Korea’s transition experiments as a post catch-up project

Abstract

Sustainability has already become one of the most important items on innovation policy agendas in many countries. South Korea has attempted to emulate a global trend towards a sustainable socio-technical system but faces different challenges. These challenges must be resolved independently and not by adopting the policies and technologies of other nations. From the post catch-up perspective, this study reviews the ongoing experiments on a transition to a sustainable socio-technical system in Korean cities and villages and analyses the limitations of these experiments. The present study reviews the Low-Carbon Green Village Project and the Seoul City Hatbit (Solar) Power Plant Project launched, respectively, in 2008 and 2012. The two case studies share commonalities in that both attempt a transition into a new socio-technical system based on the shared recognition of the valuable ‘environment’ under the existing catch-up policy mode. These case studies are reviewed as examples of transition to a post catch-up paradigm. This transition is often characterised by sustainability, diversity, and a new development trajectory along with changes in environment and energy policy perspectives, which have been neglected.

Keywords:

• sustainable socio-technical system transition
• post catch-up
• transition experiment
• community-based transition
• solar power project

1. Introduction

Aware of the limitations of existing socio-technical systems, countries worldwide are now attempting to transform their socio-technical system into one that is sustainable across various sectors including energy, transportation, and welfare. To keep pace with such a trend, Korea is moving towards a new socio-technical system and emphasising a paradigm shift from a catch-up to a post catch-up or creative system. This transition is occurring among companies that are key innovation agents but is also spreading to various other economic, social, educational, administrative, and policy sectors in Korean society. This implies that Korea must identify problems that have not yet been solved by other developed countries and find solutions to such problems independently instead of passively introducing and absorbing the technologies or policies of advanced foreign countries and tailoring them to Korean circumstances. Such a transition cannot be achieved simply by consuming new fads, knowledge, or modes of working. The transition requires changes in regulations, institutions, values, and ideology that constitute the key elements of the society’s norms, culture, and perception system (Schienstock 2004; Song et al. 2006; Seong 2008; Seong and Song 2010; Seong and Cho 2013).

In Korea, the discourse on the transition to a sustainable system is occurring at the same time as a movement towards post catch-up approaches. Post catch-up innovation requires a new approach because the goal is to create technologies and markets or institutions in which the newly created technologies are applied. This highlights the theoretical common ground between post catch-up innovation theory and the theory of socio-technical system transition because the theory of socio-technical system transition identifies problems with the existing system and aims to transform the existing system. The two approaches share the following commonalities. First, they both create a new development path or trajectory that departs from the conventional development policy of imitating existing development trajectories. Second, these two theories do not simply pursue technological innovation but focus on resolving social and economic issues through technological innovation (Song et al. 2006; Choung et al. 2014, 2015).

We examine transition experiments towards a sustainable socio-technical system in cities, communities, and villages in Korea from a post catch-up perspective. This study reviews the current state of post catch-up transition in Korea and analyses the limitations of the transition attempts. For the analysis, we conduct a theoretical review of the discussions on the theory of socio-technical system transition and post catch-up policies. In addition, we review case studies on the Low-Carbon Green Village Project and Seoul City Hatbit (Solar) Power Plant Project. For each project, we review the project overview and the details of the transition experiments to analyse the projects’ significance and impact. Based on this analysis, we draw important policy implications from the perspective of post catch-up innovation and socio-technical transition.

The research questions of this study can be summarised as follows.

First, how has Korea pursued its system transition and what are the theoretical grounds for such efforts?

Second, are there experimental cases in Korea in which attempts have been made to transition to a sustainable socio-technical system? For each case, what specific vision, objectives, or type of experimental structure or process has been pursued? What are the significance and impacts of each case?

Third, have the efforts aimed at system transition achieved the intended outcomes? What also needs to occur to realise the intended transition vision or objectives? What roles have been played and what specific efforts have been made by the government in managing the transition?

2. Theories on socio-technical system transition and post catch-up

2.1. Theories on socio-technical system transition

The development of theories on socio-technical system transition (hereinafter called ‘transition theory’) led by Dutch scholars, such as Frank W. Geels and Derk Loorbach, has been widely applied to a range of areas including energy, transportation, and food. Transition studies, a discipline that investigates the interactions between science, technology, and society from a system perspective, is the outcome of the merging of various types of theories in research areas such as technological sociology, technological history, innovation studies, organisational theory, and evolutionary economics (Bosch 2010; Sterrenberg et al. 2013).¹

Transition theory describes the transition to a new system by identifying problems within the current system and with a transition to a ‘sustainable socio-technical system’ as the long-term vision and goal. Various policies and programmes are being developed to achieve this objective. Unlike innovation system theory, which is somewhat equivocal about system orientation, transition theory focuses more on practical solutions² (Kemp and Rotmans 2004; Bosch 2010; Loorbach and Rotmans 2010).

Transition theory considers both macro and micro factors from a multi-level perspective. According to this approach, socio-technical systems have many layers: social, economic, physical landscapes, socio-technical regimes, and niches (Geels 2002, 2004) (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Socio-technical system transition from a multi-level perspective. Source: Partly a revision of Geels (2004).

The social, economic, and physical landscapes (structures that are not easy to change) are the background for the socio-technical regime. For example, phenomena such as urbanisation, ageing, and globalisation represent the landscape that defines the way long-term and sustainable technological innovations that occur. The socio-technical regime, a currently dominant socio-technical system (e.g. combustion engine-based transportation systems – automotive industry – transportation system – insurance system – private ownership system – energy supply system – industrial policy), controls most of the innovation-related activities. The niche level is where the seeds of a new socio-technical system that are different from the existing dominant socio-technical regime are formed (e.g. space for small-scale experiments such as electric vehicles, joint ownership and use, and road and transportation systems) and serve as the seeds of transition itself (Geels 2002, 2004; Song and Seong 2013).

