The economic – and anthropological? – view of supernatural institutions

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Notes

1 While Leeson (2014c) does not focus on variation, the variation of the supernatural institution analyzed there is handy to consider here.

2 With trifling exceptions.

3 More precisely, the cost of the threat it would diminish.

4 Another setting particular: the value of the property rights threatened. The value of monastic property rights was high across medieval European settings, which I therefore assume here. If, however, in some setting the value of those rights were low, so would be malediction's benefit (no matter the setting's secular-governance constraints).

5 Monastic communities lacked means of physical self-protection.

6 Different views of efficiency may be at work here. On the economic view, see Leeson (2020).