The Role of Regional Multi-Actor Mediators: The Case of IGAD in the Ethiopia-Tigray Conflict

ABSTRACT

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional organization with institutional experience in active conflict mediation, accumulated over many years. The emerging conflict in Ethiopia’s northern region of Tigray – and specifically the fact that the conflict involved Ethiopia, considered to be one of the most significant powers in East Africa and a prominent member of IGAD – posed new challenges to the organization’s mediation efforts. As such, it is important to ask what the role of regional mediation is, or how effective can such mediation be when a significant regional power is involved in an intrastate conflict with major potential regional implications. This article addresses this question considering the conflict that has engulfed Ethiopia’s northern region of Tigray since November 2020 and argues that IGAD’s late response and hesitant stand on its role as mediator in this conflict, which was related to Ethiopia’s status in the organization and the region, was a lesson that IGAD should learn regarding its involvement in current and future conflicts. Furthermore, the specific timing of the Ethiopia-Tigray crisis, which coincided with an acute climate crisis in the region, underscores the fact that IGAD must move beyond a mediation role and propose more viable ways of coping with the devastating interwoven consequences of human-made conflicts and climate hazards, especially in view of IGAD member states’ common vulnerabilities based on its experience in conflict mediation, both in relation to the Ethiopia-Tigray conflict and in other conflicts.

KEYWORDS:

• Conflict mediation
• East Africa
• environmental crisis
• Ethiopia
• IGAD
• Tigray

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Sally Healy, “Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD’S Contribution to Regional Security,” Royal Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper no. 59 (Nov. 2009), 11–12.

² Aly Verjee, “Political Transitions in Sudan and Ethiopia: An Early Comparative Analysis,” Global Change, Peace & Security 33, no. 3 (2021): 281.

³ Eritrea’s participation in the organization was not consecutive, and it recently rejoined IGAD following 16 years of absence. See: “Eritrea rejoins east africa trade and security bloc IGAD after 16 years,” Africa News, June 14, 2023, https://www.africanews.com/2023/06/13/eritrea-rejoins-east-africa-trade-and-security-bloc-igad-after-16-years/.

⁴ Getachew Zeru Gebrekidan and Messay Asgedom Gobena, “Rethinking IGAD’s Role in Addressing Emerging Regional Security Threats,” The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding (Sept. 2021), 2.

⁵ Korwa G. Adar, “Conflict Resolution in a Turbulent Region: The Case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Sudan,” African Journal of Conflict Resolution 1, no. 2 (2000): 46–7.

⁶ For a detailed description of the roots and development of Sudan civil war, see: Øystein H. Rolandsen and M. W. Daly, A History of South Sudan: From Slavery to Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

⁷ Lionel Cliffe, “Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa,” Third World Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1999): 89–111.

⁸ Steven Wöndu and Ann Lesch, Battle for Peace in Sudan: An Analysis of the Abuja Conferences 1992–93 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000).

⁹ For a comprehensive discussion on IGAD part on Sudan peace process, see: Irit Back, From Sudan to South Sudan (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 43–78; and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Meddlers or Mediators? African Interveners in Civil Conflicts in Eastern Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

¹⁰ Øystein H. Rolandsen, “Another Civil War in South Sudan: The Failure of Guerrilla Government?” Journal of Eastern African Studies 9, no. 1(2015): 163–74.

¹¹ International Crisis Group, “South Sudan: Keeping Faith with the IGAD Peace Process,” Africa Report, no. 28 (July 27, 2015).

¹² See, for example: Wayne Jordash and Uzay Yasar, “Prosecution of Starvation in South Sudan,” in Accountability for Mass Starvation: Testing the Limits of the Law, eds. Conley et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 260–96.

¹³ Samwel Odhiambo Oando and Shirley Gabriella Achieng, “Peacemaking in Africa and Nobel Peace Prize 2019: The Role of Ahmed Abiy Ali in Resolving the Ethiopia – Eritrea Cross-Border Conflict,” The African Review 48, no. 1 (2021): 22–51.

