A complex balance of power

Abstract

‘China’s growing assertiveness, America’s declining deterrent capability, and Taiwan’s growing jumpiness, not least as it watches Hong Kong, have all made a stumble into catastrophic conflict across the Taiwan Strait more likely than for decades. Brendan Taylor credibly argues this is only avoidable - however unattractive “muddling through” might be to purists on all sides - by urgently building more robust crisis-management mechanisms. A sober and compelling analysis which policymakers will ignore at their peril.’

Gareth Evans, Former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group

‘The cross-Strait balance of power is shifting, raising the risk of inadvertent and catastrophic great-power conflict. Brendan Taylor’s identification of this window of vulnerability and proposals for crisis-management advance our understanding of one of the most vexing national security problems of the next decade.’

Dr Mira Rapp-Hooper, Council on Foreign Relations

‘This is certainly a timely book addressing Taiwan’s forthcoming security challenges. Brendan Taylor provides an insightful and thought-provoking analysis regarding the threats Taiwan is facing and at the same time offers valuable suggestions in terms of how to manage this imminent crisis. This is worth reading by all interests.’

Andrew N.D. Yang, Former Minister of National Defense, Republic of China, Taiwan

Taiwan’s position looks increasingly precarious, and tensions threaten to grow into a major strategic crisis. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a central pillar of his vision for China, and has ramped up diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan. Its inhabitants are increasingly estranged from the mainland, and Tsai Ing-wen’s administration refuses to conduct relations with China on Beijing’s terms. Taiwan could take on renewed strategic significance amid the backdrop of the deepening rivalry between China and the United States, and find itself at the centre of a Cold War-style superpower confrontation.

While Washington’s support and military power has historically guaranteed Taiwan’s security, this is no longer a certainty. This Adelphi book argues that China’s military modernisation has changed the cross-strait military balance, and the ability of the US to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan may have evaporated by 2030. As China feels increasingly empowered to retake Taiwan, there is significant potential for escalation, particularly given the ambiguity of Beijing’s ‘red lines’ on Taiwan. Neither Beijing, Taipei nor Washington want such a conflict, but each is challenging the uneasy status quo. Taylor calls for the introduction of a narrower set of formal crisis-management mechanisms designed to navigate a major Taiwan crisis.

Notes

1 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1979–80 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1979), pp. 59–61, 64–65.

2 Chong-Pin Lin, ‘The Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits’, China Quarterly, vol. 146, June 1996, p. 579.

3 Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia (Arlington, VA: The Project 2049 Institute, 2017), pp. 165–71.

4 See, for example, Stephen W. Bosworth, ‘The United States and Asia’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, 1991, pp. 113–29.

5 IISS, The Military Balance 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997/98), p. 167.

6 IISS, The Military Balance 2019 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2019), p. 21.

7 Ibid., p. 307.

8 ‘Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen seeks $11 billion defence budget as China threat grows’, Japan Times, 6 August 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/08/06/asia-pacific/taiwans-tsai-ing-wen-seeks-11-billion-defence-budget-china-threat-grows/#.XVaDNOhKiUk.

9 IISS, The Military Balance 2019, p. 258.

10 Steven Lee Myers and Chris Horton, ‘Once Formidable, Taiwan’s Military Now Overshadowed by China’s’, New York Times, 4 November 2017, https://www.nytimes/com/2017/11/04/world/asia/china-taiwan-military.html.

11 Erik Eckholm, ‘China Expresses Concern Over Arms Sale to Taiwan’, New York Times, 25 April 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/25/world/china-expresses-concern-over-arms-sale-to-taiwan.html.

12 Questions have been raised over the suitability of Gavron Ltd to oversee the project, including by US officials speaking anonymously and by Taiwanese lawmakers. For further reading, see Teng Pei-ju, ‘U.S. official raises doubts about design consultancy firm overseeing new submarine construction’, Taiwan News, 15 October 2018, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3552735.

13 Lucie Béraud-Sudreau and Joseph Dempsey, ‘Indigenous submarines: not quite made in Taiwan?’, IISS, 20 August 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/08/indigenous-submarines-taiwan; Zachary Keck, ‘China’s Worst Fear: Can America Turn Taiwan into a Submarine Power?’, National Interest, 14 April 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-worst-fear-can-america-turn-taiwan-submarine-power-25374; and Carl Schuster, ‘Here Comes Taiwan’s Submarines’, National Interest, 12 October 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/here-comes-taiwans-submarines-33391.

14 IISS, The Military Balance 2019, pp. 261, 309.

15 David Axe, ‘China’s J-20 Stealth Fighter Doesn’t Need to Be an F-35 to Be Dangerous’, National Interest, 9 December 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-j-20-stealth-fighter-doesn't-need-be-f-35-be-dangerous-38297.

