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Abstract
Recent scholarship posits that the resource curse has gendered as well as economic effects on oil-rich economies, like those in the Middle East and North Africa, entrenching paternalistic relationships that disadvantage women’s entry into the labor force. Upon closer examination, however, it appears that oil may not be the most compelling argument to explain Arab women’s low presence in the workforce –– especially since women’s labor-force participation within the oil rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is generally higher than the regional average. We contend that this is, in part, a byproduct of the countries’ labor nationalization policies. Our analysis suggests that oil-driven development can in fact boost female labor force participation, revealing that rentierism as experienced in the GCC can actually have positive externalities for women.
Notes
1 The resource curse thesis was popular from the 1970s –– an era of widespread oil nationalization –– to the 1990s. However, newer work from scholars such as Jones Luong and Weinthal, Oil is not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States (2010) and Schake, “The Myth of the Resource Curse” (2012) calls into question the negative effects posited by the original thesis, instead citing such factors as weak institutions and governance as the culprits in lagging economic growth.
2 Ross, “Oil, Islam, and Women”, American Political Science Review 102.1 (2008), pp. 107–23; Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (2012).
3 Liou and Musgrave, “Oil, Autocratic Survival, and the Gendered Resource Curse: When Inefficient Policy is Politically Expedient”, International Studies Quarterly 60.3 (2016), pp. 440–56.
4 For example, one policy that they mention is mandating the head covering, yet only two countries in the Middle East formally require women to adhere to certain dress codes: Iran and Saudi Arabia. These dress codes do not directly impede women from joining the workforce and may well increase their access to public space. Finally, the authors ignore policies that have been enacted across the Middle East, including in both Saudi Arabia and Iran, to increase women’s labor force participation.
5 Shalaby, “The Paradox of Female Economic Participation in the Middle East and North Africa”, Baker Institute Issue Brief, 3 July 2014.
6 See: Willen et al., “Power Women in Arabia: Shaping the Path for Regional Gender Equality” (2016), p. 2.
7 Buttorff, Welborne, and Al Lawati, “Measuring Female Labor Force Participation in the GCC”, Baker Institute Issue Brief no. 18, Jan. 2018.
8 Willen et al., “Power Women in Arabia: Shaping the Path for Regional Gender Equality”.
9 Willoughby, “A Quiet Revolution in the Making? The Replacement of Expatriate Labor through the Feminization of the Labor Force in the GCC Countries”, working paper no. 2004-18, American University (2004); Rutledge et al., “Women, Labour Market Nationalization Policies and Human Resource Development in the Arab Gulf States”, Human Resource Development 14.2 (2011), pp. 183–98; Hertog, “A Comparative Assessment of Labor Market Nationalization Policies in the GCC”, National Employment, Migration and Education in the GCC, ed. Hertog (Citation2012), pp. 100–2.
10 Randeree, “Workforce Nationalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council States”, CIRS Occasional Paper no. 9 (2012), p. 1.
11 Hertog notes that, “Saudi Arabia was probably the first Gulf country to experiment with national employment rules” [Hertog, “Arab Gulf States: An Assessment of Nationalisation Policies”, research paper no. 2014/1, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (2014), p. 14].
12 Fasano and Goyal, “Emerging Strains in GCC Labor Markets”, IMF working paper no. 4/71, (2004), p. 16.
13 Forstenlechner and Rutledge, “Unemployment in the Gulf: Time to Update the ‘Social Contract’”, Middle East Policy 17.2 (2010), p. 40; Hertog, “Arab Gulf States”, p. 7; Forstenlechner and Rutledge discuss first-generation policies adopted in the1990s during a period of low oil prices and second-generation ones. Hertog distinguishes between first and second-generation nationalization policies according to the content of policies: prescriptive, like quotas on national employment, vs. market incentives, like reducing the wage gap (p. 4).
14 Ruppert, “Managing Foreign Labor in Singapore and Malaysia: Are there Lessons for GCC Countries?”, World Bank Publication vol. 2053 (1999).
15 According to Hertog, “all GCC labour markets share two fundamental outcomes: (i) private labour markets dominated by foreigners and (ii) the outsized role of government in the employment of nationals” [Hertog, “Arab Gulf States”, p. 4].
16 Randeree, “Workforce Nationalization”, p. 3.
17 Hertog, “Arab Gulf States”, p. 5; Randeree, “Workforce Nationalization”.
18 Randeree, “Workforce Nationalization”, p. 2; Anon., “Gulf Arab States may See Unemployment Rise, Labour Reforms Needed-IMF”, Reuters, 20 Nov. 2013.
19 Kerr, “Saudi Arabia Cuts Public Sector Bonuses in Oil Slump Fall Out”, The Financial Times, 27 Sept. 2016; Anon., “Sack All Foreigners by 2020, Says Saudi Government”, The New Arab, 10 May 2017; Anon., “Nine Top Officials Sacked after Dubai Ruler’s Spot Check Reveals Empty Desks”, The Telegraph, 30 Aug. 2016.
