How Do We Conduct Fruitful Ethical Analysis of Speculative Neurotechnologies?

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This article refers to:

Ethical Issues to Consider Before Introducing Neurotechnological Thought Apprehension in Psychiatry

Notes

1 It should be noted that it’s not clear what Meynen means by intention here, as he seems to be talking about a defendant who has potentially already committed a crime——a past intention of the act in question? A current intention of a different, possibly related act? The former raises additional difficulties for the picture Meynen has in mind here——must the thoughts occur consciously to the person during the period of time in which he is monitored? Or might brain activity be used to infer other psychological elements? It’s not yet clear what this could possibly look like, if something along these lines is at all possible.

2 Meynen might contend, against this, that the offer is not likely to be welcomed because it is invasive—he compares it to deep brain stimulation (which I have argued, in a different context, is not likely to be welcomed and should thus not be offered in exchange for release from prison, see Hübner and White 2016). This, however, is an unconvincing analogy—deep brain stimulation involves surgical intervention in the brain, which entails, among other things, risk of infection, hemorrhage (De Ridder et al. 2009) mortality, and disabling morbidity (Canavero 2014). More needs to be said about why this procedure should be seen as similarly invasive.

3 This is certainly not to say that Meynen’s article does not make a valuable contribution—he raises some ethical issues of great import that are worthy of further, sustained exploration, particularly in his discussion of responsibility.