¹⁴ Bekalu Atnafu Taye, “Ethnic Federalism and Conflict in Ethiopia,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 17, no. 2 (2017): 41–66. For a detailed timetable of the ethnic conflicts since 1991, see pp. 63–65.

¹⁵ The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) comprised four elements: the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and the South Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (SEPDF).

¹⁶ “Ethiopia: Crisis in Tigray,” Africa Research Bulletin 57, no. 11 (Nov. 2020): 22932.

¹⁷ Abdisa Olkeba Jima, “Ethiopian Political Crisis after Reform: Causes of Tigray Conflict,” Cogent Social Sciences 9, no. 1 (2023): 2.

¹⁸ For a detailed description of the evolution of the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, see: International Crisis Group, “Steering Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis Away from Conflict,” Africa Briefing, no. 162 (Oct. 2020), https://www.africaportal.org/publications/steering-ethiopias-tigray-crisis-away-conflict/.

¹⁹ “Ethiopia: Never‐Ending Tigray Conflict,” Africa Research Bulletin 58, no. 4 (2021): 23128C.

²⁰ Cara Anna, “Ethiopian Army Official Confirms Eritrean Troops in Tigray,” Associated Press News, Jan. 7, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/eritrea-abiy-ahmed-ethiopia-united-nations-kenya-9d12e2af8c22926dd6b6b0c2d67473bf.

²¹ International Crisis Group, “Ethiopia’s Tigray War: A Deadly, Dangerous Stalemate,” April 2, 2021, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b171-ethiopia-tigray-war_0.pdf.

²² Simon Marks and Mohammed Ahmed, “Ethiopia Denies Somalia Forces Involved in Fighting in Tigray,” Bloomberg, Jan. 21, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-21/ethiopia-denies-somalia-forces-involved-in-fighting-in-tigray.

²³ Getachew Zeru Gebrekidan and Messay Asgedom Gobena, “Rethinking IGAD’s Role in Addressing Emerging Regional Security Threats,” The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding (Sept. 2021): 1–8.

²⁴ Seetashma Thapa, “Horn of Africa World Food Programme: Extreme Drought Deepens Hunger in a Region Beset by Conflict,” World Food Programme, Nov. 17, 2022, https://www.wfp.org/stories/horn-africa-extreme-drought-deepens-hunger-region-beset-conflict.

²⁵ See, for example: OCHA, “Ethiopia- Tigray Region Humanitarian Update,” Situation Report, March 13, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-tigray-region-humanitarian-update-situation-report-13-march-2021.

²⁶ “AU Appoints 3 Envoys to Help Resolve Ethiopian Conflict,” voanews, Nov. 21, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_au-appoints-3-envoys-help-resolve-ethiopian-conflict/6198659.html. See also: Martin Plaut and Sarah Vaughan, Understanding Ethiopia’s Tigray War (London: Hurst, 2023). This book also includes a detailed and updated analysis of the reasons for the eruption of the conflict, its development and consequences.

²⁷ OCHA, “Humanitarian Update,” 3.

²⁸ IGAD, “IGAD is Concerned by Recent Development in Ethiopia,” Press Release, Nov. 7, 2020.

²⁹ Lavie Mutanganshuro, “East Africa: IGAD to Hold a Summit Over Tigray Crisis,” AllAfrica, Dec. 14, 2020, https://allafrica.com/stories/202012140859.html.

³⁰ IGAD, “Statement of the IGAD Executive Secretary on the Situation in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,” Nov. 4, 2021. See also: Mary Wambui, “IGAD Joins Regional Blocs Calling for Immediate Ceasefire in Ethiopia,” The East African, Nov. 4, 2021, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/rest-of-africa/igad-call-for-immediate-ceasefire-in-ethiopia-3608136.

