Chapter Two: Beijing's multifaceted approaches

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Notes

Trefor Moss, ‘China's NotSo-Hard Power Strategy’, The Diplomat, 28 June 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/28/chinas-not-so-hard-power-strategy/.

For example, Moss credits China for not escalating conflict by introducing PLAN vessels, but instead relying on paramilitaries to project Chinese presence. However, it is worth noting that in the instance he cites at Scarborough Reef, it was Chinese fishing vessels acting illegally – which the Philippine authorities then attempted to arrest, albeit in a somewhat heavy handed manner – that triggered the whole stand-off.

A parallel argument was made when Chen Shui-bian was in power in Taiwan. China only behaved as it did, because Chen was forcing it to.

See, for example: Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China's Assertive Behaviour – Part Two: The Maritime Periphery’, China Leadership Monitor, no. 35, Summer 2011, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM35MS.pdf.

The incoming Chinese ambassador to ASEAN, Yang Xiuping, used the phrase ‘core interests’ while speaking at the Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur in May 2012. ‘ChinaPhilippines Cooperation Depends on Proper Settlement of Maritime Disputes’, Xinhua News Agency, 31 August 2011.

See: Swaine and Fravel, ‘China's Assertive Behaviour – Part One: China's ‘Core Interests’, China Leadership Monitor, no. 34, Winter 2011, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM34MS.pdf.

Minnie Chan, ‘Beijing Lists Unity and Security as Core Interests’, South China Morning Post, 7 September 2011, http://www.scmp.com/article/978288/beijing-listsunity-and-security-core-interests.

Storey, ‘China's Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in the South China Sea’, p. 56.

Cronin and Kaplan, ‘Cooperation from Strength: U.S. Strategy and the South China Sea’, p. 25.

Zhong Sheng, ‘Hold Mainstream of China–ASEAN Relations’, People's Daily Online, 6 April 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90780/7779588.html.

Quoted in: ‘Full Unclosure?’, The Economist, 24 March 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21551113.

Liang Guanglie, ‘A Better Future Through Security Cooperation’, speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 5 June 2011. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-ladialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/speeches/fourth-plenary-session/general-liang-guanglie-english/.

Pia Lee Brago, ‘New Chinese Envoy sees Peaceful Solution to Spratlys Dispute’, The Philippine Star, 22 February 2012, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/779568/new-chinese-envoy-sees-peacefulsolution-spratlys-dispute.

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue discussions, 2 June 2012.

Xue Hanqin, lecture at the Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore, 19 November 2009.

See, for example: Zhong Sheng, ‘Hold Mainstream of China–ASEAN Relations’, People's Daily, 9 April 2012. Similar comments were made by Wen Jiabao during the 20th ASEAN Summit in Bali in November 2011, warning that disputes should be discussed only amongst claimants and rejecting the involvement of ‘outside powers’.

Interview with Chinese think tanker, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, 2 June 2012. Lack of Chinese interest in negotiating a follow-up Code with ASEAN through 2012 appears to confirm this interpretation.

Six-Point Agreement between China and Vietnam to guide settlement of maritime disputes, 11 October 2011. As reported, for example, by Xinhua on 12 October 2012.

‘China Envoy to Philippines Airs Views on Spratlys’, Manila Bulletin, 23 December 2010.

Jerry Esplanada, ‘Okay to Buy Warships but don't bring US into Spratly Dispute’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 23 February 2012.

Romeo- and Whiskey-class submarines formed the backbone of China's fleet in the late 1980s, while Luda-class destroyers and Jianghu- class frigates were both based on 1950s Soviet designs. For a listing of China's late Cold War fleet, see: The Military Balance 1988–89, (London: IISS, 1989), pp. 149–50.

Fravel, ‘Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the Competition over Maritime Rights’, in Cronin (ed.), Cooperation from Strength, p. 40.

A point appreciated by Deputy Chief of the PLA General Zhang Li in his 2009 call for China to establish an air and sea port on Mischief Reef. For more on this argument, see: Leszek Buszynski, ‘The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.–China Strategic Rivalry’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2, Spring 2012, p. 146.

Fravel, ‘Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the Competition over Maritime Rights’, p. 41.

Chan, ‘PLA Navy in Live-fire Attack Drills in East China and South China Seas’, SCMP, 18 January 2013.