Transition theory thus emphasises the dynamics of system transition by adopting a multi-level perspective. In transition theory, system transition is an activity where agents of new socio-technical systems (innovation agents at the niche level) disassemble the existing socio-technical regime (t1) and build a new socioeconomic regime (t2) by effectively utilising new opportunities released from changes in the landscape (e.g. the rapid progress of globalisation or aggravated climate change) (Geels 2004; Song 2013).

While the process of transition is considered evolutionary because it causes unintended outcomes, the overall process is progressive and goal-oriented. The government is an important agent controlling and guiding goal-oriented transition and orchestrating various attempts to configure a new system. To achieve the transition, the government presents a vision, designs experiments for learning, and provides dynamism instead of micro-level planning or control³ (Elzen et al. 2004; Kemp and Rotmans 2004).

Because total system transition cannot be achieved in a single step, small-scale experiments in specific regions or areas are key strategies. When small-scale experiments succeed, they can be more widely applied, and knowledge will accumulate in the process to better respond to uncertainties. In this respect, strategic niche management is an important tool for system transition. Strategic niche management helps form core areas where the seeds of a new system can be tested and cultivated and applied to other areas. This process will ultimately drive change throughout the whole system. Bounded socio-technical experiments and pilot projects are examples of such strategic niche management (Brown et al. 2004; Geels 2004; Bosch and Rotmans 2008; Bosch 2010; Loorbach and Rotmans 2010).

System transition comes from various types of transition experiments. Unlike existing innovation-related projects (innovation experiments), transition experiments emphasise trials and learning based on linkages and cooperation among many different agents to achieve transition in socio-technical systems. Because system transition involves the real-life testing of a new socio-technical system, the actual living environment is prioritised. The results of transition experiments often serve as the basis for incremental changes in the existing socio-technical system (Bosch and Rotmans 2008; Bosch 2010; Seong and Cho 2013; Song 2013) (Table 1).

Table 1: Distinctive characteristics of transition experiments.

	Classical innovation experiment	Transition experiment
Starting point	Possible solution (to make innovation market-ready)	Societal challenge
Nature of the problem	A priori defined and well-structured	Uncertain and complex
Objective	Identifying satisfactory solution (innovation)	Contributing to societal change (transition)
Perspective	Short and medium term	Medium and long term
Method	Testing and demonstration	Exploring, searching, and learning
Learning	First order, single domain, and individual	Second order (reflexive), multiple domains (broad), and collective (social learning)
Actors	Specialised staff (researchers, engineers, professionals)	Multi-actor alliance (across society)
Experiment context	(Party) controlled context	Real-life societal context
Management context	Classical project management (focused on project goals)	Transition management (focused on societal ‘transition’ goals)

Sources: Bosch and Rotmans (2008) and Bosch (2010).

2.2. Discussion on post catch-up

Innovation studies on the catching-up process of late-comer countries or companies have been actively conducted (Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Amsden 1989; Hobday 1995; Kim 1997, 1999; Lee and Lim 2001; Kim and Seong 2010). Catch-up refers to less advanced countries that follow the exact path of advanced countries. Thus, the concept of catch-up provides a target with which to catch up. In the post catch-up paradigm, however, there is no path to follow or target to mimic. Post catch-up requires the exploration of new paths and the setting of new targets. In other words, post catch-up innovation implies that it does not imitate the technology development trajectory of developed countries but creates a new trajectory of innovation activities independently. A striking difference between these two paradigms is that the post catch-up paradigm requires changes in our perceptions. We must realise that current problems cannot be solved by simply mimicking or catching up with others but, instead, by independently devising our own solutions (Schienstock and Hamalainen 2001; Song et al. 2006; Seong 2008; Seong and Song 2010).

The post catch-up paradigm is also path-dependent to some degree, but is less fixed and is relatively more open because of its greater diversity and complexity. Post catch-up processes are not exclusively designed by a certain group of agents but evolve through interactions among various relevant agents. The processes are not closed strategy mimicking the system of advanced counties but an open concept in which various agents independently create a path free of copying and catching up. Such a concept is based on an awareness that a new development model, or a new behavioural strategy, will be required for a new situation that late-comers will face once they successfully catch up with the developed countries (Song et al. 2006; Seong 2008; Seong and Song 2010; Choung et al. 2015).

Discussions on post catch-up innovation often focus on the innovation activities of companies, the key innovation agents. When the discussion is expanded to policy or institutional support for post catch-up innovation activities, however, it is often managed at the national innovation system level (Seong and Song 2010). This post catch-up innovation has the following features. First, post catch-up innovation emphasises openness and diversity. Second, post catch-up innovation does not solely emphasise high-tech or world-class technology. If that were the case, post catch-up innovation might miss the chance of developing new innovation trajectories in which various types of post catch-up innovation are attempted by the innovation capabilities of late-comers who lag behind developed countries. Therefore, the scope of post catch-up innovation is not confined to technologies but is expanded to social and cultural systems and even includes cognitive aspects such as value, symbol, and meaning. The scope is inclusive ranging from specific technologies or production methods of companies to the structural framework that regulates national policy (Chang 1994; Schienstock and Hamalainen 2001; Choung et al. 2014, 2015).

Post catch-up innovation is not simply pursuing technological innovation but is also focused on resolving social and economic issues through technological innovation. In the catch-up regime, technology innovation is pursued by imitating and absorbing existing foreign technologies when these technologies and their socioeconomic benefits are widely known. However, post catch-up innovation requires the creation of technology innovation from non-conventional trajectories and an understanding of the potential socioeconomic impacts of technology innovation. Therefore, the common approach adopted for post catch-up innovation is focused on resolving problems through technology innovation, not technology innovation itself. This approach considers the social and institutional context in which technologies are used. With the increasing need for knowledge and policies in areas where technology innovation is used and diffused, innovation-related areas are now being reviewed together. Table 2 compares catch-up with post catch-up policies of late-comers, which clarifies the features of post catch-up innovation (Perez 1988; Hobday 1995; Lee and Lim 2001; Schienstock and Hamalainen 2001; Song et al. 2006; Kim and Seong 2010).

Table 2: Differences between catch-up and post catch-up.

