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Abstract
Large-scale investments in fragile states - in Latin America, Africa, the former Soviet Union and Asia - become magnets for conflict, which undermines business, development and security.
International policy responds with regulation, state-building and institutional reform, with poor and often perverse results. Caught up in old ways of thinking about conflict and fragility, and an age-old fight over whether multinational corporations are good or bad for peaceful development, it leaves business-related conflicts in fragile states to multiply and fester.
Surveying a new strategic landscape of business and conflict, Brian Ganson and Achim Wennmann conclude that neither company shareholders nor advocates for peaceful development need, or should, accept the growing cost of business-related conflict in fragile states. Drawing on decades of experience from mainstream conflict prevention and violence reduction efforts, as well as promising company practice, they show that even acute conflict is manageable when dealt with pragmatically, locally and on its own terms.
The analysis and conclusions of this Adelphi book will interest policymakers, business leaders and community advocates alike - all those hoping to mitigate today's conflicts while helping to reduce fragility and build a firmer foundation for inclusive development.
Notes
1 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ‘The Oil for Development Programme’, 7 July 2011, http://www.npd.no/en/Publications/Reports/Oil-for-development-2010/The-Oil-for-Development-programme.
2 Norad Evaluation Department, Facing the Resource Curse: Norway’s Oil for Development Programme (Oslo: Norad, 2012), p. x.
3 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ‘Angola Report’, 4 July 2011, http://www.npd.no/en/Publications/Reports/Oil-for-development-2010/OfD-projects-Core-countries/Angola.
4 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Angola: Second Post-Program Monitoring (Washington, DC: IMF, 2014), p. 1.
5 Christopher Cramer, ‘Trajectories of Accumulation Through War and Peace’, in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 142.
6 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Country Insights – Angola (London: Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015), p. 4.
7 Jon Schubert, ‘Angola: Violent Repression of Peaceful Protests Highlights Risks of Dos Santos Succession’, African Arguments, 27 November 2013.
8 Human Rights Watch (HRW), World Report 2015: Angola (New York: HRW, 2015), p. 58.
9 Rolf Schwarz, ‘Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Protection’, Security Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 4, 2005, pp. 429–46.
10 Achim Wennmann, Grasping the Strengths of Fragile States: Aid Effectiveness between ‘Top-down’ and ‘Bottom-up’ Statebuilding, CCDP Working Paper 6 (Geneva: The Graduate Institute, 2010), p. 16; David Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 8–9.
11 Network of Global Agenda Councils, Natural Riches? Perspectives on Responsible Natural Resource Management in Conflict-Affected Countries (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2013).
12 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment (Geneva: UNEP, 2009), p. 19.
13 International Development Association (IDA), IDA's Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (Washington, DC: IDA, 2013).
14 Network of Global Agenda Councils, Natural Riches? Perspectives on Responsible Natural Resource Management in Conflict-Affected Countries (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2013).
15 Steve Commins, Alina Rocha Menocal, and Timothy Othieno, States in Development: Testing the State Building Framework (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2009), p. 140.
16 Steve Kibble, ‘Angola: Can the Politics of Disorder Become the Politics of Democratisation and Development?’, Review of African Political Economy, vol. 33, no. 109, 2006, p. 530.
17 Will Jones and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Africa’s Illiberal State-Builders (Oxford: Refugees Studies Centre, 2013), p. 5.
18 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Afghanistan's Mineral, Oil, and Gas Industries: Unless U.S. Agencies Act Soon to Sustain Investments Made, $488 Million in Funding is at Risk (Washington, DC: SIGAR, 2015), p. 16.
19 President Sirleaf, ‘Annual Message to the 53rd Legislature’, 26 January 2015, reprinted in The Perspective, http://www.theperspective.org/2015/0127201503.php.
20 See IDA, IFC and MIGA, Country Partnership Strategy for the Republic of Liberia for the Period FY13–FY17 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013).
21 Moore Stephens LLP, Final Report for the LEITI Post Award Process Audit (Monrovia: Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2013).
22 Based on interviews conducted by Brian Ganson.
23 African Union, Africa Mining Vision (Addis Ababa: AU, 2009), p. v.
24 African Development Bank (AfDB), African Union (AU) and Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Land Policy in Africa: A Framework to Strengthen Land Rights, Enhance Productivity and Secure Livelihoods (Addis Ababa: AU–ECA–AfDB Consortium, 2010), p. 23.