For a description of A2AD and the US pivot to Asia, see; ‘New US Military Concept Marks Pivot to Sea and Air’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 18, no. 20, May 2012; and Christian Le Mière, ‘America's Pivot to East Asia: The Naval Dimension’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 3, June–July 2012, pp. 81–94.

Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, ‘Small Stick Diplomacy in the South China Sea’, The National Interest, 23 April 2012.

For a fuller description of China's five maritime paramilitary agencies, see: Christian Le Mière, ‘Policing the Waves: Maritime Paramilitaries in the Asia-Pacific’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 1, December 2010–January 2011, pp. 133–46.

It is also important that the little stick of diplomacy of the paramilitaries is supported by a bigger stick of the PLAN in the background. For example, it was only CMS vessels that entered the waters around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea in September 2012, which may have indicated a desire to limit escalation on China's behalf, yet the fact that an anti-ship missiles test occurred in the East China Sea in the same month was a deliberate and complementary reminder of China's military capabilities.

‘China Patrols S China Sea to Fight Illegal Exploration’, People's Daily Online, 20 March 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7762726.html.

‘China Beefs Up its Offshore Law Enforcement’, China Daily, 18 September 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201009/18/content_11320201.htm.

In this incident, the Philippines also behaved more assertively in the deployment of a warship to make the arrests. Although the Philippines argued that this was more a matter of geography than a deliberate escalation (the warship was apparently their closest vessel to the incident) it was clear from reactions amongst the Philippines' fellow ASEAN member states that they at least were not convinced. Two days later Manila did however replace the warship with a coastguard vessel.

Chinese sources repeatedly note that Beijing regularly requests the US to desist from such surveillance activities off its shores but to no effect. The subsequent move to a more aggressive form of protest is therefore seen, at least from Beijing's perspective, as a reasonable counteraction to ongoing US hostility.

According to Shirley Kan, ‘the PLA had started aggressive interceptions of U.S. reconnaissance flights in December 2000’. US–China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 19 June 2012.

‘China-ASEAN Free Trade Area Starts Operation’, Xinhua, 1 January 2010. Bilateral trade volume between China and ASEAN reached US$362.9bn in 2011, a rise of 24% of 2010. ‘China–ASEAN Embrace Growing Trade Volume’, CNS, 17 January 2012.

By 2012, bilateral trade between China and the Philippines was already not far approaching bilateral trade between the US and the Philippines, whilst in 2011 a target of doubling bilateral trade to US$60bn a year by 2016 was agreed between China and the Philippines. Cheng Guangjin and Lan Lan, ‘Sino-Philippine Trade to Double’, China Daily, 1 September 2011.

The initial health warning was sent several weeks before the beginning of the stand-off at Scarborough but it was targeted only at fruit from a single conglomerate operating in Mindanao with no curbs on imports attached. Two months later, China's General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine noted that it had found 104 types of ‘harmful organisms’ in fruit arriving from the Philippines. Andrew Higgins, ‘In Philippines, Banana Growers Feel Effects of South China Sea Disputes’, Washington Post, 10 June 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/201206-10/world/35461588_1_chinesefishermen-president-benignoaquino-iii-south-china-sea.

Ibid.

Exports to China by trading partners whose leaders met with the Dalai Lama fell on average between 8.1% and 16.9% following such a meeting. For more on this argument, see, for example: Andreas Fuchs and NilsHendrik Klann, ‘Paying a Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect on International Trade’, Research Paper no. 113, Center for European Governance and Economic Development, 19 October 2010.

Will Rogers, ‘The Role of Natural Resources in the South China Sea’, in Cronin (ed.), Cooperation from Strength, p. 86. Figures taken from: the BP ‘Statistical Review of World Energy’, June 2011, p. 6.

Leslie Hook, ‘Gas Finds Give Impetus to China Seaclaim’, Financial Times, 9 November 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a782a6f82a73-11e2-a137-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2JTyEEgny.

There is also an important distinction over what proportion of these reserves is recoverable in terms of economic viability or technological capabilities. Chinese estimates of oil reserves in the South China Sea can be upwards of 100bn barrels. In contrast, an estimate released by the US Energy Information Administration in 2013 suggests reserves of around 11bn barrels.

Fravel, ‘Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the Competition over Maritime Rights’, p. 36.

The same is true of Chinese operations against Vietnamese and Philippine fishing vessels. Periods of tight enforcement, arrests and ransoms, are followed by periods of relative calm.

