders of the era Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit’s tussle for power across the decade. The study draws on fieldwork interviews and critical reading of Turkish and English sources to reveal new insights into the leaders’ actions and decisions that trapped the country in a state of political paralysis, inflamed left-right violence, and politicized state institutions, ultimately dragging Turkey down one of its most turbulent periods. It illustrates how the leaders played crucial roles in shaping conditions that eventually resulted in the termination of multi-party politics with a military coup on 12 September 1980.

Key Words:

• Authoritarianism
• breakdown of democracy
• civil-military relations
• Süleyman Demirel
• Bülent Ecevit
• political violence
• Turkey

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1 S. Sayarı (2010) Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22 (2), pp. 198–215; M. M. Gunter (1989) Political Instability in Turkey During the 1970s, Journal of Conflict Studies, 9 (1), pp. 63–77; T. Demirel (2003) The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980, Armed Forces & Society, 29 (2), pp. 253–280; F. Ahmad (1981) Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey, Merip Reports, 11(1), pp. 5–24; F. Ahmad (1993) The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge).

2 Sayarı, Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80, p. 209; Gunter, Political Instability in Turkey During the 1970s, p. 66.

3 D. A. Rustow (1970) Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, Comparative Politics, 2(3), pp. 337–363; L. Diamond, J. Hartlyn & J. J. Linz (1990) Introduction: Politics Society and Democracy in Latin America, in: L. Diamond, J. Hartlyn & J. J. Linz (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), pp. 3–27; J. Higley & R. Gunther (1992) Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).

4 M. Heper & S. Sayarı (2002) Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books); F. W. Frey (1975) Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey, in: G. Lenczowski (ed.) Political Elites in the Middle East, pp. 41–82 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).

5 M. Heper (2001) Turkey: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 1(3), pp. 1–19; M. Heper (1992) The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy Turkey and Germany Compared, Comparative Political Studies, 25(2), pp. 169–194; Ş. Mardin (1973) Centre Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics, Deadalus, 2(1), pp. 169–190; Ş. Mardin (1969) Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 11(3), pp. 258–281.

6 E. Özbudun (2000) Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner); E. Özbudun (1993) State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey, in: L. Diamond (ed.), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, pp. 295–316 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner).

7 H. M. Karaveli (2017) Turkey’s Authoritarian Legacy, Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 25 (Spring), pp. 62–71; J. B. White (2015) The Turkish Complex: Big Man, Hero, Traitor, State, 2015 Campagna-Kerven Lecture on Modern Turkey; S. Waldman & E. Calışkan (2017) The New Turkey and Its Discontents (New York: Oxford University Press); P. A. Musil (2011) Authoritarian Party Structures and Democratic Political Setting in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

8 H. Taş (2015) Turkey: From Tutelary to Delegative Democracy, Third World Quarterly, 36(4), pp. 776–791; K. Akkoyunlu & K. Öktem (2016) Existential Insecurity and the Making of a Weak Authoritarian Regime in Turkey, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 16(4), pp. 505–527.

9 F. Tachau & M. Heper (1983) The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey, Comparative Politics, 16(1), pp. 17–33.

10 Demirel, The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene, p. 343.

11 Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (DUHREC) provided approval for fieldwork and interviews (Approval no: 2016-033). Participants consented to have their statements and identities included in the manuscript.

12 K. Gaytancıoğlu (2014) Politik Liderlik ve Bülent Ecevit [Political Leadership and Bülent Ecevit] (Ankara: Paradigma Kitabevi Yayınları), pp. 164–166.

13 The High Command had expressed their desire for the newly retired head of the Land Forces, General Faruk Gürler, to step into the role of president.

14 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, p. 156.

15 T. Demirel (2003) Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Two Patterns of Civilian Behavior Towards the Military, Turkish Studies, 4(3), p. 7.

16 İ. Turan (2011) Türk Siyasi Partilerinde Lider Oligarşisi: Evrimi, Kurumsallaşması ve Sonuçları [Leader Oligarchy in Turkish Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalization and its Results], İ. Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 45 (October), pp. 1–21; S. Sayarı, P. A. Musil & Ö. Demirkol (eds) (2018) Party Politics in Turkey: A Comparative Perspective (London: Routledge).

17 C. Dündar & R. Akar (2015) Karaoğlan [Blackboy; author’s note: the title is a reference to a Robin Hood-like folk hero] (Istanbul: Can Sanat Yayınları), p. 92; R. Akar & C. Dündar (2008) Ecevit ve Gizli Arşivi [Ecevit and His Secret Archive] (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi), p. 177.

18 Akar & Dündar, Ecevit ve Gizli Arşivi, p. 212.

19 The coalition also included Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Reliance Party, CGP).

20 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975, p. 346.

21 Quoted in M. A. Birand, H. Bila & R. Akar (1999) 12 Eylül: Türkiye’nin Miladı [September 12: Turkey’s Turning Point] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık), p. 47.

22 Quoted in Ahmad, Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey, p. 18.

23 Quoted in Andrew Mango (2004) The Turks Today (New York: Overlook Press), p. 76.

24 Ahmad, Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey, p. 20.

25 Ahmad, Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey, p. 19; B. Gourisse (2013) Party Penetration of the State: The Nationalist Action Party in the Late 1970s, in: E. Massicard & N. Watts (eds), Negotiating Political Power in Turkey: Breaking up the Party, pp. 118–39 (London; New York: Routledge).

26 Gourisse, Party Penetration of the State, p. 133.

27 Demirel, Civil-Military Relations in Turkey, p. 7.

28 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, p. 165; Gourisse, Party Penetration of the State, p. 134.

29 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975, p. 351.

