Responsibilization in contemporary Swedish crisis management: expanding ‘bare life’ biopolitics through exceptionalism and neoliberal governmentality

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to investigate the changing relations between individuals and public authorities within the Swedish crisis management system from 1995 to 2017. After the end of the Cold War, Sweden adopted a broader understanding of security that utilizes alternative governance strategies beyond sovereign means and focuses upon domestic security and the protection of vital systems. This has resulted in the emergence of collaborative arrangements involving public and private actors and as well as the extensive responsibilization of individuals. The latter has taken place since emergency and exceptionalism persist as vital concepts also in domestic security management. The present discussion argues that these two concepts restrict possibilities for democratizing security management and provides the means for harnessing the inclusion of volunteers while not granting them due voice in collaborative governance arrangements. However, responsibilization strategies include ‘activation’ which in turn may invoke critical agency and reflection as well as enable resistance toward the current apolitical notion of crisis management.

KEYWORDS:

• Crisis management
• exceptionalism
• responsibilization
• governmentality
• biopolitics
• fear

Introduction

Policy makers have come to recognize the increased interdependence between vital societal systems and the vulnerability of modern life during a period characterized by neoliberal trends, fragmented societies, extensive outsourcing, and contractual support from private actors. In the effort to control and protect these systems, the neoliberal state has found new ways for governing beyond sovereign means and created new forms of collaboration with private actors (Collier and Lakoff 2015, 21; Larsson 2015a). There is, thus, a broad consensus today that contemporary crisis management requires collaborative efforts across organizational and jurisdictional boundaries (’t Hart and Sundelius 2013, 445; Larsson 2017, 312).

In addition, neoliberal governance has implemented strategies that encourage individuals to take responsibility for their own security to enhance societal security and resolve crisis situations (Rådestad 2017; Collier and Lakoff 2008; Dillon 2007). Both public–private collaboration and responsibilization divert attention from an examination of how the concepts of emergency and exceptionalism continue to underlie the rationality of security. Our position is that exceptionalism continues to play a decisive role in this regard in spite of the view that bureaucratization, routinization, manualization, and the influence of crisis and risk management upon domestic security would seem to have removed exceptionalism from the equation (Buzan, Waever, and Jaap 1998, 27; Aradua and Rens 2009). Briefly stated, exceptionalism coupled with neoliberal governmentality provides the grounds for modern biopolitical governance, which help us understand why crisis management remains out of bounds for democratic procedures, meaningful individual participation and opposition.

Our discussion resides upon a study of the changes that have taken place in Sweden since 1995 in the crisis management system. While it may not be possible, strictly speaking, to generalize our results on the empirical level because of our focus on this particular issue, our theoretical and critical arguments together with our findings provide insights beyond the given object of study. The political reorganization of emergency preparedness and security that began in the 1990s has brought about a substantial change from a military outlook at the national level to a decentralized and networked form of domestic security management. In this respect, Sweden comprises an excellent example for exploring the dynamics and limitations of increased individual participation in the political field of security.

Our aim is to answer the following two research questions upon the basis of the theoretical background indicated above, the case study we conducted, and our normative concern to problematize the current practices:

1. How has the role of individuals changed within the Swedish crisis management system between 1995 and 2017?

2. Is it possible to breach the continuation of exceptionalism and the anti-politics of security via imminent resistance and critical agency?

The first question, which is empirical in nature, is addressed through a longitudinal case study of the development of the Swedish crisis management system in Sweden that explicitly focuses on how the roles of individuals are portrayed. The second question, which has a normative foundation and is theoretical in character, provides the basis for a significant critique of the continued presence of exceptionalism in domestic security management and to the possibility that activation strategies also may induce critical agency.

The article is structured as follows. The immediately following section presents in greater detail the normative and theoretical underpinnings of the discussion. We first note that the crucial roles still played by uncertainty and fear in shaping domestic security management hinder both democratic reform of the sector as well as meaningful individual participation. We then examine a more normative approach entailing accounts of resistance and critical agency that possesses a potential to question the neoliberal strategy of responsibilization. The next section specifies methodological considerations involving the utilization of a post-structural policy analysis in which ideas and subjectivities play crucial roles. The article then addresses the case study in question, analyzing the development of the Swedish domestic security management system. The analysis finds that, despite extensive calls for collaboration and responsibilization, individual participation is limited to supplementary functions, primarily being regarded as a resource for unburdening the public administration when needed. We discuss these findings in relation to theoretical accounts of resistance and ‘critical agency’. Since resistance and critical agency make the claim that all forms of existences are political, we can deploy these in our problematization of exceptionalism and ‘bare life’ conception still underlying contemporary crisis management.

Exceptionalism, fear, and the democratic paradox

Crises and emergencies are by definition unexpected, exceptional, and often demand prompt resolution outside of existing regulations and legal frameworks. This is perhaps most explicitly captured in Carl Schmitt’s discussion of how liberal constitutionalism has been weakened by the ‘politics’ of exception. Schmitt argues that the declaration of a security incident, which triggers an exception to the accepted rules and procedures, enables us to identify who in fact holds sovereign power. He also states that

The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out what may take place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an extreme emergency and how it is to be eliminated (Schmitt 2005, 7).

