China's Missile Forces

Abstract

China's nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. It is a small force, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert and married to a no-first-use doctrine – all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong's oft-quoted remark that ‘nuclear weapons are a paper tiger’ seems to be bluster or madness. China's nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world's most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China's nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

Notes

¹ Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 70–71.

² ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2012’, US Department of Defense, May 2012, p. 24, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_cmpr_final.pdf.

³ ‘China Nuclear Force Commander Reiterates “No First Use” Policy To Codel Skelton’, http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07BEIJING5707&version=1314919461.

⁴ China Today: Defense Science and Industry (Beijing, National Defense University Press, 1993) p. 65.

⁵ The fact that the DF-1 was an SS-2 copy accounts for a discrepancy in Chinese and US designations – the DF-2 is the CSS-1, the DF-3 is the CSS-2, and so on. US designations are based on the order in which a missile system was identified. Having the designations so close can often result in confusion.

⁶ Thus, the DF-3 of the post-1964 era bears no relationship to the missile that bore the designation.

⁷ The Chinese distinguish ranges slightly differently than Americans. Whereas the US defines the DF-4 and DF-5 as ICBMs, China distinguishes between the two.

⁸ Evan Feigenbaum, China's Techno-warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 79.

⁹ I am indebted to Mark Stokes for this observation.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Lewis and Litai, Imagined Enemies, p. 175.

¹² According to Lewis and Xue, Xiang was an opponent of the radicals, but moderates interpreted his efforts to mend fences with Jiang Qing as a secret effort to ingratiate himself with the Gang of Four.

¹³ China makes little effort to hide troop training at such locations. One of the current DF-31 training sites, for example, is near Kangzhuang. On a hillside overlooking the site are massive characters that read ‘Build an eco-friendly test range’. China has also released videos showing units training at such locations.

¹⁴ Accidents involving the Titan II at Searcy, Arkansas in 1965, Rock, Kansas in 1978, and Damascus, Arkansas in 1980 demonstrate the challenges of maintaining fuelled missiles in launch-ready status. For a readable account of the 1980 accident at Damascus, see Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York: The Penguin Press, 2013).

¹⁵ Recently declassified US intelligence documents provide details.

¹⁶ ‘Identification of Probable CSS-3 Rollout, Erect-to-Launch Site, Lushi Probably SSM Launch Site 3, China’, CIA, 14 October 1982, approved for release 12 January 2011.

¹⁷ ‘CSS-4 Upper Silo Configuration, Lushi SSM Launch Site 3, China’, CIA, December 1984, approved for release 20 July 2010.

¹⁸ Lewis and Hua, China's Strategic Seapower, p. 27.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 120.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 188.

²¹ Ibid.

²² This date is much later than is usually given. Flight testing and conversion of barracks are detailed in classified documents leaked to Bill Gertz of the Washington Times. China conducted two DF-21 flight tests in 1995 and 1996. The first deployments were described in a November 1996 document that expected conversion to be complete by 2002. The Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated that the DF-21 had largely replaced the DF-3, which remained deployed by a single brigade by 2005. See ‘Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005’, Office of the Secretary of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf.

²³ Kenneth H. Bacon, ‘DoD News Briefing’, US Department of Defense, 12 December 2000, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1876.

²⁴ On failure, see ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010’, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 34, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_cmpr_final.pdf; on technical hurdles, see ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011’, Office of the Secretary of Defense, pp. 34, 62, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf; on success in 2012, see ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013’, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 31, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf.

²⁵ ‘Delhi Diary, July 17–25’, http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07NEWDELHI3383.

²⁶ ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013’.

²⁷ Bill Gertz, ‘China Conducts Second Flight Test of New Long-Range Missile’, Washington Free Beacon, 17 December 2013.

²⁸ Lewis and Hua, ‘China's Ballistic Missile Programs’, p. 29.

²⁹ For a technical analysis of the apparently failed August test, see James Acton, Catherine Dill and Jeffrey Lewis, Crashing Glider, Hidden Hotspring: Analyzing China's August 7, 2014 Hypersonic Glider Test, Arms Control Wonk, 3 September 2014, http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/7443/crashing-glider-hidden-hotspring.

³⁰ Donald L. Fuell, technical director for force modernisation and employment, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, quoted in ‘China's Military Modernization and its Implications for the United States’, hearing before the US–China Economic And Security Review Commission, 30 January 2014, p. 36

³¹ Liu also helped to preserve funding for the human space-flight programme. See Jeffrey Lewis and Gregory Kulacki, ‘A Place for One's Mat: China's Space Program: 1956– 2003’, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2009, p. 25.

³² ‘Inside PLA Navy's 1t nuclear-powered sub force’, China Daily, 27 October 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/slides/2013-10/27/content_17061925_2.htm.