	Catch-up strategy of late-comers	Post catch-up strategy of late-comers
Innovation path	Target with which to catch up	No target to catch; target should be independently developed
Focus	- Quick mimicking and learning strategy - Short-term performance and efficiency	- Independently exploring a path - Focusing on realising long-term vision
Innovation model	Reverse engineering	Creative innovation and architectural innovation
Role of government	Emphasis on role as a ruling entity for the development of the nation	Developing a vision for transition towards innovation systems and leading through transitional time
Strengths	- With the presence of a target to catch, quick catch-up is possible - Mimicking and learning are less costly with less political resistance	- Fixedness of existing socio-technical system is low - Flexible response is possible thanks to small sunk cost - A certain level of technical knowledge
Weaknesses	Shortage of technology, manpower, knowledge, and infrastructure	Due to strong path-dependency stemming from experience and legacy as a catch-up country

Sources: Kim and Seong (2010) and Seong and Song (2010).

In the post catch-up context, technology innovation activities must be conducted with efforts to establish markets and institutions for technology innovation activities. Therefore, a consensus is required among members of society. To be well-prepared for the high levels of uncertainty of a post catch-up regime, a series of small-scale pilot experiments on transition policies must be conducted instead of an all-out policy implementation. In fact, the system transition from catch-up to post catch-up reflects historical, social, and cultural factors unique to the concerned nation or region. Therefore, if the system transition does not evolve in conjunction with the nation or the region, it is difficult to establish successfully. It is appropriate to begin with small-scale transition experiments and then expand the scope of the experiments. An incremental approach can accumulate knowledge and reduce policy uncertainties (Seong and Song 2008, 2010; Choung et al. 2015).

Post catch-up emphasises diverse transition experiments from a mid- and long-term perspective. Learning from this process and fundamental structural transition implies that post catch-up is consistent system transition theory. The theory of socio-technical system transition is aimed at (i) creating new development trajectories, reinforcing new technological knowledge and forecasting capabilities through the configuration of technological system and (ii) creating markets and institutions, transforming social components, and reinforcing forecasting capabilities. A socio-technical system is different from existing industrial innovation policy because the former emphasises the resolution of social issues more than economic growth. A socio-technical system is considered different from industrial innovation policy that has long been focused on industrial development and growth. In the policy process, the socio-technical transition seeks technological alternatives after first defining social issues. In this respect, the theory of socio-technical system transition is different from catch-up innovation that highly values industrial development and technology acquisition (Lee and Lim 2001; Schienstock and Hamalainen 2001; Kim and Seong 2010; Choung et al. 2014). The theory of socio-technical system transition is similar to the post catch-up approach.

2.3. Similarity and differences between the socio-technical system transition and post catch-up

Post catch-up addresses the limitations of the catch-up innovation system in the establishment of a new innovation approach. Copying advanced nations is no longer viable, and with developing economies such as China swiftly gaining ground, the catch-up system has lost its usefulness, and a new approach is needed (Song et al. 2006).

The catch-up innovation system copies technologies with a proven track record and was an approach formed during industrialisation. Within this innovation system, organisations carried out orders, technology development was compressed, closed networks were formed for mobilisation, specific industries and companies were strategically supported, and a centralised bureaucratic system was established. The fundamental principle of the catch-up system was that the upper levels would set a copycat agenda, and the lower levels would swiftly and effectively execute these plans. The method enabled rapid industrialisation and the advent of global corporations in certain areas (Lee and Lim 2001; Hobday et al. 2004; Choung et al. 2014).

However, within the catch-up system, its unequal development strategy polarised the innovation system. Export companies, conglomerates, manufacturing, and information technology achieved high growth due to concentrated support, but domestic companies, small and medium-sized enterprises, and services fell into stagnation. The addiction to speedy execution and the emphasis on vertical hierarchies created authoritarian decision-making and closed innovation activities (Choung and Hwang 2013; Song and Seong 2013; Song 2015). These characteristics exacerbated social inequalities and decimated diversity and creativity, creating a core rigidity that obstructs the exploration of new approaches (Leonard-Barton 1992). The catch-up system is, ironically, being caught by new players on the one hand, and few alternatives have been presented for competing with advanced nations on the other (Choung and Hwang 2013).

The post catch-up model attempts to overcome the limitations of previous innovation systems that increase inequality, polarisation, authoritarianism, and closed-mindedness and to instead emphasise balance and social inclusion, equality, and openness. The post catch-up model looks forward to an innovation system that can reduce the polarisation between conglomerates and smaller enterprises, between export-oriented and domestic-market companies, and increase income and employment for labourers. The model expands diversity among innovation actors and attempts various experiments to explore future approaches. The post catch-up model emphasises horizontal and open networks to promote diversity and creativity (Choung et al. 2014, 2015; Song 2015). This requires system innovation and implies system reform and the establishment of a new innovation system. It is the search for system transition. It is not a strategy to follow a predecessor but to seek out a new system that is different from the old (Choung and Hwang 2013).

Socio-technical system transition and post catch-up discussions address system innovation and transition, but the content is different. Post catch-up models use innovation system discourse to advance system innovation, but transition research advocates social and technological systems-based transition. Additionally, post catch-up discourse focuses on industrial innovation and economic development, whereas transition research centres on a sustainable system that unifies social cohesion, environmental protection, and economic development. If post catch-up addresses the industrial component and the linkage between industry, academy, and researchers that provides technological knowledge, transition research extends the supply component to apply it in discussion on supply and the end user such as health, welfare, housing, food, energy, and the environment. The two discourses are different in terms of their objectives, subject areas, and participating innovation actors (Song 2016).

2.4. Korea’s efforts in socio-technical system transition and post catch-up

For the past several decades, Korea has maintained a catch-up strategy of absorbing and utilising the technologies and systems of advanced countries. Korea introduced and learned technologies and systems of advanced countries by specifically targeting their technologies, industries, and policies. Quick decision-making and strong motivation at the top of Korea’s decision-making hierarchy has also helped the country to achieve remarkable growth (Song et al. 2006; Seong and Song 2010, 2013).

