Policy options

Abstract

‘China’s growing assertiveness, America’s declining deterrent capability, and Taiwan’s growing jumpiness, not least as it watches Hong Kong, have all made a stumble into catastrophic conflict across the Taiwan Strait more likely than for decades. Brendan Taylor credibly argues this is only avoidable - however unattractive “muddling through” might be to purists on all sides - by urgently building more robust crisis-management mechanisms. A sober and compelling analysis which policymakers will ignore at their peril.’

Gareth Evans, Former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group

‘The cross-Strait balance of power is shifting, raising the risk of inadvertent and catastrophic great-power conflict. Brendan Taylor’s identification of this window of vulnerability and proposals for crisis-management advance our understanding of one of the most vexing national security problems of the next decade.’

Dr Mira Rapp-Hooper, Council on Foreign Relations

‘This is certainly a timely book addressing Taiwan’s forthcoming security challenges. Brendan Taylor provides an insightful and thought-provoking analysis regarding the threats Taiwan is facing and at the same time offers valuable suggestions in terms of how to manage this imminent crisis. This is worth reading by all interests.’

Andrew N.D. Yang, Former Minister of National Defense, Republic of China, Taiwan

Taiwan’s position looks increasingly precarious, and tensions threaten to grow into a major strategic crisis. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a central pillar of his vision for China, and has ramped up diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan. Its inhabitants are increasingly estranged from the mainland, and Tsai Ing-wen’s administration refuses to conduct relations with China on Beijing’s terms. Taiwan could take on renewed strategic significance amid the backdrop of the deepening rivalry between China and the United States, and find itself at the centre of a Cold War-style superpower confrontation.

While Washington’s support and military power has historically guaranteed Taiwan’s security, this is no longer a certainty. This Adelphi book argues that China’s military modernisation has changed the cross-strait military balance, and the ability of the US to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan may have evaporated by 2030. As China feels increasingly empowered to retake Taiwan, there is significant potential for escalation, particularly given the ambiguity of Beijing’s ‘red lines’ on Taiwan. Neither Beijing, Taipei nor Washington want such a conflict, but each is challenging the uneasy status quo. Taylor calls for the introduction of a narrower set of formal crisis-management mechanisms designed to navigate a major Taiwan crisis.

Notes

1 Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), p. 246.

2 Noah Bierman, ‘Trump warns North Korea of “fire and fury”’, Los Angeles Times, 8 August 2017, https://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-trump-warns-north-korea-of-fire-and-1502220642-htmlstory.html.

3 Kent Wang, ‘A Peace Agreement Between China and Taiwan?’, Diplomat, 5 September 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/09/a-peace-agreement-between-china-and-taiwan.

4 David G. Brown and Kevin Scott, ‘China Increases Pressure, Tsai Holds the Line’, Comparative Connections, vol. 19, no. 2, September 2017, p. 68.

5 ‘Taiwan’s KMT signals peace treaty with Beijing’, Asia Times, 15 February 2019, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/02/article/taiwans-kmt-signals-peace-treaty-with-beijing.

6 For an excellent discussion envisioning the different forms a China–Taiwan peace agreement might take, see Phillip C. Saunders and Scott L. Kastner, ‘Bridge over Troubled Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement’, International Security, vol. 33, no. 4, Spring 2009, pp. 91–98.

7 Ibid., pp. 103–07.

8 ‘Taiwan’s pro-independence govern-ment seeks peace accord with China’, Kyodo News, 3 November 2016.

9 See ‘DPP Resolution on Taiwan’s Future’, Kaohsiung, 8 May 1999, http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9920.htm.

10 ‘Taiwan warns opposition against signing agreements with China’, EFE News Service, 27 October 2016.

11 Yu Hsiang and Evelyn Kao, ‘Cross-strait peace pact bill not targeted at any person: Premier’, Focus Taiwan, 19 February 2019, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201902190015.aspx.

12 Saunders and Kastner, ‘Bridge over Troubled Water?’, p. 107.

13 Gerard Gayou, ‘Xi’s Promise to Taiwan Sounds Like a Threat’, Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/xis-promise-to-taiwan-sounds-like-a-threat-11546559725.

14 Richard C. Bush, Hong Kong in the Shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), p. 226.

15 Ibid., pp. 223–27.

16 Ibid., p. 232.

17 Ben Bland, ‘Hong Kong: is “one country, two systems” under threat?’, Financial Times, 3 December 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/43a34a48-f16e8-9623-d7f9881e729f.

18 Chris Horton, ‘Hong Kong and Taiwan are bonding over China’, Atlantic, 5 July 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/china-bonds-between-hong-kong-and-taiwan-are-growing/593347.

19 Stacy Hsu, ‘Over 80% reject “two systems”, poll finds’, Taipei Times, 10 January 2019, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/01/10/2003707656.

20 Kris Cheng, ‘Fewer Hongkongers see “One Country, Two Systems” as applicable to Taiwan – survey’, Hong Kong Free Press, 24 January 2019, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/01/24/fewer-hongkongers-see-one-country-two-systems-applicable-taiwan-survey/.

