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ABSTRACT
As the title suggests, I take up three motifs in the article. Legal science, on a narrower reading, examines the law qua object of legal cognition. Substituting legal cognition for traditional legal interpretation, Kelsen claims that legal cognition is constitutive of its object, a claim that requires a neo-Kantian transcendental argument for support. The rub comes with legal norms that fail to satisfy the conditions ostensibly imposed by legal cognition, for they, too, pass muster. They, too, are legally valid, raising serious questions about the status of the neo-Kantian dimension of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. I address these questions in my concluding remarks.
Acknowledgements
I have had the privilege of delivering guest lectures on parts of the present text, and I continue to profit from the good suggestions, queries, and criticism offered in response to my work. I wish to acknowledge with heartfelt thanks my hosts on these occasions, to wit: in Athens, Konstantinos Papageorgiou, as well as Marijan Pavčnik (Ljubljana); in Brno, Petr Agha (Prague) and George Pavlakos (Glasgow); in Durham, William Lucy and Jorge Emilio Núñez (Manchester); in Frankfurt, Ulfrid Neumann and Lorenz Schulz; in Genoa, Pierluigi Chiassoni, Riccardo Guastini, Giovanni Battista Ratti, and Maria Cristina Redondo; in Milan, Damiano Canale and Giovanni Tuzet, as well as Alessio Sardo (Heidelberg); in Posen, Marek Smolak; and in Guildford, at the University of Surrey, Marie Newhouse. Earlier, at a conference in Heidelberg organised by Martin Borowski, I received extraordinarily helpful queries from Peter Koller (Graz). Others have given me written comments at various stages of my work on this text, and I wish to thank, in particular, Jörg Kammerhofer (Freiburg), Hubert Rottleuthner (Frankfurt), Brian Tamanaha (St. Louis), and Kenneth Winston (Cambridge, Mass.). Finally, I owe a special word of thanks to Bonnie Litschewski Paulson, whose insights – sowohl sprachlich als auch sachlich – have been invaluable, and to Robert Alexy for his gracious hospitality in Kiel and for many good conversations.
Notes
1 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Reine Rechtslehre 1934) trans Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L Paulson (Clarendon Press 1992) [hereafter: LT] §31(a) (63–4).
2 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §36 (80–1); Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (2nd edn, Deuticke 1960) [hereafter: RR 2] §45(d) (348–9), Pure Theory of Law trans Max Knight (University of California Press 1967) [hereafter: PTL] 350–1.
3 Hans Kelsen, Law of the United Nations (Stevens & Sons 1950) [hereafter: UN], see the quotation at n 92 below.
4 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §36 (81), Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §45(d) (349), PTL 351. See also Kelsen, UN (n 3) xvi, quoted at n 93 below.
5 Has Kelsen not mousetrapped himself at this point? Not at all, he answers. Just as Kantians argue that the Kant of the first Critique has superseded British empiricism and Continental rationalism, so likewise Kelsen claims to have supplanted fact-based legal positivism and natural law theory with his appeal to Kant. I broached this topic many years ago in ‘The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’ (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 311. For a recent statement, see Paulson, ‘Metamorphosis in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Philosophy’ (2017) 80 Modern Law Review 860 at 876–82.
6 Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität (J.C.B. Mohr 1920) [hereafter: PS] v, in Matthias Jestaedt (ed) Hans Kelsen Werke (vol. 4 Mohr Siebeck 2013) [hereafter: HKW with vol. no.] 266.
7 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (J.C.B. Mohr 1911) [hereafter: HP] 353, in HKW 2 (n 6) 482.
8 See Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact (Einar Munksgaard 1939) 16.
9 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §48(e) (106).
10 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §2 (8), see also Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §2 (2), PTL 2.
11 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §5 (11).
12 On first glance, one is tempted to say that the distinction in question can be understood ontologically, a view that is, however, problematic. Both kinds of object in Kelsen’s theory – those found in the natural world and those found in what Kelsen identifies as the sphere of the ‘ought’ – are found in Kant’s phenomenal world. There is no suggestion in Kelsen’s texts that he is flirting with an ideal sphere comparable, say, to Kant’s noumenal world or to Frege’s ‘third world’. Indeed, the only textual support for an ontologically venturesome reading of ideality in Kelsen’s work stems from his talk, in the opening pages of the Hauptprobleme, of ‘two worlds’. This language is drawn from Georg Simmel, however, whom Kelsen is quoting here. See Kelsen, HP (n 7) 6, in HKW 2 (n 6) 84; Georg Simmel, Einleitung in die Moral Wissenschaft (vol. 1 Hertz 1892). That Simmel’s treatise stems from his early, psychologistic period raises serious doubts about any effort to read an ontological dimension into his reference to ‘two worlds’. What is more, Kelsen, in later work, takes a decidedly phenomenal stance on the question of ontology, see eg Hans Kelsen, Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus (Pan-Verlag Rolf Heise 1928) [hereafter: PhG], §§33–4 (60–3), Engl Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism trans Wolfgang Herbert Kraus, 433–5, published as an appendix to Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State trans Anders Wedberg (Harvard University Press 1945) [hereafter: GTLS]. For a variety of perspectives on questions of ontology vis-à-vis the law, see eg Ulfrid Neumann, Rechtsontologie und juristische Argumentation (R. v. Decker’s 1979); Ota Weinberger, Normentheorie als Grundlage der Jurisprudenz und Ethik (Duncker & Humblot 1981); Michel Troper, ‘Voluntarist Theories of Law: Ontology and the Theory of Legal Science’ in Paul Amselek and Neil MacCormick (eds) Controversies about Law’s Ontology (Edinburgh University Press 1991) 32; Kazimierz Opałek, ‘The Problem of the Existence of the Norm’ in Jan Woleński (ed) Opałek, Selected Papers in Legal Philosophy (Kluwer 1999) 217; George Pavlakos, Our Knowledge of the Law (Hart Publishing 2007) 51–65 et passim; Eugenio Bulygin, ‘Norms and Logic. Hans Kelsen and Ota Weinberger on the Ontology of Norms’ in Carlos Bernal et al. (eds) Bulygin, Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2015) 207.
