Deterrence and flexibility

Abstract

The US government is planning to spend an estimated US$1 trillion over 30 years to modernise or replace its triad of air-, land- and sea-based nuclear weapons. These plans have huge implications for the security of the United States and its allies, its public finances and the salience of nuclear weapons in global politics. This Adelphi book argues that the US need not replicate its Cold War triad to achieve credible and reliable deterrence.

It proposes viable alternatives that would allow the US to maintain deterrence at a lower cost, thereby freeing up funds to ease pressing shortfalls in spending on conventional procurement and nuclear security. These alternative structures – which propose a reduction in the size and shape of the arsenal – have distinct advantages over the existing plan in maintaining strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China; upholding arms-control treaties; boosting the security of US nuclear forces; and supporting the global non-proliferation regime. They would also endow the US with a nuclear force better suited to the strategic environment of the twenty-first century, and mark an advance on the existing triad in supporting conventional military operations.

Notes

1 US Department of Defense, ‘Nuclear Posture Review Report’, April 2010, p. viii, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf.

2 White House, ‘Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States’, 19 June 2013, www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclearweapons-employment-strategyunited-states.

3 Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

4 The exception to this is that 250 Minuteman III missiles currently configured for the Mk21 (SERV) re-entry vehicles with the larger and more modern 300- kilton W87 warhead cannot carry multiple warheads. However, the re-entry vehicles could be replaced with the Mk12-A re-entry vehicle to carry three 335-kilton W78 warheads.

5 Kris Osborn, ‘B-2 Bomber Set to Receive Massive Upgrade’, 25 June 2014, http://dodbuzz.com/2014/06/25/b-2-bomberset-to-receive-massive-upgrade/. A 30,000-pound (13,607kg) conventional bomb has the explosive power equal to 0.015 kilotons.

6 Loren Thompson, ‘B-3: The Inside Story of America’s Next Bomber’, Forbes, 2 September 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2015/09/02/b-3-the-inside-story-of-americas-nextbomber/.

7 These include the B61-12 and the W80-4. In addition, hundreds of ICBM and SLBM warheads could be used in the ‘primary only’ mode to greatly reduce their explosive yield, if required.

8 This force structure contains such a degree of overkill that the use of far less than one-tenth of its destructive force defies credibility. This is because exploding 100 modern nuclear warheads in urban or semi-urban areas would kill millions of people in the United States, even if no warheads detonated on the US homeland. The atmospheric pollution that would result from such an attack would cause a ‘nuclear winter’ that would collapse global food production, putting 2bn people at risk of starvation. See Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon, ‘Self-Assured Destruction: The Climate Impacts of Nuclear War’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 September 2012, http://thebulletin.org/2012/september/self-assured-destructionclimate-impacts-nuclear-war.

9 These include the B61-12 and the W80-4. In addition, hundreds of ICBM and SLBM warheads could be used in the ‘primary only’ mode to greatly reduce their explosive yield, if required.

10 ‘Lowering Nuclear Risks: An Interview With Former Defense Secretary William Perry’, Arms Control Today, vol. 46, no. 1, January–February 2016, http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_0102/Features/Interviews/Lowering-Nuclear-Risks-An-Interview-With-Former-Defense-Secretary-William-Perry.

11 These include the B61-12. In addition, hundreds of SLBM warheads could be used in the ‘primary only’ mode to greatly reduce their explosive yield, if required.

12 The Virginia-class submarines would have to carry a modified version of the Trident-II missile to fit in the VPM tubes that are slightly shorter than the tubes for the existing Trident II LE missile. If planning and development began now, a modified missile could be available by 2025. Lockheed Martin and Alliant Techsystems completed initial work on submarine-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles in 2005 but the concept was not pursued. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/slirbm.htm.

13 Dave Majumdar, ‘The U.S. Navy’s Dangerous Nuclear Attack Submarine Shortage’, National Interest, 23 May 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-navysdangerous-nuclear-attack-submarineshortage-16304.

14 These include the B61-12 and the W80-4. In addition, hundreds of ICBM and SLBM warheads could be used in the ‘primary only’ mode to greatly reduce their explosive yield, if required.