Chapter Three: Southeast Asia – between emerging great-power rivalry

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Notes

John David Ciorciari ‘The Balance of Great-power Influence in Contemporary Southeast Asia’, International Relations of the AsiaPacific, vol. 9, 2009, p. 159

Amitav Acharya, ‘Will Asia's Past be its Future?’, International Security, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 150–60.

Ciorciari, ‘The Balance of Greatpower Influence in Contemporary Southeast Asia’, p. 163. Quoting Robert Ross: ‘The Geography of the peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century’, International Security, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 81–118.

‘New U.S. Base in RI's Backyard’, Jakarta Post, 17 November 2011.

For example, Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos all have modest defence cooperation with China. Meanwhile, the Philippines and Thailand are both formal allies of the US, yet their security engagement with the US lags that of partners such as Singapore, which hosts military facilities and equipment for US forces. It should also be noted that Thailand hosts Cobra Gold, the largest military exercise in the region in which US forces are involved.

For the full text of the declaration, see: http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1971%20Zone%20of%20Peace%20Freedom%20and%20Neutrality%20Declaration-pdf.pdf

Lee Kuan Yew, Speech to the Nixon Center, Washington DC, 11 November 1996. Referenced in Eveyln Goh, ‘Singapore and the United States: Cooperation on Transnational Security Threats’, Paper prepared for 26th Annual Notes Pacific Symposium, Honolulu, Hawaii, 8–10 June 2005, p. 5, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a441177.pdf.

See, for example, Aaron Friedberg, ‘Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia’, International Security, vol. 18, no. 3, Winter 1993/94, pp. 5–33.

For more detail on aspects of this argument see Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-enmeshment, Balancing, and Hierarchical Order’, Working Paper No. 84, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, July 2005.

Ciorciari, ‘The Balance of Greatpower Influence in Contemporary Southeast Asia’, p. 176.

This was most obvious in the actions of rival claimants Vietnam and the Philippines, but also in the behaviour of concerned observers such as Singapore.

Valencia, ‘Foreign Military Activities in Asian EEZs: Conflict Ahead?’, National Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report no. 27, May 2011, p. 3.

Notification of the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand's Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, May 15, 2011. Available at: http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2011/CN.291.2011-Eng.pdf.

Indonesia broadly continued with this strategy through its chairmanship in 2011.

This coincides with a general upturn in tension in the sea, caused by a range of factors, including the May submission deadline for claims to an extended continental shelf under UNCLOS. Philippine preparedness to confront China on competing sovereignty disputes seems further to have increased following the election of President Benigno Aquino III in 2010. In 2011, Aquino announced a policy of ‘what is ours is ours’, indicating that the country would not hold back from exercising its sovereign rights within its EEZ, including with regard to both fisheries and hydrocarbon exploitation.

Ian Storey, ‘China's Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in the South China Sea’, in Cronin (ed.), Cooperation from Strength, p. 60.

Interviews with Cambodian government adviser and Singaporean academic, Shangri-La Dialogue, 2 June 2012.

According to Philippine Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Major-General Francisco Cruz, quoted in: Rene Acosta, ‘Military's Chief Spy Pushes Security Policy for Spratlys’, Business Mirror, 12 March 2012.

This has complicated implications for Vietnam's relations with China. Vietnam already imports hydroelectricity from China and is dependent on China (and Laos) for maintaining river flow into Vietnam's hydro-power plants.

Kaplan, ‘The Vietnam Solution’.

Interview at Chinese Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, 22 September 2009.

The bill was signed into law by the president the following month (in March 2009).

‘Vietnam Introduces Maritime Law’, VietNamNetBridge, 17 July 2012, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/24535/vietnamintroduces-maritime-law.html. For Chinese reactions see ‘China Opposes Vietnamese Maritime Law over Sovereignty Claims’, Xinhua, 21 June 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201206/21/c_131668632.htm.

Fravel, ‘Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the Competition over Maritime Rights’, p. 43.

‘Philippines “to take South China Sea Row to Court”’, BBC News, 22 January 2013.

See, for example: UNCLOS Part XV for a description of dispute settlement procedures; UNCLOS Part XI, Section V for ITLOS' role on seabed disputes; the ITLOS website (www.itlos.org) for a description of the chambers maintained by the tribunal; and the ICJ's website (www.icj-cij.org) for an outline of cases that can be brought to the court.

William Choong, ‘Manila Deals a Clever Hand with Desire for Arbitration’, Straits Times, 30 January 2013.

