The politics of exclusion

ABSTRACT

This article examines Gilgit-Baltistan’s uncertain status vis-à-vis Pakistan in light of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC or the Corridor), an approximately $46–60 billion USD mega-project that will connect southern Pakistan and western China. While Gilgit-Baltistan is considered the ‘gateway’ to CPEC, the Corridor has, so far, only magnified the region’s long-standing political, legal and economic ambiguity in relation to Pakistan. The article highlights the persisting impacts that Gilgit-Baltistan’s ambiguous status have on the region’s ability to participate in and benefit from CPEC, and the resulting cost of such exclusion for the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, as well as for the CPEC countries as a whole. It first examines how Gilgit-Baltistan has been largely left out of CPEC’s decision-making processes and second, highlights how the region’s status impacts its access to opportunities in the Corridor’s energy portfolio.

KEYWORDS:

• CPEC
• ‘gateway’
• exclusion
• decision-making processes
• opportunities

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

¹ The full title of agreement is the “Memorandum of Understanding on the Cooperation of Developing China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Long-term Plan and Action Between National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China and Ministry of Planning and Development of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” See “China and Pakistan”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2757_663518/. The MOU is an agreement that outlines the common understandings between China and Pakistan.

² “Minister of Planning, Development & Reforms,” Pakistan-China Institute http://www.cpecinfo.com/ahsaniqbal-message.

³ Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (12 April 1973, as amended) at Article 1(d).

⁴ See the discussion below regarding the key decision by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Al-Jehad Trust & Others v Federation of Pakistan and Others, 1999 SCMR 1379 [Al-Jehad Trust].

⁵ China has provisionally recognized the accession of Gilgit-Baltistan to Pakistan and settled its western border in a bilateral Agreement with Pakistan in 1963. See the Boundary Agreement between China and Pakistan, 1963 available at http://people.unica.it/annamariabaldussi/files/2015/04/China-Pakistan-1963.pdf. India has rejected an invitation to join the One Belt One Road Forum (discussed below) because CPEC runs through Gilgit-Baltistan. See, for example, “Pakistan, India Spar Over China’s One Belt One Road Initiative,” The Express Tribune (6 May 2017) https://tribune.com.pk/story/1403061/pakistan-india-finance-ministers-spar-cpec-obor/; and “OBOR Summit,” Times of India (14 May 2017) http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/obor-summit-china-keeps-door-open-for-india-but-announces-new-project-in-gilgit-baltistan/articleshow/58661401.cms.

⁶ Al-Jehad Trust, supra note 4.

⁷ Ibid at 1393.

⁸ Ibid at 1393. The Court also provided that the people of the Northern Areas have the fundamental right to an independent judiciary (see 1382 and 1389 of the decision). This aspect of the decision is not discussed in this article.

⁹ Ibid at 1382 and 1396.

¹⁰ Ibid at 1401.

¹¹ Ibid at 1393.

¹² See note 10 above.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., 1389–90.

¹⁵ Hussain, Remoteness and Modernity, 114.

¹⁶ Ali, “Grounding Militarism,” 87.

¹⁷ Hussain, supra note 15 at 114.

¹⁸ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, “Caught in a New Great Game?” 2. The Commission also notes that “[s]tudents, journalists and businessmen [have] demanded that [Gilgit-Baltistan] should be clearly mentioned in the constitution as a province and should get all the fundamental rights mentioned in the constitution,” 24.

¹⁹ Shigri, “Legal Linkage with GB,” Dawn (21 March 2016) https://www.dawn.com/news/1246977.

²⁰ Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 [2009 Order].

²¹ Ibid. at Preamble.

²² Ibid., Section 37. The Order also requires that members be citizens (presumably of Pakistan, although this is not specified) and be at least twenty-five years old.

²³ Ibid at Section 33 and Section 2 (see definition of “Chairman”).

²⁴ Supra note 18 at 24.

²⁵ Ibid at 24.

²⁶ Ibid at 40.

²⁷ Hussain, supra note 15 at 115.

²⁸ “CPEC Enhances Importance of Gilgit Baltistan, Information Minister GB,” Pamir Times (25 February 2017) http://pamirtimes.net/2017/02/25/cpec-enhances-importance-of-gilgit-baltistan-information-minister-gb/.

²⁹ Hussain, supra note 15 at 110. As Chad Haines also argues, the Silk Route – ‘as grounded along the KKH’ – is also key to linking Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan, physically and symbolically. See Haines, Nation, Territory, and Globalization in Pakistan, 66–67.

³⁰ “Announcing the Inaugural Belt and Road Forum,” Belt and Road Forum, http://www.oborforum.org.

³¹ “10 Fundamentals of CPEC,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor http://www.cpecinfo.com/10-questions-on-cpec

³² “List of Agreements and MoUs Signed by Pakistani and Chinese Government During OBOR Summit,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (22 May 2017) http://www.cpecinfo.com/cpec-news-detail?id=MzA5MA=.