In the early 2000s, however, Korea faced a phase of system transition that motivated the country to set new horizons and policies and to create a new path of its own. Korea needed a breakthrough strategy departing from the catch-up that had once propelled its rapid economic growth as catch-up strategies reached their limits with the outbreak of the global economic crisis and the birth of newly emerging economies. Such a need was also highlighted by criticism over thoughtlessly copied and implemented foreign policies, which forced Korea to pursue post catch-up strategies in some areas by defining and solving issues independently (Ministry of Science and Technology 2007; Seong and Song 2010).

Responding to these activities, past and present administrations over recent years have presented new paradigms for national development such as the Innovation-led Economy (former President Roh, Moo-hyun administration), Low-Carbon Green Growth (former President Lee, Myong-bak administration), and the Creative Economy (current President Park, Geun-hye administration), all of which emphasise far-reaching transitions across Korea’s economic, social, and innovation systems.

In 2008, the Lee Myong-bak administration presented Low-Carbon Green Growth as the new national vision and set out specific policy goals such as overcoming the economic crisis and creating new growth engines and jobs. To actively implement this vision, the Lee administration established the presidential Green Growth Committee and enacted the Basic Law on Low-Carbon Green Growth. The policy of Low-Carbon Green Growth is meaningful because it addresses energy and the environment, which have been largely neglected in the national agenda. Traditionally, economic and environmental policies have been pursued separately as they were considered to be conflicting. However, the Lee Myung-bak government began to emphasise the synergy effects between economic and environmental policies (Seong 2009).

With her inauguration in 2012, President Park Geun-hye presented the Creative Economy as a core national strategy and, after organisational reshuffling of the government ministries, launched the Ministry of Science, ICT (information and communications technologies) and Future Planning⁴ as a policy control tower. The Creative Economy emphasises a transition to a sustainable innovation system that can achieve both growth and welfare by moving beyond the boundaries of the past paradigm of ‘catching up with the advanced countries’, which exposed the past paradigm’s limitations with the outbreak of the global economic crisis and the birth of newly emerging economies (Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning 2013a, b).

Past administrations’ efforts for system transition have been less fruitful because of the government-led top-down mode of working in a catch-up paradigm. As system transition was pursued after the government’s unilateral announcement of plans, and without much preparation, the different agents in Korean society could not fully participate in the transition efforts or share the vision of system transition. Additionally, the old legacy of growth-oriented policies considered economic growth and development more important than and at odds with the environment (Seong 2009; Song and Seong 2013).

Various efforts have since changed the government-led, top-down approach to transition and social paradigms including lifestyle and consumption patterns. Although these efforts are not yet full-fledged, various small-scale experiments are being attempted at a basic level along with increased public awareness of the need for transition. At the same time, partnership opportunities between the government and the private sector are being emphasised to explore new paths and find new solutions. In this context, inter-ministerial cooperation, partnership, policy experiments, and learning between public and private sectors for mid-/long-term system transition are also being emphasised (Seong 2009; Seong and Song 2010, 2013; Seong and Cho 2013).

2.5. Perspectives and the analysis framework

From the post catch-up perspective, the present study reviews the ongoing experiments of transition to a sustainable socio-technical system in Korean cities and villages and analyses the limitations of these experiments. We review the Low-Carbon Green Village Project and the Seoul City Hatbit (Solar) Power Plant Project launched, respectively, in 2008 and 2012. These two case studies share commonalities in that both attempt transition to a new socio-technical system based on the shared recognition of the valuable ‘environment’ under the existing catch-up policy mode. These case studies are reviewed as examples of transition to a post catch-up paradigm, which is often characterised by sustainability, diversity, and the creation of a new development trajectory along with changes in the perspectives of environment and energy policies that have thus far been neglected. For the purpose of analysis, the background and overview of these two projects will be reviewed, and their implications and limitations will be drawn based on the review of the details, structures, and process of the two projects from the perspectives of post catch-up innovation and socio-technical system transition (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Analytical model.

3. Korea’s socio-technical system transition experiments

3.1. Low-Carbon Green Village

3.1.1. Overview

In the late 2000s, a ‘green economy’ based on recyclable energies was proposed as a possible global solution for sustainable development. Korea developed a Low-Carbon Green Growth strategy to establish a new energy system while complying with the reduction target of greenhouse gas emissions. As part of this strategy, in 2008, the Korean government announced a ‘plan to use wastes and biomass as energy resources to achieve green growth and combat climate change’ and launched the Low-Carbon Green Village Project as one of its seven initiatives under the plan.

The goal of the Low-Carbon Green Village Project was to build resource-recycling villages where food waste, animal excrement, and agricultural by-products are used to produce energy and villagers use this energy for their daily living (https://www.greenvill.or.kr) (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Goal of the Low-Carbon Green Village. Source: Korea Environment Corporation (2010); https://www.greenvill.or.kr.

The vision of this project was to build self-sustaining regional communities of green growth. To build green villages with amiable living environments offering ‘well-being’-oriented community cultures and environmentally friendly eco-systems, the project planned to increase the energy self-sufficiency rate of green villages to 40–50% by 2020 (Ministry of Science and Technology et al. 2009). This project was a pan-ministerial project involving the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (currently the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs), the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Security and Public Administration, and the Korea Forest Service with the respective ministries providing funding for the different types of pilot villages under the supervision of the forest service.

The early-stage implementation strategy encompassed three key elements. First, it aimed at securing the continuity of the project by forming regional communities and building a self-governing system in the villages through residents’ voluntary participation. Second, the strategy intended to develop and diffuse standard models by village type by successfully implementing pilot projects. Third, the strategy was to apply the results of the pilot project on a wider scale, laying the foundation for the building of 600 low-carbon green villages nationwide (Seong and Cho 2013).