Daniel Ten Kate, ‘Russia to Help Vietnam Produce Anti-ship Missiles, RIA says’, Bloomberg News, 16 February 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-16/russia-to-help-vietnam-produceanti-ship-missiles-ria-says-1-.html.

Other US vessels have been repaired in other shipyards: the first vessel was repaired in 2009 in Saigon. Thayer, ‘Vietnam Looking to Play Pivotal Role with both China and US’, Global Times, 25 July 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/723033.shtml.

Kagan, ‘The Vietnam Solution’.

For Beijing's perspective, see, for example, the comments by Zhou Shouwei, former deputy general manager of CNOOC Group in: ‘China Researcher: China hasn't yet Exploited “Mid-Southern” South China Sea’, Dow Jones Newswires, 2 July 2012.

‘Operations in the South China Sea’, Oilfield Technology, June 2011, http://www.slb.com/~/media/Files/coiled_tubing/industry_articles/201108_ct_operations_south_china_sea.pdf.

International Crisis Group, ‘Stirring up the South China Sea II: Regional Responses’, June 2012, p. 42.

‘China, Brunei Pledge Further Cooperation’, Xinhua, 30 January 2013, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8115346.html.

See for example comments by Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa that the status quo in the South China Sea is ‘not an option’. Daniel Ten Kate and Karl Lester M. Yap, ‘Risk of Conflict in South China Sea is Set to Prompt ASEAN Pact with China’, Bloomberg, 21 July 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-20/china-aseanto-agree-on-incomplete-s-chinasea-rules.html.

Sabam Siagian, ‘The Un-ASEAN Way of Treating Unresolved Issues’, Jakarta Post, 16 July 2012, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/16/the-un-asean-waytreating-unresolved-issues.html.

Thayer, ‘Behind the Scenes of ASEAN's Breakdown’, Asia Times, 27 July 2012.

In 1995, whilst again failing to clarify China's precise claims, a PRC spokesman did note that China had no dispute with Indonesia.

‘Govt to Ramp Up Troops in Natuna’, Antara [Indonesian National News Agency], 25 May 2012, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-290808210/govtramp-up-troops.html.

Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, ‘Indonesia's South China Sea Dilemma: Between Neutrality and Self-Interest’, RSIS Commentary 126, 2012.

‘Petronas in Joint Vietnam Venture’, The Star [Malaysia], 9 January 2002.

See, for example: ‘TNI Expects Stronger Navy Fleet by 2024’, Jakarta Post, 30 August 2012, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/08/30/tni-expects-stronger-navy-fleet-2024.html.

Janeman Latul and Neil Chatterjee, ‘Infrastructure as the Missing BRIC in Indonesia's Wall’, Reuters, 19 January 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/idUKL3E8CJ68F20120119.

Statement by Singapore Foreign Ministry 2011, cited in: ‘Singapore urges China to Clarify South China Sea Claim’, BBC News, 20 June 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13838462.

Philip Bowring, ‘Singapore Quiets the South China Sea’, Asia Sentinel, 29 June 2011.

For example Su Hao, from China Foreign Affairs University, commented to China Daily, that ‘Sino-Thai cooperation is expected to serve as an example for China's ties with other ASEAN nations’. Zhou Wa, ‘China's ASEAN Role Wins Praise’, China Daily, 17 April 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-04/17/content_15063180.htm.

Ibid.

The Philippine Foreign Secretary reportedly offered to soften mention of recent clashes with simply a passing reference to ‘the affected shoal’, yet even this was dismissed with limited attempt to find common ground reportedly made.

Von Sokheng and Shane Worrell, ‘Hu Pledges Millions in Aid’, Phnom Penh Post, 2 April 2012.

‘China Gives Cambodia Aid and Thanks for ASEAN Help’, Reuters, 4 September 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/04/us-cambodiachina-idUSBRE88306I20120904.

Prak Chan Thul, ‘Hu Wants Cambodia Help on China Sea Dispute, Pledges Aid’, Reuters, 31 March 2012.

Ibid.

‘Chinese Official Lauds Cambodian Support for Beijing's Core Interests’, Xinhua, 3 December 2012.

Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘Thailand Walks a Tightrope on the South China Sea’, The Nation, 7 May 2012, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Thailand-walksatightrope-on-South-ChinaSea-30181423.html.

Jeremy Grant, Ben Bland and Gwen Robinson, ‘South China Sea Issue Divides Asean’, Financial Times, 16 July 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d45667ccf29-11e1-bfd9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2JTyEEgny.

