Power and Authority in Morocco

Abstract

The 2011 Arab uprisings began in North Africa and toppled the leaders of Tunisia and Libya, but the forces that wreaked this profound change also touched their fellow Maghreb states of Algeria and Morocco. This Adelphi book examines how the politics, security and economies – which were largely stable for decades prior to 2011 – have changed in the four states. It asks why the popular revolutions in Tunisia and Libya did not spread to Algeria and Morocco; how the revolutionary states have fared since 2011; why Libya descended into a deadly civil war while the others did not; and whether the sitting governments in Algeria and Morocco have applied sustainable strategies to address the new political climate.

The book includes chapters on each of the four core Maghreb states, together with regional assessments of the jihadist threat and economic challenges. It analyses the tension between security and political reform, and argues that without persistent and comprehensive development of government institutions focused on creating jobs and providing security, the region risks future protests, terrorism or even revolution – a lesson that states throughout the Middle East should take to heart.

Notes

1 The protests were part of a general strike called by two Moroccan unions. The rioting lasted for several days.

2 Morocco's economic liberalisation policies of the previous decade had taken a toll on the disadvantaged.

3 ‘33 Dead in 2-Day Riot in Morocco Fed by Frustration Over Economy’, Reuters, 17 December 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/17/world/33-dead-in-2-day-riot-in-morocco-fed-by-frustration-over-economy.html.

4 Throughout the mid-1990s, Morocco held a number of parliamentary and local elections, and constitutional referendums. A constitutional amendment, passed in 1996, allowed for a directly elected lower house of parliament, a longstanding opposition demand. For a more detailed account of King Hassan II's policies, see Guilain Denoeux and Abdeslam Maghraoui, ‘King Hassan's Strategy of Political Dualism’, Middle East Policy, vol. 5, no. 4, January 1998, pp. 104–30.

5 According to Human Rights Watch the protests took place ‘largely without interference from police, who in some areas were barely in evidence’. See ‘Morocco: Thousands March for Reform’, Human Rights Watch, 21 February 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/20/morocco-thousands-march-reform.

6 See text of King Mohammed VI's speech, ‘King Mohammed VI Speech’, 9 March 2011, http://moroccansforchange.com/2011/03/09/king-mohamed-vi-speech-3911-full-text-feb20-khitab/.

7 Morocco is a culturally diverse country with multiple identities: Arab, Islamic, Berber and African. The monarchy binds them together under a broad Moroccan national identity. The common thread through these multiple identities is the strong Islamic foundation of Moroccan society and the king's religious role as commander of the faithful (amir al-mu'minin).

8 See Rom Landau, Moroccan Drama 1900-1950 (San Francisco, CA: The American Academy of Asian Studies, 1956), pp. 36–8.

9 King Mohammed V and the Istiqlal Party, which led Morocco's independence movement, found common cause in independence from France. However, in the ensuing years they competed over setting Morocco's political agenda.

10 The king appointed a constitutional drafting committee headed by Abdellatif Menouni, an adviser to the king. The king also appointed a consultative body to act as a liaison between the committee and a range of political parties, civil-society organisations, labour unions and other constituencies.

11 Morocco's first constitution was adopted in 1962. Subsequent constitutions under Hassan II's reign were issued in 1970, 1972, 1992 and 1996.

12 The National Democratic Institute estimated that up to 25% of ballots in parliamentary elections were either intentionally spoiled in protest or invalidated. The PJD won the largest share of valid votes with close to 23%, almost double the number for the RNI, the second largest party. See ‘Final Report on the Moroccan Legislative Elections’, National Democratic Institute, 25 November 2011, https://www.ndi.org/files/Morocco-Final-Election-Report-061812-ENG.pdf.

13 At the end of 1997, Hassan II named Abderrahmane Youssoufi, a longtime leftist political opponent who had spent time in prison and living in exile, as prime minister.

14 In mid-2011 the king established the National Human Rights Council (CNDH), which evolved from the Advisory Council on Human Rights established in the 1990s. The organisation investigates and publicises human-rights issues including prison conditions, migration, child labour and women's rights.

15 This combination of progress and repression has been described as dualism. See Denoeux and Maghraoui, ‘King Hassan's Strategy of Political Dualism’.

16 See remarks by Mustafa Elkhalifi in ‘Islamists in Power: Views from Within, Building New Regimes After the Uprising’, Carnegie Endowment event transcript provided by Federal News Service, Washington DC, 5 April 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/040512_transcript_openingnew-regimes.pdf.

17 The PJD emerged from the Movement of Unity and Reform, a coalition of Islamic movements that competed under the PJD banner in the 1997 parliamentary elections.

18 For an analysis of Moroccan Salafism, see Mohammed Masbah, ‘Moving Towards Political Participation: The Moderation of Moroccan Salafis since the Beginning of the Arab Spring’, SWP Comments, Comment 01, January 2013, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2013C01_msb.pdf.

19 ‘Morocco King Attends Prayers led by Reformed Salafi-Jihadist’, Al Arabiya News, 28 March 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/03/28/Morocco-king-attends-prayers-led-by-reformed-Salafi-jihadist.html.

20 For a list of early demands and description of the February 20 movement written by movement activists, see Mamfakinch, June 2011, http://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Press_Kit_June2011.pdf.

21 For a more complete summary of Morocco's economic challenges, see ‘Morocco: Selected Issues’, IMF Country Report, no. 13/110, 18 January 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13110.pdf.

22 See ‘HM The King Delivers Speech to Nation on Occasion of 60^th Anniversary of Revolution of King And People’, Agence Marocaine de Presse, 20 August 2013, http://www.map.ma/en/activites-royales/hm-king-delivers-speech-nation-occasion-60th-anniversary-revolution-king-and-peopl.

23 In 2005 the palace launched its National Human Development Initiative (INDH) to address the country's dismal socio-economic conditions. The initiative sought to give broader powers to local communities to launch their own development projects to create jobs, improve housing and address poverty. The programme was coordinated by the Ministry of Interior with a modest annual budget of US$200 million a year. The INDH has undoubtedly helped people, but, after nearly a decade, not enough.

24 See ‘Full Text of The Throne Day Speech Delivered By HM King Mohammed VI’, Agence Marocaine de Presse, 30 July 2014, http://www.map.ma/en/discours-messages-sm-le-roi/full-text-throne-day-speech-delivered-hm-king-mohammed-vi.

25 See ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2013’, Transparency International, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/.

26 See Haim Malka, ‘The Struggle for Religious Identity in Tunisia and the Maghreb’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 May 2014, http://csis.org/publication/struggle-religious-identity-tunisia-and-maghreb.

27 One of his songs substitutes the word ‘freedom’ for ‘the king’ in a national saying: ‘God, the nation, and the king’. Al-Haqed has been arrested several times since 2011 on various unrelated charges and subjected to lengthy court proceedings.

28 The king traditionally pardons prisoners every Throne Day (celebrated on 30 July to mark the king's ascension to the throne). One of those pardoned was Daniel Galvan, a Spanish citizen convicted of sexually abusing 11 Moroccan children and sentenced to 30 years in prison.

29 ‘Protest Culture in Morocco’, Economist, 11 June 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/06/protest-culture-morocco.