Radioactive waste management – technocratic dominance in an age of participation

Radioactive waste and nuclear energy – separate or integrated?

Radioactive waste management, though an integral part of the nuclear fuel cycle, has tended to be treated as a separate issue for public policy making. This political separation between the front end of the cycle (production of nuclear energy) and the back-end (treatment of wastes) may be easily explained. Nuclear energy produces a desired product, electricity; and it may be promoted as a sustainable source of energy. Moreover, it is a complex and, it may be said, exciting technology with an element of risk attached; a “big” technology requiring large resources, big companies and a strong commitment by the state. Nuclear power, with its links to government and big corporations, has achieved a powerful political position in energy policy making in many countries. It is a prime example of centralised, technocratic domination, operating relatively secretly and, on the whole successfully, within government where nuclear interests achieve privileged access. Over the years, nuclear energy has shown great resilience and, when opportunity for its advance has come, as is currently the case with the so-called nuclear renaissance, the nuclear industry has been ready to seize it.

By contrast, radioactive waste management has appeared as a poor relation in political terms. It has long been the Achilles Heel of the nuclear industry, an apparently insoluble problem continuing into the far future, blotting nuclear's copybook and halting the onward progress of nuclear energy. In most countries, the detritus of the nuclear age, its streams of waste from highly active and toxic liquors or solid spent fuel to the huge volumes of low-level wastes, lie scattered in ponds, stores or are fed into the atmosphere, rivers or the sea. In some cases, the clean-up of legacy wastes has barely begun and, in places like Sellafield, clean up of some of the more difficult and badly managed wastes will be a very long and very costly process. Unsurprisingly, the problem of wastes with their potential to harm people and the environment, and their persistence into the far future, strikes fear into people. This concern among ordinary citizens makes radioactive waste not simply a technical issue but a social one as well. As well as being scientifically robust to ensure safety, policies for its management must be publicly acceptable. As a consequence, policy making for radioactive waste has been a far more democratic affair, involving the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local communities and citizens at large. And this more integrative style of policy making has flourished at times when nuclear power has been on the defensive and the need to find a solution for radioactive waste more pressing. In short, when power relationships between nuclear's advocates and opponents are more balanced, a more pluralistic and participative approach to policy making gains ascendancy. When, as now, the nuclear industry becomes more assertive, there is a reversion to a more elitist and exclusive approach.

This theme of separation and integration is replicated in the respective roles of the different knowledge streams that create and influence policy making in the nuclear field. On the one hand, decision making for nuclear energy has been largely in the domain of science, technology and engineering. A technocratic expertise has populated the key positions in the nuclear industry, in the universities, on government committees and advisory bodies and in the sphere of regulation. The most influential policy documents (such as white papers, regulatory advice, recommendations of scientific advisory bodies) draw on scientific research and inquiry using scientific method and judgement to validate programmes of nuclear development. It is true that such programmes have often been controversial given the high levels of risk and cost involved but the decisions on whether to proceed have, in the main, been confined to the realm of scientific expertise. The social sciences, with the exception of economics, have played very little direct part in nuclear energy policy making. On the other hand, they have performed a role in defining a critique of nuclear energy spawning a voluminous and influential literature (academic and journalistic) that has at certain times and in some countries done much to cultivate a sceptical public opinion and thereby affect the fortunes of nuclear energy.

Social sciences have achieved much greater influence in policy making for the much more “social” problem of radioactive waste. The disciplines of sociology, politics, human geography, social psychology and others either separately or in interdisciplinary combinations provide the social critiques essential to understanding risk perception, public acceptability and participation as well as identifying the ethical principles to which policies should be applied (CoRWM 2007). Social sciences present a “softer”, more participative, even deliberative approach to policy making that has come to be know as the “participative” or “deliberative turn” (Dryzek 2000; Chilvers 2008; Saurugger 2010) or, as the European Commission put it almost a decade ago, a “democratisation of expertise” (EC 2001). The deliberative turn is characterised by ideas of partnership, voluntarism and locality which play a prominent part in the search for sites and solutions for radioactive waste management. These ideas play a complementary part in what may be termed an integrative approach to policy making in which science and social science bring to bear different approaches and understanding to finding ways of dealing with the two fundamental problems of radioactive waste – safety, the predominant realm of science, and acceptability, the issue for social science.