Interview with an adviser to the King of Cambodia, Shangri-La Dialogue, 2 June 2012.

For further details see International Crisis Group, ‘Stirring up the South China Sea II: Regional Responses’, Asia Report no. 229, 24 July 2012, p. 16.

Jens Kastner, ‘Taiwan Circling South China Sea Bait’, Asia Times, 13 June 2012.

See, for example, comments made by former Deputy Chief of the General Staff Admiral Fei Hung-po. Quoted in: Chan, ‘Sea Row Chance to Foster New Ties’, SCMP, 3 June 2012.

See, for example, the 2012 announcement of a special airborne unit able to reach Taiping Island with the help of C-130 aircraft within four hours. ‘Taiwan Sets up Airborne Unit for Spratlys’, Agence France-Presse, 2 May 2012.

In lieu of any agreement, the Philippines reportedly led the way in demanding a record be made of the fact that the South China Sea had been discussed whereas Cambodia argued that such mention compromised ASEAN neutrality. Simon Tay, ‘ASEAN, Neutral or Neutered?’, Today Online, 17 July 2012.

‘Severe Dent on ASEAN Credibility’, Singapore Straits Times, 14 July 2012; Jeremy Grant, Ben Bland and Gwen Robinson, ‘South China Sea Issue Divides Asean’.

Jason Szep and James Pomfret, ‘Tensions Flare over South China Sea at ASEAN Summit’, Reuters, 19 November 2012.

Jon Grevatt, ‘Thailand Agrees to German Submarine Procurement’, Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 March 2011.

Jaime Laude, ‘Philippine Navy needs P500B to Upgrade War Capability’, Philippine Star, 24 May 2012, http://www.philstar.com/breaking-news/809955/philippinenavy-needs-p500b-upgrade-warcapability.

Taiwan has been studying the feasibility of such an indigenous programme for several years. See: Wendell Minnick, ‘Taiwan to Build Own Subs’, Defense News, 13 April 2009.

George Amurao, ‘Philippines Builds Anti-China Muscle’, Asia Times, 2 March 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NC02Ae01.html.

Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin 2000), pp. 33–4.

Quoted in: Yoichi Kato, ‘South China Sea Disputes: Harbinger of Regional Strategic Shift?’, p. 4.

Frances Mangosing, ‘Philippines to Receive 10 New Patrol Ships from Japan’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18 May 2012.

Raisa Robles, ‘Japan Offers Philippines 10 Ships to Patrol South China Sea’, South China Morning Post, 11 January 2013.

‘Japan PM Shinzo Abe Begins Southeast Asia Push in Vietnam’, BBC News, 16 January 2013.

Mangosing, ‘Philippines to Buy 12 South Korean Fighter Jets’, Inquirer.net, 31 January 2013, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/350421/philippinesto-buy-12-southkorean-fighter-jets.

‘China Pushes India–ASEAN Towards Strategic Partnership’, iSikkim, 16 February 2012, http://isikkim.com/2012-02-china-pushesindia-aseantowardsstrategic-partnership-16-06/; ‘After Kailakunda, Singapore to Train at Indian Army Firing Ranges’, Indian Express, 12 August 2008, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/after-kalaikunda-singaporeto-train-at-indian-army-firingranges/348181.

Ananth Krishnan, ‘South China Sea Projects ‘Risky for India’’, The Hindu, 5 April 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article3281437.ece.

Krishnan, ‘In South China Sea, a Surprise Chinese Escort for Indian Ships’, The Hindu, 14 June 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3524965.ece?homepage=true.

Edna Curran, ‘Australia has Role in China Sea Dispute’, Wall Street Journal, 13 September 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444709004577650124046496702.html.

‘Vietnam Allows Russia to Set Up Ship Maintenance Base at Port in Cam Ranh Bay’, CNTV, 30 July 2012, http://english.cntv.cn/program/newshour/20120730/110324.shtml; ‘Russia Seeks to Set Up Naval Bases Abroad’, Associated Press, 27 July 2012.

For full text of 2012 EU East Asia Policy Guidelines, see: http://eeas.europa.eu/asia/docs/guidelines_eu_foreign_sec_pol_east_asia_en.pdf.

See, for example: ‘UK to Deepen Engagement with ASEAN’, Xinhua, 27 June 2012.

For more on the RCEP and the differences with the TPP, see: Murray Hiebert and Liam Hanlon ‘ASEAN and Partners Launch Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership’, CSIS, 7 December 2012, http://csis.org/publication/asean-and-partners-launch-regional-comprehensive-economicpartnership.