Japan’s geo-economic strategy: the means

Abstract

‘In foreign affairs, Japan is often thought of as a big country acting like a small one. Yet that is to miss the significance, range and effectiveness of Japan’s economic statecraft, in which the country not only acts its true size but also does so with much more autonomy and agency than it does in classic diplomacy. Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward shine a truly illuminating light on how Japan thinks and behaves as a geo-economic actor, whether through trade, investment, aid, rule-setting or, crucially, technology. This Adelphi book deserves to be widely read, for it adds greatly to our understanding of a much neglected and under-appreciated aspect of Japanese strategy.’

Bill Emmott, Chairman of the IISS Trustees; Chairman of the Japan Society of the UK; and author of Japan’s Far More Female Future (Oxford University Press, 2020)

‘Groundbreaking work and a penetrating analysis of the geo-economic challenges facing Japan, a frontline country in the age of US–China rivalry and economic statecraft.’

Dr Funabashi Yoichi, Chairman of Asia Pacific Initiative

Geo-economic strategy – deploying economic instruments to secure foreign-policy aims and to project power – has long been a key element of statecraft. In recent years it has acquired even greater salience, given China’s growing antagonism with the United States and the willingness of both Beijing and Washington to wield economic power in their confrontation. This trend has particular significance for Japan, due to its often tense political relationship with China, which remains its largest trading partner. While Japan’s post-war geo-economic performance often failed to match its status as one of the world’s largest economies, more recently Tokyo has demonstrated increased geo-economic agency and effectiveness.

In this Adelphi book, Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward draw on multiple disciplines – including economics, political economy, foreign policy and security policy – and interviews with key policymakers to examine Japan’s geo-economic power in the context of great-power competition between the US and China. They examine Japan’s previous underperformance, how Tokyo’s understanding of geo-economics has evolved and, given constraints on its national power projection, what actions Japan might feasibly take to become a more effective geo-economic actor. Their conclusions will be of direct interest not only for all those concerned with Japanese grand strategy and the Asia-Pacific, but also for those middle powers seeking to navigate great-power competition in the coming decades.

Notes

1 ASEAN was established in 1967 and its founding members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

2 ODA has played multiple roles for Japan, including as a means for recycling some of its current-account surpluses and hence to deflect political criticism of its trade policy, particularly from the US. Indeed, Japan’s Ministry of Finance has even argued that these surpluses are necessary for Japan to keep funding global ODA and foreign direct investment needs. See Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Japan’s Role in International Affairs’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 34, no. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 71–87, especially p. 74.

3 Takagi, ‘From Recipient to Donor: Japan’s Official Aid Flows, 1945–1990 and Beyond’, p. 1; and OECD, ‘Net ODA from DAC Countries from 1950 to 2020’, https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/Longterm-ODA.xls.

4 OECD, ‘Development Co-operation Profiles: Japan’, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/b8cf3944-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/b8cf3944-en.

5 See Hook et al., Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, p. 231, for a discussion on Japan’s ‘tied’ ODA.

6 Yukio Satoh, The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy, Adelphi Papers, no. 178 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 30.

7 See Shigehisa Kasahara, ‘The Flying Geese Paradigm: A Critical Study of Its Application to East Asian Regional Development’, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, no. 169, April 2004, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osgdp20043_en.pdf, for a detailed discussion of Japan’s ‘flying geese’ model.

8 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan’s Official Development Assistance: White Paper 2001’, p. 105, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2001/contents.pdf; Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Reference Statistics’ from ‘Official Development Assistance (ODA): White Paper on Development Cooperation 2019’, March 2020, pp. 8–12, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/100161439.pdf. Full white paper available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page24_000074.html.

9 Kosaka, Options for Japan’s Foreign Policy, p. 22.

10 Japanese investment into Southeast Asia had also been rising in the 1970s, largely displacing the US. In 1971, Japan held 15.4% of foreign investments in the region, compared with 36.4% for the US. By 1976, Japan’s share had risen to 36.4%, while the United States’ had fallen to 26%. See Walter LaFeber, The Clash: US–Japanese Relations Throughout History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 366.

11 The yen rose to a post-Second World War nominal high of ¥80:US$1 in early 1995. This rapid appreciation against the background of Japan’s prolonged post-bubble-burst economic adjustment may have been one of the factors contributing to Japan’s slip into prolonged deflation from the late 1990s.

12 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Official Development Assistance (ODA), Economic Cooperation Program for China’, October 2001, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/e_asia/China-2.html.

13 Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 309.