13 I have worked up a periodisation of Kelsen’s development in terms of three phases: the early phase, critical constructivism, runs from 1911 up to circa 1920, then the classical or neo-Kantian phase from circa 1920 up to 1960, and finally the late phase (Spätlehre) from 1960 up to 1971. See my essays ‘Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodization’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 153 and ‘Metamorphosis in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Philosophy’ (n 5) 860 at 882–94.
14 To be sure, Kelsen refers en passant in earlier work to issues that turn on legal interpretation. For references hereto, see Horst Dreier, Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen (2nd edn, Nomos 1990) 145 at n 325.
15 Hermann Kantorowicz (1877–1940) was born in Posen and grew up in Berlin. There and in Geneva and Munich he studied law, philosophy, and economics. His progressive political views and willingness to give voice to them did not sit well with a decidedly conservative German professoriate, leading to difficulties in his acquiring a professorship. No less for that, Kantorowicz became widely recognised in specialised academic circles as a medievalist of great distinction and as an accomplished legal theorist and legal sociologist. He served over a long period as lecturer and then as associate professor at the University of Freiburg. (The latter post came with the demeaning title of planmäßiger außerordentlicher Professor für juristische Hilfswissenschaften). Late in 1928, at age 51, he was appointed to a chair in Kiel. His dismissal from the Kiel professorship by the Nazis in 1933 was a foregone conclusion. He was of Jewish ancestry and was ‘politically unreliable’ as well – both grounds in the notorious ‘Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service’, issued by the Nazis in April 1933, for authorising the dismissal of civil servants, reaching to the professoriate. Kantorowicz spent the better part of the 1930s in England, and his posthumously published little book, The Definition of Law, AH Campbell (ed), intro. by AL Goodhart (Cambridge University Press 1958), had been intended as the introduction to a planned three-volume ‘Oxford History of Legal Science’. As editor of the project, the polymath Kantorowicz was the ideal choice, and his premature death deprived the world not only of the ‘Oxford History’ but of all that Kantorowicz would surely have gone on to write had he lived. For biographical details, see David Ibbetson, ‘Hermann Kantorowicz (1877–1940) and Walter Ullmann (1910–1983)’ in Jack Beatson and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds) Jurists Uprooted. German-speaking Émigré Lawyers in Twentieth-century Britain (Oxford University Press 2004) 269 at 269–89.
16 It is well known among jurists that ‘formalism’ is often, if not always, used as a Schimpfwort, a term of derision. Directed to Kelsen, the charge of formalism is made in overblown language by several of the Weimar politico-constitutional theorists. For examples, see my article ‘Neumanns Kelsen’ in Mattias Iser and David Strecker (eds) Kritische Theorie der Politik (Nomos 2002) 107 at 109–13. On the charges leveled by Carl Schmitt against Kelsen, see my article ‘Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. Growing Discord, Culminating in the “Guardian” Controversy of 1931’ in Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt (Oxford University Press 2016) 510 at 520, 539 at n 82.
17 Gnaeus Flavius (Hermann Kantorowicz), Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft (Carl Winter 1906) [hereafter: Der Kampf], The Battle for Legal Science trans Cory Merrill (2006) 12 German Law Journal 2005. In publishing his tract, Kantorowicz used a pseudonym, fearing that the professoriate would react negatively to his outspoken views. His fear proved to be altogether warranted. See n 39 below. Quotations from Kantorowicz in §§3 and 7 below are drawn from the German text. For the convenience of the reader, I list corresponding references to the existing English translation. (Regrettably, it leaves a good bit to be desired.)
18 On ‘free law’ and the Free Law Movement, see §2 below.
19 Hans Kelsen, ‘Juristischer Formalismus und reine Rechtslehre’ (1929) 58 Juristische Wochenschrift 1723 at 1726.
20 In chapter 6 of the first edition, Kelsen largely follows chapter 8 of the second edition. Thus, §§32–9 in chapter 6 of the first edition are reflected in §§45–7 in chapter 8 of the second edition, with §45 divided into a series of subsections. Kelsen’s treatment of gaps in the law is found in the second edition at an earlier point in the text, namely, at §35(g)(γ). In particular, §40 in the first edition (‘The Problem of Gaps’) is found in RR 2 (n 2) 251–2, in PTL 245–7, and §41 in the first edition (‘So-Called Technical Gaps’) is found in RR 2 (n 2) 254–5, in PTL 249–50; finally, §42 in the first edition (‘The Legislator’s Theory of Gaps’) is found in RR 2 (n 2) 252–4, in PTL 247–9. In his second-edition arguments on gaps, Kelsen follows in the main his arguments in the first edition, although his phrasing in the later edition is often different.
21 See eg Sheldon Amos, The Science of Law (Henry S. King & Co. 1874); Thomas Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence (13th edn, Clarendon Press 1924) 5–13. In the American context, Oliver Wendell Holmes – despite his tantalising title ‘Law in Science and Science in Law’ (1898/9) 12 Harvard Law Review 12, repr Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (Harcourt, Brace 1920) 210 – is far removed from endorsing legal science. To be sure, Christopher Columbus Langdell took the idea of law as a science seriously, see eg Langdell, ‘Teaching Law as a Science’ (1887) 21 American Law Review 123, but he is hardly representative. Holmes dubs Langdell a ‘legal theologian’ striving for the ‘logical integrity of the [legal] system as a system’, Holmes, book notice (unsigned) (1880) 14 American Law Review 233, 234. More recently in America, interest has been largely directed to the social sciences, well documented in John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (University of North Carolina Press 1995).