3.1.2. Transition experiment

3.1.2.1. Key activities

Led by four ministries, the pilot attempted to build 10 green villages of four types that reflected the different characteristics of the villages and their supervising ministries: urban (Ministry of Environment), rural (Ministry of Food and Agriculture), urban and agriculture combined (Ministry of Security and Public Administration), and mountain village (Korea Forestry Service). However, the ultimate number of villages selected for the pilot was only seven, less than the 10 for the original plan. Six were selected in 2010, and one more was added in 2013. These seven selected low-carbon green villages are currently under construction. The average budget allocated to build one pilot village is approximately five billion won or USD 4.3 million.

The project, however, has not progressed significantly. As the number of pilot villages was not the target level originally planned at the beginning, the Korean government reduced the ultimate scale of the project, drastically cutting the total number of planned villages from 600 to 40. The number of lead ministries was also reduced from four to one, the remaining being the Ministry of Environment, and the other ministries were limited to a supporting role for the Ministry of Environment. However, the system of cooperation and support among the four ministries is being maintained to consider the different characteristics of different villages.

3.1.2.2. Structure and process of the transition experiment

The master plan for the Low-Carbon Green Village Project was to build 600 green villages throughout the nation by first implementing pilots based on detailed implementation plans. ‘Green Village’ space for the pilot project is a niche space and a seed for transition because it offers actual living space where new system configuration can be tested. Experiences accumulated in this pilot space can be rolled out nationwide to launch other green villages to ultimately transform the existing socio-technical system. The detailed project plan is composed of two main parts; energy production and saving and efficiency. Activities for energy production include the construction and maintenance of power plants using wastes, biomass, wind, and solar power. To enhance energy saving and energy efficiency, energy saving action programmes, education programmes for local residents, and energy efficiency diagnosis and improvement programmes have been implemented.

The project intended to reduce the villagers’ dependency on external energy sources by creating an energy recycling chain within the villages. At the same time, the project aimed at revitalising the provincial regions and increasing economic benefits by promoting regional industries and tourism utilising the natural resources of the provincial regions. To realise such effects, the project attempts to establish a close cooperation mechanism among various stakeholders by ensuring cooperation from local communities, support from the central government, close linkage with ministries responsible for the project, and cooperation from private companies managing plant operations. For the successful operation of the pilot project, small villages have been selected for experimental operation. This approach will increase the possibility of success.

The key characteristics of this project can be summarised as follows. First, the project was intended to create an environment where both residents and local experts could actively participate in decision-making. In the pilot village selection process, the government included the existence of a village community as one of the evaluation items, motivating villagers to build solidarity that would positively impact the implementation of the project. Second, the project considered various factors affecting system transition such as new energy technologies, villagers’ life patterns, and the economic and environmental aspects of the villages. By inducing the villagers’ participation and encouraging changes in energy consumption patterns, the government intended to design a system that considered both hardware (energy facilities) and software (education of villagers).

3.1.3. Implications and evaluation

The Low-Carbon Green Village Project aimed at holistic system changes in the energy production system, which is heavily dependent on petroleum and uranium and also in the regional economy, environment, and villagers’ living conditions based on the villagers’ active participation. In this regard, the project can be considered a transition experiment towards developing a new model of sustainable regional development. In the process, the government presented a vision and goals for the transition and provided technical, administrative, and some budgetary support.

Unlike existing economic development policy that has been primarily focused on technology development and IT (information technology) sector growth, Low-Carbon Green Growth, and Low-Carbon Green Village projects have been pursued as a post catch-up strategy from their inception. In contrast to past national agendas, these projects have adopted the concept of green growth to explore co-existence with the environment by recognising the value of the environment and not seeking economic development through environmental destruction. The review of the background, initial plans, vision, and the future direction of the Low-Carbon Green Village Project reveals that the project possesses features of post catch-up policy that depart from the catch-up mode and features of local community-based transition experiments. For the actual operation, however, the project followed the traditional catch-up mode.

One reason the Low-Carbon Green Village Project failed to achieve the intended effect was an inability to consider all the related factors such as regional uniqueness, close cooperation among stakeholders, local residents’ needs, and renewable energy. First, the project was implemented in a top-down mode led by the government over a relatively short period. It was designed as a two-year project and was not accompanied by adequate preparation or consideration. In some villages, only a single month was allocated to gather villagers’ opinions because of time constraints. As the government rushed this process over a short period, the project experienced resistance from residents and internal conflict, resulting in frequent revisions and even the nullification of projects in some villages in the pilot stage. The project failed to realise the initial goal of ‘energy independence’. For example, the planned solar power generation facilities have not been installed and, instead, the original plan was revised to ensure power generation capacity by constructing undesirable facilities, causing conflict with the local residents. This government-led, short-term pilot project aroused resistance from local residents, further deepening the conflicts. Consequently, a revised course for other similar projects became inevitable or even derailed them from the pilot stage.

Second, based on a volume-oriented mind-set, government support focused on providing physical facilities but failed to fully consider different regional characteristics. New recyclable energies are complex, and their capacity utilisation rate varies depending on various factors such as climate, the environment, and the economic conditions of regional communities. However, these factors were not fully incorporated into the current project plan. Therefore, although several pilot villages have been in operation, a base for accumulating and utilising regional experiences had not been established (Lee 2011).

Third, the perspective of long-term transition has not been adopted. The participation of civil groups and other stakeholders remains superficial. Therefore, the sharing of a long-term vision, discussions on system-related issues, and the identification of transition paths have been limited. Although the theme of ‘green’ has been presented as a top-down approach based on strong political will, conventional modes of operation have hindered the project from becoming a niche or a lead in system transition.

3.2. Seoul Metropolitan City Government’s Hatbit (Solar) Power Generation Project

3.2.1. Overview

After the outbreak of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011, the demand for safe and sustainable energy increased substantially in Korea. To respond to demand, in April 2012, the Seoul Metropolitan City government announced a comprehensive plan to cut the number of nuclear power plants by one, reducing greenhouse gas emissions to combat climate changes while securing a stable power supply.