14 LaFeber, The Clash: US–Japanese Relations Throughout History, p. 377.

15 ‘Cable From Ambassador Katori to the Foreign Minister, “Prime Minister Visit to China (Conversation with Chairman Deng Xiaoping)”’, 25 March 1984, Wilson Center, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118849.

16 See Eric Harwit, ‘Japanese Investment in China: Strategies in the Electronics and Automobile Sectors’, Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 10, October 1996, pp. 978–94, for a discussion of Japanese investment in China in the 1980s and early 1990s.

17 Ward, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and China’, p. 29. Literally translated, seikei bunri means ‘the splitting of politics and economics’.

18 Royama, The Asian Balance of Power: A Japanese View, p. 6.

19 Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, pp. 297–310.

20 LaFeber, The Clash: US–Japanese Relations Throughout History, p. 377.

21 Shinichi Akiyama, ‘Japan to End Official Development Aid to China’, Mainichi, 23 October 2018, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20181023/p2a/00m/0na/016000c. See also ‘Tai Chū ODA, 40 Nen de Maku, Taitō na Kankei de Tojō Koku Shien e’ [The Curtain Falls on 40 Years of ODA to China, Now That China Is Developed, as Equal Partners China and Japan Will Work to Offer Aid to Developing Countries], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 24 October 2018, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO36829380T21C18A0PP8000/.

22 Richard Halloran, ‘Tanaka’s Explosive Trip’, New York Times, 21 January 1974, https://www.nytimes.com/1974/01/21/archives/tanakas-explosive-trip-roots-of-the-antijapanese-outbursts-in.html.

23 These were the ASEAN–Japan Forum, the ASEAN–Japan Foreign Ministers Conference and the ASEAN–Japan Economic Ministers Conference.

24 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘(5) Statement by Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama to the General Session of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference’, 22 July 1991, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-appendix-2.htm.

25 Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security, p. 53.

26 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Diplomatic Bluebook 2001: Chapter 1. General Overview’, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/chap1-c.html.

27 ‘Open regionalism’ was first used in a speech by South Korea’s president, Roh Tae-woo, on 11 November 1991 at the APEC Ministerial Meeting. See APEC, ‘APEC Ministerial Meeting’, https://www.apec.org/meeting-papers/annual-ministerial-meetings/1991/1991_amm.

28 Saori N. Katada, Japan’s New Regional Reality: Geoeconomic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), p. 92, quoting Funabashi Yoichi.

29 Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 102.

30 The World Bank’s September 1993 report, ‘The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy’, marked a high point of confidence in the region’s growth model, which rested on ‘the central role of government–private sector cooperation’ and ‘interventionist policies’. The full report is available at https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/975081468244550798/pdf/multi-page.pdf.

31 The idea of an AMF was not new and had been floated along with the establishment of the ADB, and gained traction again in Japan in the 1980s: see Jennifer A. Amyx, ‘Moving Beyond Bilateralism? Japan and the Asian Monetary Fund’, Pacific Economic Papers, no. 331, September 2002, pp. 4–5, https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/40431/3/pep-331.pdf. For a detailed discussion of Japan’s 1997 AMF démarche, see Phillip Y. Lipscy, ‘Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal’, Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 93–104, especially p. 98, http://www.lipscy.org/lipscy_amf.pdf. See also, for example, Japan’s provision of economic aid to Hanoi under the auspices of the Fukuda Doctrine after the fall of Saigon in 1975. Washington, meanwhile, had imposed a trade embargo on Vietnam. Japan terminated the aid to Vietnam following its invasion of Cambodia in 1978.

32 Koichi Hamada, ‘From the AMF to the Miyazawa Initiative: Observations on Japan’s Currency Diplomacy’, Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 13, no. 1, Spring/Summer 1999, pp. 33–50, especially pp. 33–4, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23257214?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

33 See China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Pro-active Policies by China in Response to Asian Financial Crisis’, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/200011/t20001117_697864.html; and Kentaro Iwamoto, ‘Looking Back at the “Asian IMF” Concept’, Nikkei Asia, 22 June 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Looking-back-at-the-Asian-IMF-concept.

34 Philip Y. Lipscy, ‘Reformist Status Quo Power: Japan’s Approach to International Organizations’, in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry (eds), The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and the World Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020), pp. 107–32, especially p. 115.

35 Eiichi Furukawa, ‘How Mahathir Overcame the Asian Crisis’, Japan Times, 18 July 1999, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/1999/07/18/commentary/world-commentary/how-mahathir-overcame-the-asian-crisis/.

36 Japan, Ministry of Finance, ‘A New Initiative to Overcome the Asian Currency Crisis (New Miyazawa Initiative)’, 3 October 1998, https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/international_policy/financial_cooperation_in_asia/new_miyazawa_initiative/e1e042.htm; and Hook et al., Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, p. 242.