This special issue of JIES explores the idea of separation and integration. The tendency for separation of energy and radioactive waste management policy has been reflected in a lack of dialogue between science and social science. But, in the realm of radioactive waste management the story is rather different for we find that social science has proved quite influential in contemporary policy making in several countries. The articles presented here provide evidence of such developments in several countries of northern Europe where the integration of social and scientific elements in policy making has gone furthest giving ground for optimism that the apparent progress towards achieving consensual solutions may be replicated elsewhere in other democratic contexts. On the other hand, there is also ground for a more despairing conclusion as the participative turn is exposed as a legitimating function for a revival in the fortunes of nuclear energy. It may seem ironic that the integration of science and society in policy making for nuclear waste has paved the way for integrating the long separated areas of nuclear energy and radioactive waste management thereby overcoming the main obstacle to a rapid expansion of nuclear power.

This relationship between the social and the technocratic in policy making for radioactive waste is explored in different contexts in this volume. In particular, we explore the deliberative turn, its origins, development and consequences. We may summarise the approach of this volume in terms of the following two key questions:

•	How has progress in finding solutions for radioactive waste management been achieved?
•	What has been the purpose and outcomes of participation – is it on the wane?

Let us take these two questions in turn.

The apogee of participation

Turning to the first question, it is evident that progress was born out of the failure to find solutions to the problem of radioactive waste management in pretty much every country. The top-down, unconsultative, even arrogant approach of Decide Announce Defend which imposed radioactive waste facilities on unsuspecting communities was rejected by local people and the public at large in the United Kingdom, in Sweden and in Switzerland during the 1980s and 1990s (as is shown in the articles in this issue by Blowers, Elam et al., and Krütli et al.) as well as in Germany, the United States, France and elsewhere. With the nuclear industry in retreat and a solution desperately needed for accumulating legacy wastes a period of cooperation ensued as nuclear operators, governments and anti-nuclear groups together engaged in scientific and technological decision making in which social concerns introduced through participative approaches of public and stakeholder engagement became an integral part.

The nuclear sector can be seen as playing a significant role in the reframing of technical issues into sociotechnical ones and opening up decision-making processes for public and stakeholder involvement (Bergmans et al. 2008). There emerged a consensus on both the scientific and social requirements of policy. On the scientific side, a strong focus on safety was based on the concept of deep geological disposal. The contribution of the social side was an emphasis on participative approaches to siting a geological disposal facility or repository. Participation involved an inclusive approach where municipalities voluntarily engage in a siting process where also local communities and NGOs are given the opportunity to work in partnership with the nuclear industry in finding a solution. Already in the early 1990s, a reformulation of siting programmes could be recognised in some Western European countries, most visibly in Finland and Sweden. Today, these two countries are recognised as international forerunners in the application of the technology of nuclear waste management, and they are among the few countries in the world that have identified sites for spent fuel repositories.

In June 2009, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) – responsible for developing the technology and proposing the site for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel – announced that it would apply to site a final repository in the Municipality of Östhammar, about 150 km northeast of Stockholm. Leading up to this announcement, SKB have pursued site investigations in both Östhammar and another volunteer municipality, Oskarshamn about 350 km south of Stockholm. Both municipalities host nuclear facilities, Östhammar has a nuclear power station and a repository for low and intermediate level nuclear wastes while Oskarshamn also has reactors and is the site for Sweden's central store for spent fuel. Over a period of 8 years, SKB arranged a steady stream of consultation meetings in both communities, activities regarded as vitally important to the success of the Swedish process (Dawson and Darst 2006; cf. Elam et al. in this issue). In fact, the two municipalities have in unique fashion ended up competing to host the repository.

The Swedish success in promoting the so-called Baltic Platform, the KBS (KärnBränsleSäkerhet; in English “Nuclear Fuel Safety”) multi-barrier deep geological disposal system can today be viewed as serving as a global demonstration of the practical application of nuclear waste management (Elam and Sundqvist 2009). This success can be attributed to having perennially demonstrated nuclear fuel safety for more than 30 years and today having achieved strong acceptance in the chosen Municipality of Östhammar where 80% of local inhabitants are supportive.