From the 1990s, many countries around the world began to increase the share of renewable energies in their energy mix. Korea was isolated from this global trend,⁵ and its ratio of new recyclable energy was still relatively low. To improve this situation, Seoul’s government set out a comprehensive plan that targeted a reduction of two million tonne of oil equivalent by 2014 in its power supply using electricity, petroleum, and town gas. After early target achievement, the second phase began in August 2014 under the title Energy-Efficient City Seoul and aimed to achieve a 20% energy independence rate by 2020 through self-supported energy supply, energy sharing, and energy participation. The plan was funded by investment from the private sector, budget support from central and city governments and some fundraising initiatives. By the first half of 2014, a total of 1.33 trillion KRW was invested. The total budget consisted of funding from Seoul City (24.7 million KRW), the central government (4.87 million KRW), and the private sector (1.36 trillion KRW).

The comprehensive plan to cut the number of nuclear power plants by one is composed of 10 core initiatives. One of these initiatives is the Hatbit (Solar) City Construction Project, which aims to make Seoul itself a fully functioning solar power plant. For this purpose, the Seoul government will facilitate an open transition process based on the voluntary participation of the public and private sector and Seoul citizens. The project sets specific plans to build Seoul Citizens’ Hatbit Power Plants, county power plants, 25 energy self-sufficient villages and, by 2014, to draw and use the Seoul City Habit Map, a map of solar power plants.

3.2.2. Transition experiment

3.2.2.1. Details of the project

Seoul City Hatbit Power Plant Project is not designed to construct a large-scale power plant but is aimed at meeting local communities’ electricity consumption needs by allowing public facilities and homes to produce electricity on their own sites. In doing so, the project is pursuing the roll-out of this participatory policy by fostering citizens’ voluntary participation. This entices a transition to a system based on citizens’ participation that departs from the traditional energy policy that has long been dominated by a large-scale power supplier, the central government, and a small group of experts.

For the success of the project, Seoul City tries to encompass openness and diversity in the system by allowing local residents and civil groups to actively propose their ideas using a bottom-up approach, not a government-led top-down approach. A draft master plan has been developed after 16 rounds of consultation meetings from January to April 2012 between the Seoul City Government, Hope Policy Advisor Group, and civil groups. The draft master plan was released at the first Policy Workshop and the second Grand Citizens’ Discussion Forum. The finalised master plan was released on 26 April 2012.

A total of seven cooperatives run by Seoul Metropolitan Government were operational as of September 2013. These cooperatives operate through investment from their members or loans from the Climate Change Fund. Two Hatbit Power Plants are being constructed via these cooperatives.

The first among these two power plants was installed at a local high school and is now fully operative. This Hatbit Power Plant was constructed with investment from 270 cooperative members, mostly people affiliated with the school or residents living nearby who are co-owners of the power plant. The plant was built on school grounds and has a real-time monitoring system that checks power generation capacity. This community-based solar power plant project became possible through the linkage between the school and the local community (Seoul Metropolitan City 2012).

The sales margin on power of this Hatbit Power Plant recorded more than one million won for the first four months after the start of the operation. It is now stably operated under the keen interest of students and neighbours. Thanks to the success of the first Hatbit power plant, the construction of three more solar power plants is underway at public buildings and universities.

3.2.2.2. Structure and process of the transition experiment

The Hatbit City Project is composed of sub-projects that aim to construct Hatbit power plants through citizens’ participation, to draw the Seoul Hatbit map,⁶ and to build energy self-supporting villages. In June 2012, Seoul announced a blueprint for a ‘Hatbit City’, proposing to make the city into a ‘fully-functioning solar power plant’ and outlining various initiatives such as the installation of solar power generation facilities at public and private buildings inside Seoul, providing funding support for the installation of solar power generators at private houses, revision of city laws to lower the leasing cost of public facilities, developing the Hatbit map, and building strategic partnerships with entities from various walks of life.

Seoul City’s Hatbit Power Plant Project succeeded in inducing the participation of Seoul citizens through a bottom-up decision-making process, which overcomes the limitations of the previous top-down approach. In a sense, Seoul is conducting a transition experiment by building a governance system based on cooperation between public and private sectors and citizens in its push to build an energy transition system for new recyclable energy and long-term ‘power self-sufficiency’.⁷

This governance structure involves the Seoul Citizens’ Hatbit Power Generation Cooperatives (local communities), Seoul’s city government, the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education, the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), and other public institutions. While cooperatives are responsible for conducting citizen participation campaigns and attracting investment, Seoul’s city government provides administrative support including the approval of the power plants. Public institutions offer the rooftops of their buildings for rent and KEPCO purchases electricity from Hatbit Power Plant through a purchasing agreement. These stakeholders mutually cooperate while fulfilling their clearly defined roles.

Under this cooperation mechanism, citizens and government both play important roles in policy diffusion through learning. In the case of the Hatbit Power Plant, however, a cooperative, whose members are Seoul citizens, manages all of the construction, operation, and maintenance of the plant. The cooperative often lacks expertise and know-how on power generation and energy. As result, there has been substantial trial and error in plant construction, which delayed the construction lead time. To solve the problem and help the roll-out of the project to other local communities, the cooperative shared the difficulties that it faced during the construction phase with other cooperatives and has built a database of the knowledge and experience accumulated throughout the project. The cooperative has presented its ideas through continuous cooperation with Seoul City. For the purpose of knowledge sharing, it has produced a manual containing the knowledge and experience that it accumulated from the project and offers an online community by operating an Information Centre and website for the cooperative. Seoul City also supported the roll-out of the Solar Power Plant Project, a pilot experiment for system transition, by publishing a periodical on the project. To support the project, the city even enacted a city ordinance (Seoul Metropolitan City 2012).