37 Shiraishi Takashi, ‘The Asian Crisis Reconsidered’, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-014, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, April 2005, p. 11, https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/05e014.pdf.

38 ‘The Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers Meeting’, 6 May 2000, https://aseanplusthree.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/The-Joint-Ministerial-Statement-of-the-ASEAN.pdf.

39 Chalongphob Sussangkarn, ‘The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: Origin, Development and Outlook’, ADBI Working Paper Series, no. 230, Asian Development Bank Institute, July 2010, p. 10, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156085/adbi-wp230.pdf; and Olivia Negus, ‘The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM): If Not Now, then When?’, Center For Strategic & International Studies, 1 September 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/chiang-mai-initiative-multilateralization-cmim-if-not-now-then-when.

40 Japan, Ministry of Finance, ‘Internationalization of the Yen for the 21st Century’, 20 April 1999, https://www.mof.go.jp/english/about_mof/councils/customs_foreign_exchange/e1b064a.htm.

41 Ibid.

42 Japan, Ministry of Finance, cited in Shinji Takagi, ‘Internationalising the Yen, 1984–2003: Unfinished Agenda or Mission Impossible?’, BIS Papers, no. 61, Bank for International Settlements, p. 75, https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap61g.pdf.

43 Bank of Japan, ‘BOJ’s Main Timeseries Statistics’, https://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/mtshtml/fm08_m_1_en.html.

44 Takagi, ‘Internationalising the Yen, 1984–2003: Unfinished Agenda or Mission Impossible?’, p. 83.

45 Zhang Xiaohui, ‘Why RMB Internationalization Is Vital’, China Daily, 21 May 2021, https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/168807.

46 Yoichi Funabashi, ‘Japan’s Moment of Truth’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2000–01, pp. 73–84, especially p. 77.

47 Akitoshi Miyashita, ‘Gaiatsu and Japan’s Foreign Aid: Rethinking the Reactive–Proactive Debate’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 43, no. 4, December 1999, pp. 695–732, especially pp. 718–25; and Kimie Hara and Geoffrey Jukes, ‘New Initiatives for Solving the Northern Territories Issue between Japan and Russia: An Inspiration from the Åland Islands’, Pacific Forum Issues & Insights, vol. 7, no. 4, April 2007, pp. 6–7, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v07n04.pdf.

48 Christopher W. Hughes, Alessio Patalano and Robert Ward, ‘Japan’s Grand Strategy: The Abe Era and Its Aftermath’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 63, no. 1, February–March 2021, pp. 125–60, especially p. 131.

49 The economic-reform emphasis early in Abe’s second term also made political sense for him. An overfocus on security issues at the expense of the domestic economy was one reason for the collapse in support for Abe in his short-lived first administration in 2006–07.

50 Averages calculated by author from the Bank of Japan, ‘BOJ’s Main Time-series Statistics’, https://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/mtshtml/fm08_m_1_en.html.

51 Richard Sims, Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation, 1868–2000 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 330, 355–6.

52 IMF, ‘World Economic Outlook Database’, April 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/April/select-country-group. Japan’s overall fiscal position is more stable than the gross debt stock data suggests. Net debt is considerably lower, reflecting the government’s large stock of assets, and most of the debt is held by domestic investors, now principally the BOJ.

53 SeealsoOECD,‘LevelofGDPpercapita and Productivity’, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDB_LV, for cross-country comparisons of productivity with Japan.

54 United Nations, ‘World Population Prospects 2019’, 2019, https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/.

55 David Atkinson, Nihon Kigyō no Shōsan: Jinzai Kakuho x Seisansei x Kigyō Seichō [Enabling Japanese Firms to Win: Securing of Employees x Productivity x Corporate Growth] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 2019). See also Bill Emmott, Japan’s Far More Female Future: Increasing Gender Equality and Reducing Workplace Insecurity Will Make Japan Stronger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 11–30 for a detailed discussion of Japan’s recent demographic trends.

56 ‘Did Abenomics Work?’, The Economist, 5 September 2020, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/09/03/did-abenomics-work.

57 Atkinson, Nihon Kigyō no Shōsan: Jinzai Kakuhō x Seisansei x Kigyō Seichō [Enabling Japanese Firms to Win: Securing of Employees x Productivity x Corporate Growth].

58 Kanehara Nobukatsu, Anzenhoshō Senryaku [Security Strategy] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Shuppan, 2021), p. 56.