³³ The charts, released in 1996 and 2007, redact the noise levels, but contain comparisons to other submarine types. See Jeffrey Lewis, ‘How capable is the 094?’, Arms Control Wonk, 31 July 2007, http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1579/how-capable-is-the-094-23, and Jeffrey Lewis, ‘China's Noisy New Boomer’, Arms Control Wonk, 24 November 2009, http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2544/chinas-noisy-new-boomer.

³⁴ The challenge of survivable communications is especially serious. For a review of Chinese open-source writing on this challenge, see Erickson and Goldstein, ‘China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force: Insights from Chinese Writings’. Naval War College Review, vol. 60, no. 1, 2007, pp. 55–79.

³⁵ A series of Pakistani missiles (including the Shaheen, Shaheen-2 and Ghaznavi) bear strong resemblance to missiles either deployed by China or seen at air shows in China. These missiles, however, may be partially modified – either by the Chinese for export or by Pakistanis themselves – making it difficult to say something definitive, such as Pakistani's Ghaznavi, sold as the M-11, corresponds to the missile known as the DF-11/CSS-7 Mod 1. The Shaheen-1, sold as the M-9, is usually thought to be a DF-15/ CSS-6, although DF-15 variants look quite different from one another. The Shaheen-2 is said to be a missile called the M-18 seen at the Zhuhai Airshow in China in 1988.

³⁶ Jeff Stein, ‘CIA Helped Saudis in Secret Chinese Missile Deal’, Newsweek, 29 January 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-cia-helped-saudis-chinese-missile-deal-227283; Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Why Did Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?’, Foreign Policy, 30 January 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/30/why_did_saudi_arabia_buy_chinese_missiles.

³⁷ ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2009’, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 66, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/china_military_power_report_2009.pdf.

³⁸ This is consistent with deployment numbers given in the 2009 Annual Report. See p. 48.

³⁹ See, for example, ‘Missile Commander Yang Yegong’, CCTV, available at: http://www.cctv.com/news/special/C14394/index.shtml; and ‘Yang Yegong's analysis on our country's route of nuclear counterattack’, https://web.archive.org/web/20051101235313/ http://www.milnews.com/Article/wangyou/200508/4001.html.

⁴⁰ I am indebted to Mark Stokes for highlighting the importance of grades in assessing where an officer stands in the protocol order.

⁴¹ Directory of People's Republic of China Military Personalities, 2013.

⁴² Mark Stokes, ‘China's Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System’, Project 2049 Institute, 12 March 2010, http://www.project2049.net/documents/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf.

⁴³ It appears the launch battalion is the basic unit of firepower for the Second Artillery's nuclear force. See Ken Allen and Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, ‘Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms’, in David Finkelstein and James C. Mulvenon (eds), China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs (2005).

⁴⁴ ‘Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat’, United States National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2013, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/NASIC2013_050813.pdf.

⁴⁵ ‘2nd Artillery Soldiers hidden in underground caverns for 8 day exercise eat leeks and sweet peppers’, Sina, 6 May 2013, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-05-06/0420723740.html.

⁴⁶ On the challenges of life underground, see Mark Stokes and Ian Easton, ‘Half Lives: A Preliminary Assessment of China's Nuclear Warhead Life Extension and Safety Program’, Project 2049 Institute, 29 July 2013, pp. 13–15.

⁴⁷ ‘Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2013’, p. 13.

⁴⁸ ‘The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics’, Office of Naval Intelligence, https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf; ‘China's Navy 2007’, Office of Naval Intelligence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf; Ronald O'Rourke, ‘China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Naval Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service, 8 February 2012, http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=701351.

⁴⁹ In 1984, the US intelligence community was ‘unable to identify the associated airfield storage sites’ for the ‘small number’ of nuclear- capable aircraft that ‘probably’ had nuclear bombs assigned to them. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) concluded that it was ‘improbable that China's air forces have a strategic nuclear delivery mission’ because ‘it is unlikely that these obsolescent aircraft could successfully penetrate the sophisticated air defense networks of modern military powers’. Defense Estimative Brief: Nuclear Weapons Systems in China, pp. 3–4. In 1993, the US concluded that the ‘Chinese Air Force has no units whose primary mission is to deliver China's small stockpile of nuclear bombs’. Report to Congress on Status of China, India and Pakistan Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs, http://fas.org/irp/threat/930728-wmd.htm.

⁵⁰ ‘Guo Yafei, “Third Eye”’, CNTV, 4 May 2011, http://military.cntv.cn/program/hpnd/20110504/105020.shtml.

⁵¹ ‘History: Second Artillery missile forces have become capable of strategic nuclear counterattack’, Xinhua, 31 July 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2005-07/31/content_3282531.htm.

⁵² Stokes, ‘China's Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System’.