From an international perspective, the Swedish achievements are impressive, and can be matched only by what is happening in Finland. Finnish nuclear waste management has heavily relied on competence and technology built up in Sweden; and the two countries have similar legislative requirements, for example on the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process. Finland, however, took a lead when, in 2001, its national parliament unanimously ratified a Government decision on the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a repository to be developed at one of its existing nuclear sites.

If Finland and Sweden have shown the greatest progress in taking forward the implementation of geological disposal, the process in the United Kingdom is perhaps the strongest example of a participatory process on how to create a sustainable national nuclear waste policy. After the collapse of a series of attempts to find sites for nuclear waste management culminating in the rejection in 1997 of proposals for a demonstration facility at Sellafield, the heart of the United Kingdom's nuclear complex, the whole approach to policy making was reframed integrating scientific and social components. In 2003, the UK Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) was set up, an independent body composed of 11 independent members, which made an integrated set of recommendations on the future management of the country's legacy of solid intermediate and high-level radioactive wastes. The CoRWM process involved about 5000 people participating in a national stakeholder forum, 8 specially recruited discussion groups, 568 self-selecting discussion groups, 4 citizens' panels, a schools project, an open access web-based discussion guide, as well as stakeholder round tables and public meetings at 14 nuclear sites (CoRWM 2006, p. 45; cf. Chilvers and Burgess 2008).

These examples of progress in nuclear waste management, from a situation when all nuclear countries in Western Europe witnessed a failure of technocratic handling of waste management programmes in the 1980s, shows an integrated ambition. However, this progress has been made during a time when many European countries had decided to phase out nuclear power or at least not to build new nuclear power stations. This was a period of relative quiescence in nuclear politics, a time when, with the nuclear industry in decline, it was possible to focus on clean-up and legacy waste management. With clean-up a clear and common objective the nuclear industry could work with its erstwhile opponents within what Blowers (in this issue) calls a “discourse of consensus and cooperation” to find solutions for radioactive waste that were both scientifically and socially acceptable.

This special issue presents accounts of ambitious activities in the radioactive waste sector where citizens and NGOs have been invited to participate together with industry and government agencies to develop and implement policy. These articles draw on experience in four European countries – Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Switzerland – as examples where participative forms of policy making are being developed. Of course, the panoply of ideas associated with the participative turn in policy making – of community involvement, voluntarism, partnership, regional development and the like – are not confined to these countries but are emerging in different ways in a variety of democratic contexts. The emphasis in each is slightly different, for example in France it is on economic development, in Belgium on partnership, in Canada on community agreement and in Germany on participation (CoRWM 2008; AkEnd 2002); but all have been engaged in the integration of the scientific and the social that has become the new dispensation in policy making for radioactive waste. Everywhere, or at least in Western Europe, it seemed that a revolution in policy making had been achieved.

The limits of participation

Now, we come to our second key question, “What has been the purpose and outcomes of participation?” Although progress has been considerable it has also, in some respects, been limited. The new participative approaches have been limited in range, confined to policy for the long-term management of radioactive wastes. They have impinged little, as yet, on other parts of the nuclear cycle let alone been embraced in policies for other forms of infrastructure development. That is not to say that participation is absent elsewhere, rather that the form it takes tends to be more conventional top down consultation. There are limits, too, in terms of outcomes. It remains the case that nowhere yet is there a deep geological repository under construction, let alone operating for the disposal of spent fuel or high-level wastes from civil nuclear programmes. (The Waste Isolation Pilot Project in New Mexico, USA, is operational but confined to transuranic wastes from the country's military programmes.) It is true that both Finland and Sweden have identified sites and are on course for construction of repositories but elsewhere long-term waste management is a conceptual process rather than a matter of practical implementation.

