Arabization and Its Discontents: The Rise of the Amazigh Movement in North Africa

Abstract

The Berber-Amazigh identity movement has emerged in recent decades in North African states, demanding official recognition of linguistic and cultural rights and challenging the hegemonic narrative of history propagated by ruling elites who advocate the full Arabization of society and the reduction of Berber culture to folklore status. In recent years, the movement has gained a measure of linguistic and cultural recognition from North African states. This hard-won legitimization has in turn given the Amazigh movement new confidence to press its demands. The events of the “Arab Spring” have contained an important Amazigh dimension. With the needs of North African states now even more acute, and given the political and social discontent bubbling up from below, the Amazigh identity project is clearly entering a new era, one that poses both new opportunities and new challenges, particularly in the face of increasingly influential Islamist movements.

KEYWORDS:

• Amazigh
• Arabization
• Berber
• ethno-nationalism
• identity movement

Notes

¹For the Moroccan state's efforts in this regard, see Aomar Boum, “Dancing for the Moroccan State: Ethnic Folk Dances and the Production of National Hybridity,” in North African Mosaic: A Cultural Reappraisal of Ethnic and Religious Minorities, ed. Nabil Boudraa and Joseph Krause, 214–37 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007).

²David M. Hart, “Scratch a Moroccan, Find a Berber,” Journal of North African Studies 4, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 23–26.

³For a sampling of scholarly treatments of the origins and evolution of Arab nationalism, see Sylvia Haim, ed., Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962); James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, eds., Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Rashid Khalidi et al., eds., The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Yehoshua Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, 1930–1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1986); Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Paul Salem, Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994).

⁴In the sense used by Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London and New York: Verso, 1991).

⁵“Plate-forme: Option Amazighe” [“Platform: The Amazigh Option”], January 13, 2007, http://www.amazighworld.org/auteur.php?auteur=Groupe%20Option%20Amazighe.

⁶For a fuller discussion, see Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Berber/Amazigh Memory Work,” in The Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion and Politics, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine, 50–71 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2007).

⁷Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress, The Berbers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).

⁸Lawrence Rosen, “The Social and Conceptual Framework of Arab-Berber Relations in Central Morocco,” in Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa, ed. Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, 155–73 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972).

⁹Ernest Gellner, “Introduction,” in Arabs and Berbers (Ibid.), 19.

¹⁰James McDougall, “Myth and Counter-Myth: ‘The Berber’ as National Signifier in Algerian Historiographies,” Radical History Review 86 (Spring 2003): 66–88.

¹¹Gabi Kratchowil, Die Berber in der historischen Entwicklung Algeriens (The Berbers in Algeria's Historical Development) (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1996), 43.

¹²Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Le Maroc, a l'epreuve (Morocco: The test) (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1958), 83; also quoted by El Khatir Aboulkacem, “Etre berbère ou amazigh dans le Maroc modern: Histoire d'une connotation négative,” in Berbères ou Arab? Le tango des specialists (Berbers or Arabs: The Tango of Specialists), ed. Hélène Claudot-Hawad (Aix-en-Provence: Non Lieu/IREMAMM, 2006), 127.

¹³Salem Chaker, Berbères Aujourd'hui [Berbers Today], 2nd ed. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998), 123–24.

¹⁴Information conveyed to me by Algerian students of that generation (2009, 2010).

¹⁵Jane Goodman, Berber Culture on the World Stage (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 49–68.

¹⁶For details, see Maddy-Weitzman, The Berber Identity Movement, pp. 77–78.

¹⁷Chaker, Berbères Aujourd'hui, 60.

¹⁸Gilbert Grandguillaume, Arabisation et politique linguistique au Maghreb [Arabization and Linguistic Politics in the Maghreb] (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1983), p. 127.

¹⁹Gabi Kratchowil, Die Berberbewegung in Marokko [The Berber Movement in Morocco], (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2002), pp. 212–15; Aboulkacem, pp. 128–29.

²⁰“Amazighité–Communique De La Presidence,” issued by the Embassy of Algeria, Washington, DC, April 23, 1995; for an analysis, see Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord 34 (1995) (Paris, CNRS Editions, 1997), 583–90.

²¹See the outstanding report of the International Crisis Group on the events, written by one of the leading authorities on modern Algeria, Hugh Roberts. International Crisis Group, “Algeria: Unrest and Impasse in Kabylia,” Middle East/North Africa Report, no. 15 (June 10, 2003), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/algeria/015-algeria-unrest-and-impasse-in-kabylia.aspx.