16 Wendell Minnick, ‘Taiwan Gives Up on F-35, Turns to F-16V Option’, National Interest, 28 November 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/taiwan-gives-f-35-turns-f-16v-option-37332.

17 R.D. Cheng, ‘A Median Line in the Taiwan Strait: A Dangerous Loophole’, Taiwan Sentinel, 3 April 2019, https://sentinel.tw/the-median-line-in-the-taiwan-strait-a-dangerous-loophole.

18 Richard D. Fisher Jr., ‘Taiwan reviews its missile programmes’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 27 March 2018.

19 For further reading, see Timothy R. Heath, ‘China’s Untested Military Could Be a Force – or a Flop’, Foreign Policy, 27 November 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/27/chinas-untested-military-could-be-a-force-or-a-flop.

20 Tim Huxley, ‘Why Asia’s “arms race” is not quite what it seems’, World Economic Forum, 12 September 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/09/asias-arms-race-and-why-it-doesn't-matter.

21 Michael Mazza, ‘Taiwan’s demographic crunch and its military implications’, Global Taiwan Brief, vol. 3, no. 2, 24 January 2018, http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/01/24-gtb-3-2/.

22 ‘For Taiwan youth, military service is a hard sell despite China tension’, Channel NewsAsia, 29 October 2018, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/taiwan-youth-military-service-china-tension-10873554.

23 IISS, The Military Balance 2019, p. 256.

24 The application of this term to the Taiwan case is typically attributed to William Murray: see his article ‘Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy’, Naval War College Review, vol. 61, no. 3, Summer 2008, pp. 12–39.

25 Frank Chen, ‘Taiwan’s small missile boat program hamstrung by budget cuts’, Asia Times, 13 December 2018, https://cms.ati.ms/2018/12/taiwans-small-missile-boat-program-hamstrung-by-budget-cuts.

26 See, for example, Michael A. Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka, A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan's Conventional Deterrence Posture, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, November 2018, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf.

27 J. Michael Cole, ‘How Taiwan can defend its coastline against China’, National Interest, 30 June 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-taiwan-can-defend-its-coastline-against-china-64861.

28 Richard Bush, ‘The United States Security Partnership with Taiwan’, Brookings Order from Chaos series, 13 July 2016, p. 4, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-united-states-security-partnership-with-taiwan.

29 Eric Heginbotham et al., ‘The US-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996-2017′, RAND Corporation, 2015, p. 333, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf.

30 For further reading, see Luis Simon, ‘Demystifying the A2/AD Buzz’, War on the Rocks, 4 January 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/demystifying-the-a2ad-buzz.

31 See ‘Missiles of China’, Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china.

32 Ibid.

33 Adam Ni and Bates Gill, ‘China’s New Missile Force: New Ambitions, New Challenges (Part 1)’, Jamestown Foundation China Brief, vol. 18, no. 14, 10 August 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-missile-force-new-ambitions-new-challenges-part-1.

34 Oriana Skylar Mastro and Ian Easton, ‘Risk and Resiliency: China’s Emerging Air Base Strike Threat’, Project 2049 Institute, 8 November 2017, https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/P2049_Mastro_Easton_China_Emerging_Airbase_Strike_Threat_110817.pdf.

35 IISS, The Military Balance 2019, p. 261.

36 Heginbotham et al., ‘US-China Military Scorecard’, pp. 82–88.

37 United States, Department of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019′, May 2019, p. 116, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF.

38 Robert Ross, ‘The End of U.S. Naval Dominance in Asia’, Lawfare, 18 November 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/end-us-naval-dominance-asia.

39 US Navy, ‘Status of the Navy’, 2 August 2019, https://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146.

40 See Nick Childs, ‘China’s naval shipbuilding: delivering on its ambition in a big way’, IISS, 1 May 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/05/china-naval-shipbuilding.

41 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018′, p. 30, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF.

42 Kyle Mizokami, ‘China’s Navy: Armed with 4 Aircraft Carriers by 2022?’, National Interest, 8 November 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/chinas-navy-armed-4-aircraft-carriers-2022-35482.

43 Lyle Goldstein, ‘The US-China Naval Balance in the Asia-Pacific: An Overview’, China Quarterly, vol. 232, December 2017, pp. 904–31, p. 913.

44 Ibid., p. 916.

45 US, Department of Defense, ‘China’s Military Power 2018′, p. 29.

46 Ross, ‘The End of U.S. Naval Dominance in Asia’.

47 US, Department of Defense, ‘China’s Military Power 2018′, p. 30.

48 Andrew Erickson, ‘Correspondence: How Good Are China’s Antiaccess/Area-Denial Capabilities’, International Security, vol. 41, no. 1, Spring 2017, p. 204.

