Defence procurement, technology and industry

Abstract

‘Without doubt, this is the right book at exactly the right time! Despite COVID's media predominance, the dangers to our freedom have not simply faded away; quite the opposite. With their novel analysis piercing through the layers of Germany's strategic wavering, Giegerich and Terhalle demonstrate precisely that. For anyone aiming at taking over executive responsibility for Berlin's foreign and security policy after the federal elections in September 2021, this is a must-read.’

Friedrich Merz, Member of the German Bundestag (1994-2009), Chief Whip and Minority Leader (2000-02) and member of the CDU/CSU Government Team for the 2021 federal elections

‘This is an in-depth study of a crucial topic. Well-argued and well-researched, this book offers an original take on a timely and important subject with broad implications for the future of European and transatlantic security.’

Dr Benedetta Berti, Head of Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO

The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany's post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China's rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany's armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so.

In this Adelphi book, Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany's current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin's European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than dogmatically reject the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power - including military power - in international affairs. Giegerich and Terhalle show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy.

Dr Bastian Giegerich is Director of Defence and Military Analysis at the IISS. He previously worked for the German Federal Ministry of Defence in research and policy roles and is the author and editor of several books on European security and defence matters.

Professor Maximilian Terhalle is affiliated with King's College London. Between 2019 and 2020, he served as Senior Adviser to the UK's Ministry of Defence. Previously, he taught at Columbia and Yale universities' security programmes and undertook field work in China and Egypt. His work focuses on hard security, strategy and world order; he has written or edited seven books and published widely in international newspapers and journals. He is a Lieutenant Colonel (res.) in the Bundeswehr.

Notes

1 For a clear and illuminating interview with General Sir Richard Barrons, see Konstantin von Hammerstein, ‘“So Können Sie Jedes Europäische Land in Nur 14 Tagen in die Knie Zwingen”’ [‘This Is How You Can Bring Any European Country to Its Knees in Just 14 Days’], Der Spiegel, 23 May 2020, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ex-general-richard-barrons-ueber-den-krieg-derzukunft-kampfroboter-bekommenkeine-pension-a-058c61c5-e4c2-4845-9d0e-33f3a7a3e4cc.

2 Douglas Barrie et al., ‘European Defence Policy in an Era of Renewed Great-Power Competition’, IISS and Hanns Seidel Foundation, February 2020, pp. 16–17, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2020/02/the-future-of-european-defence.

3 Douglas Barrie and Bastian Giegerich, ‘Buying Yourself Into Trouble: Germany’s Procurement Problem’, IISS, Military Balance blog, 16 December 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/12/germany-procurement-problem.

4 See Wilfried von Bredow, Armee Ohne Auftrag: Die Bundeswehr und die Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik [Army Without a Mission: The Bundeswehr and German Security Policy] (Zurich: Orell Füssli, 2020).

5 Stephan Löwenstein, ‘Sparen bei den Streitkräften? Unruhe in der Bundeswehr nach Guttenbergs Rede’ [Cuts in the Armed Forces? Unrest in the Bundeswehr After Guttenberg’s Speech], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 May 2010, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/sparen-bei-denstreitkraeften-unruhe-in-der-bundeswehr-nach-guttenbergs-rede-1978191.html?printPagedArticle=true#void.

6 Thomas Wiegold, ‘Späte Genugtuung für Guttenberg: Bundeswehr Sparte Mehr als 8 Mrd Euro’ [Late Satisfaction for Guttenberg: Bundeswehr Saved More Than 8 Billion Euros], Augen Geradeaus, 25 July 2014, https://augengeradeaus.net/2014/07/spaete-genugtuung-fuer-guttenbergbundeswehr-sparte-mehr-als-8-mrd-euro/.

7 Conversations between an author of this book and German officials suggested that the paradigm shift introduced in zu Guttenberg’s speech was added to the remarks at short notice and without a full assessment of the consequences that may arise from it.

8 Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages [Scientific Services of the German Bundestag], ‘Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr – Ziele, Maßnahmen, Herausforderungen’ [The Realignment of the Bundeswehr – Goals, Actions, Challenges], WD 2 – 3000 – 040/14, 10 April 2014, pp. 17–18, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/412254/04d0b8db2d14ece3a72d-9b580c9578a6/WD-2-040-14-pdf-data.pdf.