22 This period in Kantorowicz’s career has little in common with his tract of 1906 (n 17). See generally my essay ‘Die spätere Allgemeine Rechtslehre von Hermann Kantorowicz’ (2018) 73 Juristen Zeitung 1061.
23 Hermann Kantorowicz, ‘Staatsauffassungen’ (1925) 1 Jahrbuch für Soziologie 101.
24 Fritz Schreier (1897–1981), born and raised in Vienna, was influenced by both Edmund Husserl and Kelsen, and his work in legal theory reflects both phenomenology and the Pure Theory of Law. In addition to the monograph on interpretation cited below (n 25), Schreier published Grundbegriffe und Grundformen des Rechts (Franz Deuticke 1924). In the 1920s, he was an active participant in the ongoing discussions within the Vienna School of Legal Theory, and he was also engaged in legal practice in Vienna. Of Jewish ancestry, Schreier was arrested by the Nazis in March 1938 and briefly confined in the Buchenwald concentration camp. He succeeded in making his way to Geneva late in 1938, spending time there with Kelsen before emigrating in 1941 to the United States. After a good bit of pulling and hauling, he acquired a foothold in marketing research and, during the period 1959–67, was appointed in that field as guest professor in Los Angeles, in Haifa, and in Santa Clara. On Schreier and his work, see Meinhard Lukas, ‘Fritz Schreier’ in Robert Walter et al. (eds) Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen (Manz 2008) 471.
25 See Fritz Schreier, Die Interpretation der Gesetze und Rechtsgeschäfte (Franz Deuticke 1927) iii, see also at 1–2, 26, 48–55, 71–3, et passim; Fritz Schreier, ‘Freirechtslehre und Wiener Schule’ (1929) 4 Die Justiz 321.
26 See Kelsen, ‘Formalismus’ (n 19) 1726. On Kelsen’s attention to the Free Law Movement, see also Hans Kelsen, ‘Aussprache über die vorstehenden Berichte’ (replies to lectures by Hermann Heller and Hans Wenzel), (1928) 4 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 169 at 179. Merkl is critical of the Free Law Movement, but a direct comparison with Kelsen on the matter would be misleading. Kelsen confines his endorsement of the Free Law Movement to issues of legal interpretation, whereas Merkl addresses its entire programme in a critical vein. See Adolf Julius Merkl, ‘Freirecht und Richterfreiheit’ (1920) 16 Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung 265, in Hans Klecatsky et al. (eds) Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule (vol. 2 Europa Verlag 1968) [hereafter: WS with vol. no.] 1573.
27 What Kelsen says here about the lack of earlier work on interpretation in the Vienna School is correct with one notable exception: Merkl had addressed issues of interpretation as early as 1916. See Adolf Julius Merkl, ‘Zum Interpretationsproblem’ (1916) 42 Grünhutsche Zeitschrift für das Privat- und Öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart 535, in WS 1 (n 26) 1059.
28 Hermann Kantorowicz, ‘Methodenreform und Justizreform’ (1911) 3 Deutsche Richterzeitung 349 at 352. See Kantorowicz, Der Kampf (n 17) 10, 11–12, et passim, Engl 2008, 2009, et passim.
29 Kantorowicz, Der Kampf (n 17) 7, Engl 2006.
30 Here Jhering is busy at work, dismantling his own constructivist system and twitting the constructivists, his former allies. See Rudolf von Jhering, ‘Die civilistische Konstruktion’ (1861) 3 (no. 41) Preußische Gerichts-Zeitung, in Jhering, Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz (Breitkopf & Härtel 1884) 3 at 6–7. The English translation from which the quotation is drawn is found in Kelsen, LT (n 1) 136–7.
31 See eg Kantorowicz, Der Kampf (n 17) 30, Engl 2019. The motif of judicial creativity is evident throughout Kantorowicz’s tract.
32 Kelsen, ‘Formalismus’ (n 19) 1726.
33 On judicial creativity, an early, pathbreaking argument is found in Oskar Bülow, Gesetz und Richteramt (Duncker & Humblot 1886).
34 Kantorowicz, Der Kampf (n 17) 9, Engl 2007.
35 The expression ‘mechanical jurisprudence’ is familiar in Anglophone circles from, inter alia, Roscoe Pound’s paper ‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’ (1908) 8 Columbia Law Review 605. More generally, ‘conceptual jurisprudence’ (Begriffsjurisprudenz) – here the expression stems from Jhering’s criticism, see Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz (n 30) 337 – is shorthand for the charge of formalism raised by fin-de-siècle critics of nineteenth-century jurisprudence. For the critics’ arguments, see the papers collected in Werner Krawietz (ed) Theorie und Technik der Begriffsjurisprudenz (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1976). Recent research has shown that some of the attributions of formalism to nineteenth-century figures are unfounded. See eg Hans-Peter Haverkamp, Georg Friedrich Puchta und die ‘Begriffsjurisprudenz’ (Klostermann 2004) 5–25. A comparable showing vis-à-vis nineteenth-century American law is found in Brian Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton University Press 2010).
36 Similarities to American Legal Realism have of course been noted, see eg James E. Herget and Stephen Wallace, ‘The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism’ (1987) 73 Virginia Law Review 399.