²²“Bouteflika ébranle la Kabylie,” [“Bouteflika Shakes Kabylia”] Souss.com, October 6, 2005, http://www.souss.com/bouteflika-ebranle-la-kabylie/.

²³The full text of the speech was published in al-‘Alam (Rabat), August 22, 1994. A partial version in English can be found in Moroccan RTM TV, August 20, BBC Monitoring, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4, The Middle East, August 23, 1994: 19–20.

²⁴Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Ethno-Politics and Globalization in North Africa: The Berber Culture Movement,” Journal of North African Studies 11, no. 1 (March 2006): 71–83.

²⁵The president of the World Amazigh Congress Federal Council, Brahim Benlahoucine, was injured in clashes with the police during a “February 20th Movement” march in his hometown of Tiznit on May 29, 2011. See Le Monde Amazigh/al-‘Alam al-Amazighi/Amadal Amazighi 132 (June 2011): 11 Tiznit had already been the scene of considerable unrest at the end of 2010.

²⁶See Moroccans for Change, “King Mohamed VI Speech, 3/9/11 (Full Text” [video clip], http://moroccansforchange.com/2011/03/09/king-mohamed-vi-speech-3911-full-text-feb20-khitab/?blogsub=confirming#subscribe-blog.

²⁷Interview with one of the commission members, Rabat, September 2011. The composition of the committee opposition was mirrored by the composition of some of the political parties, particularly the Istiqlal and the Justice and Development Party (PJD). The Istiqlal had historically opposed anything that strengthened the Amazigh character of Morocco. But one sign of change was that many younger members of the parties disagreed with their elders and were amenable to the constitutionalization of the Amazigh language; interview with Muhammad al-Batiwi, Le Monde Amazigh/al-‘Alam al-Amazighi/Amadal Amazighi 131 (May 2011): 4. A joint declaration by a number of other parties decrying the likely “Balkanization” of Morocco if Tamazight was made an official state language was rebuked as a “racist position” by Amazigh associations; see Le Monde Amazigh/al-‘Alam al-Amazighi/Amadal Amazighi 133 (July 2011): 5.

²⁸For the French-language text of the new constitution, http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO/bulletin/FR/2011/BO_5964-Bis_Fr.pdf, June 19, 2011.

²⁹Interviews with various Moroccan Amazigh activists, Rabat, al-Hoceima, Nador, September 2011.

³⁰Interview with activist, September 2012.

³¹Interview, Rabat, September 2011.

³²“Benkirane Declares War on the Amazigh,” Le Monde Amazigh/al-‘Alam al-Amazighi/Amadal Amazighi 133 (July 2011): 4.

³³Ali Khaddoui, “Silence: on casse encore de l'amazigh en 2012” [“Quiet: Breaking the Amazigh Again, in 2012”], http://www.amazighworld.org/human_rights/index_show.php?id=2854.

³⁴“Les Amizighs traitent Mohamed VI de ‘dictateur’ à Rabat,” Demain online, http://www.demainonline.com/2012/01/15/les-amazighs-traitent-mohamed-vi-de-dictateur-a-rabat/.

³⁵For various demarches on the subject, see http://www.amazighworld.org/human_rights/libya/index.php; http://blog.ifrance.com/aderwi/post/23831-imazighen-in-land-of-tamazgha-what-so-called-now-maghrib-arabl.

³⁶Their weapons were apparently obtained from a variety of sources that, in addition to those captured from Qaddafi's units, included the NTC, NATO, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Tunisia; see Derek Henry Flood, “Special Commentary from Inside Western Libya, The Nalut Offensive: A View from the Battlefield,” August 3, 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38275.

³⁷Moez Zeiton, “In liberated Libya in the year 2961,” August 6, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/06/libya-berber-amazagh.

³⁸Thierry Portes, “Le Printemps des Berbère Libyens” [“The Libyan Berber Spring”], Le Figaro, July 20, 2011, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/07/20/01003-20110720ARTFIG00551-le-printemps-des-berberes-libyens.php.

³⁹The secular Paris-based “Tamazgha” attacked the “discriminatory” draft constitution as promoting an Arab-Islamic path for Libya in violation of the country's ancestral identity; see “La dérive du CNT: un projet constitutionnel discriminatoire” [“The Direction of the Transitional National Council: A Discriminatory Constitutional Project”] http://www.tamazgha.fr/La-derive-du-CNT-un-projet.html, August 24, 2011.