³¹ Tamrat G. Gebremariam, “IGAD, African Union Collateral Damages for Tigray War,” Nation, May 7, 2021, https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/igad-african-union-collateral-damages-for-tigray-war-3392126.

³² Gebremariam, “Humanitarian Truce in Tigray,” March 16, 2022.

³³ https://www.garoweonline.com/en/world/africa/igad-un-welcome-ethiopia-s-humanitarian-truce-in-tigray.

³⁴ IGAD, “Signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement – Ethiopia,” https://igad.int/signing-of-the-cessation-of-hostilities-agreement-ethiopia/. For the full version of the Pretoria Agreement, see: https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Download-the-signed-agreement-here.pdf.

³⁵ “Tigray Rebels Start Handing Over Weapons to Ethiopian Army,” The Guardian, Jan. 11, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/11/tigray-rebels-start-handing-over-weapons-to-ethiopian-army.

³⁶ The capital of Ethiopia’s Tigray region, Mekelle, was reconnected to the national power grid following the signing of a ceasefire deal. The city had been cut off from electricity for more than a year, and most areas outside the city are still cut off from the world. See: “Capital of Ethiopia’s Tigray Region Reconnected to Electric Grid,” RFI, Dec. 8, 2022, https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20221208-capital-of-ethiopia-s-tigray-region-reconnected-to-electric-grid.

³⁷ It is important to note that Eritrea, which is currently not an active member in IGAD, was not a party to the Pretoria Agreement. See: “Eritrean Soldiers Leaving Parts of Ethiopia’s Tigray – Witnesses,” Aljazeera, Dec. 30, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/30/eritrean-soldiers-leaving-major-towns-in-northern-ethiopia-witnesses.

³⁸ “Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty? Exploring the Pretoria Peace Agreement’s Achievements, Failures,” Addis Standard, Nov. 15, 2023, https://addisstandard.com/glass-half-full-or-half-empty-exploring-the-pretoria-peace-agreements-achievements-failures/.

³⁹ “Ethiopia Talks with Oromo Rebel Group End Without Deal for a Third Time,” Al Jazeera, Nov. 22, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/22/ethiopia-talks-with-rebel-group-ola-end-without-deal.

⁴⁰ “Editorial: Ethiopia’s Multiple Internal Crises Need Undivided Attention Now More Than Ever; Ignoring Them Will Be at The Peril Of The Country,” Addis Standard, Feb. 2, 2024, https://addisstandard.com/editorial-ethiopias-multiple-internal-crises-need-undivided-attention-now-more-than-ever-ignoring-them-will-be-at-the-peril-of-the-country/.

⁴¹ Mehari T. Maru, “Migration Priorities and Normative and Institutional Framework in the, IGAD Region,” Horn of Africa Bulletin, Aug. 28, 2015, http://life-peace.org/hab/migration-priorities-and-normative-and-institutional-frameworks-in-the-igad-region.

⁴² Back, From Sudan to South Sudan, 121.

⁴³ One example of IGAD’s efforts to intervene in this context was Sudan PM Hamdok’s trip to Addis Ababa amid a growing refugee crisis that saw some 50,000 Ethiopians fleeing from the northern Tigray region into neighboring Sudan. See: “In Addis Ababa, Sudan PM Announces IGAD Summit on Tigray Crisis,” Aljazeera, Dec. 13, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/13/sudans-pm-visits-ethiopia-as-tigray-refugees-surpass-50000.

⁴⁴ “Ethiopia’s Tigray Refugees Crisis Explained” UNHCR, July 22, 2022, https://www.unrefugees.org/news/ethiopias-tigray-refugee-crisis-explained/#Where%20are%20Ethiopian%20refugees%20crossing%20the%20border.

⁴⁵ “Extreme Drought Deepens Hunger in Horn of Africa, WFP,” XINUA, Nov. 18, 2022, https://english.news.cn/20221118/cfe72674326749bc99533a5e819f9686/c.html; and Thapa, “Horn of Africa World Food Programme.”