20 Willoughby, “A Quiet Revolution in the Making?”, p. 10.
21 The Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population (GLMM) Programme estimated that non-citizens comprised the majority of the population in Bahrain (54.87%, 2017), Kuwait (69.15%, 2015), Qatar (88.04%, 2015) and the UAE (88.68%, 2014) with only Oman (45%, 2016) and Saudi Arabia (36.83%, 2016) having non-nationals as a minority.
22 Willoughby, “A Quiet Revolution in the Making?”, p. 11.
23 Ibid., p. 30.
24 Willen et al., “Power Women in Arabia”; Felder and Vuollo, “Qatari Women in the Workforce”, RAND working paper no. WR-612-Qatar (2008); Randeree, “Workforce Nationalization”.
25 Fasano and Goyal, “Emerging Strains in GCC Labor Markets”, p. 4.
26 Hertog, “A Comparative Assessment”, p. 6. It seems Oman and Bahrain have also made the greatest strides in labor nationalization policy due to their inability to dole out as much in oil rents and subsidies as their neighbors, who have smaller citizen populations and/or more substantial oil wealth, necessitating and incentivizing other ways to co-opt the citizenry.
27 Ibid.
28 In 2009, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Saudi Arabia each had a higher percentage — on average more than sixty percent — of women enrolled in university than the United States and the United Kingdom, which had lower women’s enrollment (around 50%) at the time. Various explanations have been introduced to account for this educational shift from individual to state level. DeBoer and Kranov see the increase in overall university enrollment rates as a byproduct of the push to educate a broader swathe of the population [DeBoer and Kranov, “Key Factors in the Tertiary Educational Trajectories of Women in Engineering: Trends and Opportunities in Saudi Arabia, the GCC, and Comparative National Settings”, Science and Technology in the Gulf States, ed. Siddiqi and Anadon (2017), p. 56]. Tsujigami, meanwhile, cites the importance of the Saudi ulama in green-lighting women’s education and participation in the workforce in the 1990s [Tsujigami, “Higher Education and Changing Aspirations of Women in Saudi Arabia”, Higher Education Investment in the Arab States of the Gulf: Strategies for Excellence and Diversity, ed. Eickelman and Abu Sharaf (2017), p. 42]. Ridge also offers insight into what may have motivated this trend in women’s educational attainment, noting that women’s education now has symbolic value in broader policy discussions related to human rights and development in the GCC [Ridge, Education and the Reverse Gender Divide in the Gulf States: Embracing the Global, Ignoring the Local (2014)]. Due to sex segregation in schools, Ridge also maintains that teaching is deemed an appropriate career choice for women. Education has opened up women’s access to other jobs and the public sphere more broadly.
29 Herb, The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE (2014), pp. 22–3.
30 Anon., The Global Gender Gap Report (2015).
31 Rutledge et al., “Women, Labour Market Nationalization Policies”; Herb, The Wages of Oil.
32 Rutledge and Al Shamsi, “The Impact of Labor Nationalization Policies on Female Participation Rates in the Arab Gulf”, Women, Work and Welfare in the Middle East: The Role of Socio-demographics, Entrepreneurship and Public Policies, ed. Chamlou and Karshenas (2016), p. 527.
33 Ibid., p. 535.
34 Rutledge et al., “Women, Labour Market Nationalization Policies”, p. 187.
35 Felder and Vuollo, “Qatari Women in the Workforce”, pp. 24–5; Stasz; Eide; and Martorell, Post-Secondary Education in Qatar: Employer Demand, Student Choice, and Options for Policy (2007).
36 Felder and Vuollo, “Qatari Women in the Workforce”, p. 28.
37 Hertog, “A Comparative Assessment of Labor Market Nationalization Policies in the GCC”, p. 33.
38 Felder and Vuollo, “Qatari Women in the Workforce”, p. 15.
39 Willoughby, “A Quiet Revolution in the Making?”, p. 34.
40 Rutledge et al., “Women, Labour Market Nationalization Policies”.
41 Jabeen quoted in Swan, “Emiratisation Brings Greater Equality for UAE Women”, The National, 29 Apr. 2013.
42 Zerovec and Bontenbal, “Labor Nationalization Policies in Oman: Implications for Omani and Migrant Women Workers”, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 20.3–4 (2011), p. 378.
43 Ultimately, this could have far-reaching implications for women who run for office and their ability to garner authentic popular support.
44 Randeree, “Workforce Nationalization”, p. 24.
45 Ibid., 5.
46 Rutledge et al., “Women, Labour Market Nationalization Policies”, p. 192.
47 Ibid., p. 192.
48 This is a surprisingly consistent flaw in much extant analysis of women’s labor trends in the region –– i.e. discounting the distinct demographics of the GCC.
49 Government statistics are not consistently available in similar form for every year for all countries.
50 Fasano and Goyal, “Emerging Strains in GCC Labor Markets”.
51 Hertog, “An Assessment of Nationalisation Policies”, p. 8.
52 Abu Dhabi Govt, “Demographic & Social Indicators”, Abu Dhabi Statistics Centre (2008).
53 Anon., The Global Gender Gap Report (2015).
54 Ibid.; Shalaby, “The Paradox of Female Economic Participation”; World Bank, “Gender and Development in the Middle East and North Africa: Women in the Public Sphere” (2004).