25 See African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC), A Country Mining Vision Guidebook: Domesticating the Africa Mining Vision (Addis Ababa: AMDC, 2014).
26 Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), p. 47.
27 Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 22.
28 Austin T. Turk, ‘Law as a Weapon in Social Conflict’, Social Conflict, vol. 23, no. 3, 1976, p. 276.
29 Karl Wohlmuth, Good Governance and Economic Development: New Foundations for Growth in Africa (Bremen: Universität Bremen, 1998), p. 44.
30 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance (Paris: OECD, 2011), p. 31.
31 Lucy Morgan Edwards, ‘State-building in Afghanistan: A Case Showing the Limits?’ International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 92, no. 880, 2010, pp. 1–25.
32 Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy, ‘Introduction’, in Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy (eds), Whose Peace Is It Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking (London: Conciliation Resources, 2010), pp. 6–9.
33 Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, Steven B. Webb, and Barry R. Weingast, Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach to the Problems of Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), p. 5.
34 Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clemens, and Aanne Nola, ‘Building Peace and Political Community in Hybrid Political Orders’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 16, no. 5, 2009, pp. 599–615.
35 Pierre Englebert and Gailyn Portelance, ‘The Growth-Governance Paradox in Africa’, Africaplus, 6 January 2015.
36 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, Progress Report 2013–2014 (Washington, DC: USAID, 2014), p. 8.
37 Key Facts: The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (Washington, DC: USAID, 2012), p. 1.
38 Wolfgang Obenland, Corporate Influence through the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa (Aachen, Berlin and Bonn: MISEREOR, Brot für die Welt and Global Policy Forum, 2014), p. 15.
39 See Claire Provost, Liz Ford and Mark Tran, ‘G8 Alliance Condemned as New Wave of Colonialism in Africa’, Guardian, 18 February 2014.
40 Englebert and Portelance, ‘The Growth-Governance Paradox in Africa’.
41 Jean-François Bayart, ‘Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion’, African Affairs, vol. 99, no. 395, 2000, p. 259.
42 Matt Andrews, The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 104.
43 Sasha Chavkin, Ben Hallman, Michael Hudson, Cécile Schilis-Gallego and Shane Sifflett, Evicted and Abandoned: How the World Bank Broke its Promise to Protect the Poor (Washington, DC: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and Huffington Post, 2015), http://www.icij.org/project/world-bank/how-world-bank-broke-its-promise-protect-poor.
44 Ibid.
45 Fundo Soberano de Angola, http://www.fundosoberano.ao/language/en.
46 Patrick McGroarty, ‘Angola Wealth Fund is a Family Affair’, Wall Street Journal, 26 February 2013.
47 Inge Amundsen, ‘Drowning in Oil: Angola’s Institutions and the “Resource Curse”’, Comparative Politics, vol. 46, no. 2, 2014, pp. 169–89. Citations taken from online abstracts available at: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2014/00000046/00000002/art00004.
48 Global Witness, Fuelling Mistrust: The Need for Transparency in Sudan's Oil Industry (London: Global Witness, 2009).
49 Paul Stevens, Jaakko Kooroshy, Glada Lahn and Bernice Lee, Conflict and Coexistence in the Extractive Industries (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2013), p. 93.
50 Adam Branch and Zachariah Mampilly, Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change (London: Zed Books, 2015).
51 Interview with Adam Branch and Zachariah Mampilly, African Arguments, 23 March 2015.
52 Nehemiah Stark, ‘Nicaraguan Farmers Resist Grand Canal, the World’s Largest Construction Project’, Guardian, 4 April 2015.
53 Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, ‘Mimicking Democracy to Prolong Autocracies’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 4, 2015, p. 76.
54 Ibid., p. 73.
55 Ibid., p. 78.
56 Elling Tjonneland, The Norwegian People's Aid, Oil and Development: A Review of Oil for the Common Good (2007–2011) (Oslo: CMI, 2012), p. 5.
57 Brian Ganson, Risk and Risk Mitigation in the Oil and Gas Sector in Uganda (Geneva: Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2012).
58 ‘Museveni Lashes Civic Critics and Foreigners, Praises Oil Scientists’, Oil in Uganda (14 Dec 2012). http://www.oilinuganda.org/features/civil-society/museveni-lashes-civic-critics-and-foreigners-praises-oil-scientists.html.
