Israel and the Arab world: the crisis of 1967 (1967)

Abstract

With the death of Professor Sir Michael Howard, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) lost not only its president emeritus but the last of its founders and intellectual parents. The foremost military historian of his generation, Sir Michael embodied and epitomised a historical sensibility that informed all his writing. He will forever remain an icon not only for historians, but for all those who acknowledge the indispensability of history and the historical sensibility for any true understanding of present events.

In tribute to Sir Michael and in celebration of his life and work, this Adelphi book collects a selection of his remarks and writings for IISS publications over six decades, as well as previously unprinted material. Through this collection, these works will reach a new generation of readers and be made more accessible to those fortunate enough to have read them already. They illustrate Sir Michael’s role in the Institute’s creation and his abiding presence in its evolving intellectual life, and serve as a historical document, tracing the development of strategic thought and preoccupations from the 1950s to the recent past. In addition to their historical value, Sir Michael’s conclusions retain their immediacy and power. This book is therefore of direct relevance to anyone interested in contemporary events: whether the professional analyst, the student of international relations or the general reader.

‘This wonderful collection, containing pieces written by Sir Michael Howard over 60 years, will be enjoyed by his, and the Institute’s, many friends and admirers. Here will be found many reminders, written with Michael’s customary lucidity, of the big issues of the post-war period as they were seen at the time. In addition to a fascinating interview conducted not long before his death about the origins of the Institute, there are obituaries of many of the key and now too often forgotten figures of those early years.’

— Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London

‘Sir Michael’s exploration of policy judgement by fusing politics, strategy, history, ethics, and technology in the nuclear age is increasingly relevant in this complex age of artificial intelligence. His interdisciplinary approach continues to be a guide as we work to synthesize and solve the challenges presented by rapid technological advancements. The pieces contained here show both the continued relevance of his work, and his commitment to studying military history properly, in “depth”, in “width”, and in “context”.’

— Dr Yoichi Funabashi, Chairman of Asia Pacific Initiative

Notes

I. the conflict

1 Publication of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution failed to stir Hussein, who expressed no opposition to Jewish settlement; Hussein's son, Feisal, even concluded an agreement on the Jewish National Home with the Zionist Chaim Weizmann. Their sentiments changed, however, when Feisal was turned out of Damascus in 1920, and the political ambitions of the Zionists began to be apparent.

2 The Mandate provided that ‘the administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage . . . close settlement by Jews on the land’ (Article 6). Jewish immigration during those years was as follows: 1923: 7,991; 1924: 13,553; 1925: 34,641; 1926: 13,910; 1927: 3,595; . . . 1931: 5,533; 1932: 11,289; 1933: 31,977; 1934: 44,143; 1935: 64,147.

3 Palestine: Statement of Policy, May 1939, Cmd. 6019.

4 In order to secure agreement in the General Assembly, the Jewish Agency even accepted the transfer to the Arab State of a large area of Palestine along the Egyptian frontier.

5 These raids followed a terrorist attack by the Jews on a village near the Syrian border in December 1947.

6 Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill (London, 1960).

7 Soon after the campaign began to link up the body of the State of Israel with the Negev pocket, Israeli forces drove the remaining elements of the Arab Liberation Army from the area north-west of Lake Tiberias.

8 Although Egypt was awarded provisional control over the Gaza Strip by the General Armistice Agreement, it remained part of Palestine. Egypt has observed this legal distinction, which has enabled her, unlike Jordan, to deny Egyptian citizenship to the Arab refugees.

9 Iraq and Saudi Arabia did not conclude Armistice Agreements with Israel, but gave separate undertakings that they would accept terms agreed upon by Palestine's Arab neighbours and the Arab League, respectively. Jordan assumed responsibility for all Iraqi forces in Palestine.

10 Like all statistics on the Arab refugees, these can only be rough approximations, since many refugees are not registered, some live in Iraq and Kuwait, and there is no systematic method for eliminating numbers of refugees who have died. There is also no indication here of the refugees’ relative standard of living, which has been far higher in the Lebanon, for example, than in the Gaza Strip.