⁴⁶ “IGAD Regional Strategy 2021–2025: The Framework,” OCHA Services, reliefweb, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/igad-regional-strategy-2021–2025-framework?gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQiA6vaqBhCbARIsACF9M6l9Sv9BzJIz1YLRd4wLkn8QTk_9Ni26aC77wIUXMnWO6DsjKUjDJWYaArvsEALw_wcB.

⁴⁷ Jok M. Wild Hannah and Ronak Pate, “The Militarization of Cattle Raiding in South Sudan: How a Traditional Practice Became a Tool for Political Violence,” International Journal of Humanitarian Action 3, no. 2 (2018): 1–11.

⁴⁸ See, for example, the Five Phase Plan: “IGAD Countries Lose More Than US$9 billion in Cattle Rustling,” The Independent (Uganda), Oct. 8, 2019, https://www.independent.co.ug/igad-countries-lose-more-than-us9-billion-in-cattle-rustling/; Ameha Sebsibe and Wamalwa Kinyanjui, “Livestock Development at IGAD in a Nutshell,” IGAD, https://igad.int/livestock-development-at-igad-in-a-nutshell.

⁴⁹ For a detailed report of the war’s impact on the woody vegetation recovery program, see: “Report: The War in Tigray is Undermining its Environmental Recovery,” Conflict and Environment Observatory, April 2022, https://ceobs.org/the-war-in-tigray-is-undermining-its-environmental-recovery.

Alex de Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015).

⁵¹ Francesco Giumelli and Annette Weber, “UN Sanctions as Leverage in Mediation Processes?” Global Governance 28, no. 2 (2022): 251–73.

⁵² Melha Rout Biel and Donnas Ojok, IGAD, Political Settlements and Peace Building in South Sudan: Lessons from the 2018 Peace Negotiation Processes (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2018), 2.

⁵³ Getachew Zeru Gebrekidan and Messay Asgedom Gobena, “Rethinking IGAD’s Role in Addressing Emerging Regional Security Threats,” The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding, Wilson Center, Sept. 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/rethinking-igad-role.

⁵⁴ Adekeye Adebajo and Christopher Landsberg, “South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons” in From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges, eds. Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2003), 171–204.

⁵⁵ Tom Collins, “Horn Diplomacy Breaks Down as IGAD Loses Relevance,” African Business, March 10, 2021, https://african.business/2021/03/technology-information/horn-diplomacy-breaks-down-as-igad-loses-relevance.

⁵⁶ “Eritrea Troops Still on Ethiopian Soil: US,” VOA News, Jan. 28, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/eritrea-troops-still-on-ethiopian-soil-us/6938071.html.

⁵⁷ Abel Abate Demissie, “Navigating the regionalization of Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict. How regional and international actors can help consolidate peace,” Chatham House, Sept. 8, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/09/navigating-regionalization-ethiopias-tigray-conflict/06-navigating-regional-context-what.

⁵⁸ The conflict in Sudan erupted in April 2023 from a power struggle Sudan between the Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which led to an enormous humanitarian crisis. According to OCHA, about 25 million people need humanitarian assistance and support, and more than 7.4 million people – about 15 per cent of the total population of the country – have fled their homes since the conflict started. See: “Sudan Situation Report,” OCHA, Feb. 8, 2024, https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan/.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Irit Back

Irit Back is Head of the Inter-University program of African studies at Tel Aviv University, a senior lecturer in the Department of Middle East and African Studies and a researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Her research interests are contemporary Islam, conflicts resolution and regional organizations, mostly at the Horn of Africa and West Africa. She published extensively at various academic journals and other forums on these themes. Her recent book From Sudan to South Sudan: IGAD and the Role of Regional Mediation in Africa was published by Brill in 2020.