37 See Eugen Ehrlich, ‘Über Lücken im Rechte’ (1888) 17 Juristische Blätter 447, in Manfred Rehbinder (ed) Ehrlich, Recht und Leben (Duncker & Humblot 1967) 80. Alongside Ehrlich and Kantorowicz, Ernst Fuchs (1859–1929) counts as a third major figure in the Free Law Movement. For a selection of Fuchs’s papers, see Albert S. Foulkes and Arthur Kaufmann (eds) Ernst Fuchs, Gerechtigkeitswissenschaft (C. F. Müller 1965).
38 On the problems surrounding this nomenclature, see Dietmar Moench, Die methodologischen Bestrebungen der Freirechtsbewegung auf dem Wege zur Methodenlehre der Gegenwart (Athenäum 1971) 87–91.
39 Oskar Bülow, who had himself challenged the positivistic status quo in 1886 (see n 33 above), wrote twenty years later that Gnaeus Flavius (Kantorowicz) had dared the utmost and ‘was arguing for complete freedom in judicial decision-making, not restricted by statutory law at all’. Oskar Bülow, ‘Ueber das Verhältnis der Rechtsprechung zum Gesetzesrecht’ (1906) 10 Das Recht. Rundschau für den deutschen Juristenstand 769 at 774. Joseph Unger, one of the most influential figures in Austrian civil law in the entire nineteenth century and receptive to the approach reflected in the Free Law Movement, was, like Bülow, largely dismissive of Kantorowicz’s effort. See Joseph Unger, ‘Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft’ (1906) 11 Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 781. Kantorowicz went to considerable lengths to defend himself against these charges, arguing that his concern in Der Kampf had been to underscore the absurdities of ‘mechanical jurisprudence’ and to make proposals respecting the judicial role in filling gaps. Where there is no question of a gap in the law, in other words where there is a statutory provision to follow, the judge is bound by it. Nothing in Der Kampf suggests a defence of contra legem decisions. See Hermann Kantorowicz, ‘Die Contra-legem Fabel’ (1911) 3 Deutsche Richterzeitung 258.
40 On Savigny, see generally Joachim Rückert, Idealismus, Jurisprudenz und Politik bei Friedrich Carl von Savigny (Ralf Gremer 1984) and, with attention to recent literature, Rückert, ‘Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–1861). Friedrich Carl von Savigny – ein Frankfurter in Berlin’ in Stefan Grundmann et al. (eds) Festschrift 200 Jahre Juristische Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (de Gruyter 2010) 133.
41 See Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts (vol. 1 Deit und Comp. 1840) 213 et passim.
42 Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts (n 41) 213–14.
43 See Rudolf von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht (vol. 1 Breitkopf & Härtel 1893) 435–65. The teleological approach in criminal law can be traced back to Franz v. Liszt, ‘Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht’ (1883) 3 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 1.
44 Kantorowicz, Der Kampf (n 17) 35–6, Engl 2022.
45 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §37 (81); Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §45(e) (349–50), PTL, 352.
46 Mill, posing a problem that is familiar in philosophy, asks: ‘How can I know that I’m not the only person in the world who experiences pain and pleasures and has a variety of other feelings?’ Mill seeks a justification for what he claims to know, arguing that ‘other human beings have feelings like me, because … they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings’. Thus, he proceeds in his argument per analogiam. John Stuart Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (first publ. 1865) (6th edn, Longmans, Green, and Co. 1889) 243, in JM Robson (ed) Mill, Collected Works (vol. 9 University of Toronto Press 1979) 190–1.
47 I have drawn the scheme below, with minor alterations, from Ronald Munson, The Way of Words (Houghton Mifflin 1976) 339–43.
48 Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer (Harvard University Press 2009) 94.
49 See Kantorowicz, Der Kampf (n 17) 23, 36, Engl 2015, 2022–3.
50 Kelsen’s expression argumentum a contrario, is normally written argumentum e contrario, and I have used this standard form. The argument from the contrary is deployed as a parry to the argument by analogy. It says, in effect, that because the statute expressly specifies (only) G as falling within its scope, then H, I, J, etc. do not fall within its scope, notwithstanding their similarity to G.
51 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §37 (82); Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §45(e) (352), PTL 352.
52 Kelsen’s view of the autonomy of the law is captured by his references to the first concept of law, the law qua object of legal cognition.
53 Richard Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press 2008) 180 (emphasis added).
54 Posner, How Judges Think (n 53) 183.
55 On Rechtspolitik, see Hans Kelsen, ‘Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein?’ (1930/31) 6 Die Justiz 576, in WS 2 (n 26) 1873.
56 Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts (n 41) 263–4. As representative of the more recent literature on gaps in the law, see Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Die Feststellung von Lücken im Gesetz (2nd edn, Duncker & Humblot 1983).
57 This notion – that the court’s disposition of the case at hand does not take account of the exigencies that gave rise to the litigation in the first place – is familiar from the work of legal historians in Anglophone circles as a reading of ‘formalism’ in the case law. To treat the legal theorist’s resolution of a problem in the same way strikes me as the one reading of ‘formalism’ that makes good sense. In other contexts, ‘formalism’ is simply a term of disapprobation.
58 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §40 (84); see also Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §35(g)(γ) (251–2), PTL 245–7.
59 Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §35(g)(γ) (251), PTL 245–6.
60 Kelsen, review of Ludwig Spiegel, Gesetz und Recht (1913), in (1914) 1 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 766, 771–2, in HKW 3 (n 6) 427, 437. See also Kelsen, ‘Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz nach österreichischer Verfassung’ (1914) 32 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 397, in HKW 3 (n 6), 397, where Kelsen writes: ‘[T]he unity of the state person or the so-called state will is the symbol of the logically closed system of legal norms. A unified state person is given to legal cognition only in so far as a system of legal norms is given in which no legal norm can contradict another.’
61 Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §35(g)(γ) (252), PTL 246.