21 Cited in Chris Horton, ‘Taiwan’s President, Defying Xi Jinping, Calls Unification Offer “Impossible”’, New York Times, 5 January 2019, https://nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/taiwan-xi-jinping-tsai-ing-wen.html.

22 ‘Tsai Ing-wen’s prospects for re-election have improved’, Economist, 27 July 2019, https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/07/27/tsai-ing-wens-prospects-for-re-election-have-improved.

23 Peter Nicholas, Paul Beckett and Gerald F. Seib, ‘Trump Open to Shift on Russia Sanctions, “One China” Policy’, Wall Street Journal, 13 January 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-sets-a-bar-for-russia-and-china-1484360380.

24 See, for example, Adam Taylor, ‘With Trump in China, Taiwan worries about becoming a “bargaining chip”’, Washington Post, 9 November 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-trump-in-china-taiwan-worries-about-becoming-abargaining-chip/2017/11/09/ee3c0126-c4af-11e7-9922-4151f5ca6168_story.html.

25 Bob Woodward, Fear: Trump in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018), p. 305.

26 For further reading, see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ‘Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China’, Journal of American History, vol. 92, no. 1, June 2005, pp. 109–35.

27 Charles L. Glaser, ‘A US-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation’, International Security, vol. 39, no. 4, Spring 2015, pp. 49–90.

28 Lyle J. Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US–China Rivalry (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), pp. 46–78.

29 Sherry Hsiao, ‘US House passes Taiwan Assurance Act’, Taipei Times, 9 May 2019, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/05/09/2003714812.

30 Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Will We Abandon Taiwan?’, Commentary, May 2000, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/will-we-abandon-taiwan.

31 For a useful summary of the arguments against lessening the US security commitment to Taiwan, see Bernkopf, Tucker and Glaser, ‘Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?’, pp. 23–37.

32 For further reading on the history of Taiwan's nuclear programme, see Mark Fitzpatrick, Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (London: Routledge for the IISS, 2015), pp. 127–34; and Kyle Mizokami, ‘China’s Worst Nightmare: Imagine If Taiwan Had Nuclear Weapons’, National Interest, 19 April 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-worst-nightmare-imagine-if-taiwan-had-nuclear-weapons-25463.

33 Eric Gomez, ‘A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship’, Cato Institute, 28 September 2016, p. 5, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/costly-commitment-options-future-us-taiwan-defense-relationship.

34 Cited in Julian G. Ku, ‘America Just Quietly Backed Down Against China Again’, Foreign Policy, 29 November 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/29/america-just-quietly-backed-down-against-china-again.

35 Cited in John Pomfret, ‘Can China really take over Taiwan?’, Washington Post, 5 January 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/01/05/can-china-really-take-over-taiwan.

36 See, for example, Michael S. Chase, ‘Averting a Cross-Strait Crisis’, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 February 2019, https://www.cfr.org/report/averting-cross-strait-crisis.

37 Richard L. Armitage, Ian Easton and Mark Stokes, ‘U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a Sea of Change: Navigating Toward a Brighter Future’, Project 2049 Institute, March 2018, p. 26.

38 See, for example, Michael Mazza and Gary Schmitt, ‘The F-35: How Taiwan Could Really Push Back Against China’, National Interest, 18 January 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-f-35-how-taiwan-could-really-push-back-against-china-24127.

39 Joseph Bosco, ‘Time to Let Taiwan Join the Pacific Partnership’, Diplomat, 27 February 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/time-to-let-taiwan-join-the-pacific-partnership.

40 ‘The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Key Sections on Taiwan and China’, Taiwan Sentinel, 27 July 2018, https://sentinel.tw/the-2019-national-defense-authorization-act-key-sections-on-taiwan-and-china.

41 See Chase, ‘Averting a Cross-Strait Crisis’.

42 Daniel Blumenthal and Michael Mazza, ‘A Golden Opportunity for a U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement’, Project 2049 Institute, 14 February 2019, pp. 4–5.

43 See Chase, ‘Averting a Cross-Strait Crisis’.

44 Hugh White, ‘Taiwan: US deterrence is failing’, Interpreter, 22 May 2015, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/taiwan-us-detrerrence-failing.

45 See Anna Gearan and Karoun Demirjian, ‘Trump vowed to leave Syria in a tweet. Now, with a Sharpie, he agreed to stay’, Washington Post, 5 March 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-reversal-on-syria-trump-tells-lawmakers-he-agrees-100-percent-that-some-us-forces-should-stay/2019/03/05/c8fcfe9e-3f7c-11e9-a0d3-1210e58a94cf_story.html; and Henry Olsen, ‘Trump has given North Korea a valuable bargaining chip for free’, Washington Post, 5 March 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/05/trump-has-given-north-korea-valuable-bargaining-chip-free.

46 Ross, ‘The End of U.S. Naval Dominance in Asia’.

47 Gomez, ‘A Costly Commitment’, p. 10.

48 Robert S. Ross, ‘Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations’, International Security, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 2002, p. 53.