Williams maintains that such situations neither result simply from an exercise of the authority to declare a security incident nor as a diversion from normal procedures, but are rather rooted in a sense of fear and danger that legitimizes the implementation of solutions that violate a given political constitution (Williams 2011, 218). It is also significant that exceptionalism often leads to the removal of critical voices, even when this ‘rings liberal alarm bells’ (Johns 2005). For such reasons, scholars have argued that domestic crisis and security management should create a more routine-based approach involving bureaucratic management such that there would be a reduced reliance upon exceptions and states of emergency (Buzan, Waever, and Jaap 1998, 27; Aradua and Rens 2009). The dispersion of power through collaborative governance, and an insistence upon individual responsibility and contributions to the crisis management system, would potentially contradict the logic of hierarchical sovereign power and top-down executive management that has come to characterize political emergencies (Honig 2009, 1). As we shall see in our case study, neoliberal governmentality and responsibilization align perfectly well with a continuation of the exceptionalism that obstructs the democratization of modern crisis management.

To the extent that fear and a sense of danger remain decisive factors in domestic and international security management, the possibility of utilizing exceptionalism and emergency measures, including a temporary suspension of at least particular elements of democratic governance such as transparency, accountability and basic civil and political rights, is likely to persist.

Huysmans points out in this regard that

[O]ne of the key characteristics of the jargon of exception is its suppression of the political renditions of the societal. In doing so, it eliminates one of the constituting categories of modern democratic politics, hence producing an impoverished and ultimately illusory understanding of the political contestation and domination (Huysmans 2008, 165).

He further argues that exceptionalism ‘erases the societal as a realm of multi-faceted, historically structured political mediations and mobilizations’ because of the specific way in which it frames political problems and solutions (Huysmans 2008, 180), thereby comprising a moment in which executive powers enjoy supremacy over democratic institutions and principles. This conflict between the rule of law and arbitrary executive government generates a logic that continues to play a pivotal role in domestic security politics (Dillon 2007; Bjorneskov and Voigt 2017).

Foucault demonstrated that extensive caring for the population viewed as a (biological) resource of the state exists even in the most advanced liberal societies with lengthy catalogs of explicit rights (Foucault 2008). It is significant, however, that the concept of biopower or biopolitics does not contradict the exercise of sovereign power, but rather complements it. Moreover, biopolitics cancels out the political dimensions of societal existence in that it is concerned with the basic survival of human beings. This point is illustrated by Agamben, who proposes the ‘bare life’ terminology that addresses the individual as a ‘living animal (only) with the additional capacity for political existence’ (Agamben 1998, 7).

But while the democratic and political aspects of public life may be temporarily suspended in exceptional circumstances, Honig makes the case that the basic resources of democratic citizenship, including the language of rights, the rule of law, and faith in progress, do not necessarily provide the tools needed to question the forms of submission associated with calls for states of emergency. She nevertheless proclaims that ‘opportunities, invitations and solicitations to democratic orientation, action and renewal’ can in fact be identified ‘even in the context of emergency’ (Honig 2009, xv). The idea of a ‘democratization’ of emergencies and exceptions seems hastily eager to re-establish liberal institutions without taking the insights provided by Schmitt and Huysmans truly serious. Our study reveals the continuation of exceptionalism in contemporary crisis management, which remains biopolitical at its core, limiting individual participation to ‘bare life’ contributions, regardless of its inclusive language concerning the importance of voluntary and collaborative efforts. Even if we are more hesitant toward a democratization of crisis management, we still think it is important to consider how responsibilization acts on individuals and urge them to activate a specific mindset – to critically think in terms of potential threats and crises and how to cope in such situations. Such activation potentially also brings to life various forms of resistance through critical agency. In that sense, we may indeed consider a politicization rather than democratization of exceptions in that resistance and struggles of meaning-making and re-distribution of responsibility comes into play (Jong and Dückers, 2018, 97).

Foucault was eager to point out that the mechanisms and workings of power upon the bodies and minds of those who are subjects to power relations was not fully grasped by the rationalities and hegemonic strategies (Foucault 1990, 97), arguing that:

It is the moving substrate of force relations (the substance upon which power as a living organism feeds – Authors) which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable (Foucault 1990, 93).

Power and freedom are in fact mutually constitutive and naturally limits the claim of legitimate exercise of state power which further moves us away from the normative language of a shift toward democracy (Patton 2010). Still, even if legitimacy of governance is unreachable through this understanding of power, there is still room for resistance:

At the heart of power relations and a permeant condition of their existence, there is an insubordination and a certain essential obstinacy on the part of the principles of freedom, then there is no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible flight (Foucault 1982, 790)

The notion of critical agency is the core subject of such resistance. This subject holds the capacity for self-reflection and the capacity to take distance from what is considered to be domination, conformism, and compliance. ‘Critical agency is possible because the subject can place him/herself outside the objectification produced by “domination” and can imagine alternatives’ (Rebughini 2018, 4).

We will now continue to explore how this normative discussion is pertinent to the changing nature of crisis and security management.