62 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §40 (85–6) (trans amended), and see §42 (89); see also Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §35(g)(γ) (253), PTL 245–6. In the second edition of the Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen does not refer expressly to fictions in the subsection that corresponds to §40 in the first edition. Still, the arguments in the two editions are comparable.
63 See Eugenio Bulygin, ‘Kelsen on the Completeness and Consistency of Law’ in Bulygin, Essays in Legal Philosophy (n 12) 337, 344–7.
64 Bulygin, ‘Kelsen on the Completeness and Consistency of Law’ (n 63) 345.
65 See n 62 above.
66 Kantorowicz, Der Kampf (n 17) 24, Engl 2016.
67 On Heck’s work generally, see Heinrich Schoppmeyer, Juristische Methode als Lebensaufgabe. Leben, Werk und Wirkungsgeschichte Philipp Hecks (Mohr Siebeck 2001); Marietta Auer, ‘Methodenkritik und Interessenjurisprudenz. Philipp Heck zum 150. Geburtstag’ (2008) 16 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 517.
68 Philipp Heck, Begriffsbildung und Interessenjurisprudenz (J.C.B. Mohr 1932) 41 (note omitted), in M Magdalena Schoch (ed) The Jurisprudence of Interests trans Schoch (Harvard University Press 1948) 99–256 at 134 (trans amended). To be sure, Heck was already writing in this vein a quarter of a century earlier, see eg Heck, ‘Interessenjurisprudenz und Gesetzestreue’ (1905) 10 Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1140.
69 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §37 (82). In effect, the exchange between Philipp Heck and Kelsen is replicated in the recent exchange between Robert Alexy and Jürgen Habermas. Alexy offers an explication and defence of balancing, with Habermas as sceptic. See Robert Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms trans William Rehg (MIT Press 1996) 259 et passim. Most recently on these issues: Robert Alexy, ‘Proportionality and Rationality’ in Vicki C Jackson and Mark Tushnett (eds) Proportionality (Cambridge University Press 2017) 13. A richly detailed exposition of ‘principles theory’, as Alexy’s theory is often termed, is provided by Martin Borowski in Grundrechte als Prinzipien (3rd edn, Nomos 2018).
70 Kantorowicz, Der Kampf (n 17) 19, Engl 2013.
71 The copy theory, whose name stems from the idea that our sensations are ‘copies’ of independently existing objects, is familiar from British empiricism.
72 Kelsen, PhG (n 12) §34 (62), Engl 434.
73 Kelsen, PhG (n 12) §34 (62), Engl 435.
74 Hans Kelsen, Théorie pure du droit trans Henri Thévenaz (Éditions de la Baconniére 1953) 53–4 (trans here Anne Collins and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson); the monograph represents Kelsen’s own revision of the first edition of the Reine Rechtslehre (1934), a revision coming seven years ahead of his greatly expanded second edition. Kelsen’s full statements of the neo-Kantian constraint include the text quoted at n 76 below, which is drawn from the second edition of Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre.
75 Kelsen first introduces legal propositions (Rechtssätze) in the technical sense, his descriptive ‘ought’-propositions, in his 1941 paper, ‘The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence’ (1941/2) 55 Harvard Law Review 44, repr (with omissions) in Kelsen, What is Justice? (University of California Press 1957) 266, 390 (notes), and they also receive attention in Kelsen, GTLS (n 12) 45 et passim, albeit in the guise of ‘rules of law’, an unfortunate translation. Legal propositions emerge, appropriately labeled, in Théorie pure du droit (n 74), where, at 51, Kelsen distinguishes ‘les norms juridiques (Rechtsnormen), created by the legal system, from les propositions (Rechtssätze) that stem from legal science and that describe these norms’ (the German-language insertions are there, in the French translation). See also Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §16 (73–7), which contains his most complete statement on legal propositions during the classical period; the corresponding statement in PTL (n 2) 71–5, is marred by the rendition of Rechtssatz, just as in GTLS (above), as ‘rule of law’.
76 Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §16 (74–5), PTL 72.
77 Ethics counts in some instances as an exception. On the one hand, Kelsen in early work speaks sometimes of ethics and jurisprudence in the same breath, as when he writes that ‘in the ethico-juridical sense, the will is identical with the undivided whole that, as the individual, comes under consideration for ethics and jurisprudence’, Kelsen, HP (n 7) 146, in HKW 2 (n 6) 252. On the other hand, Kelsen occasionally refers to ethics as a normative science in its own right, see eg Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §7 (60), PTL 59. (I owe this reference to Jörg Kammerhofer.)
78 From Kelsen’s early period, see in particular ‘Die soziologische und die juristische Staatsidee’ trans Jana Osterkamp from the Czech, in HKW 3 (n 6) 201, 207, et passim, where, alongside legal cognition, Kelsen speaks of ‘explicative cognition’ (explikative Erkenntnis) and of ‘causal methods of cognition‘ (kausale Erkenntnismethoden). Later he settles on ‘natural cognition’ (natürliche Erkenntnis), see Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Julius Springer 1925) [hereafter: ASL] 103, 105, et passim.
79 Hans Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff (J.C.B. Mohr 1922) [hereafter: SJSB] §20 (114–20).
80 Jens Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2000) 170, speaks of Kelsen’s ‘anti-reception’ of Jellinek.
81 Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (3rd edn, O. Häring 1914) [hereafter: ASL] 137–8. On the language ‘formal-juridical’ (formal-juristische), see Jellinek, ASL 125. On the ‘two sides’ theory of the state, see also Jellinek, ASL 10–12, 41–2, 63, 137–8, 141, 274, 288, 288 at n 1, and Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre (n 80) 145–87.
