Continuities and Ruptures: Tracking the US Interests in the Black Sea Area in the Context of the ‘Pivot to Asia’

Abstract

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USA has become one of the main actors on the Black Sea stage. Whereas energy has been the key driver of Washington's involvement in the region since the end of the 1990s, the US agenda has broadened to include security issues and democratization after the 9/11 attacks. Today, in the context of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the ‘pivot to Asia’, the US influence in the Black Sea is retrenching. However, despite a seeming waning interest, Washington's involvement in the region is likely to remain driven by energy security considerations as well as by the deployment of NATO's Ballistic Missile Defense.

Notes

^[1] Bruce Lawlor, ‘The Black Sea: center of the nuclear black market’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 67(6), 2011, p. 73.

^[2] Eleven countries established BSEC in Istanbul in June 1992. Today, it numbers 12 member states, including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.

^[3] Quoted by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, ‘The “security paradoxes” of the Black Sea region’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 9(3), 2009, p. 237.

^[4] Charles King, ‘Is the Black Sea a region?’, in Oleksandr Pavliuk and Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (eds), The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building, East West Institute, Armonk, NY, 2004, p. 16.

^[5] Baptiste Chatré and Stéphane Delory, ‘The Black Sea area within the international system: the struggle for influence between the United States and Russia’, in Ivan Ruxandra (ed.), New Regionalism or No Regionalism? Emerging Regionalism in the Black Sea Area, Ashgate, Burlington, VT, 2012, p. 52.

^[6] Zeyno Baran and Robert A. Smith, ‘The energy dimension in American policy towards the Black Sea region’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 7(2), 2007, p. 266.

^[7] Ariel Cohen and Conway Irwin, ‘US strategy in the Black Sea region’, Backgrounder, 1990, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, 13 December 2006, p. 3.

^[8] Stéphane Delory and Tetyana Boburka, ‘Les enjeux énergétiques en mer Noire. Paradoxes et ambiguïté des politiques des différents acteurs’, in Baptiste Chatre and Stéphane Delory (eds), Conflits et sécurité dans l'espace de la mer Noire: l'Union européenne, les riverains et les autres, Editions Panthéon Assas, Paris, 2009, pp. 195–196.

^[9] Iris Kempe and Kurt Klotzle, ‘The Balkans and the Black Sea region: problems, potentials, and policy options’, C·A·P Policy Analysis, 2, Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, Gütersloh, 2006, p. 9.

^[10] Mustafa Aydin, ‘Contending agendas for the Black Sea region. A regional alternative’, Democratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 20(1), 2012, p. 48.

^[11] Jim Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 13 July 2012, pp. 10–11.

^[12] See NATO–Georgia relations on NATO website: < http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[13] Fiona Hill, ‘A not-so-grand strategy: U.S. policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia since 1991’, Politique étrangère, 1/2001, February 2001.

^[14] Ross Wilson, ‘US policy in the Black Sea region’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 5(2), 2006, pp. 20–21.

^[15] Mitat Celikpala, ‘Escalating rivalries and diverging interests: prospects for stability and security in the Black Sea region’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 10(3), 2010, p. 292.

^[16] Mitat Çelikpala, ‘Security in the Black Sea region’, Policy Report II, Commission on the Black Sea, Gütersloh, 2010, p. 16.

^[17] Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava, ‘The April 2010 Russo-Ukrainian gas agreement and its implications for Europe’, NG 42, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, June 2010, p. 12.

^[18] In 2007, while he was Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovych already stated that Ukraine was not yet ready to consider possible NATO membership. See NATO website: < http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-841CFFBE-119EBD6D/natolive/topics_37750.htm> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[19] See White House website: < http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/readout-presidents-call-with-president-elect-yanukovych-ukraine> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[20] See Hillary Clinton's speech at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute: < http://m.state.gov/md143941.htm> (accessed 17 February 2014).

^[21] Steven Woehrel, ‘Ukraine: current issues and US policy’, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 24 May 2013, p. 3.

^[22] Olena Tregub, ‘Passion has disappeared in US–Ukraine relationship’, Kyiv Post, 6 December 2012, < https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/passion-has-disappeared-in-us-ukraine-relationship-317270.html> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[23] Among the irregularities, the OSCE noticed the use of state resources for campaign purposes, the lack of balance in media coverage and troubles in vote counting. See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Georgia, Parliamentary Elections, 21 May 2008, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission: Final Report, Vienna, 9 September 2008.

^[24] Lincoln A. Mitchell, ‘More than location: crafting a US policy for the Black Sea region’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 8(2), 2008, p. 136.