9 Interview with German official, April 2020.

10 IISS Military Balance+ database, https://milbalplus.iiss.org/, accessed April 2021.

11 Ibid.

12 KPMG, P3 Group and TaylorWessing, ‘Umfassende Bestandsaufnahme und Risikoanalyse Zentraler Rüstungsprojekte: Exzerpt’ [Comprehensive Inventory and Risk Analysis of Central Armaments Projects: Summary], 30 September 2014, https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/11644/d5cdd057b87a9a9f84dadeaa72d4ae59/c-06-10-14-download-expertenbericht-zu-ruestungsprojekten-uebergeben-data.pdf.

13 IISS Military Balance+ database, https://milbalplus.iiss.org/, accessed April 2021.

14 Ibid.

15 See, for example, Dorothee Frank, ‘Bundeswehr-Marder Erhalten Saphir Wärmebildzielgeräte’ [Bundeswehr’s Marder to Receive Saphir Thermal Imaging Aiming Devices], Behörden Spiegel, 9 November 2020, https://www.behoerden-spiegel.de/2020/11/09/bundeswehr-marder-erhalten-saphir-waer-mebildzielgeraete/.

16 IISS Military Balance+ database, https://milbalplus.iiss.org/, accessed April 2021.

17 Nicholas Fiorenza, ‘Germany’s F125 Frigate Nordrhein-Westfalen Enters Service’, Janes, 16 June 2020, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/newsdetail/germanys-f125-frigate-nordrhein-westfalen-enters-service.

18 Deutscher Bundestag [German Bundestag], ‘Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Marcus Faber, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, Grigorios Aggelidis, Weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der FDP’ [Answer of the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation of MPs Dr. Marcus Faber, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, Grigorios Aggelidis, Other MPs and the FDP Parliamentary Group], Drucksache 19/9353 [Printed Matter 19/9353], 9 April 2019, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/093/1909353.pdf.

19 Plans to develop electronic-combatreconnaissance and suppression-of-enemy-air-defence versions of the Eurofighter were announced at the end of 2019. See Gareth Jennings, ‘Airbus Proposes ECR/SEAD Eurofighter, Emphasises German Requirement’, Janes, 5 November 2019, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/airbus-proposes-ecrsead-eurofighter-emphasises-german-requirement.

20 Matthias Gebauer and Konstantin von Hammerstein, ‘Die Radmuttern Werden Nicht Mehr Hergestellt’ [The Wheel Nuts Are No Longer Manufactured], Der Spiegel, 10 April 2020, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/tornado-flugzeuge-der-bundeswehr-die-radmuttern-werden-gar-nicht-mehr-hergestellt-a-00000000-0002-0001-0000-000170435625?context=issue. See also Douglas Barrie, ‘Dogfight Over Berlin: Germany’s Tornado Replacement Aspirations’, IISS, Military Balance blog, 21 December 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2017/12/berlin; and Douglas Barrie and Bastian Giegerich, ‘Berlin and the Bomb’, IISS, Military Balance blog, 20 March 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/03/germany-tornado-replacement-options.

21 The Christian Democratic Union of Germany, the Christian Social Union in Bavaria and the Free Democratic Party, ‘Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt. Der Koalitionsvertrag Zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP’ [Growth. Education. Unity. The Coalition Agreement Between the CDU, CSU and FDP], 26 October 2009, p. 120, https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=83dbb842-b2f7-bf99-6180-e65b2de7b4d4&groupId=252038.

22 The Christian Democratic Union of Germany, the Christian Social Union in Bavaria and the Social Democratic Party of Germany, ‘Ein Neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine Neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein Neuer Zusammenhalt für Unser Land: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD‘ [A New Departure for Europe. A New Dynamic for Germany. A New Cohesion for Our Country: Coalition Agreement Between CDU, CSU and SPD], 12 March 2018, p. 148, https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/656734/847984/5b8bc23590d4cb2892b31c987ad672b7/2018-03-14-koalitionsvertrag-data.pdf.

23 Paul-Anton Krüger and Mike Szymanski, ‘Berlin und die Bombe: Ein Offenes Geheimnis’ [Berlin and the Bomb: An Open Secret], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 May 2020, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/atomwaffen-atombombe-1.4897147.

24 Soumitra Dutta, Bruno Lanvin and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent (eds), ‘Global Innovation Index 2020: Who Will Finance Innovation?’, Cornell University, INSEAD and the World Intellectual Property Organization, September 2020, p. xxxii, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2020.pdf.