The place of individuals within the emerging political field of domestic security

Early critics of the field of traditional security studies maintained that it resided upon a narrow definition of security that was primarily concerned with national interests, the security of the state, and military capability, but displayed little understanding of the concept and dynamics of security as such (Baldwin 1997, 9). Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde consequently argued that it was necessary to broaden the concept of security to incorporate political, economic, social, and environmental threats. In addition, each of these threats could be analyzed on the three levels of the international system, the state, and the individual, with the latter being viewed as the main referent of security, while the state nevertheless continued to be defined as the principal instrument for attaining security by virtue of its capacity, agency, and power (Buzan, Waever, and Jaap 1998, 21f, 52). Also noteworthy is the fact that combining a broader understanding of security with a nominalist theory of securitization casts light upon the processes in which objects of security are constituted by means of speech-acts and audience acceptance (Guzzini 2011; Balzacq 2010).

While the absence of external military threats after the end of the Cold War motivated many western states to redirect their focus toward domestic security issues, the attacks of 11 September 2001, in the USA, produced a major surge in interest concerning security policy that led to the development of ‘integrated approaches to studying risk, crisis, and emergency management’ (’t Hart and Sundelius 2013, 445). Security is thus increasingly associated with the safeguarding of critical functions in society as well as the security of individuals (Collier and Lakoff 2015), although this more domestically focused understanding of security is also associated with a conflation of security and risk management (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Rens 2008, 148). The resulting increased interdependencies between risk, vital societal systems, and the vulnerability of modern life have given rise to complex collaborative arrangements involving both public and private actors to manage and mitigate domestic crises and security challenges (Collier and Lakoff 2015). A broad consensus has emerged that contemporary crisis management demands collaborative efforts across organizational and jurisdictional boundaries (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010).

Such developments have strongly affected relationships between the state and its citizens. For instance, social constructions regarding how individuals behave in a crisis are now often based upon the assumption that people panic and desperately need the support of public authorities. This has had a great impact upon the formation of crisis management policies, including how information and responsibilities are distributed. One common assumption is that crisis situations are typically accompanied by outbreaks of lawlessness and social chaos due to the irrational behavior of helpless individuals, who almost immediately return to a Hobbesian state of nature (Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski 2006).

In general, security experts tend to believe that individuals are ‘misinformed, badly educated and highly emotional’ (Sjöberg 1999, 5), and this rather paternalistic approach on the part of government agencies and experts obviously shapes the strategies adopted for managing crises and communicating relevant information. Even though most efforts at crisis communication reflect an awareness of the need to provide the public with accurate information, actual communication is typically informed by unfounded presumptions regarding the supposed limited ability of individuals to act and behave in specific ways (Wester 2011, 208). Such foundational disbelief concerning individual abilities and behavior undermines the level of trust between authorities and the public. This is a significant concern insofar as a sense of vulnerability, access to recourse, and public trust in the effectiveness of security systems is of great relevance for a successful response both during and after a crisis (Poortinga and Pidgeon 2005, 208).

However, despite the low level of trust on the part of authorities in the abilities of individuals to either help themselves or contribute to overall crisis management system – or perhaps because of it – neoliberal governmentality strategies of awareness creation and responsibilization have emerged. It is fruitful in this regard to take into consideration, upon the basis of Foucault’s notion of governmentality and the insights provided by governmentality studies, how governance can be conducted by means of autonomy rather than legal regulation and coercion (Foucault 2008). The strategy of responsibilization, or the transfer of responsibility from governments to individuals and other actors, reflects an effort to increase the awareness of individual actors so that they will undertake the preparations needed to avoid unnecessary risks and dangers (Garland 2001).

The supposedly vulnerable public is often viewed as both complacent and a serious threat in post-disaster contexts, and public authorities regard a heightened level of preparedness as a means to increase their own level of social control and locate individuals within a primarily military and hierarchical approach to crisis management. Nevertheless, public reflections reveal a significant potential for self-organization and altruistic behavior (Baker and Ludwig 2016, 1), and experiences from past disasters have showcased the benefits of engaging local communities in disaster risk reduction and response. There is also an increasing emphasis upon pro-active engagement with society by the authorities regarding domestic security management, along with a growing awareness that the key to security programs and social resilience involves the ‘coping capacities of citizens’, that is, their ability to respond and adapt to crises and security threats (Lentzos and Rose 2009; Collier and Lakoff 2008; Chandler 2013, 210).

While such analyses have made important contributions to security studies, we must recognize that neoliberal strategies of responsibilization produce new forms of resistance and ‘counter-conducts’ (Death 2016), and potentially also ‘emancipatory subjectivities’ (Eriksen, Nightingale, and Eakin 2015). Notwithstanding the importance of revealing the neoliberal tendencies in security management, it is also necessary to take into consideration how individuals, once activated and made responsible, can through their critical agency turn such strategies on their heads. Stated otherwise, activated citizens are not necessarily silent recipients of services, but may also become activists and create pockets of resistance and shift the burden of responsibility away from themselves during and after emergency situations. The paradox is that security and crisis management permanently contains a biopolitical concerns for the well-being of the population, whereas the rationality and strategies for its implementation may shift between various overarching governmentalities.

