Democracy, Philosophy, and the Selection of Capabilities

Abstract

A key task within the capability approach is the selection of relevant capabilities. The question of how to select capabilities has divided capability theorists into two camps: those who argue that it is a philosophical task and those who argue that it is a matter for the public. In this paper, I argue that this distinction between philosophy and democracy is counterproductive to the operationalization of the capability approach. On the one hand, proponents of the philosophical position overestimate the need for philosophical theorizing when selecting capabilities. On the other hand, proponents of the democratic positions can benefit from addressing issues raised by philosophers. I conclude that rather than making the philosophical position more democratically sensitive, we should search out ways in which philosophy can reinforce democratic processes in general and in relation to the selection of capabilities in particular.

Keywords:

• Capability approach
• Democracy
• Philosophy
• Theory of justice
• Amartya Sen
• Rutger Claassen

Acknowledgements

I am especially grateful to Ingrid Robeyns and Rutger Claassen as well as the two anonymous reviewers and the study group at Utrecht University for their extensive comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

About the Author

Morten Fibieger Byskov is a PhD student in practical philosophy at the Ethics Institute of Utrecht University, The Netherlands. His research focuses on the capability approach and how we can select capabilities for human development.

Notes

1. Several democratic and philosophical methods for the selection of capabilities have been proposed within the literature. We may arrive at a list of capabilities through an ad hoc selection, deductive reasoning, an overlapping consensus, dialectically necessary judgments, human rights theory, statistical analysis, narratives, participatory programs, deliberative democracy, and critical theory. I do not engage with these proposals for two reasons. First, all of these proposed methods are subject to some version of the objections made toward either the philosophical or democratic position as presented in Claassen's paper and mine. Second, engaging with all (or merely some) of these proposals would require a separate paper.

2. For a discussion of the value of freedom within the capability approach, see Carter (1996, 2014), Olsaretti (2005), Pettit (2001, 2009), Prendergast (2005), Robeyns (2011), and Vallentyne (2005).

3. The distinction between the philosophy and democracy is not contained to the capability approach. For a broader discussion of the distinction within normative political philosophy, see especially de-Shalit (2004) and Walzer (1981, 1985).

4. See Robeyns (2005a, 2011) for a similar distinction between the more general application of the capability approach and the narrower application(s) of the capability approach to, for example, theories of justice.

5. See also Srinivasan (2007) for a similar view.

6. See de-Shalit (2004, 811) for a criticism of Walzer's (1981) view. As de-Shalit further notes, Walzer has later changed his views on this relationship.

7. See also Sangiovanni (2007) who distinguishes between the descriptive, the interpretative, and the critical tasks of philosophy. For a discussion on the tasks of philosophy, see also Taylor (1985) and Walzer (1985).

8. For a general discussion of outcome-oriented versus procedural conceptions of justice, see especially Rawls (1999) and Nozick (1974).

9. Several capability scholars have argued that we should prefer a deliberative democratic theory to supplement the capability approach, for example, Anderson (2003) and Crocker (2008). For a larger discussion of the virtues of deliberative democracy, see Bohman and Rehg (1997), Dryzek (2000), and Elster (1998).

10. Consider, for example, as Argenton and Rossi (2013, 137) do, a religious person who believes that questioning her own beliefs would condemn her to Dante's Seventh Circle of Hell reserved for blasphemers.