11 Following the 1948–49 war, Egypt contended that Israel had illegally occupied Eilat after their Armistice of 24 February. Israel replied that the southern Negev had not been contested by forces of Egypt and Israel. The movement of Israeli forces into Eilat was against nominal Jordanian opposition, and occurred the day before the Israel– Jordan truce.

12 Terence Prittie, Israel (London, 1967).

13 Egypt and Syria formed a Joint Military Command in October 1955. Jordan joined the command just before the 1956 war.

14 See Appendix I.

15 Since the involvement of the Great Powers in the Middle East has been exhaustively dealt with elsewhere, little is said about them in this paper. The reader is referred particularly to the ISS publication, Sources of Conflict in the Middle East, Adelphi Paper 26, March 1966.

16 The Israeli Government now argues, perhaps partly to allay Arab fears, that diversion of sweet water from the Jordan will not permit large areas of the Negev to be brought under cultivation, chiefly because of a fall in the water table elsewhere in Israel and an increase in industrial demands for water. The future of the Negev will depend upon new desalination techniques.

17 See Appendix 2.

18 For most of the period since the Second World War, the United States has been the leading supplier of Egyptian imports, primarily in the form of foodstuffs sold for local currency. Relations between the United States and the UAR deteriorated during 1964, however, following the burning of the USIS library in Cairo; US aid was suspended. The two Governments managed to negotiate a $55-million aid agreement covering the first half of 1966, but this was not renewed, largely because of American concern over the Yemen war and Egyptian attacks on American policy in Vietnam.

19 Although the UAR was immediately concerned in the confrontation, she elected to contribute funds rather than receive them under this scheme.

20 Nasser accused Feisal of granting a military base to the British; this was perhaps a round about way of expressing his displeasure at the British agreement to supply Saudi Arabia with Lightning fighter aircraft.

21 Throughout her long confrontation with her Arab neighbours, Israel has chosen to meet provocation with stronger response – as in the reprisal raids before the wars of 1956 and 1967. This is a policy that has often served to escalate conflict. Her strategic vulnerability has also led her, in three wars, to believe her choice to be between ‘death by a thousand cuts’ and major military action.

22 The Armistice Demarcation Line between Israel and Syria was drawn between the Israeli Truce Line and the International Frontier, where the two were not the same. The area of Palestine between the Armistice Line and the Frontier was designated a demilitarized zone, of three sections, including areas on the eastern shores of Lake Tiberias and Lake Huleh that were on the Israeli side of the Armistice Line.

23 UNTSO was the successor of the Truce Commission established by the Security Council in April 1948. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO was made chairman of the four Mixed Armistice Commissions.

24 By October 1966, there were 66,085 complaints outstanding: 35,485 by Israel and 30,600 by Syria.

25 The Es Samu attack illustrated the strategic advantage which Syria held over Jordan, vis-à-vis Israel. The nature of the terrain meant that Israel could mount reprisal attacks much more easily against Jordan than against Syria.

26 Between 25 January and 28 March, 1967, the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission received 790 formal Israeli complaints.

ii. the crisis

27 The date of Israel's Independence Day – 14–15 May 1948 – is reckoned by the Hebrew calendar; therefore by the Gregorian calendar it falls on a different date each year. In 1967 it again fell on 14–15 May.

28 According to Al-Ahram on 12 May, the Egyptian Government had barred units of the Sixth Fleet from visiting Egyptian ports. The ostensible reason appeared to stem from an interview given in April by Israel's Premier Eshkol to the magazine US News and World

Report, in which he said: ‘We ask the United States for arms and are told, “Don't spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here’’’.

29 ‘To your information, I gave my instructions to all UAR Armed Forces to be ready for action against Israel the moment it might carry out any aggressive action against any Arab country. Due to these instructions our troops are already concentrated in Sinai on our eastern borders. For the sake of complete secure [sic] of all UN troops which install OPs along our borders, I request that you issue your orders to withdraw all these troops immediately. I have given my instructions to our Commander of the eastern zone concerning this subject. Inform back the fulfillment of this request. Yours, Farik Awal (M. Fawzy), COS of UAR Armed Forces’.

