Chapter Eight: War Transitions and Armed Groups

Abstract

The transition from war to peace is fraught with tension and the risk of a return to bloodshed. With so much at stake, it is crucial that the international community and local stakeholders make sense of the complex mosaic of challenges, to support a lasting, inclusive and prosperous peace. Recent missions, such as in Afghanistan, Somalia or Sudan, have highlighted the fact that there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to steering countries away from violence and towards stability.

This Adelphi offers a series of economic perspectives on conflict resolution, showing how the challenges of peacebuilding can be more effectively tackled. From the need to marry diplomatic peacemaking with development efforts, and activate the private sector in the service of peacebuilding aims, to the use of taxes and natural-resource revenues as a financial base for sustainable peace, this issue considers how economic factors can positively shape and drive peace processes. It examines the complex ways in which power and order may be manifested in conflict zones, where unpalatable compromises with local warlords can often be the first step towards a more lasting settlement. In distilling expertise from a range of disciplines, this Adelphi seeks to inform a more economically integrated and responsive approach to helping countries leave behind their troubled pasts and take a fuller role in constructing their futures.

Notes

This chapter focuses on intrastate conflicts, defined as those that ‘occur between the government of a state and internal opposition groups.’ Lotta Harbom, Stina Hogbladh and Peter Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 43, no. 5, September 2006, p. 626.

While debate remains over the rate of risk of a return to civil war, datasets do illustrate that many civil wars require more than one agreement to end the war and that relapses into war are not uncommon. See Stina Hogbladh, ‘Patterns of Peace Agreements: Presenting new data on peace processes and peace agreements,’ Paper presented at annual International Studies Association conference, San Diego, 2006, p. 19; Joakim Kreutz, ‘How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 47, no. 2, 2010, p. 246.

For examples see Harbom, Hogbladh and Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements', pp. 619–621.

Stewart Patrick, ‘Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 2, Spring 2006, p. 29.

Patrick, ‘Weak States and Global Threats’, pp. 34–40; James Cockayne and Adam Lupel, ‘Introduction: Rethinking the Relationship between Peace Operations and Organized Crime’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 16, no. 1, February 2009, pp. 4–19.

Edward Newman, ‘Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 30, no. 3, December 2009, pp. 429–33.

Between 1989 and 2005, only 46% of peace agreements in intrastate conflicts over government, and 41% of peace agreements in intrastate conflicts over territory, contained provisions about disarmament. Harbom, Hogbladh and Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements,’ p. 624.

For a discussion, see Jeremy Ginifer, with Mike Bourne and Owen Greene, Considering armed violence in the post conflict transition: DDR and small arms and light weapons reduction initiatives, CICS briefing paper, University of Bradford, UK, September 2004.

See Global Burden of Armed Violence (Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008), chapter 3; Hazem Adam Ghobarah, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, ‘Civil Wars Kill and Maim People – Long After the Shooting Stops', American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 2, May 2003, p. 200.

Global Burden of Armed Violence, pp. 53–7.

See Patrick, ‘Weak States and Global Threats', p. 34–40.

This chapter focuses on the domestic emergence of armed groups. In some cases external military actors have imported external criminal networks into post conflict settings, leading to violence and crime. See Cockayne and Lupel, ‘Introduction’, p. 12. But international interventions have also enabled the emergence and solidification of local actors in criminal endeavours. See James Cockayne, ‘Winning Haiti's Protection Competition: Organized Crime and Peace Operations Past, Present and Future’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 16, no. 1, 2009, pp. 77–99.

It remains difficult to mark the end of a war with a ceasefire or peace agreement because many civil wars involve numerous efforts at conflict termination. The latest UCDP dataset on conflict termination 1989–2007 (http://www.pcr.uu.se/database), the most comprehensive at this point, and used as a basis for selecting cases in this chapter. Twelve cases of terminated conflicts (no return to war within five years) were reviewed: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan (see Appendix 1).

For a typology of armed groups active in post-conflict settings see Schneckener, ‘Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance’, in Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini (eds), Private Actors and Security Governance (Berlin: Berlin Lit-Verlag, 2006), pp. 25–28.

For a number of case studies on such transitions see: Jeroen de Zeeuw, ed., From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements after Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008).

Dennis Rodgers, ‘Youth Gangs in Colombia and Nicaragua: New Forms of Violence, New Theoretical Directions?’ in A. Rudqvist (ed.) Breeding Inequality/Reaping violence: Exploring linkages and causality in Colombia and beyond (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2002), pp. 126–27.

Arthur Brice, ‘Gangs tied to paramilitaries cited in Colombia violence’, CNN, 3 February 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/02/03/colombia.violence/index.html; Jennifer Hazen, ‘Force Multiplier: Pro-Government Armed Groups’ in Small Arms Survey (ed.) Small Arms Survey 2010 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University, 2010), p. 271.

See Maya M. Christensen and Mats Utas, ‘Mercenaries of democracy: The “Politricks” of remobilized combatants in the 2007 general elections, Sierra Leone,’ African Affairs, vol. 107, no. 429, pp. 515–39.

Cockayne and Lupel, ‘Introduction’, p. 11.

Jennifer Hazen, Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective, Occasional Paper No. 20 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007), pp. 77–79.

For a discussion of organised crime in post-conflict settings see Cockayne and Lupel, ‘Introduction’, pp. 6–8.

Ana Kantor and Miriam Persson, Understanding Vigilantism: Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform in Liberia (Stockholm, Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, June 2010).

Jennifer Hazen, ‘Gangs, Groups, and Guns: An Overview’, in Small Arms Survey 2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2010), pp. 88–89.

Jennifer Hazen and Chris Stevenson, ‘Targeting Armed Violence: Public Health Interventions’, in Small Arms Survey 2008 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 289, 293; Oliver Jutersonke, Robert Muggah and Dennis Rodgers, ‘Urban Violence and Security Promotion in Central America’, Security Dialogue, vol. 40, 2009, pp. 382–85.

Benjamin Lessing, ‘The Danger of Dungeons: Prison Gangs and Incarcerated Militant Groups', in Small Arms Survey 2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2010).

Some have raised concerns about negotiating with armed groups. See Denis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler, ‘The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa’, African Affairs, Vol. 104, no. 416, 2005, pp. 375–98.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jennifer Hazen

Jennifer Hazen is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Texas at Austin.