Environmental options of local governments for regional air pollution joint control: application of evolutionary game theory

Abstract

Apanage management is currently the main method used to control air pollution in China, but it has proved to be inefficient for controlling transboundary air pollution. As a result, China’s central government is demanding joint control of regional air pollution. From the perspective of cooperation benefits, we adopt the evolutionary game theory (EGT) to analyse evolutionary trends of regional authorities’ behaviours and their stable strategy in the campaign for joint control of regional air pollution. A case study, the intergovernmental cooperation management for ‘APEC Blue’, is taken to illustrate the intergovernmental game. The result shows that an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of ‘joint control’ for local governments depends on individual region’s benefits and collaboration revenues. Local governments should be encouraged in collaborating with their neighbouring governments, because a certain amount of transaction costs will not undermine their cooperation. With regards to the case study, joint control through executive orders is unpractical in the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei region. ‘APEC Blue’ can only be temporary and the failure of such collaboration for long-term regional air pollution control is inevitable because of its high control costs, economic loss, transaction costs and low common profits.

Keywords:

• Regional air pollution
• joint control
• cooperation-benefits
• evolutionary game theory
• ‘APEC Blue’

Note

Disclosure statement

The author reports no conflicts of interest. The author alone is responsible for the content and writing of this article.

Notes

1 In 2014, the size of the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei region was 216,000 square kilometres, covering only 2% of the country. But the population and GDP of this area account for 8.08% and 10.4%, at approximately 110.52 million and 6.65 trillion yuan, respectively. In addition, there is a significant externality existing in this region for air population due to its particular geographical location. For example, 28–36% of the source of PM_2.5 in Beijing is from other areas.