⁴⁰Originating from Zwara, the forty-six-year old Ben Khalifa was one of the founders of the Libyan Amazigh movement and had long been an opponent of the Qaddafi regime, operating from Morocco between the early 1990s and 2008, when the Moroccan authorities, responding to Libyan demands, pressured him to desist from his activities, and the Libyans ceased renewing his citizenship papers. He then was able to acquire the status of “political refugee” in Holland. Until the fall of Tripoli, he was affiliated with the NTC; see “Un an de révolte arabe: Fathi Ben Khalifa, ou le ‘douloureux bonheur’ d'un Berbère revenu en Libye,” la-croix.com, February 10, 2012, http://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/S-informer/Monde/Fathi-Ben-Khalifa-ou-le-douloureux-bonheur-d-un-Berbere-revenu-en-Libye-_NG_-2011-12-21-749468; Le Monde Amazigh/al-‘Alam al-Amazighi/Amadal Amazighi 131 (May 2011): 8.

⁴¹“Libya: murderous attacks against the inhabitants of Zwara,” statement by the CMA Board, Paris, March 26–April 7, 2012, http://www.libyaimal.net/spip.php?article200. The Toubous community was represented at the CMA conference in Djerba in September–October 2011, marking an expanded definition of Amazigh identity.

⁴²Interview with Fathi Ben Khalifa, “Libya's Berbers Feel Rejected By Transitional Government,” November 10, 2011, http://forums.marokko.nl/archive/index.php/t-4064722.html.

⁴³“Le congrés Mondial Amazigh appel le Général Touareg Ali Kenna Commandant de la Région militaire sud Libye a rejoindre la rebilion Libyenne,” August 5, 2011, http://www.amazighworld.org/human_rights/cma_reports/index_show.php?Id=2498.

⁴⁴“Tuarags claim ‘independence’ from Mali,” Al-Jazeera, April 6, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124644412359539.html.

⁴⁵A booklet of aerial photos and accompanying text detailing the country's Berber heritage, published in Tunis with the seal of “Folios of the National History,” cites without comment the World Amazigh Congress's statement that Amazigh speakers constitute 5 to 10 percent of the total population. This number appears far too high. See Numidian-Berber: Tunisia from the Sky (Tunis: Alif-Les Éditions de la Méditerranée, 2009), 35.

⁴⁶See the special section, “Can the Jasmine Revolution Reach the Remaining States of Tamazgha,” including the articles by long-time Moroccan Amazigh movement activists Ahmed Dghrini and Hassn Idbelkassam, in Le Monde Amazigh/al-‘Alam al-Amazighi/Amadal Amazighi 128 (February 2011): 4–8.

⁴⁷For its declared objectives, see Sabra Mansar, “Naissance de l'Association tunisienne de culture Amazigh” [“Birth of the Tunisian Association of Amazigh Culture”], Tunisie Numerique, July 30, 2011, http://www.tunisienumerique.com/naissance-de-lassociation-tunisienne-de-culture-amazigh/62052.

⁴⁸Ali Chibani, “Les populations amazighes croient en leur Printemps” [“Amazigh populations believe in their Spring”], Le Monde Diplomatique, July 28, 2011, http://blog.mondediplo.net/2011-07-28-Les-populations-amazighes-croient-en-leur.

⁴⁹Houda Trabelsi, “Maghreb film festival celebrates Amazigh culture,” Magharebia, September 12, 2011, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2011/09/12/feature-03.

⁵⁰According to Ines Fezzani, the administrator of a Facebook page called “Reviving Amazigh Identity”; see also Chibani, “Les populations amazighes.” On April 21, 2012, the Facebook page organized a demonstration calling for the recognition of Amazigh linguistic rights in front of the Tunisian Ministry of Culture's offices.

⁵¹Congres Mondial Amazigh, “Tunisie: perspectives inquiétantes” [“Tunisia: Worrying outlooks”], October 27, 2011, http://www.amazighworld.org/human_rights/cma_reports/index_show.php?Id=2672.

⁵²“Et tamazight?” [“And Tamazight?”], El Watan (Algeria), June 20, 2011; also cited in Chibani, “Les populations amazighes.”

⁵³Yidir Plantade, “La neige paralyse depuis plusieurs jours la kabylie” [Snow Paralyzed Kabylie For Several Days], http://www.lematindz.net/news/7355-la-neige-paralyse-depuis-plusieurs-jours-la-kabylie.html.

⁵⁴David Crawford, “How ‘Berber’ Matters in the Middle of Nowhere,” Middle East Report 219 (Summer 2001): 20–25.

⁵⁵I. William Zartman, “Introduction: Rewriting the Future in the Maghrib,” in Economic Crisis and Political Change in North Africa, ed. Azzedine Layachi (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1998), 1–5.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN is principal research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies of Tel Aviv University and author of The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States (University of Texas Press, 2011).