59 Yasiin Mugerwa, ‘Repeat of History as NRM Expels “Rebel” MPs’, Daily Monitor (Kampala), 16 April 2013, http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/Repeat-of-history-as-NRM-expels--rebel--MPs/-/691252/1749452/-/format/xhtml/-/83ws7c/-/index.html.
60 Interview with Adam Branch and Zachariah Mampilly, African Arguments.
61 Roland Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, in David J. Francis (ed.), When War Ends: Building Peace in Divided Communities (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), p. 49.
62 CLEEN Foundation, Youths, Radicalization and Affiliation with Insurgent Groups in Northern Nigeria (Lagos: CLEEN Foundation, 2014), p. 99.
63 World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade Policy Review: Federal Republic of Nigeria (Wt/TPR/S/39, 1998), p. 1.
64 Keith Bradsher and Adam Nossiter, ‘In Nigeria, Chinese Investment Comes With a Downside’, New York Times, 5 December 2015.
65 Chris Nwachuku, ‘Nigeria: 100 Textile Factories Closed after Country Joined WTO’, This Day, 20 May 2005.
66 Iliya Kure, ‘Former Nigeria Textile Workers Still Struggling’, Voice of America, 13 December 2012.
67 Toye Olori, ‘WTO-CANCUN: Liberalisation Hurts Nigeria’s Textile Industry’. Inter Press Service (Lagos, 4 September 2003), http://www.ipsnews.net/2003/09/wto-cancun-liberalisation-hurts-nigerias-textile-industry/.
68 Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD), The State of Kano Textile Industries and its Effect on the Nigerian Economy: A Study of the Kantin Kwari Market in Kano State (Kano: CRD, 2012).
69 ‘Nigeria’s Textile Industry on a Rebound?’, This Day Live, 28 May 2013.
70 CLEEN Foundation, Youths, Radicalization and Affiliation with Insurgent Groups in Northern Nigeria, p. xi.
71 See Robyn Dixon, ‘In Nigeria, Child Beggars are Easy Recruits for Boko Haram Extremists’, Los Angeles Times, 17 August 2014.
72 WTO, The 10 Benefits: Peace, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b01_e.htm.
73 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Nigeria (WT/TPR/S/247) (Geneva: WTO, 2011).
74 WTO Trade Policy Review of Nigeria, ‘Statement of the US Representative’, 28 June 2011, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2011/06/28/tpr-nigeria.
75 US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland, 30 November 2011, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Boko%20Haram-%20Emerging%20Threat%20to%20the%20US%20Homeland.pdf.
76 Ibid.
77 Peter Middlebrook, ‘Building a “Fragile Consensus”: Liberalisation and State Fragility’ (Paris: OECD, 2012), p. 14.
78 Tjonneland, The Norwegian People's Aid, Oil and Development, p. 5.
79 OECD, ‘Principles for Fragile States and Situations’, http://www.oecd.org/dacfragilestates/the10fragilestatesprinciples.htm.
80 OECD, Fourth High Level Forum On Aid Effectiveness: Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (Paris: OECD, 2011).
81 OECD, Handbook on Contracting Out Government Functions and Services in Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations (Paris: OECD, 2010), p. 9. See also Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 990–1990 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
82 OECD, Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility, p. 11.
83 Ibid., p. 60.
84 Jones and Soares de Oliveira, Africa's Illiberal State-Builders, p. 6.
85 Interview by Brian Ganson.
86 Alex Emery, ‘Newmont’s Minas Conga Project Could Restart in 2014, Government Says’, BN Americas, 30 December 2013.
87 Cecelia Jamasmie, ‘Peru’s Main Opponent to Newmont’s Conga Mine Wins Local Elections’, InfoMine, 6 Oct 2014.
88 Viviane Weitzner, Tipping the Power Balance: Making Free, Prior and Informed Consent Work (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 2011).
89 David Booth, Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the Real Challenges of African Governance (London: ODI, 2012); Jean-Pierre O. de Sardan, Researching the Practical Norms of Real Governance in Africa (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008).
90 Keith Breckenridge, ‘Marikana and the Limits of Biopolitics: Themes in the Recent Scholarship of South African Mining’, Africa, vol. 84, no. 1, 2014, p. 158.
91 Marjoke Oosterom, Fragility at the Local Level: Challenges to Building Local State–Citizen Relations in Fragile Settings (The Hague and Utrecht: Hivos and ICCO, 2009).