Elements of a new security policy

Abstract

‘Without doubt, this is the right book at exactly the right time! Despite COVID's media predominance, the dangers to our freedom have not simply faded away; quite the opposite. With their novel analysis piercing through the layers of Germany's strategic wavering, Giegerich and Terhalle demonstrate precisely that. For anyone aiming at taking over executive responsibility for Berlin's foreign and security policy after the federal elections in September 2021, this is a must-read.’

Friedrich Merz, Member of the German Bundestag (1994-2009), Chief Whip and Minority Leader (2000-02) and member of the CDU/CSU Government Team for the 2021 federal elections

‘This is an in-depth study of a crucial topic. Well-argued and well-researched, this book offers an original take on a timely and important subject with broad implications for the future of European and transatlantic security.’

Dr Benedetta Berti, Head of Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO

The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany's post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China's rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany's armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so.

In this Adelphi book, Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany's current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin's European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than dogmatically reject the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power - including military power - in international affairs. Giegerich and Terhalle show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy.

Dr Bastian Giegerich is Director of Defence and Military Analysis at the IISS. He previously worked for the German Federal Ministry of Defence in research and policy roles and is the author and editor of several books on European security and defence matters.

Professor Maximilian Terhalle is affiliated with King's College London. Between 2019 and 2020, he served as Senior Adviser to the UK's Ministry of Defence. Previously, he taught at Columbia and Yale universities' security programmes and undertook field work in China and Egypt. His work focuses on hard security, strategy and world order; he has written or edited seven books and published widely in international newspapers and journals. He is a Lieutenant Colonel (res.) in the Bundeswehr.

Notes

1 Lorenz Hemicker, ‘Die Lücken der Bundeswehr’ [The Gaps in the Bundeswehr], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 April 2020, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/risiko-corona-wachsen-die-luecken-bei-der-bundes-wehr-16745947.html.

2 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Does Strategic Studies Have a Future?’, in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin S. Gray (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6^th edition, 2018), p. 418.

3 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Compare Your Country: Expenditure for Social Purposes’, https://www.compareyourcountry.org/social-expenditure/en/0/all/default, accessed 19 March 2021; and John Chipman, ‘Shifting weight of military power’, IISS Analysis, 29 January 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/01/shifting-weight.

4 Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Statistical Office of Germany], ‘Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechungen, Inlandsprodukt’ [National Accounts, Domestic Product], https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Wirtschaft/Volkswirtschaftliche-Gesamtrechnungen-Inlandsprodukt/_inhalt.html.

5 Barrie et al., ‘Defending Europe: Scenario-Based Capability Requirements for NATO’s European Members’.

6 The 80/20 split represents a middle ground of estimates. See Andrés Navarro-Galera, Rodrigo I. Ortúzar-Maturana and Francisco Muñoz-Leiva, ‘The Application of Life Cycle Costing in Evaluating Military Investments: An Empirical Study at an International Scale’, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 22, no. 5, 2011, pp. 509–43.

7 Deutscher Bundestag [German Bundestag], ‘Unterrichtung durch die Wehrbeauftragte’ [Briefing By the Armed Forces Commissioner], Jahresbericht 2020 (62. Bericht) [Annual Report 2020 (62nd Report)], Drucksache 19/26600 [Printed Matter 19/26600], 23 February 2021, pp. 82–92, https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/266/1926600.pdf.

8 Martin Sebaldt, ‘Rüstungspolitik im Zeichen des Versagens: Die Trendwende Material der Bundeswehr Zwischen Anspruch und Realität’ [Armament Policy in Decay: The Equipment Turnaround of the German Bundeswehr Between Aspiration and Reality], Zeitschrift für Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik, vol. 13, no. 2, June 2020, pp. 177–96, especially p. 179.

9 Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘What Does AI Mean for the Future of Manoeuvre Warfare?’, IISS, 5 May 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/05/csfc-ai-manoeuvre-warfare.

10 See François Heisbourg and Maximilian Terhalle, ‘6 Post-Cold War Taboos Europe Must Now Face’, Politico, 28 December 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/6-post-cold-war-taboos-europe-must-now-face-merkel-macron-trump-nato-eurozone-reform/; François Heisbourg, ‘Europe Can Afford the Cost of Autonomy’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 63, no. 1, February–March 2021, pp. 25–32, especially pp. 28–9; and Barrie and Giegerich, ‘Berlin and the Bomb’. See also Richard Barrons and Maximilian Terhalle, ‘Europe Needs to Calculate for the U.S. Military’s Shortcomings’, National Interest, 6 August 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/europe-needs-calculate-us-militarys-shortcomings-71756; Klaus Naumann and Maximilian Terhalle, ‘Deutschlands Schlafwandeln gefährdet die liberale Weltordnung’ [Germany’s Sleepwalking Endangers the Liberal World Order], Die Welt, 26 November 2019, https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/plus203825868/Nato-Deutschlands-Schlafwandeln-gefaehrdet-die-liberale-Weltordnung.html; and Maximilian Terhalle, ‘Europas Augenblick ist gekommen’ [Europe’s Moment Has Come], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 February 2018, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/sicher-heitskonferenz/gastbeitrag-eine-strategische-vision-fuer-europa-15446611.html. It is possible that making French missiles available to German aircraft could further complicate the airframe selection for the Tornado replacement in Germany.

11 Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas, ‘Auf der Suche Nach Best Practice? Die Entstehung Nationaler Sicherheitsstrategien im Internationalen Vergleich’ [Searching For Best Practice? The Development of National Security Strategies in an International Comparison], Sicherheit und Frieden, vol. 30, no. 3, 2012, pp. 129–34.