Fravel, ‘The South China Sea Oil Card’, The Diplomat, 27 June 2012, http://thediplomat.com/chinapower/the-south-china-sea-oilcard/. It should also be noted that the disputed status of these blocks means that it is likely that interest from foreign oil companies is limited. The move could therefore be more symbolic than substantive.

Mark Valencia, ‘China Upsets Asia's Applecart’, Japan Times, 11 July 2012.

In May 2012, China's first deepwater oil drill began operations in undisputed waters 320km southeast of Hong Kong. As the technology is tried and tested it is reasonable to expect exploitation in contested waters will at least be mooted.

Brian Spegele and Wayne Ma, ‘For China Boss, Deep-water Rigs are a “Strategic Weapon”’, Wall Street Journal, 29 August 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444233104577592890738740290.html.

Michael Richardson, ‘China's Gunboat Diplomacy’, Japan Times, 30 July 2012. The original comment was made in an article by He Jianbin in Global Times on 28 June 2012.

Huang Yiming and Jin Haixing, ‘Fishing Vessels set off for Nansha Islands’, China Daily, 13 July 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-07/13/content_15575461.htm.

For more on this, see: Zhang Hongzhou, ‘China's Evolving Fishing Industry: Implications for Regional and Global Maritime Security’, RSIS Working Paper 246, 16 August 2012, in particular see p. 8. See also: ‘State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2010’, UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, Rome, 2010, http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1820e/i1820e.pdf.

In March 2009, China formally announced that one reason for the conduct of patrols by Fisheries Administration vessels was to demonstrate sovereignty.

According to Xinhua, Sansha ‘administers over 200 islets’ and ‘2 million square kilometres of water’. James Webb, ‘The South China Sea's Gathering Storm’, Wall Street Journal, 20 August 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444184704577587483914661256.html.

For an example of this link between Vietnamese and Chinese actions, see: Teddy Ng, ‘New City to Run Disputed Island Chains’, South China Morning Post, 22 June 2012.

June Teufel Dreyer, ‘Sansha: New City in the South China Sea’, China Brief, vol. 12, no. 16, 17 August 2012.

See Christian Le Mière and Sarah Raine, ‘Water Pollution: South China Sea Dispute Taints the Region’, Jane's Intelligence Review, February 2013.

‘China to Officially Name Islands in Sovereignty Move’, Xinhua, 16 October 2012.

Both countries issued visas instead on separate pieces of paper.

‘New Chinese Passports “Counterproductive”’, Channel News Asia, 29 November 2012.

Again, Beijing is not the only claimant encouraging new inhabitants and visitors to the islands. The southern Vietnamese province of Khanh Hoa – which has administrative responsibility for the islands within Vietnam – has organised a delegation of Buddhist monks for a six-month curatorship of recently refurbished temples on Vietnamese-held islands in the Spratly grouping. ‘Vietnam to send Buddhist Monks to Spratly Islands’, BBC News, 12 March 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17343596.

‘China to Develop Tourism on Xisha Islands’, China Daily, 12 March 2012. There is some confusion on the precise nature of any plans. For example, on 6 April 2012, Beijing Times and Shanghai Daily both quoted China's tourism authority now denying previous reports of sightseeing tours launching soon. On the same day, Beijing News reported that Hainan was still pressing ahead with its tourismpromotion plans.

‘Chinese Cruise Ship Returns from Trial Xisha Voyage’, People's Daily Online, 10 April 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90882/7782605.html.

Prepared Statement by Fravel to a US House Committee on Foreign Affairs on ‘Investigating the China Threat, Part One: Military and Economic Aggression’, 28 March 2012.

International Crisis Group, ‘Stirring up the South China Sea (1)’, Asia Report no. 223, 23 April 2012.

For more details on these five agencies, see: ‘Five Dragons Stirring up the Sea’, Maritime Study no.5, US Naval War College, April 2010; and Christian Le Mière, ‘Policing the Waves’.

These suggestions, made by Luo Yuan in March 2012, may not reflect official policy but may be further evidence of retired Chinese generals acting to test publicly the waters for new policies. Interview with Luo in ‘Coast Guard Missing Piece of Naval Strength’, Global Times, 8 March 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/699279/Coast-guard-missingpiece-of-naval-strength.aspx.

Wang Qian, ‘Cross-province Patrol Begins in South China Sea’, China Daily, 9 November 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-11/09/content_15899201.htm.

Ibid.

Qian, ‘Hainan Border Police Given New Powers’, China Daily, 28 November 2012.