Acknowledging the fact that individuals may possess both important local knowledge and significant capabilities implies that administrative authorities should refrain from assuming full control in emergency events and instead assist individual involvement and action (Enander 2011, 166f; Scott et al. 2015). Research has indicated, however, that people’s willingness to act during crises is not matched by the system’s capacity to utilize it (Fernandez, Barbera, and Johan 2006, 62). Indeed, while ordinary citizens often converge upon disaster sites to be of assistance, which can be easily facilitated through social media platforms (Schmidt et al. 2017, 1), the nature of conventional approaches to emergency planning frequently results in reluctance on the part of authorities to promote volunteer activities. Public authorities typically adopt a command and control approach, based upon ‘clearly defined objectives, a division of labor, a formal structure, and a set of policies and procedures,’ that is not conducive to incorporating individual initiatives (Skar, Sydnes, and Sydnes 2016, 56). Ullberg and Warner thus argue that

Despite a discourse promoting the inclusion of people in planning for preparedness and reducing risk, community members are seldom truly empowered to bear this responsibility, nor are existing local social capital and cultural knowledge always considered legitimate and accepted by authorities (Ullberg and Warner 2016).

Crisis management today usually involves little feedback from local communities, even though people who are affected by a disaster or crisis possess the knowledge and capabilities needed to handle difficult situations (Bondesson 2017, 55–56). There is also great potential in the way individuals acquire experience and are able to evaluate operative aspects of emergency management (Sousa and Gómez 2012). All this serves to indicate that responsibilization and an increased awareness of security can in fact enable individuals to participate during and after emergencies and consequently ‘politicize’ the exception by virtue of their presence, knowledge, and alternative views that comes to live through critical agency. The role of the state in this type of configuration would be to support people’s ability to act both individually and collectively, which demands that individuals be viewed as ends in themselves with the capacity to act and function as agents, not merely as typical security objects. This would support critical agency in a way that could transcend the ‘bare life’ biopolitical elements that now mark states of emergency.

Analyzing policy changes in respect to how subjects are represented

The poststructuralist type of policy analysis that we utilize in the present discussion seeks to deconstruct policy and examine the ideas and presumptions that underlie specific reforms and programs. Ideas matter a great deal in respect to policy insofar as

[I]deas shape how political actors understand and act on problems, providing the objectives served by their strategic behavior. Furthermore, by shaping values and preferences, ideas provide political actors with interpretive frameworks that make them see certain information as more important than other information (Larsson 2015b, 175).

The main purpose of employing this type of policy analysis is to gain an understanding of the contingent and political foundations of policies that do not necessarily rely upon sovereign and juridical instruments of control and punishment, but rather upon discourses, attitudes, and prescriptions (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 108). To examine how relationships between the state and the citizens have been altered in the Swedish case, we focus on the element of subjectivization in policy. Subjectivization, which prescribes certain characteristics and qualities that individuals are held to possess (Schneider and Ingram 1993), may be understood as a process that comprises how subjects are created (Chandler 2013), whereby a ‘conduct of conduct’ is established (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 71). This focus permits us to investigate the beliefs and assumptions that underlie recent shifts in domestic security management, thus making possible a critical reflection upon how ‘policies constantly produce or constitute problems, subjects, objects and places in specific contexts’ (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 108).

It is important to note that the present study is intended to reveal how governing agencies wish to see individuals, and how such ideal images provide the basis of their strategies for governing and resolving problems. Stated otherwise, this study seeks to explore the specific ways in which individuals are portrayed in core policy documents. The basic and underlying tenant is that the subjectivizations of individuals shape the ways in which individuals are approached and managed within domestic security management.

The empirical analysis traces the development of the crisis and security management system in Sweden between 1995 and 2017. The main sources we utilize are Swedish Government official reports; government bills, laws, and propositions; and official documents from various responsible governmental agencies, primarily the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), established in 2009. The aims of the MSB are to oversee domestic crisis and security management and prioritize the provisioning of comprehensive support before, during, and after incidents. Since the MSB has weak operational capabilities, it focuses upon coordinating other actors and evaluating operations (Larsson 2015a, 117).

The documents examined include annual reports, responses to government bills, and independent studies conducted by the MSB and other agencies. We also conducted 10 semi-structured interviews that complement the qualitative text analysis. Our respondents, who present influential and expert views in the documents indicated, were selected in light of their experience working with relevant policy issues at the MSB.

The Swedish case: changes overtime in responsibilities

A broadening of the concept of security within the Swedish context that took place during the 1990s eventually diminished the role of the state as a security provider. The 1995 public report A More Secure Society argued that since the likelihood of military threats toward Sweden had substantially diminished, it should be possible to adopt a view of security more comprehensive than a military outlook, with a heightened focus on domestic security and peacetime social crises (SOU 1995:19, 17–21). The subsequent government bill, Total Defense in Renewal, further encouraged a broader approach to security, implying that non-military threats should receive a more prominent position within total defense planning. The need to involve both civil public authorities and private actors during crises situations was also emphasized (Prop 1995/96:11, 11–12).

This new focus on domestic security and non-military threats led to a substantial reorganization within the public administration, with one of the main new orientations being to provide coordination in the now dispersed field of security where many vital systems stood in need of protection. The plethora of emergency provisions, laws, and regulations that previously governed the functioning of the Swedish state apparatus during a state of heightened military preparedness was now replaced with three organizational principles for coping with domestic crisis:

1. The principle of responsibility – whoever is responsible for operations under normal conditions should have equivalent responsibility during crisis situations.