³³ “Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor http://www.cpecinfo.com/pm-nawaz.

³⁴ Supra note 2.

³⁵ “China’s New World Order,” CNN http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/05/world/chinas-new-world-order/.

³⁶ “China President Arrives in Pakistan to Sign £30bn ‘Land Corridor’ Agreement,” The Guardian (20 April 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/china-president-xi-jinping-pakistan-land-corridor-agreement.

³⁷ The discourse of inclusion of Gilgit-Baltistan abounds: for example, at the Parliamentary Committee on CPEC, the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan thanked the Committee for “including Gilgit-Baltistan in all its deliberations.” At the 18th meeting of the Committee last fall, one Senator was reported as saying that Gilgit-Baltistan was “being fully included in CPEC through eco-friendly economic projects in different areas.” (Jabri, “18th Meeting on Parliamentary Committee on CPEC,” Pakistan-China Institute (26 October 2016) http://www.cpecinfo.com/cpec-search-detail.php?id=Njky). The Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Minister also attended the pre-Joint Cooperation Committee meeting at the Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform in Islamabad last year where the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan stated that “[w]e all are united for the completion of this important project in letter and spirit as it provides an agenda for a developed and economically stable Pakistan” (see “Consensus Reaches Between Federal and Provincial Government to Make CPEC a Success for Prosperous Pakistan,” Pakistan-China Institute http://cpec.gov.pk/news/15.

³⁸ “CPEC Important Framework to Strengthen Federation through Connectivity,” Pakistan-China Institute (9 June 2016) http://www.cpecinfo.com/chairmans-desk.

³⁹ 2009 Order, supra note 20 at Section 47(2)(a).

⁴⁰ Ibid, Council of Legislative List (Third Schedule) of the 2009 Order.

⁴¹ For example, the Council Legislative List (Schedule 3) of the 2009 Order includes “duties of customs, including export duties,” “taxes on income other than agricultural income”, “taxes on corporations”, “taxes on the sale and purchases of goods and services imported, exported, produced, manufactured or consumed”, “taxes on the capital value of the assets”, “taxes and duties on the production capacity of any plant, machinery, under taking, establishment or installation in lieu of […] [duties]”, “terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway or air, taxes on their fares and freights” and “fees in respect of any of the matters enumerated in this list”. The 2009 Order also gives the Gilgit-Baltistan Council the overarching power “to adopt any amendment in the existing Laws or any new Law in force in Pakistan” while explicitly providing that “[t]he Government of Pakistan shall have exclusive power to make laws in respect of any matter not enumerated in the Council Legislative List or the Assembly Legislative List by Order notified in the official Gazette.” (See 2009 Order at Sections 47(2)(c) and 47(3)).

⁴² “CPEC is Property of All Provinces, Regions, Says Shahbaz,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (18 May 2017) http://www.cpecinfo.com/cpec-news-detail?id=MzA2Nw=.

⁴³ See, for example, the following article by Taj, “‘Thousands’ Protest Govt’s Negligence of Gilgit Baltistan under CPEC,” Dawn (15 May 2017) https://www.dawn.com/news/1333298; and “Absence of Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Minister in OBOR Forum Triggers Strong Reaction,” Pamir Times (13 May 2017) http://pamirtimes.net/2017/05/13/absence-of-gilgit-baltistan-chief-minister-in-obor-forum-triggers-strong-reaction/.

⁴⁴ Shigri, “No Space for GB on CPEC Table,” (11 January 2016) Dawn https://www.dawn.com/news/1232094.

⁴⁵ Supra note 37.

⁴⁶ “Radio Report,” Radio Pakistan (23 February 2017) http://www.radio.gov.pk/23-Feb-2017/radio-report-fm-muhammad-birjis-tahir-visits-gilgit-baltistan.

⁴⁷ “CPEC,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (14 September 2017) http://www.cpecinfo.com/cpec-news-detail?id=NDAxNg=.

⁴⁸ For example, see Ebrahim, “CPEC and Major Unanswered Questions,” The Third Pole (13 October 2016) https://www.thethirdpole.net/2016/10/13/cpec-and-major-unanswered-questions/. See also “Three Major Sindh Projects Make Way into CPEC”, The Nation (30 December 2016), http://nation.com.pk/national/30-Dec-2016/three-major-sindh-projects-make-way-into-cpec. Punjab, unlike the other provinces, has allegedly even asked for exemptions on customs duties for initial import of capital goods, machinery for the establishment of industry, and a 10-year income tax exemption for CPEC related investments.

⁴⁹ Linehan, “Five Projects that Will Define the Success of The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),” Frontera News (14 February 2017), reposted on the CPEC website http://www.cpecinfo.com/cpec-news-detail?id=MTI0Ng=.