82 Kelsen, SJSB (n 79) §20 (115).
83 Greek synkretismos, that is, ‘combination’. The phrase ‘methodological syncretism’ was used in fin-de-siècle legal theory in the German-speaking countries to refer to an illegitimate combining or fusion of different methods. As Jellinek puts it: ‘If one has comprehended the general difference between the jurist’s conceptual sphere and the objective sphere of natural processes and events, one will appreciate the inadmissibility of transferring the cognitive method of the latter over to the former. Among the vices of the scientific enterprise of our day is the vice of methodological syncretism.’ Georg Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte (2nd edn, J.C.B. Mohr 1905) 17.
84 To be sure, this claim raises questions about how far Kelsen is prepared to go in following Kant. Specifically, does he recognise a juridical counterpart to the doctrine of sensibility in Kant’s transcendental aesthetic of the first Critique and, going beyond this, a juridical counterpart to Kant’s doctrine of categories in the transcendental analytic, reaching to Kant’s principles of pure understanding (including, then, the Analogies of Experience)? Fritz Sander, in early work, is clearly going this far, see Fritz Sander, ‘Die transzendentale Methode der Rechtsphilosophie und der Begriff der Rechtserfahrung’ (1919/20) 1 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 468 and Fritz Sander, ‘Rechtsdogmatik oder Theorie der Rechtserfahrung’ (1921) 2 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 511. Kelsen, in his lengthy reply to Sander, waves cautionary flags all along the way, see Hans Kelsen, ‘Rechtswissenschaft und Recht’ (1922) 3 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 103. On the general issue that I raise here, see Paulson, ‘The Great Puzzle: Kelsen’s Basic Norm’ in Luís Duarte d’Almeida et al. (eds) Kelsen Revisited (Hart 2013) 43 at 53–7. On Sander, see Christoph Kletzer, ‘Fritz Sander’ in Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen (n 24) 445.
85 See eg Kelsen, SJSB (n 79) §20 (114–20).
86 I have argued the point at length, see the references in n 5 above.
87 Kelsen, SJSB (n 79) §20 (116), and see Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte (n 83) 13–14.
88 To be sure, Jellinek sometimes makes reference to cognitive methods. There is no suggestion, however, that Jellinek’s cognitive methods are to be understood constitutively. On the contrary, he reduces both ‘sides’ to psychologism and says as much. See Jellinek, ASL (n 81) 338. Jellinek’s use of the expression ‘cognitive methods’ is no different from his use of ‘points of view’.
89 The argument is rendered formally valid by adding the trivial premise – call it premise 1a – to the effect that if P is given, as in premise 1, then P is possible.
90 Imputation is, I believe, the best of Kelsen’s candidates for the juridical category, but this matter – along with imputation generally – remains controversial. See eg Robert Alexy, ‘Hans Kelsens Begriff des relativen Apriori’ in Robert Alexy et al. (eds) Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie (Nomos 2002) 179, 182–5; George Pavlakos, ‘Non-naturalism, Normativity and the Meaning of Ought: Some Lessons from Kelsen’ in Kenneth Einar Himma et al. (eds) Unpacking Normativity (Hart 2018) 77; Carsten Heidemann, ‘Der Begriff der Zurechnung bei Hans Kelsen’ in Stanley L Paulson and Michael Stolleis (eds) Hans Kelsen. Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts (Mohr Siebeck 2005) 17; Peter Langford and Ian Bryan, ‘Hans Kelsen’s Concept of Normative Imputation’ (2013) 26 Ratio Juris 85. See also Leonid Pitamic’s estimate of imputation in his important paper, ‘Denkökonomische Voraussetzungen der Rechtswissenschaft’ (1917) 3 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 339, 342, repr in Marijan Pavčnik (ed) Pitamic, An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre (Facultas Iuridica 2005), 175, 178, cited in Marijan Pavčnik, Reine Rechtslehre als Anregung (GV Založba 2015), 96.
91 ‘If … I take cognition not as a form and manner of consciousness, but as a fact that has established itself in science and that continues to establish itself on given foundations, then the enquiry is no longer directed to a subjective fact; it is directed instead to a fact that, to whatever extent self-propagating, is nevertheless objectively given, a fact grounded in principles. In other words, the enquiry is directed not to the process and apparatus of cognition, but to its result, to science itself. Then the unequivocal question arises: from which presuppositions does this fact of science derive its certainty?’ Hermann Cohen, Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte (Ferd. Dümmler 1883) 5. On the fact of science, compare Kelsen: ‘The possibility and the necessity of a normative theory of law is shown by the very [fact] of legal science (Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft) over a millennium, which, in the guise of dogmatic jurisprudence, serves – so long as there is law at all – the intellectual requirements of those who concern themselves with the law.’ Kelsen, LT (n 1) §16 (34–5) (trans amended).
92 Kelsen, UN (n 3) xvi.
93 Kelsen, UN (n 3) xvi.
94 Dreier, Rechtslehre (n 14) 149 at n 342, writes that the idea of capturing all possible alternatives is illusory, and he quotes Merkl to the effect that science would be able to set out the conceivable interpretations ‘only as a list of examples, not as a taxonomic enumeration’. See Merkl, ‘Das Recht im Lichte seiner Anwendung’ (1917) 9 Deutsche Richterzeitung 394 at 395, in WS 1 (n 26) at 1187.
95 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §36 (80); Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §45(d) (348), PTL 351.
96 See Kelsen, LT (n 1) §32 (77).
97 Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §46 (352), PTL 354. This text of Kelsen’s is by no means his only statement on the question. In a number of papers written during the 1950s, Kelsen gives expression to the same position. See eg Kelsen, ‘Was ist die Reine Rechtslehre?’ in Demokratie und Rechtsstaat. Festgabe zum 60. Geburtstag von Zaccaria Giacometti (Polygraphischer Verlag 1953) 151, in WS 1 (n 26) 618.
