Crime-Related scenarios do not lead to superior memory performance in the survival processing paradigm

ABSTRACT

Processing information according to its survival value improves memory retention. We used mass-testing across three experiments to examine whether the survival processing advantage could be extended to crime-related contexts when adopting both offender’s (Experiment 1 and 2) and victim’s (Experiment 3) perspectives. Interestingly, crime-related scenarios produced the lowest memory retention in Experiments 2 and 3, indicating no mnemonic benefit resulting from crime-related processing. Furthermore, in Experiments 1 and 2, we failed to replicate the standard survival processing effect, while in Experiment 3 the superior survival memory retention emerged in comparison with the standard control conditions (i.e., moving and pleasantness). Overall, our experiments showed that crime-related contexts did not lead to superior memory retention. Moreover, although we detected some failures to replicate the survival processing effect, this evidence is not sufficiently compelling to argue that there was a general absence of the survival processing advantage.

KEYWORDS:

• Adaptive memory
• survival processing advantage
• crime-related scenario

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The effect size we used in our a priori power analysis was similar to the mean partial eta square reported by Scofield et al. in their meta-analysis (2017) for between-subjects experiments (η_p² = .09).

2 Our moving scenario slightly differed from the original one proposed by Nairne and colleagues (2007), in which participants were asked “to imagine that you are planning to move to a new home in a foreign land. Over the next few months, you’ll need to locate and purchase a new home and transport your belongings” (p. 264).

3 Because the homogeneity of variances was violated as assessed by Levene’s test (p = .016), we further conducted a non-parametric alternative test to ANOVA (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis test). This analysis revealed similar results, χ²(3) = 55.76, p < .001, meaning that crime-related scenario participants (Mdn = 2.51) rated words lower than those in the other groups (survival, Mdn = 3.48; moving, Mdn = 3.74; and pleasantness, Mdn = 3.12, respectively).

4 All BF_s were calculated using JASP (Marsman & Wagenmakers, 2017) with a standard Cauchy prior and r_scale = 1. BF₁₀ are used to interpreting positive numbers as evidence for the alternative hypothesis. BFs of 1–3 indicate ambiguous evidence for the alternative hypothesis; 3–10 substantial evidence; 10–100 strong evidence; > 100 decisive evidence (Kass & Raftery, 1995).

5 Homogeneity of variances was not met as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p < .001). However, further examination conducted with Kruskal-Wallis test showed same results, χ²(3) = 134.77, p < .001. Of importance, crime participants (Mdn = 1.84) rated words lower than those in the survival (Mdn = 3.12), moving (Mdn = 2.48), and pleasantness scenario (Mdn = 4.20). Other statistically significantly comparisons were also revealed as well as when using Tukey’s HSD tests (all p_s < .001).

6 Although the homogeneity of variances was violated (Levene’s test, p = .001), Kruskal-Wallis test revealed an identical pattern of findings, χ²(3) = 10.50, p = .035. Specifically, participants in the crime-related scenario (Mdn = .37) reported a fewer correct words than those in both survival (Mdn = .43) and moving scenario (Mdn = .44). Other statistically significantly differences were not observed (all p_s > .05).