⁵⁰ Mir, “G-B Assembly Passes Resolution Demanding Share in CPEC,” Mountain TV (3 March 2016) http://mountaintv.net/g-b-assembly-passes-resolution-demanding-share-in-cpec/. See also “GBLA Demands Equitable Share,” Pamir Times (2 March 2016) http://pamirtimes.net/2016/03/02/gbla-demands-equitable-share-for-gigit-batlistan-in-cpec-projects-and-revenue/.

⁵¹ Shabbir ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ “HRCP Demands Provincial Status for Gilgit Baltistan,” Pamir Times (4 March 2017) https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/03/04/hrcp-demands-provincial-status-for-gilgit-baltistan/.

⁵⁴ “Energy,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/energy.

⁵⁵ Geographers David Butz and Nancy Cook argue, more generally, that the region’s “peripherality in relation to metropolitan centres of economic and political power” mean that “although Pakistan has invested heavily in controlling its Pamirian territory militarily, it has not devoted commensurate attention to the provision of economic opportunities, social welfare, infrastructure or good governance.” See Butz and Cook, “Political Ecology of Human-Environment Change in Gojal, Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan,” 199.

⁵⁶ The hydropower potential in Pakistan is over 100,000 MW with identified sites of 55,000 MW. See “Hydro Potential of Pakistan”, Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (2009) https://www.scribd.com/document/59265730/Hydro-Potential-in-Pakistan-Different-Dams.

⁵⁷ “Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009,” Gilgit-Baltistan Policy Institute Centre for Civic Education Pakistan and Forum of Federation Canada (10 July 2010) http://gbpolicyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Report-GBPI-Seminar-2010.pdf.

⁵⁸ “China Offers to Make Diamer-Bhasha Dam Project Part of CPEC,” Radio Pakistan (19 June 2017) http://www.radio.gov.pk/19-Jun-2017/china-offers-to-make-diamer-bhasha-dam-project-part-of-cpec.

⁵⁹ “CPEC Projects Progress Update,” CPEC http://cpec.gov.pk/progress-update.

⁶⁰ One article estimates that 10,000 people in Gilgit-Baltistan will lose their jobs because of the move. The authors have not verified this figure. See Peer Muhammad, “CPEC to Cause Unemployment in Gilgit-Baltistan,” The Express Tribune (16 November 2015) https://tribune.com.pk/story/992728/anticipating-effects-cpec-to-cause-unemployment-in-gilgit-baltistan/.

⁶¹ Gilgit-Baltistan Bar Council, “Demands of Gilgit Baltistan Lawyer”, Courting the Law (letter dated 6 October 2015) http://courtingthelaw.com/2015/11/26/updates/demands-of-gilgit-baltistan-lawyers/ (emphasis present in original text). See also Khan, “Proposal of GB Lawyers Action Committee for Constitutional Status of Gilgit-Baltistan,” Pamir Times (9 November 2015) http://pamirtimes.net/2015/11/09/proposal-of-gb-lawyers-action-committee-for-constitutional-status-of-gilgit-baltistan/.

⁶² Joint Communique of the Leaders Roundtable at the Forum (16 May 2017), “Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation,” http://www.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0516/c22-423.html [Joint Communique].

⁶³ See, for example, the promotional materials for the Belt and Road Initiative of the global bank HSBC, on its website: http://www.rmb.hsbc.com/?WT.mc_id=CMB_BRI2017_125.

⁶⁴ South Asia Chief Economist Office and Macro and Fiscal Management Global Practice, “Fading Tailwinds,” South Asia Economic Focus (Spring 2016), The World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/24016/9781464809156.pdf at 29.

⁶⁵ Shah, “CPEC and Kashmir Issue,” Dawn (12 June 2017) https://www.dawn.com/news/1320621. See also Izhar Hunzai quoted in Ebrahim, “CPEC,” Dawn (30 January 2016) http://www.dawn.com/news/1236159.

⁶⁶ See, for example, “CPEC Has Nothing to do with Territorial Sovereignty Disputes,” Dawn (8 October 2017) https://www.dawn.com/news/1362486/cpec-has-nothing-to-do-with-territorial-sovereignty-disputes-china-responds-to-us-criticism; and “China Rejects US Criticism of OBOR Passing through PoK”, Economic Times (6 October 2017) https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-rejects-us-criticism-of-obor-passing-through-pok/articleshow/60974361.cms. We note that one of the first cooperation principles included in the Joint Communique, supra note 62, at the Forum in May 2017 is “[c]onsultation on an equal footing: Honoring the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law including respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries; formulating cooperation plans and advancing cooperation projects through consultation.” (emphasis added).

⁶⁷ See “India to Skip China’s Mega Belt,” Economic Times (13 May 2017) http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-to-skip-chinas-mega-belt-road-initiative-cpec-tops-delhis-concerns/articleshow/58659228.cms.

⁶⁸ Ghulam Abbas, “NA Body Finalises Recommendations for GB Reform,” Pakistan Today (14 September 2017) https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/09/14/na-body-finalises-recommendations-for-gb-reform/.