Interview with Chinese academic, Singapore, 4 June 2012.

Note from the PRC's permanent mission to the UN, 7 May 2009, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf.

Global Times, 23 May 2012, quoted in: Willy Lam, ‘China Deploys Pugilistic Foreign Policy with New Vigour’, China Brief, vol. 12, no. 12, 22 June 2012.

If China's military modernisation causes insecurities in others, there is only so much China can and should do. Interview at the National Defence University, Beijing, September 2010.

Defence Ministry spokesman, quoted in: ‘Chinese Defence Ministry Vows to Safeguard Maritime Rights’, Xinhua, 28 June 2012.

General Liu Yuan is one example of a PLA officer who has been relatively outspoken in this regard. Stories of PLA corruption abound. See, for example, the removal of Lt.-Gen. Gu Junshan for the embezzlement of hundreds of millions of US dollars.

See, for example, the report by Trusted Sources that quotes from this article in People's Liberation Army Daily on 17 June 2012. ‘Keeping the Army in Step’, Trusted Sources, 22 June 2012, http://www.trustedsources.co.uk/blog/china/keeping-the-army-in-step.

See, for example: ‘Chinese People's Liberation Army Political Work Regulations’ [zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuo tiaoli] from 2003.

For an example of Yang Yi's hawkish rhetoric, see: Xinhua's interview of 26 December 2011: ‘When any country infringes upon our nation's security and interests, we must stage a resolute self-defence.’ Counter-attack measures should ‘leave no room for ambiguity’.

Chris Buckley, ‘China Military Warns of Confrontation over Seas’, Reuters, 21 April 2012.

Peter Mattis, ‘How Much Power Does China's ‘People's Army’ Have?’, The Diplomat, 13 July 2012, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/how-much-powerdoes-chinas-peoples-army-have/. In the 18th Politburo, the PLA is represented (aside from by General Secretary and CMC Chair Xi Jinping) by CMC Vice Chairs Fan Chanlong and Xu Qiliang.

Ng, ‘Hawkish Commander Heads South Sea Fleet’, South China Morning Post, 10 July 2012.

Ibid.

Ng, ‘Reshuffle Linked to Island Disputes’, South China Morning Post, 12 July 2012.

For more on this argument, see: J. Michael Cole, ‘Militarization of China's Civilian Leaders?’, The Diplomat, 29 August 2012. http://thediplomat.com/china-power/themilitarization-of-chinas-civilianleaders/.

Ming Yang, ‘Taking Advantage of China's Peaceful Stance’, China Daily, 30 June 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/201206/30/content_15539033.htm.

Ding Gang, People's Daily, 2 June 2012, as cited by: Lam, ‘China Deploys Pugilistic Foreign Policy with New Vigor’, China Brief, vol. 12, no. 12, 22 June 2012.

Cited by: Yoichi Kato, ‘South China Sea Disputes: Harbinger of Regional Strategic Shift?’, AJISS-Commentary, no. 130, 14 September 2011.

Francesco Guarascio, ‘Europe Ignoring Geopolitical Flashpoint of South China Sea’, Public Service Europe, 2 April 2012.

‘Philippines belongs to China: CCTV’, Taipei Times, 10 May 2012, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/05/10/2003532435.

The website is www.nansha.org. The list of ‘traitors’ can be found at: http://www.nansha.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=3778&sid=39e499c0b48c434b9126a0c439253e49

For a discussion of nationalism in East Asia, see: Christian Le Mière, ‘Games Countries Play’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 5, October–November 2012, pp. 250–56.

Fravel, ‘All Quiet in the South China Sea’, Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2012. The example cited is from a column by Zhong Sheng, published in The People's Daily in January 2012.

Nationalist displays with regard to these core issues are different in part because the targets, whether Tibetans and Taiwanese, are fundamentally perceived to be Chinese. In sovereignty disputes in both the East China and South China Sea, the targets of such displays are ‘foreigners’. This in turn introduces a further action–reaction dynamic.

Guarascio, ‘Europe Ignoring Geopolitical Flashpoint of South China Sea’; ‘China Plants Flag in South Sea Amid Disputes’, Reuters, 26 August 2010.

It is of course possible that the two are linked, and that the approval of nationalist sentiment in the South China Sea can be useful as a valve to diffuse and distract from problems elsewhere. See, for example: Damian Grammaticas, ‘China Bangs the War Drum over the South China Sea’, BBC News, 10 May 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18016901.