25 Amy J. Nelson, ‘Innovation and Its Discontents: National Models of Military Innovation and the Dual-Use Conundrum’, Center for International and Security Studies at School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, July 2020, pp. 4 and 19, https://cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/2020-07/EmergingTechInnovation_063020.pdf.

26 Mölling, ‘Vom Flickenteppich Deutscher Sicherheitspolitik’ [Of the Patchwork that is German Security Policy], p. 80.

27 Florian Keisinger (Airbus) and Wolfgang Koch (Fraunhofer FKIE), ‘Mission’, Future Combat Air System, http://www.fcas-forum.eu/mission.

28 The IISS has been a partner organisation in this effort and has received project funding from the German foreign ministry for this purpose. See ‘2021. Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control’, Federal Foreign Office, http://www.rethinkingarmscontrol.de.

29 Timothy Wright, Douglas Barrie and Bastian Giegerich, ‘Multi-Stakeholder Approaches to Arms Control Negotiations: Working With Science and Industry’, in Federal Foreign Office, ‘Conference Reader: 2020. Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control’, November 2020, pp. 47–53, https://rethinkingarmscontrol.de/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/20-AA-RAC-Reader-2020-10-28-final-korr-kompr.pdf.

30 See ‘“Eine Gute Erfindung Steigert das Gemeinwohl”: Rafael Laguna de la Verde im Gespräch mit Annette Riedel’ [‘A Good Invention Increases the Common Good’: Rafael Laguna de la Vera in Conversation With Annette Riedel], Deutschlandfunk Kultur, 29 February 2020, https://www.deutschland-funkkultur.de/chef-der-agentur-fuersprunginnovationen-eine-gute.990.de.html?dram:article_id=471145; Shirley Tay, ‘Exclusive: How the German Military Created a Startup Culture’, GovInsider, 9 November 2020, https://govinsider.asia/intelligent-gov/how-the-german-military-created-a-startup-culture-marcel-otto-yon/; ‘Offizieller Startschuss für Cyberagentur’ [Official Starting Signal for Cyber Agency], Tagesschau, 11 August 2020, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/cyberagentur-105.html; and Michael Brauns, ‘Universitäten der Bundeswehr gründen DTEC.Bw’ [Universities of the Federal Armed Forces Establish DTEC.Bw], Bundeswehr University Munich, 24 September 2020, https://www.unibw.de/home/news/universitaeten-der-bundeswehr-gruenden-zentrum-fuer-digitalisierungs-und-technologieforschung.

31 Judy Dempsey, ‘Why Germany’s Soldiers Are Denied Armed Drones’, Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe, 5 January 2021, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/83558?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTVdJMVlUZzFNR1kwT0RrNSIsInQiOiJZaDVMWm5QZEhYZXF6dTZHdm9QS01p%E2%80%A6.

32 Bundesverband der Deutschen Sicherheits-und Verteidigungsindustrie [Federal Association of the German Security and Defence Industry], ‘Die Deutsche Sicherheits-und Verteidigungsindustrie als Teil Einer Nationalen Sicherheits-und Verteidigungsvorsorge’ [The German Security and Defence Industry as Part of a National Security and Defence Preparedness], 21 June 2017, p. 1, https://www.bdsv.eu/aktuelles/positionspapiere/positionspapier-des-bdsv-zur-the-matik-souveraenitaet.html.

33 Krauss-Maffei Wegmann used to be on this list but its revenue is now reported as part of KNDS, which is the holding company it established with France’s Nexter Systems. The company is registered in the Netherlands. See ‘Top 100 for 2020’, Defense News, https://people.defensenews.com/top-100/.

34 Die Bundesregierung [Cabinet of Germany], ‘Strategy Paper of the Federal Government on Strengthening the Security and Defence Industry’, 14 February 2020, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/S-T/strategiepapier-staerkung-sicher-its-und-verteidigungsindustrie-en.pdf?blob=publicationFile&v=4.

35 Bastian Giegerich, ‘Coopération Franco-Allemande de Sécurité et de Défense et Autonomie Stratégique Européenne’ [Franco-German Security and Defence Cooperation and European Strategic Autonomy], Revue Défense Nationale, 2019/6 (no. 821), June 2019, pp. 43–9.