59 See ibid., p. 64 for a useful pictoral representation of the NSC’s threemeeting hierarchy. For a breakdown of the frequency of the NSC’s meetings by meeting type and subjects discussed since 2013, see Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, ‘Seisaku Kaigi’, https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyoukaigi/kaisai.html. Unsurprisingly given the circumstances of the global coronavirus pandemic, of the 43 NSC meetings held in 2020, 19 were emergency-situation sessions. There were 18 Four-minister Meetings and six Nine-minister Meetings. In normal years, however, the Fourminister Meetings dominate in terms of frequency.

60 Mayumi Fukushima and Richard J. Samuels, ‘Japan’s National Security Council: Filling the Whole of Government?’, International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 4, July 2018, p. 4, https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/119205/Japan%27s%20National%20Security%20Council%20REVISED%20%236%20for%20Jen%20Greenleaf%20DSPACE.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

61 Richard J. Samuels, Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019).

62 Kanehara, Anzenhoshō Senryaku [Security Strategy], p. 76.

63 The Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets. See Samuels, Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community; Hughes, Patalano and Ward, ‘Japan’s Grand Strategy: The Abe Era and Its Aftermath’, p. 134.

64 Samuels, Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community, p. 133.

65 Ward, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and China’, p. 35.

66 See Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation’, 27 April 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf; and Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘The Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation’, 23 September 1997.

67 Brad Glosserman, ‘NSC Change Prepares Japan for New Global Realities’, Japan Times, 1 April 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/04/01/commentary/japan-commentary/nsc-change-prepares-japan-new-global-realities/.

68 ‘Kokusai Kikan Jinji, Chūgoku Shudō wo Yokusei, Naikaku ga Senryaku Ritsuan’ [Cabinet Formulates Strategy for Heading Off Chinese Leadership in International Institutions], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 15 June 2020, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO60345600V10C20A6SHA000/; and ‘Kokusai Kikan no Nihonjin Ni Wari Zō, Chūgoku Ishiki, Kokuren Kikan Toppu wa Zero’ [Japanese Staff at International Institutions Up 20%, with China in Mind, Japan Has No Representation at the Top of United Nations Agencies], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 28 May 2021, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA25DMT0V20C21A5000000/.

69 Japan, Ministry of Finance, ‘Rules and Regulations of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act’, 24 April 2020, p. 12, https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/international_policy/fdi/kanrenshiryou01_20200424.pdf.

70 ‘Japan Restricts Land Deals Near Strategic Assets’, Nikkei Asia, 16 June 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-restricts-land-deals-near-strategic-assets.

71 ‘Japan to Restrict Use of Foreign Tech in Telecom, Power Grids’, Nikkei Asia, 18 May 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Japan-to-restrict-use-of-foreign-tech-in-telecom-power-grids.

72 ‘Japan to Limit Foreign Students’ Access to Security-linked Tech’, Nikkei Asia, 26 October 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-to-limit-foreign-students-access-to-security-linked-tech.

73 ‘Chūgoku Haiteku de Sonzaikan, Shiea Shūi 12 Hinmoku, Nihon Nuku’ [Chinese High-tech Makes Its Presence Felt, Has Leading Share in 12 Product Areas, Overtakes Japan], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 12 August 2020, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO62552800S0A810C2MM8000/.

74 Japan, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, ‘Cabinet Decision on the Bill for the Act on Promotion of Developing/Supplying and Introducing Systems Making Use of Specified Advanced Information Communication Technologies’, 18 February 2020, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2020/0218_001.html.

75 Government of Japan, ‘Science, Technology, and Innovation Basic Plan’, 26 March 2021, p. 52, https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/sti_basic_plan.pdf.

76 Koshino, ‘Is Japan Ready for Civil–Military “Integration”?’.

77 ‘Japan to Set Up Advanced-tech Fund with Eye on Economic Security’, Nikkei Asia, 17 October 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Japan-to-set-up-advanced-tech-fund-with-eye-on-economic-security.

78 Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the North Atlantic Council, ‘Japan and NATO: Toward Further Collaboration’, 12 January 2007, https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070112b.html.

79 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)’, 27 August 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.

80 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘“Confluence of the Two Seas”, Speech by H.E. Mr Shinzo, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India’.

81 Speech by Kanehara Nobukatsu, Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary and Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Secretariat, The Prime Minister’s Office, to the Naval War College, US Navy, ‘Towards the Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, 26 November 2018. Quoted with the author’s permission.

82 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘“The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy”, Address by H.E. Mr Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan’, 18 January 2013, https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/abe_0118e.html.