49 Ross, ‘The End of U.S. Naval Dominance in Asia’.

50 Ellen Mitchell, ‘Pentagon chief says US looking to put intermediate-range missiles in Asia’, The Hill, 3 August 2019, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/456032-pentagon-chief-says-us-looking-to-put-intermediate-range-missiles-in-asia.

51 Heginbotham et al., ‘US-China Military Scorecard’, p. 327.

52 Cited in Denny Roy, ‘Prospects for Taiwan Maintaining Its Autonomy under Chinese Pressure’, Asian Survey, vol. 57, no. 6, November/December 2017, pp. 1138–39.

53 ‘China military carries out military exercises in city just opposite Taiwan, days after elections’, Straits Times, 21 January 2016, https://www.straitstimes.com/east-asia/china-military-carries-out-live-firing-exercises-in-city-just-opposite-taiwan-days.

54 Benjamin Schreer, ‘The Double-Edged Sword of Coercion: Cross-Strait Relations After the 2016 Taiwan Elections’, Asian Politics and Policy, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, p. 51.

55 Zhang Tao, ‘PLA’s island encirclement patrols around Taiwan not news anymore’, China Military Online, 12 January 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-01/12/content_7907015_2.htm.

56 For further reading, see Derek Grossman et al., ‘China’s Long-Range Bomber Flights’, RAND Corporation, 2018, pp. 20–25.

57 Ibid., p. 23.

58 For further reading, see Murray Scot Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use, RAND Corporation, 2007.

59 Kensaku Ihara, ‘With economic allure fading, Taiwan keeps its distance from China’, Nikkei Asian Review, 21 May 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/With-economic-allure-fading-Taiwan-keeps-its-distance-from-China.

60 Stratfor, ‘Taiwan Confronts the Costs of Economic Integration With Mainland China’, Stratfor Worldview, 2 October 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/taiwan-confronts-costs-economic-integration-mainland-china.

61 Cited in Charlotte Gao, ‘Bypassing Tsai Ing-wen, China Offers Perks for Taiwan’s People’, Diplomat, 28 February 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/bypassing-tsai-ing-wen-china-offers-perks-to-taiwans-people.

62 Simon Denyer, ‘Taiwan battles a brain drain as China aims to woo young talent’, Washington Post, 15 April 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taiwan-battles-a-brain-drain-as-china-aims-to-woo-young-talent-away/2018/04/13/338d096e-3940-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story_html.

63 For further reading, see Bonnie S. Glaser, Scott Kennedy and Derek Mitchell, ‘The New Southbound Policy: Deepening Taiwan’s Regional Integration’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180113_Glaser_NewSouthboundPolicy_Web.pdf?F5YmxgSJTjWxHCHQr3J88zE.KkzVK5cv.

64 Kelsey Munro, ‘“Disgusting” and “extraordinary” scenes as Chinese delegation shouts down welcome ceremony’, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 May 2017, https://www.smh.com. au/politics/federal/disgusting-and-extraordinary-scemes-as-chinese-delegation-shouts-down-welcome-ceremony-20170502-gvxbou.html.

65 ‘Taiwan accuses World Health Organisation of bowing to Beijing over invitation to top health meeting’, South China Morning Post, 8 May 2018, https://sc.mp/2KlaUHr.

66 Goh Sui Noi, ‘Taiwan loses third diplomatic ally this year after El Salvador breaks ties’, Straits Times, 21 August 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-set-to-lose-its-third-diplomatic-ally-this-year-source.

67 Gary Sands, ‘What the China-Vatican Deal Means for Taiwan’, Diplomat, 21 September 2018. Available from https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/what-the-china-vatican-deal-means-for-taiwan.

68 Josh Rogin, ‘White House calls China’s threats to airlines “Orwellian nonsense”, Washington Post, 5 May 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/05/05/white-house-calls-chinas-threats-to-airlines-orwellian-nonsense.

69 Bill Birtles, ‘Last remaining US airlines give in to Chinese pressure on Taiwan’, ABC News, 25 July 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-07-25/us-airlines-give-in-to-chinese-pressure-on-taiwan/10035874.

70 J. Michael Cole, ‘China’s New Air Routes Near Taiwan: Why Now? To What End?’, Taiwan Sentinel, 11 January 2018, https://sentinel.yw/analysis-china-new-air-routes-tw.

71 Mark Landler, ‘Trump Accuses China of Interfering in Midterm elections’, New York Times, 26 September 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/world/asia/trump-china-election.html.

72 For further reading, see Rory Medcalf, ‘Australia and China: understanding the reality check’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 73, no. 2, 2019, pp. 109–18.

73 Josh Rogin, ‘China’s interference in the 2018 elections succeeded – in Taiwan’, Washington Post, 18 December 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/18/chinas-interference-elections-succeeded-taiwan.

74 Ibid.

75 Hsu, ‘Growing number of Taiwanese willing to go to war against China’.