3.2.3. Implications and evaluation

This project is significant because it attempts a transition from centralised to distributed and self-supporting energy supply systems. KEPCO has long been a dominant player in both the supply and demand side of energy policy by maintaining a monopolistic or oligopolistic position in the Korean electricity market. In this context, Seoul City strives to realise grass-roots democracy by letting Seoul citizens participate in energy production by installing small-scale solar power generation facilities on rooftops, terraces, or public buildings. Through such efforts, Seoul City tries to merge the separate agents of energy production and consumption, which will, in turn, contribute to relieving environmental problems caused by energy production and will also tap the possibility of achieving ecological transition. In other words, Seoul City has attempted a transition of the existing system by exploring new solutions for a social challenge called energy depletion based on citizens’ participation and the use of renewable energy instead of simply adding more nuclear or thermal power plants.

By allowing citizens’ direct participation in energy production, this system transition effort is bringing a positive impact, such as reduced use of fossil fuels and eased tensions over the site selection of large-scale power plants. Citizens’ participation through the voluntary establishment of cooperatives is particularly notable because it has opened up the energy sector that used to be accessible only to the public sector and private companies.

However, for this bottom-up Hatbit Power Plant Project to succeed, it is important to build a cooperation system that brings public and private sectors as well as citizen groups together and to develop policy measures and institutional systems that can induce such cooperation. Because the project attempts a major change in the existing power supply system, the Hatbit Power Plant Project requires policy and institutional modifications and refinement. For example, the selection of companies responsible for continuous facility maintenance, linkage with KEPCO’s power distribution system, and the calibration of the renewable portfolio standard system all must be reviewed and revisited. Companies in charge of maintenance are mostly small, and it is sometimes difficult to ensure consistency in maintenance service after the completion of plant construction. There were cases where the maintenance company went bankrupt and failed to adequately meet maintenance needs, which led to conflicts with the host institute that offered the plant site. Power generated at Hatbit power plants can be sold as commercial electricity only when it is linked to the power distribution network of KEPCO. However, because the generating capacity of Hatbit power plants is typically quite limited, it is difficult for these small-scale solar power plants to pay the expensive cost of linkage with KEPCO’s power distribution network. This is a major obstacle in the expansion of the Hatbit power plants and complicates the collection of installation fees, paying dividends to cooperative members, and the collection of principal investments.

Seoul City is taking the initiative in diffusing system transition by defining social issues, exploring solutions for such issues, channelling openness and diversity into its policy-making process, and promoting the roll-out of pilot experiments through learning. The successful completion of such a vision requires revision of existing catch-up policies and practices prevalent in Korean society and synchronisation with Seoul City government’s new energy policy.

4. Comparative analysis and policy implications

4.1. Case comparative analysis

The analyses reveal that the Korean government is working in various ways towards achieving a socio-technical system transition that enables sustainable development (see Table 3). The system transition now requires a ‘post catch-up’ approach as a new mind-set, or a new mode of working, instead of maintaining or improving the existing ‘catch-up mode’ that has led to Korea’s condensed past economic growth.

Table 3: Summary of cases.

	Low-Carbon Green Village project	Hatbit Power Plant
Timing of launch	October 2008	April 2012
Lead	Central government	Local government + citizen groups
Vision	Build resource-recycling villages and form communities of self-supporting energy systems	Build a sustainable city using new renewable energy to combat climate change
Goals	Lift the energy self-sufficiency rate of the villages to 40–50% by 2020	Lift the power self-sufficiency rate to 20% by 2020
Characteristics of transition	Rapid project implementation over a short period through the central government’s lead	Long-term approach for energy system transition Transition from government-led to citizen-led installation and management of Hatbit (solar) power plants Search for a new solution for social issues, for example, the construction of a solar power plant as a source of renewable energy instead of adding more nuclear or thermal power plants
Significance and challenges	Environmental value reflected in policy unlike the existing economic development policy Lack of project information sharing and insufficient opinion gathering among villagers Local provinces not playing a seed role for system transition Lack of a foundation for roll-out through learning	More citizen involvement in the transition from top-down to bottom-up Building a foundation for change in energy policy trajectories from fossil fuel to renewable energy Increased need for linkage and synchronisation with the relevant institutes for successful policy diffusion

The above-mentioned case studies are innovative because they explicitly seek post catch-up and system transition, but they have limitations in making an impact because of existing system legacies and their dependence on existing paths or trajectories. There is criticism that the logic of economic growth and development still dominates environmental values because of the strong legacy of the past development era.

Transition experiments towards a sustainable socio-technical system in Korea emphasise a visible outcome in a short timeframe. Because the transition efforts are being implemented under a strong government initiative, practical needs are not properly reflected, and autonomy is not granted to the various stakeholders in society. As result, Korea lacks a learning mechanism to accumulate knowledge and facilitate learning processes through small-scale experiments or pilot projects. Additionally, systems or mechanisms that can motivate stakeholders in the private sector to attempt policy experiments are missing.

Transition experiments are not solved by imitating or ‘catching up’ with other countries. Transition is a challenge that requires a unique approach that fits the situation and context of Korea. Small-scale policy experiments and various pilot projects should be actively pursued rather than the implementation of mega-scale government policies. Once these trials succeed, their scale can be increased. During this process, relevant knowledge can be accumulated so that the uncertainties and possibility of failure can be gradually eliminated.

In the two cases, we see that sustainable transition and post catch-up are being resolved simultaneously. From the perspective of transition, the catch-up social and technological system is unsustainable because of its high energy consumption, inequality, and polarisation. Therefore, post catch-up should create a new path of evolution for social and technological systems and establish a system that can sustainably allow simultaneous growth, social inclusion, and environmental protection.

In transition research, reinterpreting post catch-up discourse, the niche that uses a window of opportunity to change in the larger context attempts post catch-up and sustainable transition at the same time. A social and technological niche that works under a horizontal managing principle, and one that extends beyond the vertical and authoritarian framework of the catch-up social and technological system, can serve as a new path to establish a sustainable social and technological system.

The formation of governance for transition management is the catalyst to social and technological innovation that emphasises post catch-up and pursues system innovation. A new social and technological system will be developed with the composition of a transition management team for post catch-up sustainable transition, the establishment of a transition consensus committee centred on such efforts, and the expansion of a transition network through the pursuit of various projects for post catch-up sustainable transition.