There are limits to the participatory process itself that are considered in this issue. In particular three limitations emerge. First, the tendency for most programmes is to rely on a technocratic framing where participation is most of all about informing people and trying to get support for decisions already taken. Second, the fact that the results from processes of participation and deliberation are not taken up in the policy process. Third, in some instances successful participatory programmes relating to legacy wastes have been appropriated as a legitimating function by representatives from the nuclear industry and government to support nuclear new build. When this happens, both the ambition and commitment to further participation begins to wane.

The first limitation is identified in the article by Elam, Soneryd and Sundqvist, which analyses the technocratic foundations of the “famous” Swedish waste programme. The consistent ambition of the Swedish waste management company, SKB, has been the authoritative demonstration of safety. This ambition has been required by legislation since the late 1970s and has forced the industry to identify its core issue as an expert activity where an outside audience of state authorities, local representatives and citizens are informed of the progress made by SKB. This means that the many consultation meetings held in connection to the siting process have been technocratically framed and more genuine attempts at public influence have been hard to achieve, even if these activities have been presented by SKB as processes of public participation and involvement.

In the article on the successive failures of the Swiss waste repository siting programme in Wellenberg, Krütli et al. identify a range of problems when trying but failing to fit public involvement with safety requirements. This lack of integration, ending in a technocratic framing is according to the authors an explanation of the failures. However, more optimistically, they conclude that integration is possible to achieve. Based on interviews and survey data supporting integration, they take a first step in a formulation of an integration including public reviews of expert reports, which could stimulate and improve experts' technical solutions. Moreover, it is important to take into account citizens' local knowledge and experience as part of the overall technical design of the programme.

The article of Strauss focuses on the second limitation, the problem of policy uptake. In this, she examines the limitations of participatory processes in relation to the Finnish EIA process, and the focus is on how these processes are organised and what kind of effects they have. It is asked whether public participation processes in connection to these programmes are “meaningful”, i.e. whether the results of public consultations are taken up in the wider planning and decision-making process. The answer is that in Finland a lack of an independent regulator protecting accountability and quality of public involvement has encouraged a strong bias towards project implementation rather than a more deliberative approach to policy making.

This problem of policy uptake, how the results of participation processes could feed into broader policy processes, is also in focus in Markku Lehtonen's comparison of participatory activities in Finland, France and the United Kingdom. In all three countries, deliberative and participatory processes at the microlevel have differed in their effectiveness in influencing national policy on nuclear waste management as well as the policy on the future of nuclear power. The Finnish EIA process has suffered from a strong dominance by the nuclear establishment, where the EIA process became a legislative requirement and formally correct bureaucratic exercise instead of a process where local inhabitants and NGOs could genuinely influence the policy process. By contrast, the CoRWM process in the United Kingdom showed a much stronger focus on how the results from a highly varied and independent process could feed into the policy process without being ignored or manipulated.

The third limitation, on participatory processes and their use as a legitimating function for new nuclear power, is a key theme of the article by Blowers. The costs and benefits of a new nuclear programme have been much contested and in the previous issue of the Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences Sovacool (2010) set out the overall perspective on the limitations of a nuclear renaissance as a prelude to this volume. Despite the problems of capital cost, safety, reliability and the physical constraints of water and land use that Sovacool sets out, the nuclear renaissance has got off the ground on the back of its promise of energy security and environmental sustainability. But, a major constraint on new build in the United Kingdom and elsewhere is the problem of finding acceptable solutions for nuclear waste management. As Blowers shows, the UK government has seized on the promise of a future repository for legacy wastes as a solution for new build wastes also. The much acclaimed CoRWM process with its public support for geological disposal as the best long-term solution for legacy wastes is thus being perverted to underwrite a new build programme for which it was never intended.

The integrated forms of policy making widely supported and introduced to find solutions for radioactive waste management are now being enlisted in the support of new build. Two things may flow from this. First, that public and stakeholder enthusiasm will wane as they come to recognise that solutions they backed are being used to support the expansion of nuclear energy and the creation of more wastes. The other is that the emphasis on new build will bring about a reversion to the more traditional top-down, expert-driven, centralised and closed decision making in which consultation rather than participation is the mode of public involvement. For both reasons, stakeholder disaffection and technocratic domination, it may mean that the first blush of enthusiasm for new approaches to policy making is coming to an end.