98 Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §47 (352), PTL 355.
99 I have discussed the Kelsen-Schmitt exchange at length in my article, ‘Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. Growing Discord, Culminating in the “Guardian” Controversy of 1931’ (n 16).
100 See generally Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (J.C.B. Mohr 1931).
101 Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (n 100) 45–6 (emphasis added), quoted by Kelsen, ‘Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein?’ (n 55) 592, in WS 2 (n 26) 1888–9.
102 See the quotation in the text at n 101 above (emphasis added).
103 See eg Kelsen, LT (n 1) §31(e) (70) and, much later in time, Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §35(g)(α) (243), PTL 237.
104 See, in particular, Kelsen, HP (n 7) 154–7, in HKW 2 (n 6) 262–6.
105 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §28 (56), see also Kelsen, PhG (n 12) §8 (18), Engl 400.
106 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §2 (8); Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §2 (2), PTL 2.
107 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §3 (9); Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §3 (3), PTL 3.
108 The event in the life of Wilhelm Voigt that gained notoriety took place on 16 October 1906. The event is best known as the point of departure for Carl Zuckmayer’s highly successful comedy, Der Hauptmann von Köpenick (1931).
109 See n 13 above.
110 The interpretation offered by HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press 1961) 35, is correct for Kelsen’s earlier period, the period preceding his remarkable shift in the 1930s. Hart draws on Kelsen’s GTLS (n 12) to illustrate the earlier doctrine, but this is not correct. Kelsen’s shift is reflected in the lengthy paper of the mid-1930s, see n 111 below.
111 Hans Kelsen, ‘Recht und Kompetenz. Kritische Bemerkungen zur Völkerrechtstheorie Georges Scelles’ in Kurt Ringhofer and Robert Walter (eds) Kelsen, Auseinandersetzungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre. Kritische Bemerkungen zu Georges Scelle und Michel Virally (Springer 1987) 1. The publication stems from a manuscript of the 1930s.
112 Kelsen, ‘Recht und Kompetenz’ (n 111) 75.
113 See Kelsen, GTLS (n 12) 59–60.
114 Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §18 (82–3), PTL 78. At the point of the ellipsis, Kelsen adds ‘or (positively) permitted’, as though empowerments and positive permissions came to the same thing. See, correcting this oft-encountered mistake, Eugenio Bulygin, ‘On Norms of Competence’ in Bulygin, Essays (n 12) 272, 275–6.
115 Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §5(a) (26), PTL 25.
116 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §34 (78); Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §45(b) (347), PTL 349.
117 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §35 (78–9); Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §45(b) (347), PTL 349.
118 See generally Timothy AO Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford University Press 2000).
119 See Kelsen, LT (n 1) §§27–31 (55–75); Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §§34–5 (196–282), PTL 193–278.
120 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §35 (78); Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §45(a) (347), PTL 349.
121 See generally Stanley L Paulson, ‘The Makings of a Radical Norm Theory’ in Martin Borowski et al. (eds) Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie (Mohr Siebeck 2017) 589.
122 Merkl, ‘Das Recht im Lichte seiner Anwendung‘ (n 94). As early as 1915, Merkl adumbrated aspects of his Stufenbau doctrine, albeit without the language of Stufen, see Merkl, ‘Ein Kampf gegen die normative Jurisprudenz’ in Dorothea Mayer-Maly et al. (eds) Merkl, Gesammelte Schriften (vol. I/1 Duncker & Humblot 1993) 339, 343 at n 8. See also Martin Borowski, ‘Die Lehre vom Stufenbau des Rechts nach Adolf Julius Merkl’ in Hans Kelsen. Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts (n 90) 122, 124–5.
123 See Adolf Julius Merkl, Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Franz Deuticke 1923).
124 See Adolf Julius Merkl, ‘Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaus’ in Alfred Verdross (ed) Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht: Untersuchungen zur reinen Rechtslehre (Julius Springer 1931) [hereafter: ‘Prolegomena’] 252, in WS 2 (n 26) 1311. On how Merkl’s doctrine in ‘Prolegomena’ differs from the earlier expositions, see Borowski, ‘Die Lehre vom Stufenbau des Rechts nach Adolf Julius Merkl’ (n 122) 129–30.
125 See Merkl, ‘Prolegomena’ (n 124) 294 at n 8, in WS 2 (n 26) 1361 at n 8.
126 Hans Kelsen, ‘Die Lehre von den drei Gewalten oder Funktionen des Staates’ (1923/4) 17 Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 374, in WS 2 (n 26) 1625. To be sure, there are hints of Kelsen’s endorsement of Merkl’s Stufenbau doctrine earlier, see eg Kelsen, PS (n 6) §29 (118–19 at n 2), with references there to several of Merkl’s early statements.
127 Kelsen, ASL (n 78) 229–55.
128 See Kelsen, LT (n 1) §31(a) (63–75); Kelsen, GTLS (n 12) 123–62; Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §35 (228–87), PTL 221–78.
129 Hans Kelsen, ‘Foreword’, Second Printing of Main Problems, in Stanley L Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (eds) Normativity and Norms (Clarendon Press 1998) 3 at 13, Kelsen, HP (n 7) Vorrede zur 2. Aufl. (1923) v at xv. It is of interest that Kelsen, in the quoted text, invites attention to a ‘genetic system of legal norms’, that is to say, the creation of legal norms by means of higher-level legal norms. In recent work, Pablo E Navarro and Jorge L Rodríguez distinguish two approaches to the formation of legal norms, namely, an approach whereby a legal system looks to genetic relations and an approach whereby a system looks to deductive relations between legal norms. The paradigm of the former is the Stufenbau doctrine introduced by Merkl, and the latter is perhaps best known from Carlos E Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin, Normative Systems (Springer 1971). See Pablo E Navarro and Jorge L Rodríguez, Deontic Logic and Legal Systems (Cambridge University Press 2014) 143–9, 232–40.