The two cases emphasise system transition as a long-term vision and use area units such as villages and cities as strategic niches. Successful system transition – along with efforts for linkage and combined environmental environment, living, education, and culture policies – brings together, underneath an inclusive perspective, administration policy tools and funding to change the daily lives and actions of related actors. In both cases, system transition was presented as a vision and objective but, in the execution, catch-up and post catch-up activities manifested in a combined form. This manifestation showed the limitations of the Lee Myung-bak administration’s Low-Carbon Green Village Project, which was pursued using a top-down authoritarian management style. On the other hand, Seoul government’s solar power project allows citizens to lead energy independence and helps them to internalise energy production and innovation in their daily lives. The project emphasises cooperation between the government and the people by establishing open governance where the people take centre stage in policy creation and implementation. These cases are examples of Korea’s system transition efforts that assume a mid to long-term perspective of learning from various experiments and attempt to create fundamental change in the structure and practices of the previous system, all in tandem with post catch-up discourse.

4.2. Policy implications for system transition-based post catch-up

The success of these various current attempts at socio-technical system transition at regional or village levels requires the following to build a social consensus along with systematic transition management.

First, support should be provided at the national level with the central government recognised as the key agent responsible for creating a vision for transition and undertaking the necessary coordination. Although various transition experiments can be attempted at the regional level, the role of the central government is critical in developing long-term vision and transition goals, building consensus, and improving legal systems or the public mind-set. Moreover, vertical, horizontal, and temporal integrity can be ensured when a common vision is shared between central and local governments and projects led by respective ministries are planned in a more integrated and coordinated manner instead of unilateral projects led by the central government. Additionally, the central government should try various policies to adjust conflicting political and economic interests and induce the will to change from the top-down while encouraging change from the bottom-up.

Second, as a key agent that conducts and manages the transition, the role of the provincial regions should be emphasised. Provincial regions should no longer be entities that passively follow the decisions made by the central government but should be key agents that design and implement internally created development paths considering regional characteristics. For this purpose local governments should be empowered and given ownership in policy-planning and learning. The Low-Carbon Green Village Project showed that a top-down approach under the central government’s lead without considering regional characteristics or residents’ needs might threaten the project and hinder long-term motivation for system transition. For such a project to succeed, diverse innovation agents from society that possess varied perspectives should be given the opportunity to explore and plan shared visions related to regional innovation. Their role as a platform or a medium that links the central government and the regional communities should be strengthened.

Third, particular effort should be made to reach an agreement or consensus on transition. Successful transition requires securing the legitimacy of the transition and a consensus among various agents in the community. Unless leaders in government induce change in the mind-set of its people and build social consensus, it is difficult to build motivation for transition. Given that the Korean political system only allows for a single-term presidency, presidents can drive their policies based on their popularity at the beginning of their presidential terms but may not be able to sustain their policies in the later stages of their administration and into the next administration, a phenomenon known as the ‘lame duck’ effect (Seong and Song 2008; Seong 2009). Major advanced countries, including the Netherlands, have set key policy directions and initiatives through discussion and consensus-building efforts among stakeholders when attempting a transition toward sustainable socio-technical systems. For policies to maintain consistency and continuity across different administrations, a common vision among various stakeholders and building trust and cooperation among participating agents is critical.

Fourth, regional policies should be oriented towards sustainability by focusing on improving the lifestyle quality of the relevant regions and strengthening social equality. Various provincial regions are making different attempts towards change to achieve their vision of a creative and sustainable community, but they are still bound to the existing policy frameworks of regional development. Regional policies geared towards sustainability should differentiate themselves from the old policy practices in terms of strategy, policy-planning approaches, implementation mechanisms, and performance management. A clear understanding of current social issues should be accompanied with a systematic investigation of such issues. Residents’ social needs for better lifestyle quality or welfare services should be captured through field research and relevant policy agendas should be developed accordingly. At the same time, for the importance of transitions such as sustainability to be fully reflected in regional policies and actual projects, modes of working and evaluation should change along with the changes in policy-planning and implementation (Seong 2009; Seong et al. 2012; Seong and Cho 2013).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by National Research Foundation of Korea Grant [NRF-2014S1A5B6A02048960].

Notes

1. From the perspective of system transition, various theories have been integrated including technology system theory in technology history, social constructionism and actor-network theory in techno-sociology, innovation studies and innovation system theory, organisational sociology that emphasises system isomorphism, and evolutionary economics in complexity theory.

2. For example, transition theory requires system transition from a treatment-focused healthcare system to a prevention-focused system to solve various system-related problems, such as inadequate quality of life and the effective management of welfare spending.

3. Developing a new vision and agenda is critical in setting the direction of the transition. The government plays an active role in developing a long-term vision and transition agenda. When the transition outcomes are not materialised or the transition process faces obstacles, the government’s role in continuing the transition process or avoiding the resistance becomes very important (Elzen et al. 2004; Kemp and Rotmans 2004).

4. The science component of the former administration’s Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology has merged with the telecommunications component of the former Korea Communications Commission.

5. As of 2011, Korea’s share of new renewable energy in primary energy was the lowest among OECD economies at 2.8%, lagging New Zealand (37.2%), Sweden (32.8%), Germany (11.3%), the US (5.9%), and the UK (4.7%).

6. The Seoul Hatbit map, which visualised the solar power facilities installed on the rooftop of the buildings and houses throughout the city, has been available since March 2013 when the map was uploaded at the official website of Hatbit Map. By providing information on the needed investment for facility installation, power generation capacity, and profitability analysis in the potential sites, the map helps the continuous expansion and promotion of the Hatbit Power Plant.

7. To construct energy independent villages, two pilot villages have been selected and assistance is being provided for these villages to help them achieve energy independence of 5% of their energy consumption. The implementation of the Energy Independent Village Project is carried out in three stages: energy saving, which minimises energy consumption; improving energy efficiency, which minimises energy loss, and producing new renewable energy including solar power. During the implementation, the unique characteristics of respective villages are considered. These projects are common in that they are all implemented by citizens’ initiatives.