83 For example, Kosaka Masataka, Kaiyō Kokka Nihon no Kōsō [Japan’s Vision as Maritime Power] (Tokyo: Chūokōron-Shinsha, 2008), pp. 239–50; and Kosaka, ‘Options for Japan’s Foreign Policy’, p. 2.

84 ‘Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision at the Crossroads: Will It Endure After Abe?’, Strategic Survey 2020: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2020), pp. 130–8, especially p. 131.

85 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, 1 April 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/page25e_000278.html.

86 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan’s Security Policy’, 6 April 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000079.html.

87 See Kanehara, Anzenhoshō Senryaku [Security Strategy], p. 258. See also John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), pp. 258–62 for a discussion of Kennan’s article.

88 See Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)’.

89 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The 13th East Asia Summit’, 15 November 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page4e_000945.html.

90 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Extraordinary Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Kono’, 14 April 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000629.html.

91 ‘Japan Says Won’t Decide on AIIB Until Corruption Addressed’, Reuters, 7 June 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-g7-summit-japan-aibb/japan-says-wont-decide-on-aiib-until-corruption-addressed-idUKKBN0ON12P20150607.

92 Katada, Japan’s New Regional Reality: Geoeconomic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, p. 112.

93 Interview with Dr Funabashi Yoichi, Chairman, Asia Pacific Initiative, July 2021.

94 The name of the unit was changed in July 2017 to TPP Nado Sōgō Taisaku Honbu after Japan and the EU had reached an agreement in principle on the Economic Partnership Agreement, which took effect in February 2019.

95 UK, Department of International Trade, ‘Japan Will “Spare No Effort to Support the UK” in Joining the CPTPP’, 31 July 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/japan-will-spare-no-effort-to-support-the-uk-in-joining-the-cptpp.

96 ‘China Applies to Join Pacific Trade Pact to Boost Economic Clout’, Reuters, 17 September 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-officially-applies-join-cptpp-trade-pact-2021-09-16/.

97 Masaya Kato and Kosuke Takeuchi, ‘With Eye on China, Japan Refuses to Ease TPP Rules for New Members’, Nikkei Asia, 18 December 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/With-eye-on-China-Japan-refuses-to-ease-TPP-rules-for-new-members.

98 The strategic importance of submarine cables is also evident in the one project so far financed under the Trilateral Partnership between Australia, Japan and the US: an undersea fibre-optic cable connecting the Pacific Island of Palau to the 15,000-kilometrelong Bifrost Cable, which will, when completed in 2024, run between Singapore and the US. Palau is important for US security because of its location in the ‘second island chain’ defence line; Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Speech by Prime Minister Abe at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting: Toward a New Era of “Hope-Driven Economy”’, 23 January 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ecm/ec/page4e_000973.html; and interview with a senior Japanese government figure on 28 July 2021, quoted on condition of anonymity.

99 Interview of a senior figure in the Japanese government, 28 July 2021. Quoted under condition of anonymity.

100 Japan, Ministry of Finance, ‘G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment’, https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/international_policy/convention/g20/annex6_1.pdf.

101 ‘Full Text: Keynote Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping at APEC CEO Dialogues’, Xinhua, 19 November 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-11/19/c_139527192.htm.

102 EU, ‘The Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between the European Union and Japan’, 27 September 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/68018/partnership-sustainable-connectivity-and-quality-infrastructure-between-european-union-and_en; and US, Department of State, ‘Blue Dot Network’, https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/.

103 For a useful definition of China’s ‘cyber sovereignty’, see Nigel Inkster, The Great Decoupling: China, America and the Struggle for Technological Supremacy (London: Hurst & Company, 2020), pp. 155–6.

104 Toru Tsunashima, ‘China Rises as the World’s Data Superpower as Internet Fractures’, Nikkei Asia, 24 November 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Century-of-Data/China-rises-as-world-s-data-superpower-as-internet-fractures.

105 For a detailed discussion on India’s aspirations for ‘self-reliance in digital technologies’, see Neha Mishra, ‘India: Leading or Thwarting Data Governance and Digital Trade?’, Hinrich Foundation, 10 August 2021, https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/article/digital/india-leading-or-thwarting-data-governance-and-digital-trade/; see also WTO, ‘Osaka Declaration on Digital Economy’, June 2019, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/osaka_declration_on_digital_economy_e.pdf.

106 ‘Material Advantage: FOIP and U.S. Alliances in Asia’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 20 September 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/material-advantage-foip-and-us-alliances-asia.

107 Abe Shinzo, ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’, Project Syndicate, 27 December 2012, https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe.

108 US, White House, ‘Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The Spirit of the Quad”’, 12 March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/.