30 Author’s interview with S. Sayarı, July 19, 2016.

31 Interview with Author, April 19, 2016.

32 Ahmad, Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey, pp. 20–21; Birand, Bila & Akar, 12 Eylül: Türkiye’nin Miladı, pp. 47–48.

33 Gourisse, Party Penetration of the State, p. 134.

34 Ibid, p. 133.

35 Akar & Dündar, Ecevit ve Gizli Arşivi, p. 228–236; Sayarı, Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80, p. 203.

36 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, p. 172.

37 Quoted in Birand, Bila & Akar, 12 Eylül: Türkiye’nin Miladı, p. 48.

38 See İ. Bal & S. Laçiner (2001) The Challenge of Revolutionary Terrorism to Turkish Democracy 1960–80, Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(4), pp. 101–102; S. Sayarı (1985) Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case, The RAND Corporation, pp. 7–8; Sayarı, Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80, pp. 203–204.

39 Interview with author, October 13, 2016.

40 M. Ünlü, H. Bila, R. Akar & A. İnandım (1998) 12 Eylül Belgeseli [12 September Documentary] (Cine 5).

41 Birand, Bila & Akar, 12 Eylül: Türkiye’nin Miladı, pp. 127–129.

42 Ünlü, Bila, Akar & İnandım, 12 Eylül Belgeseli.

43 Ibid.

44 Author’s interview with S. Sayarı, July 19, 2016.

45 F. Tachau (2000) Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy, Turkish Studies, 1(1), pp. 137–138.

46 See Charles Tilly (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill College).

47 Sayarı, Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80, pp. 203–204.

48 Demirel, The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene, p. 340.

49 R. Akar, C. Dündar & M. Özcan (2004) Karaoğlan [Blackboy] (CNN Türk); Birand, Bila & Akar, 12 Eylül: Türkiye’nin Miladı, p. 32.

50 F. Tachau (2002) Bülent Ecevit: From Idealist to Pragmatist, in M. Heper & S. Sayarı (eds), Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books), p. 122; M. Heper (2002) Conclusion, in M. Heper & S. Sayarı (eds), Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books), p. 234.

51 This was a coalition in which Demirel’s AP took control of 13 ministries; Erbakan’s MSP had eight and the MHP controlled five.

52 Author’s interview with Sayarı, July 19, 2016.

53 Ecevit, “12’ler”le Istanbul’da Görüştü [Ecevit Met with “the 12” in Istanbul] (1978) Milliyet, 22 December 1978, p. 8. Since the 11 seats fell short of the 13 required for majority rule, he also coerced Turhan Feyzioğlu and Salih Yıldız from the CGP, along with Faruk Sükan from the DP, to join his coalition,

54 Mango, The Turks Today, pp. 72–78.

55 Ünlü, Bila, Akar & İnandım, 12 Eylül Belgeseli.

56 GSNSC (1982) 12 September in Turkey: Before and After (Ankara: Ongün Kardeşler Printing House), p. 107.

57 Ü. Cizre (2014) AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi [AP-Army Relations: Anatomy of a Dilemma] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları), pp. 191–192.

58 Cizre, AP-Ordu Ilişkileri, p. 191.

59 Ibid, p. 176.

60 Ibid, p. 175.

61 A. Przeworski (2003) Why Do Political Parties Obey Results of Elections?, in J. M. Maravall & A. Przeworski (eds), Democracy & the Rule of Law, pp. 114–144 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).

62 N. Gage (1979) Roughhouse Politics Help Keep Turkey on Its Knees, New York Times, 27 May 1979, p. 2.

63 Time (1979) A Game of Musical Chairs, 29 October 1979, p. 57.

64 Time (1979) Ecevit Gets a Reprieve but His Government Faces a Troubled Summer, 2 July 1979, pp. 39–42.

65 Gage, Roughhouse Politics Help Keep Turkey on its Knees, p. 2.

66 For example, on December 26, 1978, 109 deaths occurred, and 170 people were seriously injured, resulting from violence between the Sunni and Alevi communities in Kahramanmaraş. See Sayarı, Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80, p. 204.

67 Birand, Bila & Akar, 12 Eylül: Türkiye’nin Miladı, pp. 48–54, 100–109.

68 Sayarı, Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80, p. 202.

69 Ibid, p. 210.

70 Gunter, Political Instability in Turkey during the 1970s, p. 79.

71 Quoted in Birand, Bila & Akar, 12 Eylül: Türkiye’nin Miladı, p. 71.

72 Time (1980) A New Year’s Warning as Terrorism Runs Wild, the Military Gets Impatient, Time, 14 January 1980, p. 40.

73 Cizre, AP-Ordu Ilişkileri, pp. 186–189.

74 Author’s interview with İ. Turan, April 19, 2016.

75 M. A. Birand (1987) The Generals’ Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980 (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers), p. 48.

76 Quoted in Cizre, AP-Ordu Ilişkileri, pp. 159–160.

77 Birand, Bila & Akar, 12 Eylül: Türkiye’nin Miladı, p. 135.

78 Ibid, pp. 136–137.

79 Ünlü, Bila, Akar & İnandım, 12 Eylül Belgeseli.

80 Gunter, Political Instability in Turkey during the 1970s, p. 68.

81 Demirel, The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene, p. 344.

82 Author’s interview with S. Sayarı, July 19, 2016.

83 W. Hale (1994) Turkish Military and Politics (London: Routledge), p. 232.

84 Ünlü, Bila, Akar & İnandım, 12 Eylül Belgeseli.

85 Quoted in Dündar & Akar, Karaoğlan, p. 109.

86 Author’s Interview with S. Sayarı, July 19, 2016.