2. The principle of similarity – the organization of any function in crisis situations should remain as similar as possible to its normal status.

3. The principle of subsidiarity – crisis and security challenges should be managed at the lowest possible level.

The new organizational structure that these principles made possible was intended to adapt the Swedish context to new types of threats to security and redirect attention away from total defense planning to managing local crisis situations and exceptional circumstances (SOU 2001:41, 15–30).

Security in a New Time (SOU 2001:41) was the first public report that addressed the new relationship between the state and individuals regarding domestic security management, but it put forward no principles for how to define and manage it. The report was in fact rather negative concerning the possibility of collaborative efforts, maintaining that corporations, organizations, and individuals both lacked the knowledge needed to prepare for the long-term consequences of crises, and were apparently unwilling to contribute to a collaborative crisis management system (SOU 2001:41, 74, 77). It consequently emphasized that combatting the decline in trust which individuals had in public authorities in this regard demanded the provision of the necessary information (SOU 2001:41, 55–58). A government bill from the same year, Society’s Safety and Preparedness (Prop 2001/02:158), put forward the idea that the ability of individuals to act can influence the ability of rescue services to respond. A second government bill, Voluntary Defense Activities within Total Defense (Prop 2001/02:159), addressed the importance of individuals in respect to total defense capabilities in terms of citizen engagement (Prop 2001/02:159, 9). These two bills articulated the view that individuals should be primarily responsible for preparations for relatively minor incidents, but they also clearly indicated that the public authorities would need to intervene during security crises and large-scale events as soon as individuals could no longer manage the situation (Crismart 2014, 18).

The 2006 Swedish Defense Committee report A Strategy for the Security of Sweden (Ds 2006:1) argued that a degree of re-centralized control on the national level was necessary to ensure efficient crisis response (Ds 2006:1, 25f). This report in large part addressed recent natural disasters, including the 2004 East Asian tsunami, in which there were many Swedish casualties, and the destructive 2005 Cyclone Gudrun in Sweden. Evaluations of these incidents argued that individuals have a responsibility to take preventive measures and protect their own lives and property. However, the security strategy articulated in the government bill Coordination during Crisis – For a Safer Society (Prop 2005/06:133) focused mainly on societal safety and functions, stating that most such events exceed the limits of individual responsibility because the general public lack the ability and knowledge needed to act without the assistance of the authorities (Prop 2005/06:133, 45).

The government argued that the actual responsibilities of both authorities and individuals needed to be further clarified to avoid continued individual reliance upon public authorities in times of crisis, which could damage trust if the authorities were unable to meet excessive demands (Prop 2007/08:92, 8, 42). Individuals should thus bear primary responsibility for their own safety, and public authorities should assist them only when absolutely necessary (Prop 2007/08:92, 49). This was made explicit in a government bill the following year, Society’s Emergency Preparedness – Strengthened Coordination for Increased Security, which stated that

[I]ndividuals bear the responsibility for their own safety and preparedness in that society may have to prioritize its resources and efforts when severe disturbances occur (SOU 2009/10:124, 8f).

The 2014 Law on Explosives Precursors and Report of Crisis Preparedness Development (Prop 2013/14:144) further expanded the role individuals should play within the crisis management system. Increased individual awareness, preparedness, and the ability to endure in times of crisis were clearly presented as contributing to the resilience and robustness of society as a whole (Prop 2013/14:144, 13) since the responsibility to be prepared not only involves individual self-interest, but also serves the entire population. This bill advanced the notion that while individuals bear primary responsibility for protecting their own lives and property, doing so contributes to societal security and unburdens the crisis management system. Only when individuals could no longer provide for their own security would public authorities have the responsibility to become engaged (Prop 2013/14:144, 30).

This transformation of the political structures and prerequisites concerning crisis management, emergency preparedness, and the role of individuals concerning their responsibility and capacity for ensuring public security took place in a relatively stable geopolitical environment after the end of the Cold War. More recent international and geopolitical events, such as perceived Russian aggression toward Ukraine, have set in motion a return to a militaristic focus in crisis and security management. The latter also reflects the increased level of threat involving terrorist actions in Europe in general and Sweden in particular, which, along with cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, has shifted the focus from domestic crisis situations to external and international threats to security (Government Decision 2015, 3–4; Crismart 2017, 23). Consequently, the Government in 2015 commissioned the MSB and the Swedish armed forces with developing a comprehensive proposal for total defense (Government Decision 2015, 1), with the MSB being placed in charge of planning regarding a civilian defense structure that would be in place by 2020. This includes an explicit focus on the roles of individuals in crisis and security management (MSB 2016b, 2f).

This ongoing project is addressed in the analysis below, where we further explore the relationship between the state and individuals and illustrates the contrast between ‘bare life’ biopolitics and (absence of) critical agency.