30 On the afternoon of 17 May, U Thant handed two aide-mémoires to the UAR Permanent Representative. The first recapitulated the events of the previous twenty-four hours, and ended with a stern warning that UNEF ‘cannot now be asked to stand aside in order to become a silent and helpless witness to an armed confrontation between the parties’. It either had to stay where it was, or depart entirely. U Thant added that the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had seen ‘no recent indications of troop movements or concentrations along any of the lines which should give rise to undue concern’. The second aide-mémoire reviewed the ‘Good Faith Agreement’ of November 1956. See Appendix 1.

31 See Appendix 1.

32 Ibid.

33 The Yugoslav platoon at Sharm-el-Sheikh had withdrawn from the actual positions commanding the Straits of Tiran, at Ras Nasrani, on 19 May. The UAR probably could have imposed a blockade at any time from then on.

34 Unconfirmed reports from Israel after the war have indicated that David Ben-Gurion was considerably less willing to entertain military action than he had been eleven years earlier, as Prime Minister. He reportedly was concerned that Israel should have the support of at least one major Western power. Premier Eshkol, on the other hand, is reported to have been more inclined towards military action from the early stages of the crisis.

35 The previous evening the United States Government had also counselled the UAR to exercise restraint.

36 Mr Eshkol, in his reply on 1 June, stated that a settlement must be founded on ‘the territorial independence and integrity of all States of the region; resistance to revanchism and attempts to change the situation by force; abstention from acts of hostility, including acts of sabotage carried out by infiltrators across the border and the imposition of a maritime blockade; and noninterference in the internal affairs of States’.

37 The rejection by President de Gaulle of Israel's bid for French support met with strong opposition in France, both within the ruling Gaullist party and without. There have been recurrent reports that armaments shipments, including a few aircraft, continued to flow to Israel, until the French Government formally declared an arms embargo on the first day of the war. After that, according to widespread reports in Western capitals, some aid reached Israel through third countries.

38 The latter image was presented in two television interviews given by President Nasser to Messrs. Anthony Nutting and Christopher Mayhew, M.P., a few days before the war.

39 For a considerable segment of public opinion in Israel, this article was too accurate in analyzing Israel's position to permit further doubts that Nasser had calculated the consequences of closing the Straits of Tiran.

40 One division in the Gaza Strip was that of the Palestine Liberation Army, and cannot be accorded equal weight in the order of battle with the other Egyptian forces. This division was in position when the crisis began.

iii. the war

41 Israel time, which is an hour behind Cairo time.

42 Israel's Sherman tanks were relics of the 1940s, while the Centurions had long been obsolescent and the Pattons were cast-offs from the Bundeswehr. Their excellent performance in this war was unexpected, and was due almost entirely to the high maintenance and training standard of the Israeli Defence Forces.

43 These figures for armaments are those at present available to the Institute for Strategic Studies. A full presentation is given in Appendix 3. Their accuracy, particularly in relation to the Israeli forces, cannot be guaranteed. Israeli security is excellent, and the precise size of her armed forces remains one of her most closely guarded secrets.

44 The Israelis are reported to have held back no more than twelve operational aircraft for defensive operations over Israel.

45 The largest regular formation in the Israeli Army was the brigade. Larger formations were, like Army Corps in the British Army, created ad hoc of whatever combination was suitable to the task in hand. Thus General Tal's division contained a preponderance of armour; General Joffe's was entirely armoured; General Sharon's was a balanced force of infantry, armour, and parachute troops.

46 It was afterwards emphasized by General Hod that two-thirds of all sorties flown were ‘taking part in the land battle’, mostly in striking Egyptian armour and vehicles behind the battle zone. Israeli ground forces had been warned to expect little air co-operation in the earlier phases of operations. But aircraft which could not be used in the main air battle, such as the Fouga Magister trainers, were placed at General Gavish's disposal from the very beginning.