36 Detlef Puhl, ‘La Coopération en Matière d’Armement Entre la France et l’Allemagne: Un Terrain d’Entente Impossible?’ [The Franco-German Armaments Cooperation: An Impossible Agreement?], Notes de l’Ifri – Visions Franco-Allemandes, [Ifri Notes – Franco-German Visions] no. 31, November 2020, https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/notes-de-lifri/visions-franco-allemandes/cooperation-matiere-darmement-entrefrance. See also Barbara Kunz, ‘Switching Umbrellas in Berlin? The Implications of Franco-German Nuclear Cooperation’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 43, no. 3, September 2020, pp. 63–77; and Nelson, ‘Innovation and Its Discontents: National Models of Military Innovation and the Dual-Use Conundrum’, p. 20.

37 Die Bundesregierung [Cabinet of Germany], ‘Strategy Paper of the Federal Government on Strengthening the Security and Defence Industry’, 14 February 2020, p. 8, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/S-T/strategiepapier-staerkung-sicherits-und-verteidigungsindustrie-en.pdf?blob=publicationFile&v=4.

38 Ischinger, Welt in Gefahr: Deutschland und Europa in Unsicheren Zeiten [World in Danger: Germany and Europe in Uncertain Times], p. 280.

39 Conversations between an author of this paper and German industry representatives, February and April 2020.

40 Thomas Wiegold, ‘Deutscher Exportstopp für die Saudis: Großbritannien Warnt Deutschland vor Folgen’ [German Export Ban For the Saudis: Great Britain Warns Germany of the Consequences], Augen Geradeaus, 19 February 2019, https://augengeradeaus.net/2019/02/deutscher-exportstoppfuer-die-saudis-grossbritannien-warntdeutschland-vor-folgen/. See also Matthias Gebauer and Christoph Schult, ‘Großbritannien Wirft Berlin Mangelnde Bündnistreue Vor’ [Great Britain Accuses Berlin of Lacking Loyalty to the Alliance], Der Spiegel, 19 February 2019, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ruestungsexporte-nachsaudi-arabien-brandbrief-aus-grossbritannien-an-deutschland-a-1253997.html.

41 Anne-Marie Descôtes, ‘Vom “German-Free” zum Gegenseitigen Vertrauen’ [From ‘German-Free’ to Mutual Trust], Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik no. 7/2019 [Security Policy Working Paper no. 7/2019], Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik [Federal Academy for Security Policy], https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/arbeitspapier_sicherheitspolitik_2019_7.pdf.

42 See BAE Systems, ‘Our Key Markets’, https://www.baesystems.com/en/what-we-do/suppliers/our-key-markets.

43 Rick Noack, ‘Germany’s Ban on Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia Is Having a Bigger Impact Than Expected’, Stars and Stripes, 19 February 2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/germany-s-ban-on-arms-exports-to-saudiarabia-is-having-a-bigger-impact-than-expected-1.569265; and Nelson, ‘Innovation and Its Discontents: National Models of Military Innovation and the Dual-Use Conundrum’, p. 20.

44 Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, ‘Building Franco-German Consensus on Arms Exports’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 61, no. 4, August–September 2019, pp. 79–98, especially p. 80.

45 Matthias Gebauer and Gerald Traufetter, ‘Regierung Genehmigt Neue Waffendeals mit Saudi-Arabien’ [Government Approves New Arms Deals With Saudi Arabia], Der Spiegel, 19 September 2018, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ruestung-bundesregie-rung-genehmigt-neue-waffen-dealsmit-saudi-arabien-a-1229003.html.

46 Barrie and Giegerich, ‘Buying Yourself Into Trouble: Germany’s Procurement Problem’; Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages [Scientific Services of the German Bundestag], ‘Das Deutsch-Französische Abkommen Vom 21. Oktober 2019 Über Ausfuhrkontrollen im Rüstungsbereich im Lichte des Art. 59 Abs. 2 GG’ [The Franco-German Agreement of 21 October 2019 on Export Controls in Arms Policy in Light of Article 59, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law], WD 2 – 3000 -122/19, 15 November 2019, pp. 8–9, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/673972/3921230d2453e988b485aae981323a35/WD-2-122-19-pdf-data.pdf; and Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control, ‘War Weapons List’, https://www.bafa.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Foreign_Trade/afk_war_weapons_list.html.