Contesting the hegemony of democracy promotion: towards the demos

Abstract

Since the end of the cold war, democracy promotion has provided moral legitimacy to the foreign interventions of Western states. Thus, it has constituted a central element of the hegemonic strategy of the US state and the Western transnational capitalist class. However, in this article, I suggest that democracy promotion itself faces a profound crisis of legitimacy. In this article, I challenge the currently hegemonic definition of democracy as ‘polyarchy’ and critique the foundational justifications for democracy promotion and claims about its successes. I then describe the factors combining to generate democracy promotion’s current legitimacy crisis. I conclude that, linked as it is to American state power and neoliberal globalization, the future for Western democracy promotion remains deeply uncertain. I also argue that it befalls critical scholars to challenge hegemonic definitions and practices of democracy and democracy promotion.

Keywords:

• democracy
• democracy promotion
• globalization
• hegemony
• neoliberalism

Notes

^1. In particular, through multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements.

^2. Through, for example, the (post-)Washington Consensus conditionalities attached to bilateral and multilateral loans and grants.

^3. On the transnational constitution of force, see Chomsky (1992), Blum (1995), Robinson (1996) and Barkawi and Laffey (1999).

^4. Indeed, a broadening of this analysis to incorporate Europe’s democracy promotion apparatus would incorporate no counter-hegemonic actors with the exception of Germany’s tiny and marginal Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. It would include more centrist organizations such as Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy. However, the focus is on United States here because of its organizations’ continued dominant position in the industry.

^5. Through, for example, the Department’s US Africa Command. See http://www.africom.mil/AfricomFAQs.asp.

^6. See, for example, ‘Corporate Members’ at http://www.cfr.org/about/annual_report/.; See http://carnegieendowment.org/about/index.cfm?fa=funding.; See http://carnegieendowment.org/about/index.cfm?fa=trustees.

^7. For evidence of unprincipled democracy promotion in the post-communist world, see Wedel (2001), Mendelson and Glenn (2002), Youngs (2006), Gahramanova (2009). For evidence from the Arab world, see Carothers (2004), Schmid and Braizat (2006), Olsen (1998), Ottaway 2008, Kausch (2008), Choucair Vizoso (2008), Echagüe (2008). For evidence from Asia, see Carothers (2004), Youngs (2008), Nordhold (2004). For evidence from Latin America, see Robinson (1996), Carothers (2004), Clement (2005). For evidence from Africa, see Olsen (1998), Chafer (2002), Crawford (2005), Khakee (2007), Carothers (2004), Youngs (2008).

^8. See the case studies in Youngs (2008).

^19. See, for example, Brown et al. (1996), Owen (1994), Halperin et al. (2005).

^10. George W Bush’s speech to mark Human Rights Day 2008 (http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/December/20081210155356eaifas0.9769709.html).

^11. See, for example, Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Leftwich (1995), Evans (1995) and Woo-Cumings (1999).

^12. For more on the effects of the American invasion of Iraq on democracy promotion, see Diamond (2005), Traub (2008) and Carothers (2008).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Joel Lazarus

Joel Lazarus currently has no institutional affiliation. He completed his DPhil at St Anthony’s College, Oxford, in October 2011. Since then, he has worked as a lecturer at the Universities of Oxford, Reading and SOAS. He is co-founder of People’s Political Economy (www.ppeuk.org) – a community education project based in Oxford that aims to bring people together to learn about and respond to the current crisis.