55 Randeree, “Workforce Nationalization”; Forstenlechner and Rutledge, “The GCC’s ‘Demographic Imbalance’: Perceptions, Realities and Policy Options”, Middle East Policy 18.4 (2011), pp. 25–43; al-Majdali, “National Labor Quotas Increased in Private Sector”, Kuwait Times, 8 Aug. 2014.
56 Hertog, “Arab Gulf States”, p. 4. According to Hertog, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia have the highest proportion of nationals employed in the private sector.
57 Hertog, “Arab Gulf States”, p. 1.
58 Oman Govt, “Labour Law” (2012).
59 Anon., “Omanisation Programme and Policy”, Oman Information Center (n.d.).
60 Das and Gokhale, “Omanization Policy and International Migration in Oman”, Middle East Institute, 2 Feb. 2010.
61 Oman Govt, “Oman’s 2016 Statistical Yearbook”, National Centre for Statistics and Information 44 (2016).
62 Oman Govt, “Monthly Statistical Bulletin”, National Centre for Statistics and Information 28 (Feb. 2017).
63 Matherly and Hodgson, “Implementing Employment Quotas to Develop Human Resource Capital: A Comparison of Oman and the UAE”, International Journal of Liberal Arts and Social Science 2.7 (2014), pp. 75–90; Fasano and Goyal, “Emerging Strains in GCC Labor Markets”.
64 Sleiman, “GCC Women Take Charge as Economies Shift”, Al Arabiya English, 17 Apr. 2014.
65 Barnett, Malcolm, and Toledo, “Shooting the Goose that Lays the Golden Egg: The Case of UAE Employment Policy”, Journal of Economic Studies 42.2 (2015), p. 299. According to the authors, “the long-term target appears to be 55%, according to a 2009–2012 Emiratization plan developed by the UAE State Audit Institution” (p. 287). Also see: Matherly and Hodgson, “Implementing Employment Quotas”, p. 77.
66 Ibid.
67 Barnett, Malcolm, and Toledo, “Shooting the Goose”, p. 287.
68 Govt of Dubai, “Percentage Distribution of Employed 15 Years and Over by Nationality, Sex and Economic Activity – Emirate of Dubai” (2012).
69 It is interesting to note that while analyzing the raw data, we found that defense actually has the highest proportion of employed national women in the public sector. One third of the Ministry of Defense’s employees are women [Al-Kuttab, “Defending the Homeland is no more a Male-Dominated Sector in the UAE”, Khaleej Times, 22 Dec. 2017]. While we do not have an explanation for why so many women work in defense, it is certainly worth investigating in future research.
70 Felder and Vuollo, “Qatari Women in the Workforce”, p. 5.
71 Hertog, “Arab Gulf States”, p. 22.
72 Khatari, “Minister: Qataris to Comprise 90 Percent of Public Sector by 2026”, Doha News, 27 Dec. 2015.
73 Felder and Vuollo, “Qatari Women in the Workforce”, pp. 27–8, estimate 2%. The Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics reports less than one percent of Qatari nationals working in the private sector with 0.95%, 0.85%, and 0.77% in 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively [Govt of Qatar, Bulletin: Labor Force Statistics, 2015 (2015)].
74 According to Randeree “the requirements ranged from 6% in the construction sector, to 19% in media, and 49% in the banking sector” [Randeree, “Workforce Nationalization”, p. 13].
75 Anon., “Mobility: Immigration Alert”, Ernst and Young (2016).
76 Anon., “Saudi Arabia Wants More Women in the Workforce by 2020: Ministry of Labor”, Albawaba, 22 Mar. 2017.
77 Govt of Saudi Arabia, “Labor Force” (2017).
78 Ross, The Oil Curse, p. 111.
79 On this issue, see: Barnett; Malcolm; and Toledo, “Shooting the Goose”, p. 290; Rutledge et al., “Women, Labour Market Nationalization Policies”, p. 189–90.
80 Govt of Qatar, Qatar National Development Strategy 2011–2016: Towards Qatar National Vision 2030 (2011), p. 178.
81 Willen et al., “Power Women in Arabia”; Mitchell et al., “In Majaalis al-Hareem: The Complex Professional and Personal Choices of Qatari Women”, DIFI Family Research and Proceedings (2015); Rutledge et al., “Women, Labour Market Nationalization Policies”.
82 Felder and Vuollo, “Qatari Women in the Workforce”.
83 Ibid., p. 15.
84 Willen et al., “Power Women in Arabia”, p. 4.
85 See Iversen and Rosenbluth, “Work and Power: The Connection between Female Labor Force Participation and Female Political Representation”, The Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008), pp. 479–95, for an excellent review of the literature examining the relationship between economic and political empowerment.
86 Willen et al., “Power Women in Arabia”, p. 8.
87 Rutledge et al., “Women, Labour Market Nationalization Policies”.