An Unholy Mess: Why ‘The Sanctity of Life Principle’ Should Be Jettisoned

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present an account of an important element of medical ethics and law which is widely cited but is often confused. This element is most frequently referred to as ‘the principle of the sanctity of life’, and it is often assumed that this language has a religious provenance. However, the phrase is neither rooted in the traditions it purports to represent nor is it used consistently in contemporary discourse. Understood as the name of an established ‘principle’ the ‘sanctity of life’ is virtually an invention of the late twentieth century. The language came to prominence as the label of a position that was being rejected: it is the name of a caricature. Hence there is no locus classicus for a definition of the terms and different authors freely apply the phrase to divergent and contradictory positions. Appeal to this ‘principle’ thus serves only to perpetuate confusion. This language is best jettisoned in favour of clearer and more traditional ethical concepts.

Keywords:

• sanctity of life
• quality of life

Notes on contributor

David Albert Jones is Director of the Anscombe Bioethics Centre, Oxford; he was appointed in 2010. He is also a Research Fellow at Blackfriars Hall, Oxford University and a Research Fellow at St Mary's University, Twickenham. Professor Jones read Natural Sciences and Philosophy at Cambridge (1984–1987), and Theology at Oxford (1992–2000).

Notes

1 Note that this search includes the term ‘dignity’ which is a distinct concept from ‘sanctity’ or ‘sacredness’ and this accounts for many citations especially during and after the second world war when ‘human dignity’ language was often invoked in opposition to Nazi ideology. The concept of human dignity is not the focus of the present article.

2 The use of the term by Fletcher to refer to an ethical stance should be distinguished from the use of ‘vitalism’ to refer to the metaphysical claim that the phenomenon of life requires the presence of a ‘vital principle’ or élan vital irreducible to purely chemical or physical forces. This earlier biological thesis was associated most notable with the embryologist Hans Driesch (1867–1941) and the philosopher Henri Bergson (1874–1948).

3 Note that reference to intrinsic (or inherent) worth is very different from ‘infinite’ worth. For example, one might refer to the ‘intrinsic’ value of a commodity meaning its usefulness, in contrast to its ‘extrinsic’ value for sale or exchange, or in contrast to its ‘sentimental value’ to a particular person. This would not imply that the ‘intrinsic value’ of the item was infinite.