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Abstract
The most recent global wave of democratic reversal is marked by executive takeovers. Politically motivated interventions in domestic markets aimed at restructuring the underlying power dynamics in society have been part and parcel of these takeovers. This article investigates the new political economy behind the AKP’s competitive authoritarian rule in Turkey as an example of this larger trend. The article argues that the AKP government has built a loyal business class through an elaborate system of rewards and punishment since 2002. With the aim of consolidating its business constituency, the AKP politicized state institutions (debt collection, tax authorities, privatization, public procurement) and eroded the rule of law to distribute rents and resources to its supporters, transfer capital from its opponents to its supporters, and to discipline dissidents in business circles. These mechanisms allowed the party to skew the political playing field in its favour through its access to private resources as well as its disproportionate access to the media—built by pro-AKP businessmen—and thus underpinned the AKP’s competitive authoritarian regime.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks are due to Mesut Kılıç for his valuable research assistance. We would also like to thank Karabekir Akkoyunlu, Nancy Bermeo, Tim Dorlach, Samuel Greene, Nora Fisher Onar, Kerem Öktem, Ziya Öniş, Osman Savaşkan, Feryaz Ocaklı, Kıvanç Özvardar, Andreas Schedler, and participants at the interdisciplinary workshop on the ‘Political Economy of Contemporary Turkey’ (30‒31 July 2015), the inaugural symposium ‘Consortium of European Symposia on Turkey’ (1‒3 October 2015) and the ‘Rise of Competitive Electoral Authoritarian Regimes’ panel at APSA 2015. We are grateful to three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.
Notes
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125. Özbudun, op. cit. p. 52; also <http://m.karsigazete.com.tr/politika/akpli-bakandan-itiraf-gibi-sozler-h83076.html> (accessed 26 June 2016).
126. M. Yetkin, ‘Muhalefet Hapis, Şirketler Kayyum Tehdidi Altında Olursa’, Hurriyet, 16 June 2016.
127. Some trustees allegedly hold more than 50 companies in their portfolio, earning them thousands of US dollars per month <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/iflas-ertelemeler-icin-cok-onemli-gibi-duzenlemeler-geliyor-40122916> (accessed 22 June 2016).
128. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/turkey-unemployed-youth-demand-trustee-post.html#ixzz4CUUIlGwM> (accessed 20 June 2016).
129. Ibid.
130. <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/zaman-gazetesine-kayyum-atandi-1522464/> and <http://www.dw.com/en/turkish-police-raid-zaman-opposition-newspaper-using-tear-gas-water-cannon/a-19095747> (accessed 10 June 2016).
131. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/kayyum-atanan-zaman-ve-cihan-gundem-2239981/> (accessed 10 June 2016).
132. <http://www.dunya.com/sirketler/boydaktan-sonra-naksan-holding-de-ayrildi-haberi-297604> (accessed 28 October 2015).
135. For Erdoğan’s statement of 22 September 2016 see <http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-ohal-ile-normal-zamanlarda-yapamayacagimiz-seyleri-yapabilme-gucune-sahip-olduk,361194>.
138. G. Jenkins, ‘AKP strengthens its hold on the Turkish media’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 5, 15 May 2008.
139. Radikal, 23 April 2008; S. Yılmaz, ‘Çalık’ın Kullandığı Kredinin Koşulları’ [The conditions of the credit given to Çalık Holding], Milliyet, 2008, 23 July 2008.
140. These recordings revealed that Erdoğan asked the Limak‒Kolin partnership to buy the Sabah-ATV media group in exchange for a contract to build Istanbul’s multibillion-dollar third airport. Ethem Sancak, a Turkish businessman with close ties to Erdoğan, bought three media outlets previously owned by the Çukurova Group from TMSF. Soon after this sale, Sancak bought BMC motors from the TMSF at a significantly lowered price without an open tender. For details see Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Power and Media in Turkey, Freedom House Report, 2014, available at <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Report%20-%202-3-14.pdf>.
141. Fatih Vural’s interview with Ethem Sancak, Türkiye Gazetesi, 12 February 2013.
142. For an informative report on Turkey’s level of transparency in campaign finance, see <http://www.seffaflik.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/siyasetin-finansmanı-rapor_Ocak-2016.pdf> (accessed 24 January 2017).
143. <http://www.osce.org/odihr/122553?download=true> (accessed 12 January 2016).
146. <http://www.medya56.com/demirtas-isadamlarina-basbakanin-kampanyasina-zorla-bagis-yaptiriliyor.html>.
147. SDP başkanı Ayhan Ogan Ogün habere konuştu [SDP Chairman talks to Ogun News] <http://www.ogunhaber.com/haber/sdp-baskani-ayhan-ogan-ogunhabere-konustu-haberi-237313h.html> (accessed 10 June 2015).
148. For a propagandist piece on the AKP’s foreign policy in Africa and Albayrak’s humanitarian investments written by a Yeni Şafak columnist, see <http://t24.com.tr/haber/ali-bayramoglu-patronunu-yazdi-somalide-elcilik-ve-hastane-insaati-ile-liman-isletmesini-albayraklar-yapiyor,285250> (accessed 28 June 2015).
149. <http://www.cengizholding.com.tr/tr-tr/Sosyal-Sorumluluk/Egitim/Sayfalar/Marmara-Ilahiyat-Fakultesi.aspx> (accessed 10 June 2016).
150. <http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/cengiz-den-valilige-maden-bagisi-83803.html> (accessed 10 June 2016).
151. The bitter conflict with the Gülen movement has disrupted the AKP’s clientelist networks. While the recent takeovers provide the AKP with even more assets to distribute to its supporters, the sudden shifts may diminish the Islamist economic base. For instance, the government even turned against the few Islamist industrial firms such as the Ipek and Boydak conglomerates that had amassed sufficient capital to compete with Istanbul-based economic powerhouses. Even before the coup attempt, the Turkish private sector—with the exception of the energy and construction sectors—was still dominated by old secular firms located in Istanbul and its vicinity.
152. For an analysis of the coup night, see B. Esen and S. Gumuscu, ‘Turkey: how the coup failed’, Journal of Democracy, 28(1), 2017, pp. 59–73.
153. A. Güven, ‘Rethinking development space in emerging countries: Turkey’s conservative countermovement’, Development and Change, 47(5), 2016, p. 1012.
154. Ibid.
155. The AKP’s social policy regime will be critical in determining the party’s support among the popular classes in the face of increasing economic hardships. For an analysis of the party’s social policy regime see A. Buğra, ‘Social policy and different dimensions of inequality in Turkey: a historical overview’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1385283.
156. Plattner, op. cit.; Levitsky and Way, ‘The myth of democratic recession’, op. cit.; Diamond, op. cit.