The individual as a silent resource

The discussion above has illustrated the general development of the Swedish crisis management system after 1995. The overall problem is presented in terms of societal resilience, with increased risk awareness and improved societal capabilities being important for withstanding and managing crises. While the biological human being is envisioned as the primary focal point, which is to say that the protection of individuals and the health and security of the population is prioritized, there is also a substantial change in the overall discourse regarding individuals and security. Increased responsibility was placed upon individuals when they were identified as security objects within the new security environment in the mid-1990s since they were to provide for their own security, but this was also regarded as providing substantial relief to public authorities and contributing to the robustness of society as a whole.

However, while individuals were thus transformed from being a relative liability to a strong but silent force in domestic security management, allowance was made neither for channels of reciprocity between the state and individuals, nor for procedures to promote the influence of individuals either during or after a crisis. In addition, the need to ensure that individuals possess the capabilities necessary to answer for their own safety created a separation between capable (responsible) and incapable (non-responsible) individuals. Moreover, the main point with encouraging individual responsibility was in fact to supplement the limited state resources at the disposal of the public authorities. This was highlighted in a government bill from 2014 which stated that

Experiences show that measures at this time are not adequate for immediately reaching everyone in need. It is therefore important that individuals have the ability to handle their own security during the beginning of a crisis (Prop 2013/14:144, 17).

A national campaign stressed the need for each household to prepare a 72-hour survival kit to increase individual awareness and the ability to survive a crisis. The MSB also organized Preparation Week in 2017, which will most likely become an annual national campaign, to raise awareness of the vulnerability of modern society and the importance of individual responsibility (MSB 2017a; Crismart 2015, 11). However, one of our respondents observed that the purpose of the MSB’s recommendations was in fact to

make people understand that they will not receive help straight away, and therefore have to plan for and manage the initial stages of a crisis by themselves (Respondant No. 2).

Not many people were speaking of individual preparedness (prepping) to any great extent when the conceptual development of civil defense began in 2013–2014 since the general view was that it was too much to expect individuals to prepare for possible crises and be responsible for their own security (Respondant No. 1). There was also unease within the MSB concerning the new ways of thinking about civil defense and emergency preparedness that led to a situation in which new crisis and security management needs were formulated using old concepts and visions, such as prepping (Respondant No. 1). The reality in Sweden today is that of an ongoing process of responsibilization in which public authorities devote substantial time and resources to raising individual awareness, even as they make it clear that public funds and efforts cannot and should not be used to assist capable individuals.

Thinking of crisis management in economic terms

The MSB and the Swedish civil crisis management structure has the deeply rooted goal of pursuing economic efficiency and prioritizing what is deemed most valuable to protect. A recent armed forces report explicitly states that the aim is to identify not only ‘who will act, but also the resources that will be used in a constant assessment of what is worth protecting’ (Försvarsmakten 2016, 6). The same report makes a number of references to the costs associated with support efforts, the difficulty with prioritizing necessary tasks because of a lack of resources sufficient for meeting all the needs of society, and the uncertainties of future crisis scenarios (Försvarsmakten 2016, 10f). One of the most deep-seated assumptions regarding crisis management strategies and the roles of individuals is the notion that ‘we cannot reach everyone in the initial stages of an emergency/crisis’ (Prop 2013/14:144, 30), and that individuals should bear the primary responsibility for protecting their own lives and property. One respondent remarked in this regard that the ‘individual is viewed as a means for unburdening the system’ (Respondant No. 1), while another described the role of the public authorities as ‘complementary to individual responsibility during crises’ (Respondant No. 3).

The depiction of public authorities as having only limited resources available for emergency and crisis management plays a key role in the policy of responsibilization since one aim of the latter is that individuals cope with security challenges on their own, with the responsibility of public authorities being limited to leadership, coordination, and collaboration with civil society NGOs (Respondant No. 3).

But even though the MSB’s responsibility is to support and coordinate individual efforts, it has absorbed many neoliberal ideas that are apparently at odds with the task of coordination. As one employee stated in respect to the new national emergency communication system, which was financed by subscription fees,

the MSB’s key task is to sell the concept of crisis management to other public agencies and organizations and convince them of its benefits (Respondant No. 4).

The limited involvement of volunteers in crisis management

At the same time that public authorities want capable individuals to assume a greater responsibility for their own security, thereby ‘unburdening’ the crisis management system, substantial numbers of both volunteers and NGOs seek to contribute in more active ways during crisis events. Nevertheless, even those policy documents that address the importance of increased individual responsibility are often lukewarm toward utilizing the knowledge and resources that volunteers bring to the table. For example, the report evaluating the response to the 2014 Västmanland forest fire stated that all actors must live up to their responsibilities both before and during a crisis in accordance with the legal framework, emphasizing the need for familiarity with society’s emergency preparedness so that their ‘ability to handle a crisis is not dependent upon how the authorities are organized or on the knowledge of private individuals’ (MSB 2016a, 6). This phrasing clearly indicates that society’s crisis management organization should not rely upon individuals. The issue in this regard is not only that the regulations governing the involvement of multiple actors in emergency preparedness and crisis management explicitly focus on the public sector (MSB 2016a, 6), but that individuals are not regarded as comprising a reliable force capable of making significant contributions to resolving domestic security situations.