130 See the quotation at n 1 above.
131 See Merkl, ‘Prolegomena’ (n 124) 282, in WS 2 (n 26) 1347.
132 For pointed criticism of the widespread tendency in Merkl’s day to present the law as though it were exclusively a matter of statutory law, see eg Adolf Julius Merkl, ‘Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz’ (1918) 47 Juristische Blätter 425 at 425–7, in WS 1 (n 26) 1091 at 1091–5.
133 Kelsen, ‘Foreword’ in Normativity and Norms (n 129) 14, Kelsen, HP (n 7), Vorrede zur 2. Aufl. xv. It is of interest that Merkl, a year before Kelsen wrote these lines, in effect absolved Kelsen of this very mistake. That is, Kelsen is not writing in the Hauptprobleme as though the law were found ‘only in the general statute’. According to Merkl, Kelsen gives the lie to the mistaken notion of a ‘statutory monopoly’ (Gesetzesmonopol) by pointing to the role of the executive and thereby inviting attention to administrative law. See Adolf Julius Merkl, ‘Gesetzesrecht und Richterrecht’ (1922) 2 Prager Juristische Zeitschrift 337, 338 at n 2, in WS 2 (n 26) 1615, 1616 at n 2. See also Merkl, Lehre von der Rechtskraft (n 123) 200.
134 See Hermann Kantorowicz, ‘Die Epochen der Rechtswissenschaft’ (1914/15) 6 Die Tat 345, 348–50, and at far greater length Hermann Kantorowicz and WW Buckland, Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law (Cambridge University Press 1938) 33–67 quoted here at 33.
135 See eg Ralf Dreier, ‘Was ist und wozu Allgemeine Rechtstheorie?’ Recht und Staat (Heft 444/445 J.C.B. Mohr 1975).
136 The only competition that comes to mind stems from the Austrian jurist Karl Wolff. Legal science, he writes, comprises legal history, comparative law, legal policy, legal philosophy, and the logic of the law (Rechtslogik). Karl Wolff, Grundlehre des Sollens (Wagner 1924) 204. Wolff, unlike Kantorowicz, does not include legal dogmatics in his characterisation of legal science. See Karl Wolff, Verbotenes Verhalten (Hölder, Pichler, Tempsky 1923) 170–2.
137 To be sure, as I note, the Kantorowicz whom I contrast with Kelsen in this section is altogether different from the Kantorowicz of the polemical tract of 1906, see n 22 above.
138 Kelsen, LT (n 1) §1 (7); Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §1 (1), PTL 1. These lines in the opening sections of the two editions are virtually identical.
139 Hans Kelsen, ‘Was ist ein Rechtsakt?’ (1952) 4 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 263, in WS 2 (n 26) 1381, Engl ‘What is a Legal Act’ trans Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L Paulson (1984) 29 American Journal of Jurisprudence 199.
140 Alfred Verdross, ‘Eine Antinomie der Rechtstheorie’ (1951) 73 Juristische Blätter 169, in WS 2 (n 26) 1375.
141 Kelsen, ‘Was ist ein Rechtsakt?’ (n 139) 263, in WS 2 (n 26) 1381, Engl 200 (trans amended).
142 Hans Kelsen, ‘Die Ziele der Reinen Rechtslehre’ in E Hexner (ed) Festschrift für Professor Laštovka (Comenius University of Bratislava 1936) 203. An English version of the text appeared a year later: Kelsen, ‘The Function of the Pure Theory of Law’ in Law. A Century of Progress 1835–1935 (vol. 2 New York University Press 1937) 231. The quotations here are drawn from the German text, but I include a reference to the English text for the convenience of the reader.
143 Kelsen, ‘Die Ziele der Reinen Rechtslehre’ (n 142) 203, Engl 231–2.
144 In the original, ‘Die Ziele der Reinen Rechtslehre’ (n 142): ‘die theoretische Grundlage für all andere Zweige’ (emphasis added).
145 Kelsen, RR 2 (n 2) §26 (112–13), PTL 106–7.
146 The first of these tasks is evident in Kelsen’s major work, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (1911), in which he seeks legal concepts that are free of psychologism and naturalism. The second task awaits his neo-Kantian turn in the early 1920s, when he seeks to undergird the concepts he has arrived at. See n 13 above.
147 See my article ‘Die spätere Allgemeine Rechtslehre von Hermann Kantorowicz’ (n 22).
148 See, in particular, Kantorowicz, ‘Staatsauffassungen’ (n 23) 101.
149 See Gustav Radbruch, Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie (Quelle & Meyer 1914) 84–97 et passim.
150 Heinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft (6th and 7th edns, J.C.B. Mohr 1926).
151 Hermann Kantorowicz, Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie (J.C.B. Mohr 1911).
152 Kantorowicz, Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie (n 151) 20.
153 Hermann Kantorowicz, review of Hermann Cohen, Ethik des reinen Willens (1907) in (1910) 31 Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 602, 603.
154 See Kantorowicz, ‘Staatsauffassungen’ (n 23) 112–13; Hermann Kantorowicz, ‘Legal Science. A Summary of its Methodology’ (1928) 28 Columbia Law Review 679, 691.
155 See eg the interesting critique of Platonism, based on uninstantiated properties, kinds, and relations, in Michael J Loux, Metaphysics (3rd edn, Routledge 2006) 40–5 et passim.
156 See n 13 above.
157 Aspects of this dimension have been developed with great skill and insight by Pierluigi Chiassoni, ‘Wiener Realism’ in Kelsen Revisited (n 84) 131.