49 Stephan Fruhling, ‘US strategy: between the “pivot” and “Air-Sea Battle”’, East Asia Forum, 26 August 2012, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/08/26/us-strategy-between-the-pivot-and-air-sea-battle.

50 Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, ‘China Sanctions Enforcement and Fuel Prices in North Korea: What the Data Tells Us’, 38 North, 1 February 2019, https://www.38north.org/2019/02/bkatzeffsilberstein020119.

51 Richard D. Fisher, Jr., ‘Taiwan reviews its missile programmes’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 27 March 2018.

52 Ian Easton, ‘China’s Top Five War Plans’, Project 2049 Institute, 6 January 2019, https://project2049.net/2019/01/06/chinas-top-five-war-plans.

53 Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia (Arlington, VA: The Project 2049 Institute, 2017), pp. 99–100.

54 Michael Beckley, ‘The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion’, International Security, vol. 42, no. 2, Fall 2017, p. 91.

55 Ibid.

56 Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, p. 102.

57 For further reading, see Ibid., pp. 114–21.

58 Tanner Greer, ‘Taiwan Can Win a War With China’, Foreign Policy, 25 September 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/taiwan-can-win-a-war-with-china.

59 Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, p. 206.

60 Ibid., p. 207.

61 Ibid., pp.135–36.

62 Denny Roy, “Prospects for Taiwan Maintaining Its Autonomy under Chinese Pressure’, Asian Survey, vol. 57, no. 6, 2017, pp. 1135–58, p. 1141.

63 Beckley, ‘The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia’, p. 92.

64 Ibid., p. 94.

65 David C. Gompert, Astrid Smith Cevallos and Christina L. Garafold, War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).

66 Ibid., pp. 41–50.

67 Ibid.

68 For further reading, see Bonnie S. Glaser, ‘Cross-Strait Confidence Building: The Case for Military Confidence-Building Measures’, in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 157–63.

69 Ibid., p. 177.

70 For a useful summary of previous cross-strait CBMs, see Brad Glosserman, ‘Cross-Strait Confidence Building Measures’, Issues & Insights, vol. 5, no. 2, February 2005, pp. 7–16.

71 Ibid., pp. 11–13.

72 Bonnie Glaser and Brad Glosserman, ‘Promoting Confidence Building across the Taiwan Strait’, A Report of the CSIS International Security Program and Pacific Forum CSIS, September 2008, p. 13.

73 See Glaser, ‘Cross-Strait Confidence Building’, p. 177; and Glaser and Glosserman, ‘Promoting Confidence Building across the Taiwan Strait’, pp. 14–19.

74 Bonnie Glaser, ‘Managing Cross-Strait Ties in 2017′, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2017, p. 6, https://www.csis.org/analysis/managing-cross-strait-ties-2017.

75 Glosserman, ‘Cross-Strait Confidence Building Measures’, p. 7.

76 David A. Welch, ‘Crisis Management Mechanisms: Pathologies and Pitfalls’, CIGI Papers, no. 40, September 2014, p. 5.

77 For further reading, see Desmond Ball, ‘Improving Communications Links between Moscow and Washington’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 28, no. 2, May 1991, pp. 135–59.

78 See Glaser and Glosserman, ‘Promoting Confidence Building across the Taiwan Strait’, p. 12. This same logic was reiterated during more recent discussions with senior Taiwanese officials in Taipei conducted as part of this project.

79 Lally Weymouth, ‘Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen: Beijing must respect our democratic will’, Washington Post, 21 July 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2016/07/21/44b0a1a4-4e25-11e6-a422-83ab49ed5e6a_story.html.

80 Phil Williams, Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), p. 190.

81 Ibid., p. 185.

82 For an excellent discussion of the evolution of Chinese approaches to crisis management, see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis-Management Theory and Practice in China’, Naval War College Review, vol. 69, no. 1, Winter 2016, pp. 29–71.

83 International Crisis Group, ‘East China Sea: Preventing Clashes from Becoming Crises’, Asia Report, no. 280, 30 June 2016, p. 8.

84 Blair and Bonfili, ‘The April 2001 EP-3 Incident’, p. 380.

85 US, Department of State, ‘U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue’, 9 November 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/11/287282.htm.

86 For further reading, see Ashley Townsend and Rory Medcalf, ‘Shifting waters: China’s new passive assertiveness in Asian maritime security’, Lowy Institute for International Policy, April 2016, pp. 30–31.

87 Michael Fabey, ‘Confrontation between Chinese and US destroyers suggests policy shift’, Jane's Navy International, 4 October 2018, https://www.janes.com/article/83571/confrontation-between-chinese-andus-destroyers-suggests-policy-shift.

88 Michael D. Swaine, ‘A Relationship Under Extreme Duress: U.S.-China Relations at a Crossroads’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 16 January 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/16/relationship-underextreme-duress-u.s.-china-relations-atcrossroads-pub-78159.

89 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 628.

90 Cited in Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis (London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1971), p. 2.