There is obviously a potential danger in relying upon volunteers insofar as their lack of formal responsibility may lead to asymmetrical and uncertain responses in emergency situations, and this is obviously reflected in the public regulations (MSB 2016a, 63). Individual volunteer activities are thus not included in the field-guide that apparently provides instructions for how public authorities are to coordinate with civil society organizations in periods of crisis (MSB 2016d).

Another example in this regard is a 2017 MSB report that provides an overall evaluation of the contributions of relevant actors during 2016 crisis management operations. Although the activities of individuals during such events were presented as supplementary to the efforts of public authorities, who could utilize them as necessary, the report revealed that the authorities were reluctant to include volunteers in their operations (MSB 2017b, 17). Moreover, even though the MSB had recently participated in an international effort to develop a new ISO-standard concerning the involvement of spontaneous volunteers during crises, such involvement was identified as one of the greatest future challenges facing policymakers (MSB 2015). One respondent in fact remarked during an interview that identifying structures, arenas, and management practices that could facilitate such engagement would require revision of the MSB system (Respondant No. 3).

We have thus found little support in our investigation for the existence of a systematic approach to the inclusion of individuals and volunteers that in any meaningful way consider a critical capacity or what might be termed meaningful and respectful participation. Rather, individuals and volunteers are acted upon as silent resources that should complement public authorities. This is paradoxical in light of the extensive efforts taken to raise awareness and encourage individuals to prepare for and withstand crises and unburden the public authorities.

Merging neoliberalism and exceptionalism through biopolitics

Proposed policy guidelines for developing emergency preparedness structures in Sweden describe the ability of individuals to assume responsibility and act on their own as of the utmost importance for society’s security (Prop 2013/14:144). The document in question states that openness, participation, and dialog between individuals, administrative authorities, and other actors should be encouraged, and it emphasizes the need for individuals, based upon their specific situation, to ensure their own security in respect to emergency preparedness. The latter centers on individual risk awareness, responsibility, will, and the ability to manage one’s own security, with information campaigns having been undertaken concerning how individuals can become more involved in crisis management (Prop 2013/14:144, 14, 25f).

However, these campaigns have constructed the issue in such a way that they focus on spreading knowledge, not creating interest in or commitment to security. When this is coupled with the issues of prioritization and restricted resources during emergencies, questions inevitably arise regarding how public authorities will be able to include individuals in crisis management structures. Not only has social trust and cooperation been undermined by individuals being encouraged to take care of themselves and not expect assistance from the authorities, the evident unwillingness of public authorities to ensure the involvement of volunteers in crisis response further diminishes any possibility of meaningful participation and illustrates the continuation of exceptionalism and ‘bare life’ biopolitics. Against this background, one respondent added that

As an individual, you have the responsibility to find out how you can provide assistance, and the authorities are responsible to offer help where it is most needed. Society is lacking in this regard. I believe there are a rather large number of spontaneous volunteers who are left outside the crisis management system because it takes a lot of resources and manpower to manage that kind of inclusion.… In an ideal world, authorities are responsible to provide citizens with the possibility to be involved in crisis management operations (Respondent No. 1).

MSB policy documents describe individuals as being responsible for their own security and for acquiring the capacity to contribute to the prevention and management of incidents, but they do not acknowledge the continuation of exceptionalism in contemporary crisis management which precludes that citizens may demand accountability for action taken and not taken with regard to security (MSB 2014, 11). These both imply an underappreciation of the importance of local knowledge and experience for crisis management and support quite traditional security practices and sovereign practices – in spite of a progressive discourse about collaboration and participation.

Sweden launched a rescue operation of unprecedented scale during the 2014 Västmanland fire, and the contributions of individuals and NGOs in fact came to be regarded as invaluable in mitigating the emergency. This prompted official statements that it was necessary to reevaluate the basic principles of crisis management in Sweden and promote collaboration (MSB 2016a, 23f). Other reports also pointed to the need to question authorities’ attitudes toward spontaneous volunteers (Crismart 2016). A 2016 MSB report remarks that previous studies indicated the need to

focus on civil defense from a holistic perspective that addresses steering, coordination, management, as well as incentives for private actors to engage in the civil defense planning (MSB 2016c, 10).

The same report also points to the need for a better understanding of

the behavior and reactions of individuals during accidents and crises, including how individuals and groups perceive and process information about threats and risks (MSB 2016c,11).

Such statements lend a degree of credence to claims that the MSB’s crisis management policies are now aimed at reorienting the focus from a purely technocratic understanding of individual resources in society toward a more nuanced appreciation of individual responsibilities, including how different individuals react to emergencies.

Nevertheless, it is evident from the information campaigns that the only way now possible for individuals to contribute to common security and preparedness is to take care of themselves (MSB 2017a). This contradiction is rarely taken into consideration, however. One of the respondents in fact described the overall purpose of the information campaigns as communicating the information needed for individuals to decide whether or not they should undertake preparations for potential crises (Respondent No. 3). Furthermore, the bulk of information is aimed at increasing the ability of individuals to prepare for and survive the initial stages of a crisis, not to increase their overall capabilities during or after an emergency or invoke critical agency and political concerns, such as indicating how management can be held accountable for their efforts.