^[25] Nichol, op. cit., p. 2.

^[26] Ibid., p. 11.

^[27] Ibid., p. 16.

^[28] ‘No NATO membership for Georgia, Ukraine in 2014’, Ria Novosti, 22 October 2013, < http://en.ria.ru/world/20131022/184292221.html> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[29] ‘NATO Military Committee acknowledges Georgia's progress in defence reforms’, NATO website, 11 February 2014, < http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-FFE7810A-AFBA4F88/natolive/news_107032.htm?selectedLocale = en> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[30] ‘Грузия продолжит курс на интеграцию в ЕС и НАТО’ [Georgia pursues its way to EU and NATO integration], Black Sea News, 17 January 2014, < http://www.blackseanews.net/read/75565> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[31] Oksana Antonenko, ‘Towards a comprehensive regional security framework in the Black Sea region after the Russia–Georgia war’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 9(3), 2009, p. 267.

^[32] Özgür Özdamar, ‘Security and military balance in the Black Sea region’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 10(3), 2010, p. 354.

^[33] F. Stephen Larrabee, ‘The United States and security in the Black Sea region’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 9(3), 2009, p. 311.

^[34] Antonenko, op. cit., p. 265.

^[35] ‘Secretary Kerry: June 2013 remarks with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister before their meeting’, 3 June 2013. See on Secretary of State website: < http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/06/210214.htm> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[36] ‘Ukraine postpones agreement with ExxonMobil to February’, Natural Gas Europe, 27 January 2014, < http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/ukraine-agreement-exxonmobil-delays-february> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[37] ‘Украина и Азербайджан могут наладить поставки сжиженного газа через Грузию’ [Ukraine and Azerbaijan could provide supplies of liquefied natural gas via Georgia], Black Sea News, 15 November 2013, < http://www.blackseanews.net/read/73042> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[38] Neil Buckley, ‘Ukraine's shale gas lures Western companies’, Financial Times, 14 November 2013, < http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/abe8802a-4d0c-11e3-9f40-00144feabdc0.html> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[39] The ‘Varyags to the Greeks’ route was a trade route that connected the Baltic region to the Byzantine Empire through the Kievan Rus’ lands and the Black Sea between the early 9th century and the 11th century.

^[40] Özdamar, op. cit., p. 356.

^[41] Woehrel, op. cit., p. 11.

^[42] Jim Nichol, ‘Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: political developments and implications for U.S. interests’, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 24 January 2013, pp. 36–37.

^[43] ‘Госдеп США: Грузия должна наладить отношения с Абхазией и Цхинвали’ [US Department of State: Georgia must establish relations with Abkhazia and Tskinvali], News Day.az, 7 December 2013, < http://news.day.az/georgia/450415.html> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[44] ‘US starts building anti-missile shield in Romania’, Voice of Russia, 28 October 2013, < http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_10_28/NATO-building-anti-missile-shield-in-Romania-2686/> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[45] Mustafa Kibaroğlu, ‘Turkey's place in the “Missile Shield”’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 15(2), 2013, pp. 223–236.

^[46] ‘US to use Romanian air base for Afghan pullout’, BBC News, 18 October 2013, < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24590082> (accessed 12 February 2014).

^[47] Beniamin Poghosyan, ‘US–Turkish relations in the Obama era’, The RUSI Journal, 158(1), 2013, p. 40.

^[48] Tarık Oğuzlu, ‘Testing the strength of the Turkish–American strategic relationship through NATO: convergence or divergence within the Alliance?’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 15(2), 2013, pp. 207–222.

^[49]The Economist, ‘Back to basics’, 16 November 2013, p. 55.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Sergei Konoplyov

Sergei Konoplyov is Director of the Black Sea Regional Security Program and of the US–Russia Security Program at Harvard University. A former officer of the Soviet Armed Forces, he served in several military missions in Africa, Latin America and Central Asia. A graduate of the Moscow Military Institute, he also holds a degree from Kyrgyz University in Journalism and a Master's degree in Public Administration from the Kennedy School of Government. He received his PhD at the Kiev Institute for International Relations.

Igor Delanoë

Igor Delanoë holds a PhD in Modern and Contemporary History from the University of Nice Sophia Antipolis in Nice (France). His research interests include Russian defence and security issues, Russian interests in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, and the geopolitics of Russia and post-Soviet space. During his postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard University (JFK School of Government and Ukrainian Research Institute), he expanded his field of study to include US interests and security issues in the wider Black Sea area.