One interviewee noted that

people are actually full of initiative and solidarity and inclined to finding solutions, which proves that many public actors have the wrong image of people’s capabilities and how they react (Respondent No. 2).

Furthermore, when the MSB speaks of society’s capabilities, they are referring to their conception of ‘what should exist and function in society in order to protect important values’ (MSB 2014, 7). It could thus be argued that ‘capability’ is itself a value that must be produced in such a way that it makes individual less dependent on public resources yet at the same time encourages volunteering during crisis to a significantly greater extent. The MSB has developed 10 future challenges for societal protection and preparedness, such as ‘do not lose the trust of the public’ and ‘the individual’s preparedness is essential’ (MSB 2014), but these include no mention of how to tackle the lack of democracy, accountability and transparency that still characterize crisis management despite a discourse of increased collaboration and participation. This fact clearly indicates how the concepts of emergency and exceptionalism continue to play a decisive role in the formation of domestic security management that forfeits a commitment to reciprocity and meaningful participation.

Moreover, while the term responsibility is of paramount importance in public information campaigns, the latter mention neither rights nor even duties (Respondent No. 2). One of our respondents provided a very telling example of the impact this confusion of concepts has had on how the MSB presents the role of individuals in their campaigns, observing that

All of a sudden, the issue of civil defense was to be considered in the planning of the campaigns, which was not something we had been preparing for…. [A]nd the government pushed for something akin to wartime readiness [folkförankring], which is a concept that I’ve never used regarding peacetime crises. All of a sudden we were to “dust off” the terminology of heightened readiness and war (Respondent No. 2.

Various documents from the government and the MSB often maintain that the key aspects of society that must be protected include

human faith in democracy and the rule of law; confidence in society’s institutions, political decision-making, and management capability; and the absence of corruption and the abuse of justice (MSB 2014, 15).

Such views can be attributed in many respects to the underlying principles of current crisis management structures and the orientation of security policies toward traditional objects of interest within the public domain. As a consequence, the traditional conception of what is most important to protect and preserve is based upon a dated, and perhaps no longer appropriate, understanding of how threats to the country present themselves.

We have shown that democratic principles and practices have held little or no place during, or even after, emergencies and crisis situations – which is to say that the protection of democratic principles remains undemocratic. This shows the continuation of Schmittian exceptionalism in modern crisis management and the neoliberal architecture of participation as ways to unburden public authorities.

Conclusion

The present study has revealed that in spite of a general discourse that seemingly promotes collaboration involving NGOs, volunteers, and individuals in Swedish crisis management, such participation is in fact limited to supportive functions intended to unburden the public authorities in time of crisis. The study thus illustrates how neoliberal strategies of responsibilization, within a decentralized order of power, are combined with the logic of exceptionalism, which together foster a continuation of ‘bare life’ biopolitics rather than collaborative governance and participation capable of underpinning more inclusive forms of crisis management systems. Indeed, the broader understanding of security that has emerged since the early 1990s is marked by the extension of exceptionalism to ever more areas of social and political life. This serves to constrict the space available for democratic participation by the general public despite the promotion of collaboration and increased participation by the public.

Insofar as we still live in a world in which individuals are viewed as vulnerable subjects, even though research has revealed that they possess great potential for concrete contributions at moments of crisis, the biopolitical management of populations will continue. What is puzzling is that neoliberal logics of responsibilization merges with sovereign logics of emergency in modern crisis management that produces a continuation of state of exception and the temporary annihilation of democratic institutions and procedures through an ever wider application of fear and individualization. Whereas Schmitt pointed out the context and features of exceptions (Schmitt 2005, 7), Huysmans suggested that the exception ‘eliminates one of the constituting categories of modern democratic politics, hence producing an impoverished and ultimately illusory understanding of the political contestation and domination’ (Huysmans 2008, 165). This is indeed a bleach image of our time as politics of fear is an ever present form of politics that flourish in austerity, insecurity, and feelings of precarity.

Despite the quite pertinacious mergence of neoliberal and sovereign powers in contemporary crisis management, we still place our hope for imminent resistance through critical agency. As responsibilization aspire to activate a specific mind-set, this in turn may invoke resistance and struggles of meaning-making and indeed a re-distribution of responsibility. Such resistance is further assisted by new events and alternative discourses that provide a more complex understanding of the rationalities underlying the current governance strategies. This article may serve as a critical note in that regard since it highlight the continuation of exceptionalism, emergency and politics of fear that guides contemporary crisis management policies.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Carl Rådestad

Carl Rådestad works as an analyst and researcher at Straterno AB, which provides consulting services on policy issues and strategical development in national crisis management. He has contributed to various public reports, and recently published a chapter on social security in Sweden in Andris Sprūds and Elizabete Vizgunova (eds) Societal Security in the Baltic Sea Region – Expertise Mapping and Raising Policy Relevance (Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2018).

Oscar Larsson

Oscar Larsson (2017–2019) holds a post-doctoral position at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU). His main research focus is on power relations within collaborative forms of governance, particularly in the field of security and crisis management. He currently works on the foundations of global governmentality and has recently published articles on network governance in Critical Policy Studies, on post-structuralism and neo-institutionalism in Critical Review, and on crisis management in Risk, Hazards and Crisis in Public Policy.